The American
Political Science Review

VOL. XLIV DECEMBER, 1950 NO. 4

THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE NATIONAL INTEREST VS. MORAL ABSTRACTIONS

HANS J. MORGENTHAU
University of Chicago

It is often said that the foreign policy of the United States is in need of maturing and that the American people and their government must grow up if they want to emerge victorious from the trials of our age. It would be truer to say that this generation of Americans must shed the illusions of their fathers and grandfathers and relearn the great principles of statecraft which guided the path of the republic in the first decade and—in moralistic disguise—in the first century of its existence. The United States offers the singular spectacle of a commonwealth whose political wisdom did not grow slowly through the accumulation and articulation of experiences. Quite to the contrary, the full flowering of its political wisdom was coeval with its birth as an independent nation—nay, it owed its existence and survival as an independent nation to those extraordinary qualities of political insight, historic perspective, and common sense which the first generation of Americans applied to the affairs of state.

This classic age of American statecraft comes to an end with the physical disappearance of that generation of American statesmen. The rich and varied landscape in which they had planted all that is worthwhile in the tradition of Western political thought was allowed to go to waste. It became a faint and baffling remembrance, a symbol to be worshipped rather than a source of inspiration and a guide for action. Until very recently the American people seemed to be content to live in a political desert whose intellectual barrenness and aridity were relieved only by some sparse and neglected oases of insight and wisdom. What in that period, stretching over more than a century, went under the name of foreign policy was either improvisation in the face of an urgent problem which had to be dealt with somehow, or—and especially in our century—the invocation of some abstract moral principle in the image of which the world was to be made over. Improvisation as a substitute for foreign policy was largely successful, for in the past the margin of American and allied power to spare generally exceeded the degree to which American improvidence fell short of the demands of the hour. The invocation of abstract moral principles was in part hardly more than an innocuous pastime; for embracing everything it came to grips with nothing. In part, however, it was a magnificent instrument for marshalling public opinion in support of war and warlike policies—and for losing the peace to follow. The intoxication with moral abstractions which as a mass phenomenon started with the Spanish-American War, and which in our time has become the prevailing substitute for political thought, is indeed one of the great sources of weakness and failure in American foreign policy.

It is, however, worthy of note that underneath this political dilettantism, nourished by improvidence and a sense of moral mission, there has remained alive an almost instinctive awareness of the perennial interests of the United States. This has especially been true with regard to Europe and the Western Hemisphere; for in these regions the national interest of the United States has from the beginning been obvious and clearly defined.

I

In the Western Hemisphere we have always endeavored to preserve the unique position of the United States as a predominant power without rival. We have not been slow in recognizing that this predominance was not likely to be effectively threatened by any one American nation or combination of them, acting without support from outside the Western Hemisphere. It was, then, imperative for the United States to isolate the Western Hemisphere from the political and military policies of non-American nations. The interference of non-American nations in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere, especially through the acquisition of territory, was the only way in which the predominance of the United States could have been challenged from within the Western Hemisphere itself. The Monroe Doctrine and the policies implementing it express that permanent national interest of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

Since a threat to the national interest of the United States in the Western Hemisphere can come only from outside it, that is, historically from Europe, the United States has always striven to prevent the development of conditions in Europe which would be conducive to a European nation's interference in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere or to a direct attack upon the United States. Such conditions would be most likely to arise if a European nation had gained such predominance that it could afford to look across the sea for conquest without fear of being menaced at the center of its power, that is, in Europe itself. It is for this reason that the United States has consistently—the War of 1812 is the sole major exception—pursued policies aiming at the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. It has opposed whatever European nation—be it Great Britain, France, Germany, or Russia—seemed to be likely to gain that ascendancy over its European competitors which would have jeopardized the hemispheric predominance and eventually the very independence of the United States. Conversely, it has supported whatever European nation seemed to be most likely to restore the balance of power by offering successful resistance to the would-be conqueror. While it is hard to imagine a greater contrast in the way of thinking about matters political than that which separates Alexander Hamilton from Woodrow Wilson, in this concern for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe—for whatever different reasons—they are one. It is by virtue of this concern that the United States has intervened in both World Wars on the side of the initially weaker coalition and that its European policies have so largely paralleled those of Great Britain; for from Henry VIII to this day Great Britain has invariably pursued one single objective in Europe: the maintenance of the balance of power.

With Asia the United States has been vitally concerned only since the turn of the century, and the relation of Asia to the national interest of the United States has never been obvious or clearly defined. In consequence, the Asiatic policies of the United States have never as unequivocally expressed the permanent national interest as have the hemispheric and European ones; nor have they for that reason commanded the bipartisan support which the latter have largely enjoyed. As a further consequence, they have been subjected to moralistic influences in a measure from which the European and hemispheric policies of the United States have been largely immune. Yet beneath the confusions, reversals of policy, and moralistic generalities, which have made up the surface of our Asiatic policy since McKinley, one can detect an underlying consistency which, however vaguely, reflects the permanent interest of the United States in Asia. And this interest is again the maintenance of the balance of power. The principle that expresses it is the "open door" in China. Originally its meaning was purely commercial. However, in the measure in which other nations, especially Japan, threatened to close the door to China not only commercially, but also militarily and politically, the principle of the "open door" was interpreted to cover the territorial integrity and political independence of China not for commercial but political reasons. However unsure of itself the Asiatic policy of the United States has been, it has always assumed that the domination of China by another nation would create so great an accumulation of power as to threaten the security of the United States.

II

Not only with regard to Asia, however, but wherever American foreign policy has operated, political thought has been divorced from political action. Even where our long-range policies reflect faithfully, as they do in the Americas and in Europe, the true interests of the United States, we think about them in terms which have at best but a tenuous connection with the actual character of the policies pursued. We have acted on the international scene, as all nations must, in power-political terms; we have tended to conceive of our actions in non-political, moralistic terms. This aversion to seeing problems of international politics as they are and the inclination to viewing them instead in non-political, moralistic terms can be attributed both to certain misunderstood peculiarities of the American experience in foreign affairs and to the general climate of opinion prevailing in the Western world during the better part of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth centuries. Of these peculiarities of the American experience three stand out: the uniqueness of the American experiment, the actual isolation during the nineteenth century of the United States from the centers of world conflict, and the humanitarian pacificism and anti-imperialism of American ideology.

The uniqueness of the American experiment in foreign policy contains two elements: the negative one of distinctiveness from the traditional power-political quarrels of Europe and the positive one of a continental expansion which created the freest and richest nation on earth without conquest or subjugation of others.

That the severance of constitutional ties with the British crown was meant to signify the initiation of an American foreign policy distinct from what went under the name of foreign policy in Europe was a conviction common to the founders of the republic. As Washington's Farewell Address put it: "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities." In 1796, European politics and power politics were identical; there was no other power politics but the one engaged in by the princes of Europe. "The toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice" were the only manifestations, on the international scene, of the struggle for power before the American eye. The retreat from European politics, as proclaimed by Washington, could, therefore, be taken to mean retreat from power politics as such.

The expansion of the United States up to the Spanish-American War seemed to provide conclusive proof both for the distinctiveness and moral superiority of American foreign policy. The settlement of the better part of a continent by the thirteen original states seemed to be an act of civilization rather than of conquest and as such essentially different from, and morally superior to, the imperialistic ventures, wars of conquest, and colonial acquisitions with which the history of other nations is replete. Yet it was not so much political virtue as the contiguity of the sparsely settled object of conquest with the original territory of departure, which put the mark of uniqueness upon American expansion. As was the case with Russia's simultaneous eastward expansion toward the Pacific, the United States, in order to expand, did not need to cross the oceans and fight wars of conquest in strange lands, as did the other great colonizing nations. Furthermore, the utter political, military, and numerical inferiority of the Indian opponent tended to obscure the element of power, which was less obtrusive in, but no more absent from, the continental expansion of the United States than the expansionist movements of other nations. Thus it came about that what was in actuality the fortuitous concatenation of two potent historic accidents could take on, in the popular imagination, the aspects of an ineluctable natural development, a "manifest destiny," thus confirming the uniqueness of American foreign policy in its freedom from those power-political blemishes which degrade the foreign policies of other nations.

Yet American isolation from the European tradition of power politics was more than a political program or a moralistic illusion. As concerns involvement in the political conflicts of which Europe was the center, and the commitments and risks which such involvement of necessity implies, American isolation was an established political fact until the end of the nineteenth century. The actuality of this fact was a result of deliberate choice as well as of the objective conditions of geography. Popular writers might see in the uniqueness of America's geographic position the hand of God which had unalterably prescribed the course of American expansion as well as isolation. But more responsible observers, from Washington on, have been careful to emphasize the conjunction of geographic conditions and of a foreign policy which chooses its ends in the light of geography and which uses geographic conditions to attain those ends. Washington referred to "our detached and distant situation" and asked, "Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?"

From the shores of the North American continent, the citizens of the new world watched the strange spectacle of the struggle for power unfolding on the distant scenes of Europe, Africa, and Asia. Since for the better part of the nineteenth century their foreign policy enabled them to retain the role of spectators, what was actually the result of a passing historic constellation appeared to Americans as a permanent condition, self-chosen as well as naturally ordained. At worst they would continue to watch the game of power politics played by others. At best the time was close at hand when, with democracy established everywhere, the final curtain would fall and the game of power politics would no longer be played.

To aid in the achievement of this goal was conceived to be part of America's mission. Throughout the nation's history, the national destiny of the United States has been understood in anti-militaristic, libertarian terms. Where that national mission finds a nonaggressive, abstentionist formulation, as in the political philosophy of John C. Calhoun, it is conceived as the promotion of domestic liberty. Thus we may "do more to extend liberty by our example over this continent and the world generally, than would be done by a thousand victories." When the United States, in the wake of the Spanish-American War, seemed to desert this anti-imperialist and democratic ideal, William Graham Sumner restated its essence: "Expansion and imperialism are a grand onslaught on democracy . . . expansion and imperialism are at war with the best traditions, principles, and interests of the American people." Comparing the tendencies of European power politics with the ideals of the American tradition, Sumner thought with Washington that they were incompatible. Yet, as a prophet of things to come, he saw that with the conclusion of the Spanish-American War America was irrevocably committed to the same course which was engulfing Europe in revolution and war.

To understand the American mission in such selfless, humanitarian terms was the easier as the United States—in contrast to the other great powers—was generally not interested, at least outside the Western Hemisphere, in a particular advantage to be defined in terms of power or of territorial gain. Its national interest was exhausted by the preservation of its predominance in the Western Hemisphere and of the balance of power in Europe and Asia. And even this interest in general stability rather than special advantage was, as we know, not always recognized for what it was.

Yet while the foreign policy of the United States was forced, by circumstance if not by choice, to employ the methods, to shoulder the commitments, to seek the objectives, and to run the risks, from which it had thought to be permanently exempt, American political thought continued to uphold that exemption at least as an ideal—an ideal which was but temporarily beyond the reach of the American people, because of the wickedness and stupidity either of American or, preferably, of foreign statesmen. In one sense, this ideal of a free, peaceful, and prosperous world, from which popular government had banished power politics forever, was a natural outgrowth of the American experience. In another sense, this ideal expressed in a particularly eloquent and consistent fashion the general philosophy which during the better part of the nineteenth century dominated the Western world. This philosophy contains two basic propositions: that the struggle for power on the international scene is a mere accident of history, naturally associated with non-democratic government and, hence, destined to disappear with the triumph of democracy throughout the world; and that, in consequence, conflicts between democratic and non-democratic nations must be conceived not as struggles for mutual advantage in terms of power but primarily as a contest between good and evil, which can only end with the complete triumph of good and with evil being wiped off the face of the earth.

The nineteenth century developed this philosophy of international relations from its experience of domestic politics. The distinctive characteristic of this experience was the domination of the middle classes by the aristocracy. By identifying this domination with political domination of any kind, the political philosophy of the nineteenth century came to identify the opposition to aristocratic politics with hostility to any kind of politics. After the defeat of aristocratic government, the middle classes developed a system of indirect domination. They replaced the traditional division into the governing and governed classes and the military method of open violence, characteristic of aristocratic rule, with the invisible chains of economic dependence. This economic system operated through a network of seemingly equalitarian legal rules which concealed the very existence of power relations. The nineteenth century was unable to see the political nature of these legalized relations. They seemed to be essentially different from what had gone, so far, under the name of politics. Therefore, politics in its aristocratic, that is, open and violent form, was identified with politics as such. The struggle, then, for political power—in domestic as well as in international affairs—appeared to be only an historic accident, coincident with autocratic government and bound to disappear with the disappearance of autocratic government.

It is easy to see how this general climate of opinion, prevailing in the Western world, nourished similar tendencies in the American mind, grown from the specific experiences of American history. Thus it is not an accident that nowhere in the Western world was there such depth of conviction and tenacity in support of the belief that involvement in power politics is not inevitable but only a historic accident, and that nations have a choice between power politics and another kind of foreign policy conforming to moral principles and not tainted by the desire for power. Nor is it by accident that this philosophy of foreign policy found its most dedicated and eloquent spokesman in an American President, Woodrow Wilson.

III

The illusion that a nation can escape, if it only wants to, from power politics into a realm where action is guided by moral principles rather than by considerations of power, not only is deeply rooted in the American mind; it also took more than a century for this illusion to crowd out the older notion that international politics is an unending struggle for power in which the interests of individual nations must necessarily be defined in terms of power. Out of the struggle between these two opposing conceptions three types of American statesmen emerge: the realist, thinking in terms of power and represented by Alexander Hamilton; the ideological, acting in terms of power, thinking in terms of moral principles, and represented by Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams; the moralist, thinking and acting in terms of moral principles and represented by Woodrow Wilson. To these three types, three periods of American foreign policy roughly correspond: the first covering the first decade of the history of the United States as an independent nation, the second covering the nineteenth century to the Spanish-American War, the third covering the half century after that war. That this division of the history of American foreign policy refers only to prevailing tendencies and does by no means preclude the operation side by side of different tendencies in the same period, will become obvious in the discussion.

It illustrates both the depth of the moralist illusion and the original strength of the opposition to it that the issue between these two opposing conceptions of foreign policy was joined at the very beginning of the history of the United States, decided in favor of the realist position, and formulated with unsurpassed simplicity and penetration by Alexander Hamilton. The memorable occasion was Washington's proclamation of neutrality in the War of the First Coalition against revolutionary France.

In 1792, the War of the First Coalition had ranged Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands against revolutionary France, which was tied to the United States by a treaty of alliance. On April 22, 1793, Washington issued a proclamation of neutrality, and it was in defense of that proclamation that Hamilton wrote the "Pacificus" and "Americanus" articles. Among the arguments directed against the proclamation were three derived from moral principles. Faithfulness to treaty obligations, gratitude toward a country which had lent its assistance to the colonies in their struggle for independence, and the affinity of republican institutions were cited to prove that the United States must side with France. Against these moral principles, Hamilton invoked the national interest of the United States:

> There would be no proportion between the mischiefs and perils to which the United States would expose themselves, by embarking in the war, and the benefit which the nature of their stipulation aims at securing to France, or that which it would be in their power actually to render her by becoming a party.
>
> This disproportion would be a valid reason for not executing the guaranty. All contracts are to receive a reasonable construction. Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation; and though in the performance of stipulations relating to war, good faith requires that its ordinary hazards should be fairly met, because they are directly contemplated by such stipulations, yet it does not require that extraordinary and extreme hazards should be run. . . .
>
> The basis of gratitude is a benefit received or intended, which there was no right to claim, originating in a regard to the interest or advantage of the party on whom the benefit is, or is meant to be, conferred. If a service is rendered from views relative to the immediate interest of the party who performs it, and is productive of reciprocal advantages, there seems scarcely, in such a case, to be an adequate basis for a sentiment like that of gratitude. . . . It may be affirmed as a general principle, that the predominant motive of good offices from one nation to another, is the interest or advantage of the nation which performs them.
>
> Indeed, the rule of morality in this respect is not precisely the same between nations as between individuals. The duty of making its own welfare the guide of its actions, is much stronger upon the former than upon the latter; in proportion to the greater magnitude and importance of national compared with individual happiness, and to the greater permanency of the effects of national than of individual conduct. Existing millions, and for the most part future generations, are concerned in the present measures of a government; while the consequences of the private actions of an individual ordinarily terminate with himself, or are circumscribed within a narrow compass.
>
> Whence it follows that an individual may, on numerous occasions, meritoriously indulge the emotions of generosity and benevolence, not only without an eye to, but even at the expense of, his own interest. But a government can rarely, if at all, be justifiable in pursuing a similar course; and, if it does so, ought to confine itself within much stricter bounds. . . . Good offices which

are indifferent to the interest of a nation performing them, or which are compensated by the existence or expectation of some reasonable equivalent, or which produce an essential good to the nation to which they are rendered, without real detriment to the affairs of the benefactors, prescribe perhaps the limits of national generosity or benevolence. . . .

But we are sometimes told, by way of answer, that the cause of France is the cause of liberty; and that we are bound to assist the nation on the score of their being engaged in the defence of that cause. . . .

The obligation to assist the cause of liberty must be deduced from the merits of that cause and from the interest we have in its support.

. . . .

An examination into the question how far *regard to the cause of Liberty* ought to induce the United States to take part with France in the present war, is rendered necessary by the efforts which are making [*sic*] to establish an opinion that it ought to have that effect. In order to a right judgment on the point, it is requisite to consider the question under two aspects.

I. Whether the cause of France be truly the cause of Liberty, pursued with justice and humanity, and in a manner likely to crown it with honorable success.

II. Whether the degree of service we could render, by participating in the conflict, was likely to compensate, by its utility to the cause, the evils which would probably flow from it to ourselves.

If either of these questions can be answered in the negative, it will result, that the consideration which has been stated ought not to embark us in the war. . . .

The certain evils of our joining France in the war, are sufficient dissuasives from so intemperate a measure. The possible ones are of a nature to call for all our caution, all our prudence.

To defend its own rights, to vindicate its own honor, there are occasions when a nation ought to hazard even its existence. Should such an occasion occur, I trust those who are most averse to commit the peace of the country, will not be the last to face the danger, nor the first to turn their backs upon it.

But let us at least have the consolation of not having rashly courted misfortune. Let us have to act under the animating reflection of being engaged in repelling wrongs, which we neither sought nor merited; in vindicating our rights invaded without provocation; in defending our honor, violated without cause. Let us not have to reproach ourselves with having voluntarily bartered blessings for calamities.

But we are told that our own liberty is at stake upon the event of the war against France—that if she falls, we shall be the next victim. The combined powers, it is said, will never forgive in us the origination of those principles which were the germs of the French Revolution. They will endeavor to eradicate them from the world.

If this suggestion were ever so well founded, it would perhaps be a sufficient answer to it to say, that our interference is not likely to alter the case; that it would only serve prematurely to exhaust our strength.

But other answers more conclusive present themselves.

The war against France requires, on the part of her enemies, efforts unusually violent. They are obliged to strain every nerve, to exert every resource. However it may terminate, they must find themselves spent in an extreme degree; a situation not very favorable to the undertaking anew, and even to Europe combined, an immense enterprise.

To subvert by force republican liberty in this country, nothing short of entire conquest would suffice. This conquest, with our present increased population, greatly distant as we are from Europe, would either be impracticable, or would demand such exertions, as following immediately upon those which will have been requisite to the subversion of the French Revolution, would be absolutely ruinous to the undertakers. . . .

There are two great errors in our reasoning upon this subject. One, that the combined powers will certainly attribute to us the same principles, which they deem so exceptionable in France; the other, that our principles are in fact the same.

If left to themselves, they will all, except one, naturally see in us a people who originally resorted to a revolution in government, as a refuge from encroachments on rights and privileges *antecedently* enjoyed, not as a people who from choice sought a radical and entire change in the established government, in pursuit of new privileges and rights carried to an extreme, irreconcilable perhaps with any form of regular government. They will see in us a people who have a due respect for property and personal security; who, in the midst of our revolution, abstained with exemplary moderation from every thing violent or sanguinary, instituting governments adequate to the protection of persons and property; who, since the completion of our revolution, have in a very short period, from mere reasoning and reflection, without tumult or bloodshed, adopted a form of general government calculated, as well as the nature of things would permit, to remedy antecedent defects, to give strength and security to the nation, to rest the foundations of liberty on the basis of justice, order and law; who have at all times been content to govern themselves without intermeddling with the affairs or governments of other nations; in fine, they will see in us sincere republicans, but decided enemies to licentiousness and anarchy; sincere republicans, but decided friends to the freedom of opinion, to the order and tranquillity of all mankind. They will not see in us a people whose best passions have been misled, and whose best qualities have been perverted from their true direction by headlong, fanatical, or designing leaders, to the perpetration of acts from which humanity shrinks, to the commission of outrages over which the eye of reason weeps, to the profession and practice of principles which tend to shake the foundations of morality, to dissolve the social bands, to disturb the peace of mankind, to substitute confusion to order, anarchy to government. . . .

It is therefore matter of real regret, that there should be an effort on our part to level the distinctions which discriminate our case from that of France, to confound the two cases in the view of foreign powers, and to pervert or hazard

> our own principles by persuading ourselves of a similitude which does not exist. . . .
>
> But let us not corrupt ourselves by false comparisons or glosses, nor shut our eyes to the true nature of transactions which ought to grieve and warn us, nor rashly mingle our destiny in the consequences of the errors and extravagances of another nation.

Must a nation subordinate its security, its happiness, nay, its very existence to the respect for treaty obligations, to the sentiment of gratitude, to sympathy with a kindred political system? This was the question which Hamilton proposed to answer, and his answer was an unequivocal "no." Hamilton unswervingly applied one standard to the issues raised by the opposition to Washington's proclamation of neutrality: the national interest of the United States. He put the legalistic and moralistic arguments of the opposition, represented by Madison under the pseudonym "Helvidius," into the context of the concrete power situation in which the United States found itself on the international scene and asked: If the United States were to join France against virtually all of Europe, what risks would the United States run, what advantages could it expect, what good could it do for its ally?

IV

Considerations such as these, recognized for what they are, have guided American foreign policy but for a short period, that is, as long as the Federalists were in power. *The Federalist* and Washington's Farewell Address are their classic expression. Yet these considerations, not recognized for what they are, sometimes even rejected, have determined the great objectives of American foreign policy to this day. During the century following their brief flowering, they have by and large continued to influence policies as well, under the cover, as it were, of those moral principles with which from Jefferson onward American statesmen have liked to justify their moves on the international scene. Thus this second period witnessed a discrepancy between political thought and political action, yet a coincidence in the intended results of both. What was said of Gladstone could also have been said of Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, Theodore Roosevelt, the war policies of Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt: what the moral law demanded was by a felicitous coincidence always identical with what the national interest seemed to require. Political thought and political action moved on different planes, which, however, were so inclined as to merge in the end.

John Quincy Adams is the classic example of the political moralist in thought and word who cannot help being a political realist in action. Yet even in Jefferson, whose dedication to abstract morality was much stronger and whose realist touch in foreign affairs was much less sure, the moral pretense yielded often, especially in private utterance, to the impact of the national interest upon native good sense.

Thus during the concluding decade of the Napoleonic Wars Jefferson's thought on international affairs was a reflection of the ever-changing distribution of power in the world rather than of immutable moral principles. In 1806, he favored "an English ascendancy on the ocean" as being "safer for us than that of France." In 1807, he was by the logic of events forced to admit:

> I never expected to be under the necessity of wishing success to Buonaparte. But the English being equally tyrannical at sea as he is on land, & that tyranny bearing on us in every point of either honor or interest, I say, "down with England" and as for what Buonaparte is then to do to us, let us trust to the chapter of accidents, I cannot, with the Anglomen, prefer a certain present evil to a future hypothetical one.

However, in 1812, when Napoleon was at the pinnacle of his power, Jefferson hoped for the restoration of the balance of power. Speaking of England, he said that

> it is for the general interest that she should be a sensible and independent weight in the scale of nations, and be able to contribute, when a favorable moment presents itself, to reduce under the same order, her great rival in flagitiousness. We especially ought to pray that the powers of Europe may be so poised and counterpoised among themselves, that their own security may require the presence of all their forces at home, leaving the other quarters of the globe in undisturbed tranquility.

In 1814, again compelled by the logic of events, he came clearly out against Napoleon and in favor of a balance of power which would leave the power of Napoleon and of England limited, but intact:

> Surely none of us wish to see Bonaparte conquer Russia, and lay thus at his feet the whole continent of Europe. This done, England would be but a breakfast; and, although I am free from the visionary fears which the votaries of England have effected to entertain, because I believe he cannot effect the conquest of Europe; yet put all Europe into his hands, and he might spare such a force to be sent in British ships, as I would as leave not have to encounter, when I see how much trouble a handful of British soldiers in Canada has given us. No. It cannot be to our interest that all Europe should be reduced to a single monarchy. The true line of interest for us, is, that Bonaparte should be able to effect the complete exclusion of England from the whole continent of Europe, in order, as the same letter said, "by this peaceable engine of constraint, to make her renounce her views of dominion over the ocean, of permitting no other nation to navigate it but with her license, and on tribute to her, and her aggressions on the persons of our citizens who may choose to exercise their

right of passing over that element." And this would be effected by Bonaparte's succeeding so far as to close the Baltic against her. This success I wished him the last year, this I wish him this year; but were he again advanced to Moscow, I should again wish him such disasters as would prevent his reaching Petersburg. And were the consequences even to be the longer continuance of our war, I would rather meet them than see the whole force of Europe wielded by a single hand.

Similarly, in 1815, Jefferson wrote:

> For my part, I wish that all nations may recover and retain their independence; that those which are overgrown may not advance beyond safe measures of power, that a salutary balance may be ever maintained among nations, and that our peace, commerce, and friendship, may be sought and cultivated by all.

It was only when, after 1815, the danger to the balance of power seemed to have passed that Jefferson allowed himself again to indulge in the cultivation of moral principles divorced from the political exigencies of the hour.

From this tendency to which Jefferson only too readily yielded, John Quincy Adams was well-nigh immune. We are here in the presence of a statesman who had been reared in the realist tradition of the first period of American foreign policy, who had done the better part of his work of statecraft in an atmosphere saturated with Jeffersonian principles, and who had achieved the merger of these two elements of his experience into an harmonious whole. Between John Quincy Adams' moral principles and the traditional interest of the United States there was hardly ever a conflict. The moral principles were nothing but the political interests formulated in moral terms, and vice versa. They fit the interests as a glove fits the hand. Adam's great contributions to the tradition of American foreign policy, freedom of the seas, the Monroe Doctrine, and Manifest Destiny, are witness to this achievement.

The legal and moral principle of the freedom of the seas was in the hands of Adams a weapon, as it had been two centuries earlier in the hands of Grotius wielded on behalf of the Low Countries, through which an inferior naval power endeavored to safeguard its independence against Great Britain, the mistress of the seas. The Monroe Doctrine's moral postulates of anti-imperialism and mutual non-intervention were the negative conditions for the safety and enduring greatness of the United States. Their fulfillment vouchsafed the isolation of the United States from the power struggles of Europe and, through it, the continuing predominance of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Manifest Destiny was the moral justification as well as the moral incentive for the westward expansion of the United States, the peculiar

American way—foreordained by the objective conditions of American existence—of founding an empire, the "American Empire," as one of the contemporary opponents of Adams' policies put it.

V

Jefferson and John Quincy Adams stand at the beginning of the second period of American thought on foreign policy, both its most eminent representatives and the heirs of a realist tradition which continued to mould political action, while it had largely ceased to influence political thought. At the beginning of the third period, McKinley leads the United States, as a great world power, beyond the confines of the Western Hemisphere, ignorant of the bearing of this step upon the national interest and guided by moral principles which are completely divorced from the national interest. When at the end of the Spanish-American War the status of the Philippines had to be determined, McKinley expected and found no guidance in the traditional national interests of the United States. According to his own testimony, he knelt beside his bed in prayer, and in the wee hours of the morning he heard the voice of God telling him—as was to be expected—to annex the Philippines.

This period initiated by McKinley, in which moral principles no longer justify the enduring national interest as in the second, but replace it as a guide for action, finds its fulfillment in the political thought of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson's thought not only disregards the national interest, but is explicitly opposed to it on moral grounds. "It is a very perilous thing," he said in his address at Mobile on October 27, 1913,

> to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest. It not only is unfair to those with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own actions. . . . We dare not turn from the principle that morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us, and that we will never condone iniquity because it is most convenient to do so.

Wilson's war-time speeches are but an elaboration of this philosophy. An excerpt from his address of September 27, 1918, opening the campaign for the Fourth Liberty Loan, will suffice to show the continuity of that philosophy:

> It is of capital importance that we should also be explicitly agreed that no peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting. . . .
>
> First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned;

> Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all;
>
> Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.
>
> Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.
>
> Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.
>
> Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms. . . .
>
> National purposes have fallen more and more into the background and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place. The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and playing for high stakes. That is why I have said that this is a peoples' war, not a statesmen's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken.

Yet in his political actions, especially under the pressure of the First World War, Wilson could no more than Jefferson before him discount completely the national interest of the United States. Wilson's case, however, was different from Jefferson's in two respects. For one, Wilson was never able, even when the national interest of the United States was directly menaced, to conceive of the danger in other than moral terms. It was only the objective force of the national interest, which no rational man could escape, that imposed upon him as the object of his moral indignation the source of America's mortal danger. Thus in 1917 Wilson led the United States into war against Germany for the same reasons, only half-known to himself, for which Jefferson had wished and worked alternately for the victory of England and of France. Germany threatened the balance of power in Europe, and it was in order to remove that threat—and not to make the world safe for democracy—that the United States put its weight into the Allies' scale. Wilson pursued the right policy, but he pursued it for the wrong reasons.

Not only did the crusading fervor of moral reformation obliterate the awareness of the United States' traditional interest in the maintenance of the European balance of power, to be accomplished through the defeat of Germany. Wilson's moral fervor also had politically disastrous effects, for which there is no precedent in the history of the United

States. Wilson's moral objective required the destruction of the Kaiser's autocracy, and this happened also to be required by the political interests of the United States. The political interests of the United States required, beyond this immediate objective of total victory, the restoration of the European balance of power, traditional guarantor of American security. Yet it was in indignation at the moral deficiencies of that very balance of power, "forever discredited," as he thought, that Wilson had asked the American people to take up arms against the Central Powers! Once military victory had put an end to the immediate threat to American security, the very logic of his moral position—let us remember that consistency is the moralist's supreme virtue—drove him toward substituting for the concrete national interest of the United States the general postulate of a brave new world where the national interest of the United States, as that of all other nations, would disappear in a community of interests comprising mankind.

Consequently, Wilson considered it to be the purpose of victory not to restore a new, viable balance of power, but to make an end to it once and forever. "You know," he told the English people at Manchester on December 30, 1918,

> that the United States has always felt from the very beginning of her history that she must keep herself separate from any kind of connection with European politics, and I want to say very frankly to you that she is not now interested in European politics. But she is interested in the partnership of right between America and Europe. If the future had nothing for us but a new attempt to keep the world at a right poise by a balance of power, the United States would take no interest, because she will join no combination of power which is not the combination of all of us. She is not interested merely in the peace of Europe, but in the peace of the world.

Faced with the national interests of the great allied powers, Wilson had nothing to oppose or support them with but his moral principles, with the result that the neglect of the American national interest was not compensated for by the triumph of political morality. In the end Wilson had to consent to a series of uneasy compromises which were a betrayal of his moral principles—for principles can, by their very nature, not be made the object of compromise—and which satisfied nobody's national aspirations. These compromises had no relation at all to the traditional American national interest in a viable European balance of power. Thus Wilson returned from Versailles a compromised idealist, an empty-handed statesman, a discredited ally. In that triple failure lies the tragedy not only of Wilson, a great yet misguided man, but of Wilsonianism as a political doctrine as well.

Yet Wilson returned to the United States, unaware of his failure. He offered the American people what he had offered the allied nations at Paris: moral principles divorced from political reality. "The day we have left behind us," he proclaimed at Los Angeles on September 20, 1919,

> was a day of balances of power. It was a day of "every nation take care of itself or make a partnership with some other nation or group of nations to hold the peace of the world steady or to dominate the weaker portions of the world." Those were the days of alliances. This project of the League of Nations is a great process of disentanglement.

VI

While before Paris and Versailles these moral principles rang true with the promise of a new and better world, they now must have sounded to many rather hollow and platitudinous. Yet what is significant for the course which American foreign policy was to take in the interwar years is not so much that the American people rejected Wilsonianism, but that they rejected it by ratifying the denial of the American tradition of foreign policy which was implicit in the political thought of Wilson. We are here indeed dealing with a tragedy not of one man, but of a political doctrine and, as far as the United States is concerned, of a political tradition. The isolationism of the interwar period could delude itself into believing that it was but the restorer of the early realist tradition of American foreign policy. Did it not, like that tradition, proclaim the self-sufficiency of the United States within the Western Hemisphere? Did it not, like that tradition, refuse to become involved in the rivalries of European nations? The isolationists of the twenties and thirties did not see what was the very essence of the policies of the Founding Fathers—that both the isolated and the preponderant position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere was not a fact of nature, and that the freedom from entanglements in European conflicts was not the result of mere abstention on the part of the United States. Both benefits were the result of political conditions outside the Western Hemisphere and of policies carefully contrived and purposefully executed in their support. For the realists of the first period, isolation was an objective of policy, which had to be striven for to be attained. For the isolationists of the interwar period, isolation was, as it were, a natural state, which only needed to be left undisturbed in order to continue forever. Conceived in such terms, it was the very negation of foreign policy.

Isolationism, then, is in its way as oblivious to political reality as is Wilsonianism—the internationalist challenge, to which it had thought to have found the American answer. In consequence, they are both strangers not only to the first, realist phase of American foreign policy, but to its whole tradition. Both refused to face political reality either in realistic or ideological terms. They refused to face it at all. Thus isolationism and Wilsonianism have more in common than their historic enmity would lead one to suspect. In a profound sense they are brothers under the skin. Both are one in maintaining that the United States has no interest in any particular political and military constellation outside the Western Hemisphere. While isolationism stops here, Wilsonianism asserts that the American national interest is nowhere in particular but everywhere, being identical with the interests of mankind itself. The political awareness of both refuses to concern itself with the concrete issues with regard to which the national interest must be asserted. Isolationism stops short of them, Wilsonianism soars beyond them. Both have but a negative relation to the national interest of the United States outside the Western Hemisphere. They are unaware of its very existence. This being so, both substitute abstract moral principles for the guidance of the national interest, derived from the actual conditions of American existence. Wilsonianism applies the illusory expectations of liberal reform to the whole world, isolationism empties the realist political principle of isolationism of all concrete political content and transforms it into the unattainable parochial ideal of automatic separation.

In view of this inner affinity between isolationism and Wilsonianism, it is not surprising that the great debate of the twenties and thirties between internationalism and isolationism was carried on primarily in moral terms. Was there a moral obligation for the United States to make its contribution to world peace by joining the League of Nations and the World Court? Was it morally incumbent upon the United States, as a democracy, to oppose Fascism in Europe and to uphold international law in Asia? Such were the questions which were raised in that debate and the answers depended upon the moral position taken. The question which was central to the national interest of the United States, that of the balance of power in Europe and Asia, was hardly ever faced squarely, and when it was, it was dismissed on moral grounds. Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States from 1933–1944 and one of the most respected spokesmen of internationalism, summarizes in his *Memoirs* his attitude toward this central problem of American foreign policy in these terms:

> I was not, and am not, a believer in the idea of balance of power or spheres of influence as a means of keeping the peace. During the First World War I had made an intensive study of the system of spheres of influence and balance of power, and I was grounded to the taproots in their iniquitous consequences. The conclusions I then formed in total opposition to this system stayed with me.

When internationalism triumphed in the late thirties, it did so in the moral terms of Wilsonianism. That in this instance the moral postulates which inspired the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt happened to coincide with the exigencies of the American national interest was again, as in the case of Jefferson and of the Wilson of 1917, due to the impact of a national emergency upon innate common sense and to the strength of a national tradition which holds in its spell the actions even of those who deny its validity in words. However, as soon as the minds of the American leaders were freed from the inescapable pressures of a primarily military nature and turned toward the political problems of the war and its aftermath, they thought and acted again as Wilson had acted under similar circumstances. That is to say, they thought and acted in moral terms, divorced from the political conditions of America's existence.

The practical results of this philosophy of international affairs, as applied to the political war and post-war problems, were, then, bound to be quite similar to those which had made the allied victory in the First World War politically meaningless. Conceived as it was as a "crusade"—to borrow from the title of General Eisenhower's book—against the evil incarnate in the Axis Powers, the purpose of the Second World War could only be the destruction of that evil, transacted through the instrumentality of "unconditional surrender." Since the threat to the Western world emanating from the Axis was conceived primarily in moral terms, it was easy to imagine that all conceivable danger was concentrated in that historic constellation of hostile powers and that with its destruction political evil itself would disappear from the world. Beyond "unconditional surrender" there was, then, a brave new world after the model of Wilson's, which would liquidate the heritage of the defeated evil, not "peace-loving" nations and would establish an order of things where war, aggressiveness, and the struggle for power itself were to be no more. Thus Mr. Cordell Hull could declare on his return in 1943 from the Moscow Conference that the new international organization would mean the end of power politics and usher in a new era of international collaboration. Three years later, Mr. Philip Noel-Baker, then British Minister of State, echoed Mr. Hull by stating in the House of Commons that the British Government was "determined to use the institutions of the United Nations to kill power politics, in order that by the methods of democracy, the will of the people shall prevail."

With this philosophy dominant in the West—Mr. Churchill provides almost the sole, however ineffective, exception—the strategy of the war and of the peace to follow could not help being oblivious to those considerations of the national interest which the great statesmen of the West, from Hamilton through Castlereagh, Canning and John Quincy Adams to Disraeli and Salisbury, had brought to bear upon the international problems of their day. War was no longer regarded as a means to a political end. The only end the war was to serve was total victory, which is another way of saying that the war became an end in itself. Hence, it became irrelevant how the war was won politically, as long as it was won speedily, cheaply, and totally. The thought that the war might be waged in view of a new balance of power to be established after the war, occurred in the West only to Winston Churchill—and, of course, to Joseph Stalin. The national interest of the Western nations was, then, satisfied insofar as it required the destruction of the threat to the balance of power emanating from Germany and Japan; for insofar, the moral purposes of the war happened to coincide with the national interest. However, the national interest of the Western nations was jeopardized insofar as their security required the creation of a new viable balance of power after the war.

How could statesmen who boasted that they were not "believers in the idea of balance of power"—like a scientist not believing in the law of gravity—and who were out "to kill power politics," understand the very idea of the national interest which demanded above all protection from the power of others? Thus it was with deeply and sincerely felt moral indignation that the Western world, expecting a brave new world without power politics, found itself confronted with a new and more formidable threat to its security as soon as the old one had been subdued. There was good reason for moral indignation, however misdirected this one was. That a new balance of power will rise out of the ruins of an old one and that nations with political sense will avail themselves of the opportunity to improve their position within it, is a law of politics for whose validity nobody is to blame. Yet blameworthy are those who in their moralistic disdain for the laws of politics endanger the interests of the nations which are in their care.

The history of American foreign policy since the end of the Second World War is the story of the encounter of the American mind with a new political world. That mind was weakened in its understanding of foreign policy by half a century of ever more complete intoxication with moral abstractions. Even a mind less weakened would have found it hard to face with adequate understanding and successful action the unprecedented novelty and magnitude of the new political world. American foreign policy in that period presents itself as a slow, painful, and incomplete process of emancipation from deeply ingrained error and of rediscovery of long-forgotten truths.

The fundamental error which has thwarted American foreign policy in thought and action is the antithesis of national interest and moral principles. The equation of political moralism with morality and of political realism with immorality is itself untenable. The choice is not between moral principles and the national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles, divorced from political reality, and another set of moral principles, derived from political reality. The basic fact of international politics is the absence of a society able to protect the existence, and to promote the interests, of the individual nations. For the individual nations to take care of their own national interests is, then, a political necessity. There can be no moral duty to neglect them; for as the international society is at present constituted, the consistent neglect of the national interest can only lead to national suicide. Yet it can be shown that there exists even a positive moral duty for the individual nation to take care of its national interests.

Self-preservation for the individual as well as for societies is not only a biological and psychological necessity, but in the absence of an overriding moral obligation a moral duty as well. In the absence of an integrated international society, in particular, the attainment of a modicum of order and the realization of a minimum of moral values are predicated upon the existence of national communities capable of preserving order and realizing moral values within the limits of their power. It is obvious that such a state of affairs falls far short of that order and realized morality to which we are accustomed in national societies. The only relevant question is, however, what the practical alternative is to these imperfections of an international society based upon the national interests of its component parts. The attainable alternative is not a higher morality realized through the application of universal moral principles, but moral deterioration through either political failure or the fanaticism of political crusades. The juxtaposition of the morality of political moralism and the immorality of the national interest is mistaken. It operates with a false concept of morality, developed by national societies but unsuited to the conditions of international society. In the process of its realization, it is bound to destroy the very moral values which it is its purpose to promote. Hence, the antithesis between moral principles and the national interest is not only intellectually mistaken but also morally pernicious. A foreign policy derived from the national interest is in fact morally superior to a foreign policy inspired by universal moral principles. Albert Sorel, the Anglophobe historian of the French Revolution, well summarized the real antithesis when he said in grudging admiration of Castelreagh:

> He piqued himself on principles to which he held with an unshakable constancy, which in actual affairs could not be distinguished from obstinacy; but these principles were in no degree abstract or speculative, but were all embraced in one alone, the supremacy of English interests; they all proceeded from this high reason of state.

May as much be said by a future historian of the American foreign policy of our time!

THE PARLIAMENTARY LABOR PARTY IN GREAT BRITAIN

JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS
Williams College

Who rules Britain? For the political scientist hunting out the real core of power, the question is hard to answer. Students of British politics have variously concluded that the Cabinet, or Parliament, or the party in power, or the administrative class of civil servants, or the "Big Three" (or Four, or Five)—or some combination of these—actually held the reins of authority. Constitutionally, however, the question is an easy one. Formal power rests with a majority of the Members of Parliament. This majority can pass laws and raise money, can bring down governments and make new ones, can change the Constitution itself.

Those who have ruled Britain in this sense during the past five years have been a few hundred Labor Members of the House of Commons, organized in the Parliamentary Labor Party. Constitutionally, this is the ruling group, every member of which has equal power. In fact, a small minority of Labor Members, grouped in or about the Cabinet, actually make the great decisions of state. At the same time, the large majority of Labor Members not only lack real power but even in their very name —Backbenchers—they appear as the symbols of impotence.

As a constitutional ruling group embracing the actual ruling group, the Parliamentary Labor Party[1] must deal with the same problems facing rulers in other polities—problems of mediating among power-seeking individuals and factions, of giving proper scope to leaders without sacrificing some responsibility to followers, of maintaining group morale and discipline, of insuring stability without clogging the free flow of talent to the top, and of doing all these under conditions of crisis government. The resulting tensions may show themselves in Britain in practices that we have come to associate with totalitarian elites—in systems of rewards and punishments, in secret trials and public purges, in denunciations, confessions, and recantations. Or these stresses may be resolved through methods close to the democratic ideal—through responsive leadership, a sense of teamwork, a tolerance of minorities, a respect for the majority, a flair for intra-group adjustment, and behind all this, a lofty conception of government. The fact that the P.L.P. operates in a democratic context, against a background of party government, and through a fusion of executive and legislative power, makes its recent experience of particular interest to students of other governments, especially of our own.

---

[1] Hereafter cited as the P.L.P.

I. FIFTY-YEAR SEARCH FOR A FORMULA

The decisive step in the rise of the P.L.P. came in February, 1900. At a meeting in London of Socialists and trade unionists to establish the Labor Representation Committee—the immediate forerunner of the Labor Party—the delegates carried Keir Hardie's resolution that "this Conference is in favour of establishing a distinct Labour group in Parliament who shall have their own whips and agree upon their policy. . . ."[2] While the L.R.C. won only two seats in the 1900 "Khaki election" a few months after the conference, these words of Hardie's hinted at two problems that were to obstruct the efforts of the Labor M.P.'s in subsequent years. What was to be the relation of the parliamentary group externally to the Labor Party as a whole? And how was the P.L.P. to be organized internally so as to resolve the conflicting claims of discipline, democracy, and leadership?

It is hardly surprising that the question of the relation of the parliamentary group to the "mother party," while troublesome, has been the easier of the two to solve. The British respect the formal independence and supremacy of Parliament; for most of them the idea of an outside body dictating policies to Members of Parliament has an alien flavor. More important, the ultimate control of the Labor Party over the selection of candidates, and its solidarity on matters of basic doctrine, organization, and vote-getting, inevitably have produced close links with its members in Parliament. A general division of work between Labor Party and P.L.P. slowly developed. The Labor Party in conference sets the objectives and roughs out a broad program. The P.L.P. decides the details and timing of legislation. The fact that the membership, and especially the leadership, of the P.L.P. is almost always well represented on the National Executive Committee of the Labor Party helps cement the ties between them. Indeed, a leading question facing British Labor today is not whether the Labor Party has too much control of Labor M.P.'s[3] but whether the Prime Minister and other Cabinet members do not overly influence Labor Party program and policies.

Internal organization has been a much knottier problem. As long as the P.L.P. was in opposition, this problem could not become acute. The Party carried on its work in Parliament in a democratic fashion, meeting frequently to discuss policy and program.[4] It regularly elected its own leaders—sometimes after hard-fought contests—giving to the nation a series of notable men in Hardie, Clynes, MacDonald, and Henderson. The P.L.P. appointed an executive committee, whips, and standing committees to carry on party business. During Labor's brief period in power in 1924, the leaders and rank-and-file maintained liaison through meetings of an elected group of twelve Backbenchers with several Ministers.

---

[2] G. D. H. Cole, ***British Working Class Politics, 1832–1914*** (London, 1941), p. 158.

[3] The question of possible N.E.C. domination of a Labor Government was, however, a campaign issue in 1945.

The real test of party discipline and democracy in Parliament could come only when Labor held office for a somewhat sustained period. That test came in 1929–31. While a consultative committee of twelve Members was again established to meet with Cabinet Ministers, and while party meetings continued, it was understood that the leaders were to be given a freer hand now that they held office. But affairs went badly almost from the start. The MacDonald Government charged in party meetings that Members, by voting against the Whips, were violating the Standing Orders that provided for party discipline.[5] Backbenchers replied that the Government was introducing legislation without consulting or informing them in advance. Both these charges were true. For example, the Government's Unemployment Insurance bill, prepared by Ministers, was directly challenged by a hostile amendment, and obstructive tactics were used against the bill by Laborites during the committee stage.

The departure of MacDonald to form a National Government came as the dramatic climax of these troubles. The rank-and-file of the P.L.P. was left with a feeling of deep bitterness and with a determination to tie any future Labor Cabinet more closely to the Labor M.P.'s. The P.L.P. called on the National Executive Committee to consider ways and means of achieving this end. The Executive Committee recommended to the 1933 Party Conference that the P.L.P. should have a larger role in deciding whether to establish or dissolve a Labor Government, in the selection of Ministers by the Prime Minister, and in matters of public policy and administration.[6] The Conference approved these recommendations.

For a dozen years of Opposition and Coalition Government these resolutions remained academic ones. In July, 1945, the picture changed abruptly. Soon after the election almost 400 Labor Members were crowding into the House of Commons. They formed a younger, less experienced, more vigorous and diverse group than the previous delegation. Many M.P.'s came direct from the armed services; at least one miner arrived almost straight from the pithead. Labor's huge majority was not only a reservoir of power and talent for the new Government, but also a challenge to its capacity for leadership, and a test of the P.L.P.'s skill at blending democracy and discipline.[7]

---

[4] Dean E. McHenry, *The Labour Party in Transition, 1931–1938* (London, 1938), pp. 165–168.

[5] *Report* of the 31st Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 1931, pp. 93, 174.

[6] G. D. H. Cole, *A History of the Labour Party from 1914* (London, 1948), pp. 288–299.

II. FORMAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY

Soon after the new Parliament convened the P.L.P. reviewed its organization and procedure. Departing only slightly from tradition, it decided to establish a small committee composed in part of Backbenchers to serve as a two-way liaison between Cabinet and rank-and-file. To "allow initiative and individuality to have full scope,"[8] however, the P.L.P. set up a series of Groups, chaired by Backbenchers, to deal with a broad range of policy matters. This move was hailed by Members as a means of enabling them to take part more actively in parliamentary work, and of providing the Cabinet with a better understanding of minority views in the House.[9]

Since 1945 the Liaison Committee has consisted of a chairman and vice-chairman (elected by the members of the P.L.P. each session), the Leader of the House (Herbert Morrison), the Chief Whip, a representative of the Labor Peers (who are technically part of the P.L.P.), and the Secretary of the P.L.P. (not a Member of Parliament). The Committee has met at least weekly, and sometimes more frequently. The Committee has several functions: it keeps the Government in touch with Party feeling, tries to head off revolts by mediating between leaders and rank-and-file, arranges for meetings of the P.L.P. and for smaller conferences of Ministers and interested Backbenchers, and generally seeks to soothe ruffled feelings in Party and Government. No votes are taken in the Committee; all issues are resolved through discussion and compromise. While the chairman and vice-chairman, who are elected in open contests without interference from the Government, consider themselves representatives of the whole body of Labor Members, they seek also to strike a balance between the claims of the rank-and-file and the demands of the leadership.

---

[7] Owing to the paucity of written material on the P.L.P., the remainder of this article, except as otherwise noted, is based chiefly on interviews with Members of Parliament (including members of the Government, Backbenchers, and officials of the P.L.P.) conducted by the author in England during July–December, 1949.

[8] *Report* of the 45th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 1946, p. 56.

[9] See, for example, *The Tribune*, September 7, 1945, p. 3; *The New Statesman and Nation*, Vol. 30, p. 157 (September 8, 1945).

The whole P.L.P. meets about once a fortnight. A meeting can be summoned at the request of the Government or of one of the Groups. Usually the meetings are enlivened by informal but vigorous debate. The Prime Minister and other Ministers often attend to explain Government policy or to answer attacks from the floor. Sometimes the meetings take up a number of party or legislative matters; occasionally a whole session, lasting for several hours, will involve a particular Minister's statement of a Cabinet policy, and his defense of it under hot fire from his adversaries in the Party. A motion for a vote may be made from the platform or from the floor, but votes have been taken on only a few occasions since 1945. The reason for this is that the Government will shift its position in advance of the meeting if it fears that strong sentiment is developing against its policy. At the same time the Backbenchers, fully aware of the Government's capacity to mobilize a majority behind itself on almost all occasions, hesitate to precipitate a formal vote that may bind them at least morally on the floor of the House.

Twenty Groups were established in 1945, covering virtually the whole field of governmental activity. Almost all the Groups corresponded to Ministries, such as the Groups on External Affairs, Defence and Services, Agriculture and Food, Finance, Health, Social Insurance, and so on; however, there are also Groups concerned with electoral reform, legal and judicial questions, and "arts and amenities." Some of the Groups created sub-committees as their work expanded. At the start, the chairmen and even some of the members of the Groups were openly or surreptitiously chosen by the Government; in recent years the chairmen have been picked by the Groups without interference, and Members have been free to join or leave Groups as they wished. Some Groups have had over 50 members; others have been well below that figure.

Those Members of Parliament who expected that the Groups would give them a chance to take part actively in policy-making have had their hopes rudely dashed. From the start the Ministers made it clear that they did not look on the Groups in this light. The Ministers' reasons for taking this position were twofold: they felt that constitutionally they could not reveal proposed legislation to a few Members before presenting it to the whole House; and they believed that as a practical matter it would be risky to discuss legislative proposals with Backbenchers because the latter might speak for only a narrow minority of the Party, or they might "leak" to the press, or they might try to obstruct or alter Cabinet proposals. Some Backbenchers have come to feel that the group meetings are a waste of time, or, even worse, that they are a means of keeping the rank-and-file occupied with trivial tasks so that their influence would be minimized.

To be sure, the Group system has been of service in certain respects. It has given Members a chance to educate themselves in particular areas of public policy by consulting with Ministers and with outside experts. Activity in Groups has in some cases been a stepping-stone to junior Government posts. And in a few instances Groups have had a positive impact on policy. The most notable example of such influence came early in the Parliament, when the Civil Aviation Group exerted pressure on a policy matter of some importance and forced the Government to modify its legislation. At the same time, the Groups have been of some help to the leadership. Ministers have used them as informal working-parties, or as means of feeling out House sentiment and gaining a ready exchange of views with representatives close to the voters. In a few cases Ministers and Backbenchers have come into close rapport, to the satisfaction of all concerned.

But in general the Groups have not had great influence, and some of them have been virtually ignored by the Ministers. In 1947, when Backbench frustration had become acute, the Party leaders tried a new approach. On the theory that the Party Groups tended to attract Members with special interests who might not broadly represent Party opinion, it was decided to widen the scope of the Party's Area Groups. Each of these consisted of Members from one region, such as Scotland or Yorkshire. These Groups had existed for some time for the consideration of local and regional problems; now they were to be encouraged to take up national matters. Embracing cross-sections of Party ideology, they were to serve as "little party meetings." Each Group was to cooperate with the respective regional council of the Labor Party, and to tie in with the parliamentary leaders through a junior Whip.

Here again hopes for more effective Backbench participation have been deflated. Members have found that the very diversity of opinion on national issues has made discussion difficult and often fruitless. To some busy Ministers the Area Groups have been but one more array of organizations to deal with. Area Groups have continued to take up matters of geographical interest; they have not come to focus attention on national problems. To the student of politics this move of the Government to strengthen these groups is of considerable interest, because it demonstrates that the leadership fears the divisive effect of ideological conflict in the Party more than it fears that of local or regional competition. But as a practical matter the step proved to be of little importance.

III. INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

A parliamentary establishment, no less than an administrative one, abounds with clusters of groups cutting across formal lines of organization and authority. Indeed, such groups hatch and thrive all the more luxuriantly in an environment essentially political, competitive, and disputatious. The informal organization of the P.L.P. is a guide to the distribution of actual rather than legal authority. If the picture of power still remains cloudy, it is because the threads of influence are all the harder to disentangle in the absence of the clear chains of command and deference that formal organization charts depict.

In the P.L.P. the informal lines of influence do not necessarily cramp the authority of the formal leadership; in some cases they fortify it. Mansfield and Marx have noted the existence in administrative structures of "personal organizations installed or recognized by the leaders within the framework of the formal structure, to transmit direction and keep the leaders posted on internal conditions."[10] The Trade Union Group in the P.L.P. is not a formal group listed in the annual reports, nor does it have official status. It is, however, tacitly recognized by the leadership as the clearing house for Members officially sponsored and financed by trade unions in elections. The Trade Union Group does not act as an economic interest bloc within Parliament; high policy matters affecting the unions are left to the leaders of the Trades Union Congress to take up directly with the Cabinet. But on parliamentary matters the chairman or vice-chairman of the group deals with the Whips and the Liaison Committee. There is also a Miners' Group, holding a comparable status, sometimes acting through the Trade Union Group, sometimes outside it.

Given the traditional discipline and solidarity of trade unionists in Parliament, discussed below, the Trade Union and Miners' Groups are at least as much instruments of the Government as they are vehicles of economic self-expression. Through them the leaders can gauge sentiment in the trade union section of the P.L.P. and communicate its preferences and priorities. So far as these economic groups are concerned, there is a close approximation between the formal and informal pattern of power in the P.L.P. The leadership can manage even the most powerful economic interests, as reflected in the union groups, just as it manages the local and regional interests, as expressed through the Area Groups.

---

[10] Fritz Morstein Marx (ed.), *Elements of Public Administration* (New York, 1946), p. 297.

The ideological groups present a different picture. There are many of these, most of them hardly visible to the outsider, fluid in organization and membership, transitional in nature. Some are quite open and "respectable," such as the Parliamentary Christian Socialist Group, which studies and publicizes the relation of Christianity to the theory and practice of Socialism. Others are wholly political in nature. Perhaps the best known of these is the "Keep Left" Group, which flourished during 1946 and 1947, the years of the Great Debate over Bevin's foreign policies. Headed by Richard H. S. Crossman, a young left-wing Backbencher, and composed of about 15 dissentient Labor Members, "Keep Left" attacked Bevin vigorously in party meetings, and more temperately in the House. A sort of Loyal Opposition within the Party, the Keep Left Group used to meet weekly and rather openly, but it has been less active and outspoken in the last year or two.[11] Today one hears of more clandestine groups, with such names as the "Red Peppers" or the "1950 Club," which are supposed to be working for an invigorated socialist program.

These groups, above all "Keep Left," have decidedly influenced policy, especially in the cases of the conscription bill and policy toward Palestine. Yet here again the informal organization has been by no means a constantly disruptive force. Sometimes it has helped the leadership manage its parliamentary majority more deftly, especially when the leaders have been willing to compromise. The reason for this is clear. Instead of holding their forces in reserve for an open encounter on the floor, the leaders of the dissenters have been willing to communicate in advance with the Government, which in turn has often been ready to alter its proposals to meet the exigencies of the intra-party situation. In this sense, the spokesmen for informal ideological groups become the mediators between leadership and rank-and-file, and appear virtually as adjuncts of the formal organization.

Finally, there is Parliament itself, a formal institution with an impact on informal organization that is both subtle and powerful. "The corporate life of a legislative body," wrote Gaus some 25 years ago, "has its demands upon the feelings and sentiments of its members. The dining-room, the smoking-room, and the terrace have their rights as well as the place of combat."[12] The coming to power of a socialist regime has seen little change in this situation, although socialists traditionally have warned of the "insidious influence" of the parliamentary establishment. Labor M.P.'s elected in 1945 were determined, says one of them, to change Westminster, not to be changed by it. But soon they had "surrendered to the potent tradition, become absorbed into that close and closed community over which Mr. Speaker presides."[13]

---

[11] It has, however, recently issued a pamphlet entitled "Keeping Left."

[12] J. M. Gaus, *Great Britain; A Study of Civic Loyalty* (Chicago, 1929), p. 107.

Within the confining atmosphere of the House communication among Members is excellent. Unlike Members of Congress, somewhat detached in their office suites in Washington, the M.P.'s spend virtually all their hours in or immediately outside the legislative chamber. Information, gossip, ideas, reactions, spread quickly. A vast amount of business is conducted over teacups, at the bar, in the corridors. The saying of a wise Frenchman—"There is more in common between two deputies one of whom is a Communist than there is between two Communists one of whom is a deputy"—cannot be applied squarely to the socialist members of the P.L.P. But the respect of these Members for parliamentary tradition and practice and their absorption in parliamentary life enormously simplify the work of the Party leaders, whose power rests ultimately on the loyalty and solidarity of the rank-and-file.

IV. THE WAY OF DISSENT

For many years the P.L.P. lived under a set of disciplinary standing orders. These provided that Members should consult Party officers in Parliament before acting on matters involving Party policies; that the P.L.P. could "withdraw the whip" (i.e., expel Members from the P.L.P.) "on account of things said or done" in the House; that, where Members persistently strayed from the Party line, the Party officers must move to report them to the National Executive Committee of the Labor Party, which would "consider the matter in its constituency and other aspects."[14] In the latter event, the Member confronted by expulsion had the right to be heard by the N.E.C.

---

[13] *The New Statesman and Nation*, Vol. 31, p. 3 (January 5, 1946).

[14] The full text of the present standing orders, as revised in the 1945–46 session of Parliament, is as follows:

"The Parliamentary Party have the authority to withdraw the Whip on account of things said or done by Members of the Party in the House, such decision to be reported to the National Executive Committee.

"Outside activities, whether in writing or speech, which are contrary to the discipline or constitution of the Party shall be dealt with by the National Executive Committee.

"1. For the purpose of securing concerted action in the House, Members shall consult the Officers of the Parliamentary Party before tabling any Motion, Amendment or Prayer, or other proposal which may involve Party policies or decisions and shall not vote for any Motion, Amendment or Prayer contrary to the decision of the Party Meeting.

"2. Where there is persistent refusal to observe the decisions of the Parliamentary Party, it shall be the duty of the Liaison Committee to bring a recommendation to the Party Meeting to report the Member to the National Executive Committee, who shall consider the matter in its constituency and other aspects with which the National Execu-

Contemplating its secure majority, the Government in 1945 agreed to the suspension of these standing orders for one year. The motive behind the "experiment," it was announced, was the "belief that the building of a tradition of free discussion combined with a true spirit of good fellowship, co-operation and comradeship in a great cause is to be preferred to written Standing Orders."[15]

Here was a significant venture in the relaxation of the formal rules of a constitutional ruling group. And remarkably enough, the venture succeeded, the suspension having been continued to date. To be sure, the Government was fully aware that its control was secured by other factors at least as important as the written rules, as discussed below. And the "special standing orders" insisting on full unity and teamwork on the part of the officers of the P.L.P. were not suspended.[16] Still, the loosening of the formal ties was a concession to the idea of debate and dissent, noteworthy for a Government holding full power for the first time.

Moreover, the suspension has had important practical consequences in enabling dissenters to use rather freely the parliamentary weapons available to minorities in the House of Commons. If these weapons are frail compared to those used by congressional minorities in the United States, still their role should not be minimized in judging the forces involved in parliamentary policy-making. Since 1945 Backbenchers have used such methods as submitting an Amendment to the Address, moving the Adjournment of the House, signing a Motion, speaking against a Government measure in the House, and simply announcing their hostility to a Government measure in a formal statement. It is significant that none of these methods would actually defeat the Government on a legislative matter before the House. They are not so intended. Thus on one occasion 57 Members tabled a hostile amendment coupled with a statement that they would not force it to a division and that, if anyone else did so, they would abstain.

It would seem that these minority devices are designed to influence

---

tive Committee is concerned. The Member concerned shall have the right to be heard both by the Parliamentary Party and the National Executive Committee.

"3. It is recognized that on certain matters, for example religion and temperance, Members may have good grounds for conscientious scruples, and in such cases they may abstain from voting.

"(The above Standing Orders may be amended, rescinded, altered, added to or suspended for such period and under such conditions as may be determined upon by a duly constituted meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party.)"

[15] *Report* of the 45th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 1946, p. 57.

[16] *Report* of the 43rd Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 1944, p. 199.

the Cabinet's policy-making indirectly by staging a brief show of force. Much the same can be said for two more potent weapons—abstentions and voting against the Government in a division. Most of such hostile actions have occurred when the Government clearly had the backing of enough Conservatives to provide the necessary majority. Thus there was no threat of a Government defeat and a dissolution. The Government, for its part, has been content to let the Chief Whip in most cases simply call in recalcitrant Members for a fatherly talk, especially when they voted in defiance of a three-line Whip. Even this minimum action has not always been taken.

The sequence of events in the case of the Conscription bill—one of the few examples of an effective Backbench revolt—suggests the varied manner in which dissenters can make themselves felt. Late in 1946 the Government, disappointed at the low level of voluntary enlistments, decided on an 18-month period of conscription. On November 6 of that year Mr. Attlee announced the proposed bill to a private meeting of the P.L.P. The P.L.P. was divided; according to one report, it voted for the plan by 126–54.[17] Two weeks later 100 Labor M.P.'s abstained in a House vote on a critical amendment attacking the Government's foreign policy. By March 31, 1947, when the Conscription bill was laid before the House, 80 Labor Backbenchers had signed an amendment asking the Party to reject it. Attlee again defended the bill at a meeting of the P.L.P. that was reported to be stormy. Next day 72 Laborites voted against the bill, 20 abstained from voting, and 50 did not show up at the House at all. Two days later the Government suddenly reduced the proposed period of service from 18 to 12 months. This concession worked, the Government winning passage of the bill the following month by a 368–17 vote and endorsement at the Labor Party conference later in the month.[18]

In this case—and in a few others such as the Air Transport bill and policy on Palestine—the Government was openly prevailed upon by a minority to alter its stand. The procedure, however, was not one of bargaining across a table, or of factional maneuvering on the floor. It was a matter of the Government estimating the strength of dissent and independently making a concession. The Government is no more sensitive to the voting power of the opposition within its ranks than it is to the stir the dissenters create outside Parliament, the force of their protest in

---

[17] *The New York Times*, November 7, 1946, p. 18.

[18] It was reported that members of the trade-union section of the P.L.P. and even a Junior Whip criticized the leadership, in a later P.L.P. meeting, for modifying its proposals in the face of minority opposition. See *Report from the Committee of Privileges*, House of Commons, July 23, 1947, especially Appendix 4.

Party meetings, the attitude of the Labor Party rank-and-file. Thus the Government maintains its supremacy in part through alertness, through an effective intelligence service reporting on all segments of the party, through a flexibility of strategy. But it also commands more formidable means of maintaining its position.

V. THE WEB OF DISCIPLINE

The Prime Minister makes appointments to approximately 70 Cabinet, ministerial, and junior ministerial posts in the Government. He passes on the selection of private parliamentary secretaries—positions that are often stepping-stones to higher office—and he allots peerages and a multitude of other honors. He also may demote or re-shuffle his subordinates in the Government. Since positions are continually becoming vacant, here is a disciplinary weapon of considerable importance at the disposal of the leadership. "The authority of the Whips," says a Backbencher, "lies not in their power of imposing public penalties but in their private condemnations. They hold the political careers of Members in their hands."[19]

It is easy, however, to exaggerate the disciplinary role of promotion and demotion. An inclination to pass out favors to the faithful must be tempered by other considerations. For one thing, the Government must be concerned with the recruitment of talent, and talent is by no means monopolized by the orthodox. Again, the leaders must sustain group morale and expectations, which may be undermined if Members undergo deprivations merely because of their independence. Furthermore, the Government is forced to draw personnel from all sections of the Party, ideological and otherwise, in order to maintain a balanced and representative team of leaders. Finally, some Backbenchers are resigned to their lot, or satisfied with their role of critic, or they may be "playing the long shot" in hoping that their own advancement may come in some future change of Government.

The sheer voting power of Ministers in the House and in P.L.P. meetings is a source of strength to the leadership, since its own bloc can be relied on to vote and to vote "right." Added to this is another group, the professional trade unionists, many of whom can usually be expected to offer simple, almost mechanical loyalty to the Government. To these M.P.'s loyalty is the central principle of their political lives; most of them grew up in the tradition of industrial unity and discipline, of solidarity as the essential price of survival. It is significant that trade-union Members, not the Government, have pressed for re-imposition of the standing orders of the P.L.P. On the other hand, the trade unionists are not automatons; and even as union members they might desert the Government on certain issues of acute concern to the unions.

---

[19] Seymour Cocks, M. P., *The Tribune*, June 13, 1947, p. 12.

In large measure the discipline and solidarity of the P.L.P. flow from similar elements that exist in the Labor Party itself. All the Labor M.P.'s are members of a Party that cherishes its memories of ancient struggles, its heroes and martyrs, its hopes and hatreds, its socialist dreams and ideals. Again and again when Party conventions have been badly split, an appeal to the "Movement" or to the "Cause" has restored harmony. Legislating socialism can, of course, give room for many sharp differences, especially under the economic stress of the last few years, but in a sense the British Socialists have been "false to their dogma but true to their convictions," and it is easier to unite on the basis of convictions. This ideological unity, combined with the Labor Party's constitutional, organizational, and financial arrangements, its class base, and the nature of the society around it, partly explain Labor's unity within Parliament as well as outside.

Such are the more positive sources of Party solidarity; the negative basis of discipline in the Labor Party closely affects the P.L.P. too. For the Labor Party, acting directly or through its Executive Committee, can try a Member for rebellious activities and expel him from the Party —which often means from Parliament as well. The relaxation of discipline within Parliament (through suspension of the standing orders) has meant that the job of judging and penalizing is now handled by the Party itself. The Member is not supposed to be subject to outside Party discipline for acts committed within the House, such as for voting against a three-line Whip. This distinction is a rather artificial one, however, because a rebel in the House inevitably must maintain association with groups outside. Three instances of punitive action by the Labor Party will suggest how discipline is administered.

K. Zilliacus. This Labor Member of Parliament had been an outspoken critic—outside as well as within Parliament—of the Government's foreign policies. In December, 1948, the Gateshead (East) Constituency Labor Party re-adopted him as their parliamentary candidate for the next election. In January, 1949, the Elections Subcommittee of the N.E.C. (of which the Prime Minister is a member *ex officio* as Leader of the Party) presented Zilliacus with a sheet of charges and questioned him in a private meeting. Zilliacus proclaimed his faith in the Party's socialist principles and contended that the Government had departed from them. The subcommittee was disposed to recommend endorsement of Zilliacus as the Gateshead candidate, but during the following month the N.E.C. (composed of the Prime Minister, 12 trade union leaders, six Ministers, one Backbencher, and seven others) decided to withhold endorsement of his candidature and so informed the Gateshead Party. The Gateshead Party, however, voted to support Zilliacus. In April Zilliacus took part in the reportedly pro-Soviet Paris Peace Conference; he was soon summoned to a meeting of the Elections Subcommittee, which accused him of being more in sympathy with Communist international policy than with that of the Labor Party. In May, 1949, the N.E.C. voted to expel Zilliacus from the party, and the Gateshead Party was informed that it must select another candidate. At the Labor Party's annual conference in June Zilliacus himself was not permitted to speak, but the chairman of the Gateshead Party and others challenged the action of the N.E.C. on the floor, losing by a card vote of 4,721,000 to 714,000.[20] Subsequently the "reformed" Gateshead Party adopted a candidate sanctioned by the N.E.C., and Zilliacus ran in the General Election as an independent. He lost to the regular Labor candidate.

The Nenni Telegram. In April, 1948, on the eve of the election in Italy, a telegram wishing him "outstanding success" went to the Left Socialist candidate Nenni over the signatures of 37 Labor Members of Parliament. The Chief Whip immediately summoned John Platts-Mills, M.P., the leader of the group, who had been under observation by the N.E.C. ever since he described the Communist rise to power in Czechoslovakia as "a great victory for the workers." Platts-Mills refused to recant; fifteen of his fellow-signatories soon announced, however, that they had not signed the telegram, or had signed by misunderstanding, or had since retracted. After a meeting with Platts-Mills a few days later, an N.E.C. subcommittee recommended to the N.E.C. that Platts-Mills be excluded from the party.[21] On April 28 the N.E.C. approved this recommendation, and immediately afterwards the Liaison Committee of the P.L.P. wrote Platts-Mills that "in view of the decision" of the N.E.C. the Whip was to be withdrawn from him at once. The N.E.C. wrote to the remaining 21 signatories that a number of M.P.'s were persisting "in acting as a group in organized opposition to Party policy" and warning them that, unless they individually undertook within ten days to desist from such conduct, they would be expelled. Each of the recipients gave the required assurances. The Labor Party endorsed the expulsion of Platts-Mills at its May, 1948, conference, as did the Management Committee of Platts-Mills's constituency party, the Finsbury Labor Party. Twenty-four Labor members of the Finsbury local Council expressed sympathy for Platts-Mills in a letter to him; but 16 of these later withdrew their support, and the other eight were expelled from the Labor Party by the Management Committee. Platts-Mills fought the General Election as an independent, and was defeated by the Labor Party candidate.

---

[20] *Report* of the 48th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 1949, pp. 18, 112, 119. For Zilliacus' side of the case, see his pamphlet, *Why I Was Expelled* (London, 1949).

[21] *Report* of the 47th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 1948, pp. 17, 120–121.

Ireland Bill. In May, 1949, over 60 members of the P.L.P. voted against the Government three-line Whip on various amendments to a bill defining Britain's relations with the new republic of Ireland. These Members, many of whom represented constituencies with strong "Irish" voting strength, had previously been warned by Party leaders not to enter into specific commitments on this issue. Following their desertion the Labor Members were warned that, if they defied the Government again, they would be reported to the N.E.C. The dissenters included five private parliamentary secretaries. The Prime Minister wrote to the Ministers concerned, and dismissals of the errant five followed immediately. The experience suggested two conclusions: first, action inside Parliament has increasingly become a matter of disciplinary attention outside Parliament (a tendency stimulated, no doubt, by the election of February, 1950, and by the likelihood of another election soon); second, defection among leaders of even second or third rank within the group will not be tolerated.

The discipline that binds the Labor Member in his purely legislative work also extends to his activities outside Parliament. A case in point is his relationship with the Civil Service. A Backbencher would, of course, not expect to participate formally or informally in administrative decision-making (in this respect the separation of powers is far more exacting in Britain than in the United States). Even more, the Backbencher would not interfere in the everyday business of government in the fashion of a Member of Congress, who defends and advances the interests of his constituents in his dealings with the bureaucrats. The Member of Parliament, like the Member of Congress, serves as a middleman between citizen and administrator—he gathers information, steers constituents to the right bureau, and might even approach a civil servant personally. But he would not be able to exert much pressure. If he tried to exercise influence, he would eventually come up against the same centralized controls that operate in the House, for his parliamentary masters are ultimately the administrative masters as well.

VI. LEADERSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITY

The P.L.P., in summary, can be described as a body in which (1) little success has been achieved in establishing with any certainty the relative powers of the minority of Members who make up the Government and the majority who comprise the rank-and-file; (2) formal and informal authority lies largely in the same hands—those of the leaders; (3) discipline is bulwarked in a variety of ways, both positive and negative; (4) dissent is permitted in the discussing and making of public policies to the extent that it does not put the Government in jeopardy.

The crucial test of the P.L.P. as an effective organization came in 1950, after the Labor Government was given its "razor-edge" majority in Parliament. Until this writing, at least, the P.L.P. has met that test in two respects. The Standing Orders have not had to be re-imposed, nor have organizational changes been necessary. And aside from one or two surprise forays by the Conservatives on minor matters, Labor has been able to mobilize a majority in the Divisions. With their margin over the opposition cut at times to one or two votes, the Laborites have tended to close ranks. Intra-party divisions have been less noticeable. "Any formal control of Members has been rendered unnecessary," writes one Labor Member, "by the ready and spontaneous acceptance of a new self-discipline."[22] Everyone knows, too, that those who had been expelled from the Party and who had run in the General Election as independent candidates were defeated by Party regulars. The British Government is in the grimly humorous position of having "hair-trigger" government, but it is significant that the British brand of parliamentary instability stems chiefly from an even inter-party balance, not from intra-party disunity.

Ultimately, one's evaluation of the P.L.P. turns largely on his conception of the role of democratic government today. If Britain's vital need since 1945 has been leadership that could override the narrow demands of minorities, whether economic, regional, or ideological, in order to further the general interest, the P.L.P.—and the political and governmental system of which it is a part—has on the whole served its function. The P.L.P. not only has permitted leadership; it has exacted it. The Government has been able to depart from traditional socialist dogma and to face changing economic and political needs partly because it could depend on the loyalty of the rank-and-file. There have been other factors too—the leadership skills of Attlee and Morrison, and the fact that the Cabinet has been broadly representative of both wings of the Party and thus can reach some compromise in private. But the willingness of the P.L.P. to be led, and of most of its members to forego "private political enterprise," has been a decisive factor.

This leadership has been responsible leadership—responsible to the popular electoral majority organized by the Labor Party and represented in Parliament by the P.L.P. It has not been responsible to a simple majority of Labor Members, as under the caucus system,[23] or to the dead center of P.L.P. sentiment as gauged by polls or straw votes. The leadership has been responsible in the sense that it has encouraged intensive give-and-take within the P.L.P.,[24] has had an alert eye and a sensitive apparatus for discerning the pattern of opinion, has usually responded to shifts of viewpoint in the Party and avoided open tests of power. It has shown this sense of responsibility even though—before the February, 1950, election—it would have almost inevitably won such tests of power through its control of the majority of the P.L.P. members. Considering the essential solidarity and discipline of the P.L.P., the present arrangements probably maximize rather than minimize the influence of the independent-minded Backbencher.

---

[22] *The Tribune*, March 24, 1950, p. 8.

"While on the Continent it is the Party discipline which provides the necessary restraining influence on the organization," wrote Wertheimer, "in England it is essentially loyalty of the organization to its leaders and the confidence in their superior discernment and judgment."[25] This tradition remains strong in the P.L.P., but it is coupled with qualities of solidarity, democracy, and Backbench vitality that heavily influence the character of parliamentary government under Labor rule.

---

[23] Cf. Louise Overacker, "The Australian Labor Party," in this REVIEW, Vol. 43, pp. 677–703 (August, 1949), especially section on the Parliamentary Labor Party, pp. 696 ff.

[24] Thus a note appended to the Standing Orders of the P.L.P. advises Members that they should "take advantage of Party meetings in suitable instances to raise questions of Party policies concerning which they have doubts."

[25] Egon Wertheimer, *Portrait of the Labour Party* (London, 1930), p. xxvi.

RESEARCH ON POLITICAL PARTIES AND LEADERSHIP

POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

JULIAN L. WOODWARD AND ELMO ROPER
Elmo Roper, New York

The aim of this paper is to make a modest contribution toward improved understanding of how the political process actually operates in America. It reports the results of some research on individual citizen participation in political activity and describes a tool that may be used for classifying individuals in terms of the amount of political activity in which they engage. Finally it outlines some differences that are observed when attitudes with respect to some public personalities and issues held by the politically active portion of the citizenry are compared with attitudes of the politically inert.

The research study from which the data reported here are derived is one of a long series carried out over the past five years for the Public Relations Department of the Standard Oil Company (N. J.). The primary purpose of these studies has been to find out how the company stands with the American public —to learn what virtues people credit to it and what sins they think it is committing. Research on such topics inevitably involves the question of who among the vast body of American citizens are most articulate in their feelings about big corporations and most concerned to defend or attack them. Since similar questions arise whenever the citizen's role with respect to any public issue comes up, the tools developed for corporation public relations may have much wider applicability and usefulness. It is hoped that the following discussion will demonstrate that research undertaken for purely practical considerations did, in this instance, yield by-products (findings and techniques) that are of significance to the science of politics.

I. MEASURES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY

What was sought in the study was a method for segregating the people who are relatively active in relation to national political issues from those who are relatively inactive. Such a quest immediately involves a definition of what constitutes "political activity," or at least a procedure for arriving at a definition. The procedure followed was to write a large number of questions, the answers to which would presumably throw light on an individual's political behavior, and then to try these questions out in personal interviews with a test national sample of American adults. Some of the questions were found not to work well in doorstep interviews, and were discarded. Others were found to yield results so closely intercorrelated that one question could in effect stand for several others. The list was finally boiled down to the questions shown in Table I. These questions may be said to measure the political activity of the respondent in five different channels of possible influence on legislators and government officials. These "channels" can be described as (1) voting at the polls, (2) supporting possible pressure groups by being a member of them, (3) personally communicating directly with legislators, (4) participating in political party activity and thus acquiring a claim on legislators and (5) engaging in habitual dissemination of political opinions through word-of-mouth communications to other citizens. Taken together, these five ways of behaving constitute an operational definition of the term "political activity."

No doubt most political scientists would make some additions to or subtrac-

TABLE I

Questions Used in Setting Up the Political Activity Index

Question Number*	
1	Do you happen to belong to any organizations that sometimes take a stand on housing, better government, school problems, or other public issues? (If "yes") What organizations?
	* * *
2a	When you get together with your friends would you say that you discuss public issues like government regulation of business, labor unions, taxes, and farm programs frequently, occasionally, or never?
	and
2b	(If "frequently" or "occasionally") Which of the statements on this card best describes the part you yourself take in these discussions with your friends? (1) Even though I have my own opinions, I usually just listen. (2) Mostly I listen, but once in a while I express my opinions. (3) I take an equal share in the conversation. (4) I do more than just hold up my end in the conversation; I usually try to convince others that I am right.
	* * *
3	Have you ever written or talked to your Congressman or Senator or other public officials to let them know what you would like them to do on a public issue you were interested in?
	and
4	In the last four years have you worked for the election of any political candidate by doing things like distributing circulars or leaflets, making speeches, or calling on voters?
	* * *
5	Have you attended any meetings in the last four years at which political speeches were made?
	* * *
6	In the last four years have you contributed money to a political party or to a candidate for a political office?
	* * *
7	Probably you can't remember exactly, but about how many times do you think you have gone to the polls and voted during the last four years?

* The questions did not actually appear in this order in the interview questionnaire. They were intermixed with questions on personalities and issues.

tions from the list. Just as there are many different tests for intelligence made up of different component sub-tests, so there may be many different tests for political activity. The only claims made for this particular list of questions are (1) that it seems to have a good deal of "face validity" as a measure of citizen political activity, and (2) that it works well in a public opinion interview in the sense that the questions are comprehended and answered with apparently little exaggeration by people of all educational levels and political persuasions. With the political activity questions limited to six, room is left in the questionnaire for other topics. More complete coverage of different forms of political behavior would have been at the expense of possible questioning on issues, since the length of a doorstep interview is limited.

The political activity questions were first tested in a pilot study with a national sample of 500 respondents; then, after revision, the list was included in a questionnaire that was administered to a national cross-section sample of 8,000 respondents designed to be representative of the adult population of the

TABLE II

Scoring System for Political Activity Index

	% of total sample qualifying	Score points credited	Total possible score for channel
Voting			
Once or more in last four years	75	1	3
Three times or more	47	1	
Five times or more	21	1	
Discussing Public Issues with Others			
Discusses frequently and takes an equal share in the conversation	21	1	2
Discusses frequently and usually tries to convince others he is right	6	1	
Belonging to Organizations That Take Stands on Public Issues			
Belongs to one or more such organizations	31	1	2
Belongs to two or more	7	1	
Written or Talked to Congressman or Other Public Official to Give Own Opinion on a Public Issue			
One or more times in the past year	13	1	2
Two or more times in the past year	7	1	
Worked for Election of a Political Candidate in Last Four Years	11	2	2
Contributed Money to a Party or Candidate in Last Four Years	7	1	1
TOTAL POSSIBLE SCORE			12

United States. The first column in Table II indicates how the population reacted to the questions asked. It will be noted that only 13% of the sample claimed at least once in the past year to have written or talked to a Congressman or to other public officials to let them know what the respondent wanted done about a public issue, and only 11% reported that they had worked for the election of a political candidate during the past four years. Forty-seven per cent declared that they had voted at the polls at least three times in the last four years; 21% said they had voted five times or more in the same period. As we know from other studies, these figures inflate actual voting somewhat; and indeed all the percentages in the table are probably affected somewhat by the natural tendency of people to exaggerate their own activity a bit when they are queried by an interviewer. But even without allowing for inflation, the figures on political participation are so low as to give support to the conclusion that in America the few act politically for the many.

II. THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY INDEX

While the individual questions stand by themselves as measures of different types of important political behavior, there is some advantage in combining them into a single index in order to give each respondent a single, over-all political activity rating. As a preliminary to setting up such an index, each of the questions was cross-tabulated against every other, and the intercorrelation between each pair of questions was computed. It became clear from an inspection of the correlation pattern that all the questions were positively correlated with each other, indicating that some common factor (or factors) was measured to some degree by all of them. It was apparent also that none of the inter-correlations was so high as to lead to the conclusion that any two questions were measuring nearly the same thing. With these conditions of partial but not perfect inter-correlation obtaining between all the different questions, a combination of the measures into a single "Index" seemed justified. The Political Activity Index, once constructed, would give a broader and yet better coordinated and more meaningful definition to the concept of political activity than would any of the individual measures taken separately.

Any combining of independent measures into a single "test" involves some sort of weighting among the elements that are combined. Table II shows the weights that were adopted in this study. These weights express a judgment as to the relative importance of the different "channels" through which political influence may be exercised, but they also take into account the relative frequencies with which people give the various possible answers on each question. The result is an index scoring system with a maximum possible score of twelve points for any single person. When all the respondents in the sample were assigned their proper scores in terms of the answers they gave to the six questions, a distribution of scores was obtained for the sample as a whole that is shown in Table III.

A glance at Table III shows a heavy skewing toward the lower end of the score-point distribution. Only 10% of the total adult population attain a score of six or better, and 73% cannot even make a score of four. The political inertness of the larger part of those eligible to vote is apparent. Twenty per cent have done none of the things that would give them a single credit on the Index; and one needs to have voted only once in the last four years, or to have been a member of one organization "that sometimes takes a stand on . . . public issues," in order to gain such a single credit.

The decision as to where to draw the line in marking off the so-called politically active group from the politically inert mass of the population is an entirely arbitrary one. What was done was to segregate the ten per cent of the population with the highest scores in a group described as "very active politically" while the 17% with the next highest scores were placed in a group termed "fairly active." When the two groups are combined for some tabulations, there results a grouping which comprises a little more than a quarter (27%) of the adult population and which is described simply as "politically active."

TABLE III

Distribution of Political Activity Scores

Score of respondent	% of total sample who make the score	Cumulative per cent	
12	0.1%	0.1%	Very Active (10.3%)
11	0.3	0.4	
10	0.7	1.1	
9	1.2	2.3	
8	1.6	3.9	
7	2.4	6.3	
6	4.0	10.3	
5	6.5	16.8	Active (16.8%)
4	10.3	27.1	
3	15.6	42.7	Inactive (34.6%)
2	19.0	61.7	
1	19.1	80.8	Very Inactive (38.3%)
0	19.2	100.0	
	100.0		

The rest of the distribution—the 73% of the sample with scores of less than four—is referred to in subsequent discussion as the group of "politically inactive." In some tabulations it is further sub-divided into the "fairly inactive" (the 35% of the total with scores of two or three) and the "very inactive" (the 38% with scores of zero or one).

III. WHO ARE THE POLITICALLY ACTIVE?

In what parts of the population will the highest incidence of politically active people be found? Table IV gives some answers to this question.

It will be noted, first, that the better educated and the more well-to-do are much more likely to be active than those less well-off or less educated. While this is no startling discovery the disparity is large enough to be worthy of some attention. Only 12% of the persons of "D" economic level are "politically active," as against 69% of the "A's."[1] A person with a college education is five times as likely to be "very active" as one with a grade school education only. These facts have important implications for the democratic process.

TABLE IV

Amount of Political Activity Exhibited by Various Sub-Groups in the Population

	% within each sub-group who are politically			
	Very active	Fairly active	Fairly inactive	Very inactive
Sub-groups				
"A" economic level	36%	33%	23%	8%
Executives	34	29	28	9
Professional people	31	32	25	12
Stockholders	28	30	30	12
College educated	24	28	30	18
"B" economic level	24	26	34	16
Republicans	15	21	39	25
Men	13	19	36	32
People 50 years of age and over	12	17	34	37
People 35–49 years	11	19	39	31
"C" economic level	11	19	38	32
White people	11	17	36	36
Farmers	11	14	35	40
Independents in politics	10	21	37	32
Total adult population	10	17	35	38
People with only high school education	9	17	40	34
Democrats	9	15	37	39
Non-stockholders	8	15	37	40
Women	8	14	33	45
People 21–34 years of age	8	14	32	46
Laboring people	6	14	37	43
Housewives	6	14	34	46
People with only grade school education	5	11	33	51
Negroes	5	10	25	60
"D" economic level	3	9	31	57

It must, of course, be remembered that while a much smaller percentage of "D's" than "A's" are politically active, the more numerous "D's" still contribute a considerable share of the total body of politically active people. The "very active" group is actually made up 13% of "A's," 23% of "B's," 54%

---

[1] In the total sample 4% are "A" economic level, 10% are "B's," 52% are "C's," and 34% are "D's."

of "C's," and 10% of "D's." It has an unusually high percentage of college people in it—but still less than half have had a college education.

The political composition of the "very active" group is also interesting. It contains a larger proportion of avowed Republicans than does the group of politically inactive (Table V). In fact, there are a few more Republicans in the "very active" group than there are avowed Democrats, in spite of the ratio of three Democrats to two Republicans found in the total national sample. It should be noted, however, that if the "very active" Independents are added to the "very active" Democrats, the two together constitute a clear majority over the "very active" Republicans.

These facts about political distribution may explain how the Democrats manage to win elections (with the aid of the Independents and of the normally politically inactive but pro-Democratic masses who get aroused at election time), while the Republicans (by greater political activity between elections) keep the Democrats in office from carrying out many of their platform promises.

TABLE V

Political Orientation of People with Different Political Activity Scores

	Total sample	Political Activity			
		Very active	Fairly active	Fairly inactive	Very inactive
% Republicans	29	43	37	32	19
% Democrats	44	38	40	46	44
% Independent	16	16	20	18	14
% Other, Don't Know and No Answer	11	3	3	4	23

IV. ATTITUDES OF THE POLITICALLY ACTIVE TOWARD "NATIONAL FIGURES" AND INSTITUTIONS

As a way of illustrating the uses to which the Political Activity Index may be put, we will report attitudes toward U.S. Senators, President Truman and the C.I.O., all cross-tabulated by political activity.

People were asked to name the U. S. Senator whose actions they usually *approve* of most and the ones whose actions they *disapprove* of most, and then were always asked the follow-up question "Why?" The results of this inquiry are shown in detail in Tables VI, VII, VIII, and IX, and may be summarized as follows:

(1) There is apparently a good deal of what might be called political illiteracy even among the politically "very active" group. About a third of the group were not prepared to name *any* U.S. Senator whose actions they usually approved, and about half could not or would not name a single Senator of whom they disapproved. Ten per cent of the very active who *did* name a Sena-

tor, either with approval or disapproval, named a person who was not at the time a U.S. Senator at all!

(2) There is little concentration on any single Senator or group of Senators as most approved or disapproved. Senator Taft emerges as the most controversial figure (19% approval, 10% disapproval among the "very active"). The only other Senators who get mentions from more than one per cent of the "very active" sample are, on the approval side, Senators Vandenberg, Byrd, Humphrey, Lucas and Morse; and on the disapproval side, Senators Pepper, Taylor and Humphrey. Judged by the number of mentions, the Republicans seem to have more "national figures" among their corps of Senators than do the Democrats, if the term "national figure" is used to describe someone whom a lot of people either look up to or frown upon.

TABLE VI

Senators Whose Actions People Say They Approve of Most

	Politically very active people	Politically very inactive people	All Republicans	All Democrats	All Independents
Total respondents	830	3063	2329	3479	1308
	%	%	%	%	%
Didn't name any Senator	33	84	61	72	66
Named someone not a U. S. Senator	10	2	5	5	5
Most frequently mentioned Senators:					
Byrd (D)	7	1	4	1	3
Eastland (D)	1	*	*	1	*
Fulbright (D)	2	*	*	1	*
Humphrey (D)	3	*	1	1	2
Ives (R)	2	*	1	*	1
Johnson (D)	1	*	1	1	1
Lucas (D)	2	*	*	1	2
McClellan (D)	1	*	0	1	*
Morse (R)	3	*	2	1	1
Pepper (D)	2	*	*	1	1
Saltonstall (R)	1	*	1	*	1
Taft (R)	19	2	17	3	8
Vandenberg (R)	9	1	7	2	6

* Less than 0.5%.

(3) The major reasons given, even by the "very active," for approving or disapproving of Senators tend to have more to do with the Senators' presumed personal characteristics than with their stands on public issues. It is obvious from reading the replies that many people were hard put to it to give any reason at all for their feeling about Senator X, except that they "liked him" or "dis-

liked him." Among the "very active" people who *did* list some concrete policy of the Senator that they approved or disapproved, there was some tendency to approve more often for what might be called "conservative" policies than for "liberal" ones. (This conclusion results from assigning all the classifiable answers to one or the other category.) On the disapproval side the conservative-liberal debate showed no clear leaning in either direction. All of these tendencies are consistent with the picture of the "very active" group that was outlined earlier.

TABLE VII

Senators Whose Actions People Say They Disapprove of Most

	Total sample	Politically very active people	Politically very inactive people	All Republicans	All Democrats	All Independents
Total respondents	8006	830	3063	2329	3479	1308
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Didn't name any Senator whose actions they usually disapprove of	81	51	90	79	81	75
Named someone not a U. S. Senator	4	10	2	4	4	5
Most frequently named Senators:						
Taft (R)	5	10	3	3	7	7
Pepper (D)	3	8	1	5	1	3
Hickenlooper (R)	1	1	*	1	1	1
Humphrey (D)	1	2	*	2	*	1
Taylor (D)	1	2	*	1	*	1

* Less than 0.5%.

(4) The avowed Independents in politics seem to lean more toward Democratic "liberalism" than toward Republican "conservatism" when they record their critical reactions to Senators, and the same is true to a somewhat lesser extent when they record their reasons for approving senatorial behavior.

A device known as an "adjective test" was used for measuring attitudes toward President Truman and toward the C.I.O. The respondent was presented with a card on which a list of words and short phrases was printed and was then asked to "pick out the three or four" which "best describe the way you feel about President Truman." Subsequently he was asked to pick out words that described the way he felt about the C.I.O. Results of this questioning are shown in Tables X and XI. It should be noted that, while in the tables the words are classified as "favorable" or "unfavorable," there were no such labels on the card handed the respondent. The list he saw had the "favorable" and "unfavorable" words well scrambled. In accordance with the standard procedure, one-half the sample were presented with a card listing the words in one order, while for the other half of the sample the word order was reversed.

The reactions of the politically "very active" to President Truman are somewhat mixed. Those who like him seem to "respect" him more often than they "admire" him, and "admire" him more often than they "have confidence in" him. Those who are negative toward the President seem to "*lack* confidence in" him more often than they "disapprove of" him; and he is apparently a man who rarely inspires "fear," "dislike," or "distrust."

TABLE VIII

Why People Approve of the Senators They Do

	Politically very active people	Politically very inactive people	All Republicans	All Democrats	All Independents
Number of respondents naming some U. S. Senator as one whose actions they usually approve of	506	335	822	847	378
	%	%	%	%	%
Reasons for approving:					
Like his personal characteristics	41	25	41	28	32
He's conservative	31	16	39	16	24
(For controlling labor, unions)	(15)	(9)	(24)	(6)	(11)
(For less government spending)	(10)	(6)	(11)	(7)	(9)
Like his stand on specific issues but no indication of stand	30	13	23	21	24
He's liberal	16	16	10	21	19
He works for local interests	8	14	6	14	6
Just like his policies	5	6	7	5	6
He's interested in welfare of farmers	6	5	3	8	3
He's a "middle of the road man"	2	1	1	1	1
Don't know	2	11	4	7	3

Democrats and Republicans naturally use pro and con words in quite different ratio to describe their reactions to the President, but the particular words they choose tend to fall into the pattern outlined above. Harry Truman is a man whom people can "respect" (perhaps because of his office or his courage) more easily than they can "admire" or "have confidence in" him; he is a man who inspires lack of confidence in many, but he is not one whom many distrust or dislike. One regrets that we do not have a similar word profile for Franklin D. Roosevelt as a sort of standard against which to measure Truman.

The C.I.O. arouses an entirely different response pattern, and one that is, in the main, strongly negative. Not even the Democrats have any great enthusiasm for it, and to "admit need for" it is as far as many of them will go. The Independents are more willing to admit the need for an organization such as the C.I.O., but otherwise are as negative as the Democrats. Americans seldom use the word "fear" in relation to an institution, and it is consequently surprising that almost a quarter of the most politically active people use this word in describing their reactions to the C.I.O.

TABLE IX

Why People Disapprove of the Senators They Do

	Politically very active people	Politically very inactive people	All Republicans	All Democrats	All Independents
Number of respondents naming some U. S. Senator as one whose actions they usually disapprove of	344	187	401	561	265
	%	%	%	%	%
Reasons for disapproving:					
He's too conservative	25	37	17	38	37
(Anti-labor, anti-union)	(11)	(17)	(5)	(20)	(14)
(All against the little fellow and for big business)	(5)	(8)	(4)	(9)	(8)
(Against civil rights, anti-Negro)	(8)	(8)	(6)	(6)	(8)
He's too liberal	25	13	32	12	14
(Socialistic, radical)	(15)	(11)	(18)	(8)	(8)
(Backs too many social reforms)	(5)	(2)	(9)	(2)	(3)
(For too much government spending)	(4)	*	(7)	(1)	(2)
(Too partial to labor)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(1)
Don't like his personal characteristics	34	28	41	24	31
Don't like his policies (non-specific)	13	14	8	21	14

* Less than 0.5%.

V. POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE

So far the Index has been presented only as a measure for segregating a "top tenth" of the population that probably is on the average more active politically than the other nine tenths. It has not been maintained that the "top tenth" are actually the most influential group of people in determining the course of political events.

Whether "more active" also means "more influential" is a difficult question to answer, since the political scientist's model picturing how influence is exerted in the American democracy seems to be far from complete. Certainly there is a close relation between political activity (as defined above) and political influence, but it is difficult to ascertain just how close the relation is. It may well be that only the top fiftieth, instead of the top tenth, in the population (i.e., the two million people with the highest activity scores) can be properly described as "influentials" in any realistic sense. And it is of course also possible that the kinds of activity covered in the Index are not good measures of political *influence* at all and that some other approach, placing greater stress on the offices held or the roles played in relation to organized pressure groups, might be more fruitful. No final answer can be given here until there is available a much clearer picture of the mental processes of the legislator or government administrator when he decides how to vote or act on a measure that is before him. What weighting does the average legislator assign to the different influences

TABLE X

Words Picked from a List to Describe How Respondent Feels about President Truman

	Politically very active people	Politically very inactive people	All Republicans	All Democrats	All Independents
	%	%	%	%	%
Favorable Words:					
Admire	25	29	16	41	25
Respect	36	44	31	56	44
Have confidence in	22	34	16	46	27
Approve	21	34	16	44	27
Admit need for	7	6	6	8	8
Neutral (indifferent to)	1	3	2	1	3
Unfavorable Words:					
Disapprove	36	11	35	11	19
Lack confidence in	52	17	53	19	35
Dislike	18	5	17	5	9
Distrust	23	4	17	6	9
Fear	11	2	9	3	5
Only Favorable Words	35	55	29	69	47
Only Unfavorable Words	48	16	50	14	29
Both Favorable and Unfavorable Words	13	7	13	9	13
Indifferent to	1	3	2	2	3

that play upon him in a given situation, and what is the average impact of any particular influence over a series of situations? In the long run, is it the legislator's daily mail from politically active citizens, the calls he gets from lobbyists, the advice from the party organization, the fear of what citizens may do next election day, or his own social philosophy that gets heaviest weight in his average decision? Until political scientists can put the daily thought processes of a sample of legislators under the microscope, there will be no complete or final answers to these questions.

TABLE XI

Words Picked from a List to Describe How Respondent Feels about the C.I.O.

	Politically very active people	Politically very inactive people	All Republicans	All Democrats	All Independents
	%	%	%	%	%
FAVORABLE WORDS:					
Admire	6	4	3	7	4
Respect	9	7	6	10	9
Have confidence in	9	8	5	11	11
Approve	13	14	9	18	17
Admit need for	27	14	19	21	28
NEUTRAL (indifferent to)	4	5	5	6	4
UNFAVORABLE WORDS:					
Disapprove of	34	17	34	23	25
Lack confidence in	27	12	22	16	19
Dislike	31	14	29	19	19
Distrust	34	12	28	18	19
Fear	23	7	20	10	13
ONLY FAVORABLE WORDS	23	20	16	26	27
ONLY UNFAVORABLE WORDS	48	25	49	32	34
BOTH FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE WORDS	16	5	12	9	13
INDIFFERENT TO	4	5	5	6	4

VI. IMMEDIATE USES FOR THE INDEX OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Further research is planned by the authors on this question of "How to identify the influentials in American political action." In this work they hope also to profit from the researches of political scientists. In the meantime, while waiting for fuller knowledge on what makes one influential, they plan to continue experimentation with the Index, viewing it primarily as a measure of citizen participation in the process of government and only secondarily, and very cautiously, as a means of locating people who exert influence. The authors can think of five uses to which the Index, in its present state of development, might usefully be put. These are:

(1) To compare different groups in the population with respect to the amount of political activity they exhibit. (Where does interest in political issues and the habit of political activity reside? In which regions, political parties, socio-economic classes, ethnic or occupational groups is the greatest amount of political activity to be found?)

(2) To measure general progress in citizenship education, by noting gains or losses from year to year in the proportion of people who make high political activity scores.

(3) To study relationships between political activity and information. (Are the most active the best informed? What levels of information go along with what degrees of political activity?)

(4) To segregate a target group of people who are most likely to be concerned enough with public issues to "take steps" about them. Appeals directed to this group should yield a higher rate of return than appeals to the total population.

(5) To provide a productive test group for study of opinion formation and the influences that bear on it. The "top tenth" are likely to have more definite and more articulate opinions, and hence constitute a good group with which to work. (What communications media do the "top tenth" expose themselves to? Can content of these media be correlated with opinions on socio-political issues?)

In practice, the Index may not prove to be as valuable in all of these five respects as is hoped. On the other hand, it may find new uses as yet not suspected. At present writing, all that can be said with certainty is that it appears to be a promising tool and one deserving of further experimentation.

INTERVIEWING SOUTHERN POLITICIANS

ALEXANDER HEARD
University of North Carolina

This is a report on the interviews used in preparing *Southern Politics in State and Nation.*[1] The book, by V. O. Key, Jr., resulted from a study carried on over a three year period at the Bureau of Public Administration of the University of Alabama. Roscoe C. Martin, then director of the Bureau, originated the project, obtained support for it from the Rockefeller Foundation and gave it general supervision.

Mr. Key was assisted by several persons, including this writer. He directed a large share of the project's resources to the task of interviewing participants in southern politics. Forty per cent of the budget was allocated for the salaries and expenses of the two interviewers[2] and for transcribing their reports. Thirty per cent of the time of the senior staff members and twenty per cent of the total time of the whole staff was spent in the field. The decision to devote this large amount of time and money to interviewing rested on the conviction that much significant political information could be obtained only from politicians themselves or from their close associates. It rested also on the belief that accurate observation would eliminate the need for conjecture about many political phenomena.

The interviews supplemented the customary research materials. Several hundred bibliographical items were assembled after systematic searching of periodical guides and library catalogues. Considerable effort was devoted to collecting election returns, registration and poll tax figures, constitutions, codes, session laws and party rules[3] in addition to the secondary works. A daily paper from each southern state and several other periodicals were clipped regularly. Extensive statistical computations were made, with much literature outside the field of political science called upon to aid in their interpretation. The information from the interviews was used by the author in close conjunction with the data from these other sources.

The interviewers sought information which falls roughly into six categories. First, they needed an accurate narrative of major political events. Newspaper reports and state government documents often fail to tell an adequate story of even recent political happenings. Half a dozen interviews, for instance, were necessary to learn the facts surrounding the repeal of the Florida poll tax in 1937. Second, they tried to learn something of the methods of politicians and the organizations with which they work—for example, how political funds are raised and how primary compaigns are organized. They sought, thirdly, to discern the objectives of practicing politicians, e.g., what the state senator thinks he is after. In the fourth place, they devoted much time to learning how legal and party rules are applied in practice; to answer, for example, such questions as whether *all* persons actually have to show their poll tax receipts. Next, when reflective persons were found, it was possible to test some of the working hypotheses of the study against their judgment. Finally, the interviewers wanted to uncover local attitudes toward political and social problems.

---

[1] (New York, 1949.) Eleven states were studied: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

[2] Donald S. Strong and this writer. The conclusions set forth here grew from the writer's experience in the nine states in which he worked.

[3] Most of the political statistics collected for the study, supplemented by additional material, have been published by Alexander Heard and Donald S. Strong in *Southern Primaries and Elections* (University, Alabama, 1950).

All in all, the interviewers set out to get the important facts about southern politics that could not be obtained from more objective sources. The detailed subjects most fully treated in the interviews are listed later in this article.

I. SELECTION OF INFORMANTS

Five hundred and thirty-eight persons were interviewed in the eleven states. They included politicians and political observers of all classes.[4] How were they chosen?

An interviewer spent about five weeks in each state. To help him become familiar with the state's politics, to decide whom to interview and what questions to ask, he went through an orientation program before commencing his task. He read the most adequate one volume history of the state. He read the newspaper clippings accumulated by the study. He became familiar with the major political races since 1920 and with the county-by-county returns of important recent races. He studied a standard set of correlations and maps showing the nature of the candidates' strength in these races. He learned the party rules and the legal provisions affecting the electoral process.[5] He rummaged through secondary works and government reports that threw light on the economic, social, topographical and political conditions of the state.

The interviewer emerged from this period of study with a set of questions that he thought ought to be answered about the state's politics. At the outset of the study, Mr. Key had drafted a 32-page outline of the subject matter with which the study would be concerned, and the interviewer's questions were drawn with an eye to the topics enumerated in this outline. He also prepared a preliminary list of persons to see. Then, as further orientation, on first entering a state the interviewer consulted personal friends and acquaintances to get an informal picture of affairs. These friends were sometimes able to advise him about persons worth interviewing and to warn him against those who would probably not be helpful. As the traveller made his way around the state he picked up additional prospects, and his decisions on whom to see were progressively influenced by the results of the preceding talks. He planned his itinerary in order to see people in all major sections, especially when sectional antagonisms were evident in the politics. Three-fifths of all interviews took place outside state capitals.

---

[4] Among those interviewed were 11 former governors, 5 United States Senators and former Senators, 16 United States Representatives and former Representatives, 27 managers of statewide political campaigns, 8 state party chairmen, 12 county party chairmen, 9 county and district judges, 56 present and former state legislators, 6 mayors, 8 secretaries of state, 9 prosecuting attorneys, 25 labor leaders (14 CIO, 7 AFL, 4 railroad brotherhoods), 14 farm organization leaders, 14 business organization leaders, 50 "reform" leaders, 21 officials charged with the administration of the poll tax, registration, primaries or elections, 9 publishers, 48 editors, 29 correspondents and columnists, 48 educators, 40 Negro leaders, and 26 Republican leaders. There was a visit to the office of all secretaries of state and to other offices to obtain statistical and legal data, as well as attendance at miscellaneous gatherings such as party rallies, "speakings," a KKK meeting, an ADA meeting, and a Negro political rally.

[5] Research assistants prepared abstracts of legal regulations and party rules as well as statistical calculations. The correlations were designed to show any social or economic bases of a candidate's strength, any similarities in the distribution of his strength from one race to another, any similarities to the strength of other politicians, and so forth.

The interviewer went first to persons likely to cooperate. The executive officers of pressure groups were generally willing to talk, though not always ready to tell all they knew. Newspaper people and educators had no difficulty in understanding the purpose of the study, and most of them were in sympathy with it. The interviewer soon learned that among partisans he was most assured of a welcome in that band loosely called "liberals." Labor leaders, Negro leaders, spark plugs of reform movements—all generally extended themselves to be of assistance. In a different category, retired politicians were of particular aid. The interviewer found them almost invariably eager to talk, and to talk frankly.

The interviewer went to these "easy" people first; at the same time he set up a stiff guard against overvaluing their data merely because they stood ready to give it. Where it was possible to do so, harder cases were put off until later in the schedule. After visiting around the state somewhat the interviewer felt better prepared to tackle the wary campaign manager, the remote financial angel, the tight-lipped county boss, the wealthy former governor busy with his law practice and the crusty plantation manager of hundreds of tenants.

The task of choosing whom to interview and what to ask placed a heavy responsibility upon the interviewer, while the independence with which he worked put a high premium on close understanding with the members of the staff who would use his findings. Since by his selection of interviewees he influenced greatly the quality of the information obtained, he had to evaluate it constantly, together with the sources providing it. It was his task to see that a balanced, sound body of data finally came from the interviews; that the required topics were covered; and that conflicting viewpoints were fully represented.[6]

---

[6] Studies by public opinion research organizations indicate that the validity of interview results is affected by the personal views of the interviewers and by discrepancies in race or class between interviewers and respondents. Sources of distortion are at least two: in the selection of persons for interview and in the differences in rapport established between the interviewer and his informants. The type of interviewing being discussed here differs from public opinion sampling, but the opportunities for bias are obvious. This is especially true when all interviews are conducted by one or two individuals rather than

II. RAPPORT BETWEEN INTERVIEWER AND INFORMANT

The success of an interview rests in part on the relationship between the interviewer and his informant. Many factors influence this relationship. The kind of introduction the visitor takes to his informant is one. The way in which the meeting is arranged is another. The persons, organizations and viewpoints with which the interviewer is identified in the mind of the person interviewed make up a third. Finally, the explanation that the interviewer gives of his purposes and the way he frames his questions further influence his informant.

Introducing the interviewer. For the southern politics study, 503 interview meetings were held. The interviewer was presented to his informants in the following ways:

%
39 The interviewer had no introduction.
29 The informant was suggested by a third party whose name could be used, but no formal introduction was arranged.
15 The interviewer was a personal friend of the informant and needed no introduction.
6 An introduction was made in person or through a letter by a personal friend of the interviewer.
6 An introduction was made by a person not previously known to the interviewer, usually a person who had himself been interviewed.
4 An introduction based on previous contacts was made by the Bureau of Public Administration.
1 Casual encounters led to interviews.
—
100

Although it is difficult to generalize on the best ways to get to an informant, a general tendency was noted; it seemed that, on the whole, no introduction at all brought the best results.

When a third person makes the introduction, he thereby usually guarantees the interviewer a courteous reception. In circles skeptical toward outsiders, or among busy people, a proper connection is particularly helpful. Yet, by and large, the ability of the interviewer to create respect for his mission and confidence in his intentions seemed to be more important than the introduction that he brought. In one black-belt town, for instance, the interviewer had impeccable connections. Nevertheless, he had to assure more than one person that he was not a "communist" and had not come as an agent of meddling Yankees. The principle was demonstrated in various settings. The interviewer called on a state A. F. of L. president and took with him adequate references. Unhappily, a CIO friend turned up in the A. F. of L. office at the same time; his cordial greeting to the interviewer produced an unmistakable reticence on the part of the A. F. of L. chief.

---

by a battery of persons whose biases may in some ways offset each other. See Hadley Cantril, *Gauging Public Opinion* (Princeton, 1944), Ch. 8, and Frederick Williams and Hadley Cantril, "The Use of Interviewer Rapport as a Method of Detecting Differences Between 'Public' and 'Private' Opinion," *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 22, pp. 171–75 (1945).

An introduction by a local partisan sometimes made it hard for the interviewer to convince his informant of his impartiality, for the interviewer seemed to acquire some of the color of his sponsor. When the sponsor and the informant were on the same side of the political fence, this factor might not be a handicap; but often it inhibited the conversation. The presence of third parties obstructed free conversation in somewhat the same way. Informants were invariably restrained in the presence of others, even old cronies. Talk about local affairs cannot be entirely frank if it will get back to one's fellow citizens.

Arranging appointments. The meetings were arranged in the following ways:

%	
45	The interviewer called in person, unannounced, and the interview was held forthwith.
30	The interviewer telephoned in advance for an appointment.
9	The interviewer called in person, unannounced, and a subsequent appointment was arranged.
9	A third party arranged the appointment.
4	The interviewer arranged the appointment in a chance personal conversation.
3	The interviewer arranged the appointment by letter.
100	

In over half the instances the interviewer asked in person for an appointment without preliminary contact. His chief purpose was to save time. With some 45 full-dress interviews to be held during his five weeks in a state, the interviewer had to bestir himself. He travelled by car and arranged his itinerary so that several prospects lay along the route; if one were not available he could go on to another. In important cases, however, or where a lengthy special trip was necessary, he made an appointment in advance. In cities with several prospects, he shuttled from one to another. As a result, the interviewer frequently had to wait to see his informant; but the time lost in waiting was less than would have been required to set up a series of appointments. Furthermore, the interviewer could maintain a flexible schedule if not bound by advance appointments. As noted later, this flexibility made it infinitely easier to write up the results of the interviews.

Some persons with interviewing experience have felt that they obtained best results when their conversation was dignified by an appointment, but for this study the interviewer preferred to arrive unannounced at the office of his prospect. In seeking an audience, he suggested that if the present time were not convenient, he hoped a later appointment could be granted. He found that this personal approach frequently forced, or at least encouraged, a favorable reception. There was less chance to "stall" than an advance inquiry by telephone or by letter might have provided. When the interviewer was in town just for an hour or so, his request assumed special urgency. Similarly, when he had gone out of his way to visit the town, his request was seldom turned down. Not unimportant was the opportunity for personal contact that was afforded. The prospective interviewee could see the kind of person with whom he was dealing, and the interviewer had a chance to use his powers of persuasion. The interviewer concluded that this element of personal contact is particularly important when a stranger wants to talk about "politics."

The initial steps in the interview process, though important, proved less significant than the rapport which the interviewer was able to create once the conversation began.

A friendly attitude. The interviewer immediately tried to place himself in a frame of reference that would arouse the sympathy of his prospective informant. He emphasized the indigenous nature of the study: southerners themselves, for a change, were studying southern politics. He expressed familiarity with individuals, organizations and situations that might appeal to his listener. He used or ignored references from third parties as the situation indicated, and tried to make himself attractive to his informant. One of the interviewers was a graduate of the University of North Carolina; some "liberal" circles seemed to find this fact reassuring. The other had spent a long period teaching at the University of Texas; the connection aided him greatly in that state. Some of the persons interviewed were previously acquainted with the Bureau of Public Administration or its personnel. In short, any common bond that could be located was exploited. The interviewer tried to adapt himself to colloquialisms, and even to local habits of dress.

He announced himself as a faculty member of the University of Alabama seeking to understand a much misunderstood subject, southern politics. He described the study in varying degrees of detail, conforming to the interests of his listener. In all cases he emphasized the impartial character of the study. He took care to display neither sympathy nor hostility towards partisan viewpoints. He assiduously avoided the term "investigation" and disclaimed it if it were used by another. His strength lay in an open and direct appeal for help. Many a gnarled campaigner or smooth inside-operator responded to the simple plea that students of politics had no way to get at the realities of politics except by going to politicians themselves. The direct appeal may have conveyed the sincerity of the inquirer, or may merely have been flattering, but it was patently more successful than an indirect approach might have been.

In eighteen months only three persons refused to grant interviews. One was a local boss in Georgia known for his aversion to the press. He was approached through a third party. If the interviewer had confronted him directly, he might have acceded. Another was a small town editor in South Carolina. He apparently took exception to an opening remark of the interviewer, and invented objections to all times proposed for an appointment. The third was a Virginia state legislator who said that he had plans for using the information requested and would prefer not to rob his own project.

A number of persons were skeptical of more study about the South. A Mississippi editor argued impatiently that southerners ought to study northern politics; they should dig up so much dirt that the Yankees would lose their taste for meddling in the affairs of others. A South Carolina labor leader was bitter. He could not imagine that any southern university would permit a fair statement about labor in politics to be published. But even these persons talked. They and others talked with a generosity and interest which suggested that political scientists should tap more and more this great source of information about politics, the politicians themselves.

The campaign manager of perhaps the South's most notorious demagogue told of his campaign strategy and showed his campaign books with so much pleasure that he invited his visitor back for a second session. In two states, the most influential politican was viewed by the public as unapproachable and slightly "unclean." When questioned with candor, these men gave two of the most penetrating interviews of the whole series. In another state, observers whispered that a leading banker played an important role as collector and distributor of campaign funds but was too deeply involved to talk about it. When interviewed, the banker answered frankly all questions put to him.

"Off-the-record" assurances. The freedom with which informants talked depended in part on their confidence that the interviewer would not embarrass them. The interviewer announced at the outset that he was not interested in statements for quotation. He explained that he was interested in getting data to help him and his colleagues understand their subject, and that he would respect all confidences. A few persons seemed to distrust the disclaimer and were reticent. Others brushed the assurances aside and invited quotation. Generally, however, the informants accepted the assurances for what they were worth and spoke freely.

To keep the spirit and letter of the security commitments created problems. The interviewer had to guard against repeating confidences that became part of his working information. The memoranda reporting the interviews had to be handled by as few people as possible, with some awkwardness in intra-office procedure resulting. And since interview sources were cited only in the first draft of the manuscript, the author had to accept a special burden of responsibility in his use of the material.

Putting the questions. In many interviewing assignments a questionnaire guides the interviewer, but in this work a different technique was used. The interviewer tried to avoid the formal atmosphere of an interview and instead to create the informal atmosphere of a conversation. By showing his familiarity with local conditions, he tried to convince his informant that he was worthy of a man-to-man talk. He speculated on political conditions and raised questions designed to stir his informant's interest. He adapted his pitch to the individual. The visitor might best reach a precinct registrar by sitting at his feet to catch the pearls thrown out in reply to direct questions, while he might more readily interest a United States Senator with a talk in which both parties exchanged views.

The interviewer could not adhere strictly to a written list of questions. He went into each interview, however, knowing specifically what information he was after and how he would direct the conversation to get it. Sometimes the conversation went according to plan—the questions being answered satisfactorily and the conversation moving easily from one to another. At other times, the informant proved unable or unwilling to discuss the questions at first raised. Then other subjects had to be explored. The interviewer kept alert to follow up lines of conversation adventitiously opened as the interview progressed. If a story-swapping atmosphere were established, the potentialities were almost limitless; but the interviewer felt it necessary to prepare himself for a lag in the talk by holding in reserve a battery of observations that would lead naturally to additional questions.

At the risk of impropriety, the questioner dragged out each interview as long as information was forthcoming. The interviews averaged 70 minutes in length, ranging from fifteen minute quickies to half-day visits. The schedule averaged roughly two 70-minute interviews per day.

III. REPORTING THE INTERVIEWS

The interviewer spent more time in writing up his interviews than in holding them. He took no notes during the interviews; to do so would have defeated the effort to create a conversational atmosphere. Consequently, he needed to get something on paper as soon as possible after the talking stopped. One reason that he tried to avoid advance appointments was to make sure of having all the time he needed to take notes immediately after leaving the interview. When, occasionally, the interviewer went directly from one informant to another, the value of both sessions was qualified thereby. The interviewer was preoccupied with the first during the second, and had to take care in unscrambling the two sets of statements. Whenever possible, he not only made notes immediately after the interview but dictated a memorandum within a day or two. (A stream of Ediphone cylinders was kept moving to and from the University by mail.) He reported as many direct quotations as possible in order to preserve the spirit of the interview. In fact, he generally tried to report everything said by the informant, no matter how valueless it might appear at the time.

As already mentioned, an outline of the subjects to be covered was drawn up at the outset of the project. Code numbers were given to the 240 topics of the outline. A file folder was set up for each code number, and materials from all sources were filed in these folders, with a separate folder set up for each state to receive duplicate material. The interview reports were divided into separate "items"—each item dealing with one of the coded topics in the outline. Each item was transcribed on a separate sheet and given the identification of the interview (name, place, date, etc.) and the code number of the topic to which it pertained. When an item pertained to more than one topic, an additional copy was made for each classification. Because of the extreme detail of the breakdown, the interviewer had some difficulty in keeping the classifications consistent.

The first item in each interview was preceded by an introduction giving the circumstances of the interview, such as why the interviewee was selected, how the session was arranged, how long it lasted and what the physical surroundings were. It also gave an appraisal of the interviewee and his information. The details were perhaps tedious, but they were necessary in evaluating the reliability of the data. The memoranda averaged a little over seven items each. Some had only one item; one had 26. In all, the memoranda ran to about 5,000 pages, while each item averaged something over a page in length.

IV. SUBJECTS COVERED

Earlier, the *types of data* sought in the interviews were described—namely, pictures of how certain major political developments occurred, of the methods and aims of politicians, of how laws and party rules were applied in practice, of social and political attitudes, together with informed comments on tentative findings. We now turn to the *subjects* that were most frequently reported on by the interviewers.

Information was obtained on 199 of the 240 coded topics of the outline. Altogether, 4,904 items of interview material were reported, each classified under one of the 199 topics. Twenty-nine of the code numbers, however, accounted for three-fourths of all the items. For convenience, the closely related topics among the 29 have been grouped together. The resulting 12 general subjects are listed below with the percentage of the total items devoted to each of them. These subjects—the ones on which the interviewers turned up most information—have particular importance for the one-party politics of the South.

%	
13.2	The nature and political activities of special interest groups, such as labor unions, Farm Bureaus and government employees.
12.9	Factional alignments among politicians and officeholders.
12.0	Campaign finance.
7.7	Campaign tactics and the nature of campaign propaganda.
6.9	The conduct and administration of elections and primaries.
5.6	Factional alignments among voters, in contrast to politicians and officeholders, especially the nature of Negro groupings and Negro political organizations.
4.8	Republican party.
4.5	The organization and management of political campaigns.
4.2	Social and racial attitudes.
3.9	Registration of voters.
3.6	Fraud and irregularity in the conduct of elections and primaries (already included in the larger subject above, conduct and administration of elections and primaries).
3.1	Estimates of the number of Negro voters.

V. WHAT OF THE RESULTS?

We have mentioned already the types of people who were easiest to approach and we have pointed out that most persons were cooperative. What was the most valuable information obtained? What type of informant was most helpful? How reliable were the data?

With few exceptions, the most valuable interviews were held with practitioners who related their personal experiences. The candidates, campaign managers, public officials and leaders of special groups who simply told what they did in politics and how they did it provided the most convincing and useful data. Their contribution was particularly significant because it was unavailable from other sources.

On the other hand, efforts to obtain "interpretation" of political phenomena were disappointing. Few of the practitioners had an appreciation of the social significance of their activities. The interviewer found that, even among professional observers, the time he could profitably spend discussing intangibles was limited. One of the ambitions of the study was to estimate the consequences for the South of its one-party politics. In the early stages, the interviewer asked many questions on this subject. Virtually no meaningful responses were forthcoming. A former governor of Arkansas delivered himself of a brilliant statement, but his type was rare. Even on more restricted problems of analysis, the results were much the same. There are in the South, for instance, sharp variations in the rates of participation in elections, the variations occurring from one county to another and also in elections held at different times in the same county. Few local informants had any idea of the factors that might provide an explanation. It should be noted, however, that much of the seemingly useless interview material took on meaning when put with data from other sources. And even a wholly disappointing interview provided the portrait of a politically significant individual.

In questioning practitioners about their activities, the interviewer found an interesting pattern. The more self-sufficient the individual, the freer he was to talk. Politicos are often inhibited by a sense of loyalty to their associates or by fear of their superiors. Thus the minions of a political machine refused to talk about matters that their boss discussed with freedom, and politicians operating in close alliance with others declined to answer questions that independent operators answered frankly. Politicians on the make proved less inclined to get down to the essentials than weathered veterans who had won and lost races for twenty years. In fact, the older and more experienced the politician, the more likely he was to speak freely. In several instances, persons retired from active affairs gave superb interviews. (The hazards of senility, alas, cannot always be avoided.) They were particularly informative on practices that skirt the law.

With party and public officials, the interviewer was sometimes able to ask for information as a matter of right. Even in those instances, however, he felt it undesirable to put his informant on edge. If he pressed for answers his informant did not want to give, the interviewer ran the risk of shutting him up altogether. The interviewer believed that he could break down the reticence by other tactics, and such usually proved the case. Sometimes he was able to approach the subject successfully from a different angle, or by a combination of tangential questions.

The staff was constantly aware of the problem of reliability in using the interview data. The limitations inherent in the interview process had been recognized at the outset. But the need to rely on material subject to incompleteness, and even error, only pointed up one of the recurring requirements of social research: imaginative yet disciplined thinking able to work in spite of imperfect data.

The interviewer felt that few informants tried to mislead. More often, they evaded embarrassing questions. The informant's manner frequently gave a hint of insincerity, if any were present, while the reputation of the informant served to put the interviewer on guard several times. As much interview information as possible was verified as an index to the dependability of the informant. It seemed clear that intentional deception was much less frequent than unintentional error. Few people can speak accurately on such a matter as campaign costs; fewer still will refrain from making guesses. On all matters, they will generalize on the basis of incomplete, though perhaps accurate, information. Even responsible citizens succumb to the temptation to repeat political gossip as though it were gospel. In every state the interviewer encountered questionable gossip that permeated the whole political community and was accepted by experienced observers as reliable. He made a point of tracing some of this gossip to its source. Numbers of items were found to have originated in nothing more substantial than speculation in high quarters, or simply in a misquotation of an informed individual.

Moreover, on many questions of technical fact the interviews proved useful only as a source of leads. Erroneous statements about the content of laws and party rules and about the outcome of elections revealed the amazing amount of misinformation carried around by many "practical" politicians.

Some persons with whom the staff took counsel were disappointed that no direct effort was made to learn "what the man in the street thinks" about controversial issues. They suggested that interviews confined largely to "big shots" would give a false view of lesser public opinion. The best informed observers that could be found were consulted about public attitudes. The results were sometimes disturbing, however, when apparently reliable informants reported diametrically opposed views as prevailing in a community. The interviewers engaged in no systematic opinion sampling of their own, but the results of opinion surveys were obtained wherever available. These experiences support further the conclusion stated above, that the interviewees were most helpful when they described their own personal activities, things they knew about at first hand.

Every effort was made to test the validity of information obtained in interviews against data collected from other sources. Its accuracy and its plausibility were evaluated by the interviewer when he reported it and by the other staff members when they used it. They were satisfied with the dependability of the data that was used. Interview material went into nearly all the chapters of the book and accounted for a great part of the contents of a majority of them.

One test of general dependability was made. One section of *Southern Politics* contains chapters describing the factionalism in each state. Much of the material for these chapters came from interviews. As a corrective measure, the staff submitted each of the chapters to three or four informed persons in the state to which it pertained. These readers occasionally had differences of opinion about broad interpretations. It was reassuring, however, that rarely did they point out an error of fact. The test may merely indicate the universality of ignorance, but it heartened the staff to know that at least it had company.

CERTAIN PERSONALITY FACTORS OF STATE LEGISLATORS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

JOHN B. MCCONAUGHY
University of South Carolina

Some twenty years ago Harold D. Lasswell, in his *Psychopathology and Politics*,[1] attempted to show by case histories some of the motivations and personality characteristics of certain political types. This book was a pioneer in its field because it applied the psychoanalytic "free fantasy" technique to the field of political science. The case histories were chosen from those in selected hospitals and from the official files of certain psychiatrists. From these case histories, Lasswell was able to obtain information which threw new light on the actions of such political types as the agitator and the administrator. He then developed the formula $p\}d\}r=P$; where p equals private motives, d equals displacement onto public objects, r equals rationalization in terms of public interest, $\}$ means "transformed into," and P signifies the political man.[2]

Lasswell's techniques are invaluable for the study of political personalities and motives. It is unfortunate that others have not utilized them more fully and thereby added to the store of knowledge concerning the personalities of politicians; but a partial explanation lies in the fact that the techniques themselves present obstacles to their ready use by political scientists. In the first place, the case histories are usually confidential and difficult to obtain. In the second place, in order to evaluate them validly the political scientist needs training as a psychiatrist as well as a political scientist. Finally, most of the case histories deal with either neurotic or psychotic individuals who came to the hospital or the psychiatrist only because they were somewhat abnormal. Although the study of the abnormal helps one to understand the normal, it would be a contradiction of terms to consider the abnormal typical of the normal. And while it is true that abnormality is a matter of degree rather than *non sui generis*, still the degree of difference can be so great as to be the difference between the reactions of politicians in a democratic United States and a nazi Germany or a communist Russia. There is no question about the validity of Lasswell's analysis concerning the individuals whom he studied; but because of the nature of his data and their selection, it is difficult for others to corroborate his findings and to determine whether or not his individuals are typical or representative of the average politician.

The Political Science Department at the University of South Carolina, in cooperation with the Psychology Department,[3] has been interested in developing new techniques which could be applied more widely to politicians at present active in politics. These techniques have the advantage of studying the normal rather than the abnormal; they are more objective than subjective, and are capable of being checked by other political scientists with a minimum

[1] (Chicago, 1930). [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 261–262.

[3] **Especially with Dr. M. Kershaw Walsh, Head of the Psychology Department.**

amount of training in psychology, rather than in psychiatry. The principal disadvantage of these techniques is that they are extensive rather than intensive. A political scientist using Lasswell's methods could probe deeper into individual cases than the researcher using the new techniques.

The procedure followed consisted of giving a battery of personality and opinion tests to eighteen legislators, state senators and representatives of South Carolina. The majority of the tests were administered at the State House during the regular session of the General Assembly; a few, however, were given to the men in their home offices. The legislators were promised absolute anonymity in order to encourage truthful answers. One control group for two of the tests, the Unlabelled Fascist Attitude Test and the Lentz C-R Opinionaire, was composed of a South Carolina service club of 28 members. A second control group for the C-R Opinionaire was composed of 21 adult men who had finished four years of college work and had received their A.B. degrees. A graduate student, with training in both political science and psychology[4] administered the tests and did the statistical research.

In general the legislators were quite cooperative in taking the tests, once they were assured that their identity would not be disclosed. The principal difficulty in administering the tests to them was the fact that they were extremely busy most of the time while the legislature was in session; consequently, each individual had to be given one test at a time. This operation required a high degree of patience. On the other hand, the fact that the legislators were meeting in Columbia, where the University is located, offered some compensating advantages.

Some explanation should be made of the statistical methods used in this research, since political scientists may not be as familiar with them as are psychologists.[5] Whenever equivalents were available, the raw scores of the tests given were converted into percentiles before comparisons were made, so that as many as possible of the scores would be given in the same unit of measurement. There were eleven factors tested by this particular battery of tests, and for each factor the following seven statistical values were found:

1. The frequency distribution, a tabular presentation showing how many cases are found in each step interval of the entire distribution.

2. The average, as found by the formula $\Sigma(F \cdot M)/N$, in which sigma (Σ) denotes "the sum of," F denotes frequency, M denotes the midpoints, and N denotes the number of cases.

3. The median, that point in a series above which 50% of the cases are located and below which 50% of them are located. This is found by merely counting one-half of N and using the score found at that point.

4. The standard deviation, the measure that sets the approximate limits of

---

[4] Marie Joyce Hayes, whose unpublished M.A. thesis, "The Personality Factors of Contemporary Political Leaders of South Carolina" (University of South Carolina, 1948), deals with some of the findings of the tests.

[5] For a fuller discussion of the statistical procedures involved, see Henry E. Garrett, *Statistics in Psychology and Education* (New York, 1926).

the middle two-thirds of a distribution when marked off above and below the average. It is found by the formula $\sqrt{\Sigma(FD^2/N}$ in which sigma (Σ) denotes "the sum of," F the frequency, D^2 the square of the deviation of each score from the average, and N the number of cases.

5. The correlation of scores of the legislators with their ages by the rank-difference method. In order to use this method, each politician was given a rank number according to his age, the oldest having number one and the youngest number eighteen. Each legislator was also given a number for each factor analyzed according to his scores, one denoting the highest score and eighteen the lowest. The correlation between the two was found by the formula $p = 6\Sigma D^2/N(N^2-1)$, in which p denotes *rho* or the coefficient of correlation, Σ denotes "the sum of," D^2 denotes the square of the difference between the ranks of age and score for each man, and N denotes the number of cases. The coefficient of correlation is found by squaring the differences between the rank orders of ages and scores, adding these and multiplying the sum by six. This is the dividend of the final fraction. The number of cases is then squared, one is subtracted from this figure and the result is multiplied by the number of cases. The product is then divided into the dividend. A positive coefficient would indicate a correlation between high scores and age; a negative coefficient would indicate a correlation between high scores and youth. A coefficient is considered significant only when it is at least ±.30.

6. A comparison of the averages of the scores of the older men with those of the younger. The ages of the men tested were 29-32-35-37-39-46-46-48-49-50-50-56-57-64-64-70. Therefore the youngest quarter, or quartile, of the men would be those from 29 to 38 years of age and the oldest would be from 59 to 70 years of age. The average of each of the extreme quartiles was found by the formula Σ scores/N. These averages were used to substantiate the coefficients of correlation.

7. Scattergrams were utilized to give a graphic picture of different correlations. The scores of the different men were plotted on the Y, or vertical, axis, and the variable factor (urbanity, education, or sales) was plotted on the X, or horizontal, axis. Each legislator, represented by a line, is placed in the correct position on the graph according to his score and the variable factor. A freehand line is drawn to show the general trend of the correlation. A positive correlation on such a scattergram would be shown by a line proceeding from the lower left-hand corner of the graph to the upper right-hand corner. A perfect negative correlation would be shown by a line proceeding from the upper left-hand corner to the lower right-hand corner at a 45 degree angle. A line proceeding from the upper middle of the graph to the bottom middle of the graph shows no correlation. The freehand line is drawn in such a manner that there is an equal number of short lines, representing the scores and the variable factor, on each side of the major line.

The tests given in this survey were the Bernreuter Personality Inventory, the Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors G-A-M-I-N, the Edwards Unlabeled Fascist Attitude Test and the Lentz C-R Opinionaire. All have the advantage that the traits being measured are not discernible by the person taking the test, thereby increasing the validity of the test.

The outstanding feature of the Bernreuter and the Guilford-Martin tests is that they measure several different factors of personality at one time, saving much time in administration. The following traits are measured by the Bernreuter Personality Inventory:

> (1) B1-N. A measure of neurotic tendency. Persons scoring high on this scale tend to be emotionally unstable. . . . Those scoring low tend to be well-balanced emotionally.
>
> (2) B2-S. A measure of self-sufficiency. Persons scoring high on this scale prefer to be alone, rarely ask for sympathy and encouragement, and tend to ignore the advice of others. Those scoring low dislike solitude and often seek advice and encouragement.
>
> (3) B3-I. A measure of introversion-extroversion. Persons scoring high on this scale tend to be introverted; that is, they are imaginative and tend to live within themselves. . . . Those scoring low are extroverted; that is, they rarely worry, seldom suffer emotional upsets, and rarely substitute day-dreaming for action.
>
> (4) B4-D. A measure of dominance-submission. Persons scoring high on this scale tend to dominate others in face-to-face situations. Those scoring low tend to be submissive.[6]

Norms have been compiled for male and female high school students, college students and adults, with which the scores of examinees may be compared. The Bernreuter Test has been criticized because of the fact that it shows a positive correlation between introversion and neurosis, which may be an artifact due to the use of some identical items in the two scales B1-N and B3-I. A test which could have been used in place of the Bernreuter would have been the Guilford-Martin S-T-R-D-C test, but the Bernreuter test was adopted because it is the most widely used test and therefore affords the best basis for comparison.

TABLE I

Bernreuter Personality Inventory

	Average P.R.	Median P.R.	S.D.	Rho-Correlation with Age
B1-N	32.83%	28.33%	24.19	−.04
B2-S	65.89%	72.50%	21.99	−.08
B3-I	28.78%	26.00%	20.93	−.02
B4-D	58.33%	62.50%	22.26	−.02

In interpreting the above table, the average adult male would score 50 per cent. The table indicates that the South Carolina political leaders are far less neurotic than the average male adult, far less introverted, more self-sufficient, and slightly more dominant. Indeed, the political leaders seem to be better adjusted to life and more stable than the average male voter. The results would seem to throw serious doubt on the theory sometimes advanced by psychoanalysts that politicians go into politics because of feelings of insufficiency or an inferiority complex. The politician is no dreamer; apparently he is a realist who enjoys meeting people and going on parties.

---

[6] Robert G. Bernreuter, *Manual for the Personality Inventory* (Stanford University, 1935), p. 1.

The traits measured by the Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors G-A-M-I-N are:

(1) G. General pressure for overt activity.
(2) A. Ascendency in social situations as opposed to submissiveness.
(3) M. Masculinity of attitudes and interests as opposed to femininity.
(4) I. Lack of inferiority feelings; self-confidence.
(5) N. Lack of nervous tenseness and irritability.[7]

TABLE II

Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors G-A-M-I-N

	Average P.R.	Median P.R.	S.D.	Rho-Coefficient with Age
G	54%	59%	25.68	−.30
A	67.17%	72%	21.61	−.30
M	69.72%	67%	19.09	.35
I	76.83%	83%	23.15	.06
N	60.19%	61.67%	26.50	.41

As Table II shows, the politicians tested were only slightly more energetic than the average male population, but they were much higher than average in respect to ascendancy in social situations, masculinity and lack of nervous tenseness and irritability. The political leaders were highest in lack of inferiority feelings. Only 23.17 per cent of the total adult male population ranks higher in lack of inferiority feelings than the average South Carolina political leader tested. The findings on lack of inferiority feelings also agree with B2-S on the Bernreuter Personality Inventory.

The Edwards Unlabelled Fascist Attitudes Test is based on a similar test, composed by Stagner, which arrived at the conclusion that while subjects may reject any statements labelled "fascist," they may accept the same statements if they are not so labelled.[8] Stagner's pioneer work in the field measures such phases of fascism as militarism, nationalism, anti-radicalism, contempt for the lower classes and opposition to labor unions.[9] Edwards' purpose was to include attitudes toward birth control, education, status of women, status toward religion, etc., for these phases can be a more delicate and less recognizable test of a fascist tendency.[10]

---

[7] *Manual of Directions and Norms for the Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors G-A-M-I-N*, p. 1.

[8] Allen L. Edwards, "Unlabelled Fascist Attitudes," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 36, p. 572 (1941). The Edwards Test was standardized on only 91 college students at the University of Akron in 1940, and may be a little hyper-sensitive. Its reliability has sometimes been questioned.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 575.

The lowest possible score obtainable on the Edwards Test is 20; the highest possible score is 100. In order to be sure of the meaning of the Edwards Test in South Carolina a control group composed of 28 adult members of a service club in South Carolina was used to provide a comparison with the legislators. This control group consisted of persons of varying ages.

TABLE III

Edwards Unlabelled Fascist Attitudes Test

	Midpoint	Average	Median	S.D.	Rho-Age and Score
Legislators	60	58.72	55.33	11.96	.38
Control Group	60	59.33	57.00	10.98	

	Rho County Sales and Score	Rho H. S. Graduates and Score	Rho Urban Percentage and Score
Legislators	−.31	−.42	−.38

It can be seen from Table III that the South Carolina political leaders averaged below the control group in fascist tendencies. (The political leaders also averaged from 1.3 points to 6.6 points, according to age, below the average made by the students who took the tests under Edwards.) In addition, this table shows that fascist tendencies increase with age but are inversely proportional to county sales, high school education and urban percentage of the voters who elect the South Carolina political leaders.

The Lentz C-R Opinionaire, which tests conservatism-radicalism, is based

TABLE IV

Lentz C-R. Opinionaire

	Conservatism Av. P.R.	Median P.R.	S.D.	Rho with Age
S.C. Legislators	64.78%	67.50%	26.58	.41
Control Group #1	60.00%	68.50%	21.74	
Control Group #2	54.26%	59.50%	20.37	

	Rho with Sales	Rho Education	Rho Urbanity
S.C. Legislators	−.45	−.03	−.13

---

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 576.

on the assumption that the conservatism-radicalism difference among persons is dependent upon the degree of their opposition or favor toward change.[11]

Although the South Carolina political leaders are among the top 36.22 per cent of the most conservative male adults in the United States, they average only slightly more conservative than the two South Carolina control groups. As indicated in the table, conservatism increases heavily with age and decreases quickly when legislators are from counties with high retail sales, which is an index of prosperity. The effects of education and urbanity of the electorate upon the political ideas of their representatives are too small to be statistically significant.

In conclusion, the Bernreuter Inventory given to eighteen of 170 South Carolina legislators indicated that the political leaders were decidedly less neurotic than the general male population; that they were more self-sufficient; that they were decidedly more extroverted; but that they were only slightly more dominant. The Guilford-Martin Inventory of Factors G-A-M-I-N indicated that South Carolina political leaders have, to an insignificant degree, more general pressure for overt activity than the average person; that they are decidedly more masculine than the general male population; that they are, to a large degree, more self-confident than the average person and have fewer feelings of inferiority; and that they are less irritable and tense than the average person. The South Carolina leaders, according to the Edwards Unlabelled Fascist Attitude Test, are less fascist than those treated by Edwards. The acceptance of fascist ideas by the leaders decreases with the prosperity, education and urbanity of the county which they represent. The C-R Opinionaire indicates that South Carolina political leaders are, to a significant degree, more conservative than the general college population, but not much more conservative than the samples of South Carolina population used as control groups. The counties in South Carolina with the largest retail sales send more liberal political leaders to the state capitol than counties with low retail sales.

In conclusion, it must be stressed that the results reported are highly tentative and should be used with extreme caution. The sample of eighteen political leaders is too small to be conclusive for the country as a whole. The eighteen leaders came from only one state, and personality traits might differ in other areas. It is to be hoped, consequently, that political scientists using similar techniques in other parts of the country may be able to add information which either corroborates or refutes the results obtained in South Carolina.

---

[11] Theodore F. Lentz and Colleagues, *Manual for C. R. Opinionaire* (St. Louis, 1935), p. 1.

THE STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

LESTER G. SELIGMAN

University of Chicago

> **It is a lesser question for the partisans of democracy to find means of governing the people than to get the people to choose the men most capable of governing.**
>
> **ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, in a letter to John Stuart Mill.**

Politics by leadership is one of the distinguishing features of the twentieth century. If the eighteenth century enunciated popular sovereignty and direct democracy as a major theme in democratic thought and the nineteenth century was concerned with the challenge of stratification and group conflict, then twentieth century trends have made us sensitive to the role of leadership. The search for the values of security and equality have led to changes in the character of politics. If one were to delineate this newer pattern of a *politics by leadership*, it would include the following: (1) the shift in the center of conflict resolution and initiative from parliamentary bodies and economic institutions to executive leadership;[1] (2) the proliferation of the immediate office of the chief executive from its cabinet-restricted status to a collectivity of co-adjuting instrumentalities; (3) the tendency toward increased centralization of political parties, with the subordination of the victorious parties as instruments for the chief executive; (4) the calculated manipulation of irrationalities by political leadership through the vast power-potential of mass communications; (5) the displacement of the amateur by the professional politician and civil servant; (6) the growth of bureaucracy as a source and technique of executive power but also as a fulcrum which all contestants for power attempt to employ; (7) the growth of interest groups in size, number and influence, with the tendency toward bureaucratization of their internal structure; (8) the changing role of the public that finds its effective voice in a direct and an interactive relation with the chief executive.

What are the social sources of this new pattern of politics? The centralizing tendencies[2] of the modern democratic state need no elaborate recapitulation. The pressing needs arising from economic instability, war, technological change and urbanization have caused new tasks and functions to be entrusted to executive leadership.[3] The new commitments to a sustained full employment policy and national defense augment these tendencies by calling for increased direction and decision by government, while underlying all of the tendencies toward increased executive direction there lies the basic technical factor that in the large state, characterized by universal suffrage, political action presupposes large organization that tends to thrust initiative to the top.[4]

---

[1] Otto Kirchheimer, "Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise," *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, Vol. 9, pp. 264–89 (1941).

[2] On the leadership political trends, see Herman Finer, *The Future of Government* (London, 1946), Ch. 1; Ernest Barker, *Reflections on Government* (London, 1942), pp. 123 ff.; W. Ivor Jennings, *Cabinet Government* (London, 1942); Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, 1946), pp. 77–128; E. Pendleton Herring, *Presidential Leadership* (New York, 1940); Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (New York, 1946), Ch. 18.

[3] For the growing literature on "constitutional dictatorship," see Frederick M. Watkins' essay, "The Problem of Constitutional Dictatorship," in C. J. Friedrich and Edward

What bears more iteration is the record of failures of leadership as part of the history of our times. The failure to recognize the importance of concentration of responsibility is a principal factor in the defeats of the Weimar Republic, Republican Spain, Austrian Social Democracy, the French *Front Populaire*, America in the 1920's and 1930's, and England during its Baldwin and Chamberlain regimes.[5] Although these failures of leadership arose in part from constitutional limitations and political practices,[6] including the restraint imposed by political traditions, the inadequacies in the caliber of prevailing leadership must be reckoned with. Nor were the failures in leadership confined to organs of the state alone. They also involved such voluntary associations and functional groups as labor, business and church organizations; for democracy rests upon a plurality of capable leadership rather than upon the selection of the single leader. The question may thus be seriously raised as to whether the democracies have been defective by impeding the free and continuous rise of adequate leadership.[7]

However, if the periods of defeat prevailed when crises and men were not congruent, there has also been another source of politics by leadership in the trend of political personalism of dynamic leaders—the two Roosevelts, Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Churchill, Poincaré—who have expanded the meaning of executive leadership. By their acts and ideas, these decisive leaders carved new sources and methods of power which have proved indispensable for democratic survival. Each, paradoxically, while resisting institutional restraints contributed to the further institutionalization of executive leadership.

S. Mason (eds.), *Public Policy* (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 324–79; Lindsay Rogers, *Crisis Government* (New York, 1934); Clinton L. Rossiter, *Constitutional Dictatorship* (Princeton, 1948).

[4] Studies of large-scale organizations indicate that formal centralization may in fact result in the devolution of authority to elements that are away from the center; thus formal centralization may well result in decentralization in terms of effective influence. This decentralization to other elements of leadership in the structure does not do violence to a conception of politics by leadership, but is quite consistent with it.

[5] On England, see Hamilton Fyfe, "Democracy and Leadership," *Nineteenth Century and After*, Vol. 129, pp. 465–76 (May, 1941); on France during the Popular Front regime, see Lindsay Rogers, "Personal Power and Popular Government," *Southern Review*, Vol. 3, pp. 225–42 (1937–38).

[6] See Arnold Brecht, "Constitutions and Leadership," *Social Research*, Vol. 1, pp. 265–86 (May, 1934). F. A. Hermens stresses the role of P. R. as a major deterrent to leadership in *Democracy or Anarchy* (Notre Dame, 1941).

[7] On this general theme see the stimulating essay by Albert Salomon, "Leadership and Democracy," in Max Ascoli and Fritz Lehmann (eds.), *Political and Economic Democracy* (New York, 1937), pp. 243–54.

Today, with more "built-in" provisions for executive leadership, we have possibly become less dependent upon the dynamic individual figure.[8]

In the larger sphere of social relations, the laying bare of the stresses of urbanization, economic insecurity, large-scale organization and the decline of community has tended to confirm the Hobbesian diagnosis that under certain conditions widespread insecurity seeks resolution in submission to leadership.[9] The bureaucratization process in both the occupational and the non-occupational aspects of living is consonant with impersonality in social relations, creating a vacuum that may be filled by the "solicitude" of a "sincere" leader.[10] As control becomes concentrated at the apex of the pyramid in the large-scale organization, the participant citizen tends to become a dissipated entity. Many observers, searching for the strategic factor to rekindle participation and involvement, have contended that it lies within the discovery and training of a liberating, democratic leadership. Attesting to this is the growing literature in education, industrial management, voluntary associations and public administration, which is devoted to the study of the recruitment and training of such leadership.

Such are the roots of the new concern with political leadership in democracy. One of the tasks that confronts us is defining the concept of democratic leadership. The empirical face of the new politics requires new democratic self-assessments in terms of its value consequences and implications. It is patent that democratic leadership must not mean the surrender of any of the values of free expression, public sharing in policy, the consideration of men as men and not things, and the procedural processes of discussion and compromise. Yet the pattern of politics associated with leadership and centralization which brings indispensable democratic virtues of more widespread social welfare and equalization of opportunity cannot but challenge other democratic values.

We might therefore suggest that the concept of leadership for democracy should include in its formulation an attempt to answer the following questions: How can a democracy set up leaders, from whom it desires direction, without paying submission as its price? Can democracy furnish leadership that will provide for change with responsibility and for power that is scrupulously used? There are also sub-problems of leadership for democracy: Can democracy provide for the orderly continuity and succession of leadership? Is the recruitment of leadership representative and not restricted? Does the path of ascent enhance or weaken the capacity of potential leaders to cope with the problematic situation confronting leadership today?[11] Does the institutionalization of the executive tend to screen leaders from accurate perception of public needs?[12] These are problems of institutional adjustment but also problems for democratic values. Democratic thought has not yet adequately wrestled with the problems of the implications of leadership.[13] Motivated perhaps by its opposition to authority,[14] it has regrettably left to the proponents of authoritarian and aristocratic-conservative politics the elaboration of a political theory of leadership.[15] Yet leadership concern is but the new aspect of the age-old problem of representation in politics, a question that has always been a root one for democratic theory.

---

[8] We may note the resurgence of demands for "cabinet government" in America as an expression of this desire to institutionalize executive leadership. (Institutionalization may result in generating the "myth" of the leader although the capacities of the man are not in accord with the myth.)

[9] Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (London, 1940); Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York, 1941).

[10] See the interesting study by Robert K. Merton, *Mass Persuasion* (New York, 1947). On bureaucratization and leadership generally, see Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (Eden and Cedar Paul trans.; Glencoe, 1949), together with the writings of Gaetano Mosca and Max Weber.

These remarks are but introductory to the consideration of the status of political leadership study today. If the subject is indeed of considerable importance, what is being done towards its exploration?

I. RECENT STUDIES OF LEADERSHIP

A. *Leadership as a Social Status-Position.* The study of leadership is sometimes focussed upon the conception of leadership as a status index and position.[16]

---

[11] A question asked by Brooks Adams in *The Law of Civilization and Decay* (New York, 1943).

[12] The writer is engaged in preliminary research on the men of the "inner circle" of presidential leadership, in which this question, among others, is explored.

[13] Joseph A. Schumpeter addresses himself to this question of reformulation of the conception of democratic politics in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (2d ed.; New York, 1947), Chs. 21–23. Schumpeter stretches his "theory of competitive leadership" too far in relegating the public to a mass-passivity status, and he does not go far enough in considering extra-governmental group factors in politics.

[14] Locke's chapter "Of Prerogative" in his *Second Treatise of Civil Government* showed appreciation of the necessity of executive leadership in the democratic state.

[15] See Carl Schmitt, *Staat, Bewegung, Volk* (Hamburg, 1935); Ernst Rudolf Huber, *Verfassung* (Hamburg, 1937), pp. 90 ff; René de Visme Williamson, "The Fascist Concept of Representation," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 3, pp. 29–41 (Feb., 1941); Émile Faguet, *The Cult of Incompetence* (Beatrice Barstow trans.; New York, 1911), among others.

[16] Illustrative are the following: Harold J. Laski, "The Personnel of the English Cabinet, 1801–1924," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 22, pp. 12–31 (Feb., 1928); John G. Heinberg, "The Personnel Structure of French Cabinets," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 33, pp. 267–78 (April, 1939); Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Leaders of Labor and Radical Movements in the United States and Foreign Countries," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 33, pp. 382–411 (Nov., 1927); (for a summary of many such studies, Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* [New York, 1927]); John Brown Mason, "Lawyers in the 71st to 75th Congress," *Rocky Mountain Law Review*, Vol. 10, pp. 43–52 (Dec., 1937); Madge M. McKinney, "The Personnel of the Seventy-seventh Congress," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 36, pp. 67–75 (Feb., 1942); J. F. S. Ross, *Parliamentary Representation* (London, 1948); Marion Brockway, *A Study of the Geographical, Occupational, and Political Characteristics of Congressmen* (M.A. thesis, University of Kansas, 1934); Frank P. Bourgin, *Personnel of the American Senate* (M.A. thesis, Claremont College, 1933). Consult especially Bruce Lannes Smith, Harold D. Lasswell, and Ralph D. Casey, *Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion* (Princeton, 1946), for references to many studies on the social recruitment of political leadership.

Such studies attempt to answer the following types of questions: Whom is the social and political structure elevating to eminence? From what strata of society are leaders recruited? What occupational skills do they possess? What are the channels of their ascent to power? Generally, the broad significance of such studies is their attempt to answer to what extent there is circulation and representativeness in the composition of political leadership. All too frequently, however, this type of research results in little else than statistical tabulation of collectivities of leaders. It fails to answer completely why particular individuals rose to the top. From this standpoint, such collectivity studies would be enriched by including more intensive case studies of one or more representatives of the sample. Moreover, the negative implications of such studies are sometimes more significant than the positive reports. Thus one question that ought always to be asked is to what extent there are blocks, and what is the nature of the blocks, to the free recruitment of leadership in our society. How do changes in leadership recruitment occur as related to (1) political changes (such as the direct election of Senators); (2) economic changes (such as inflation-depression periods); (3) war, etc. We are indeed in need of systematic and historical trend studies of ascent and recruitment aspects of politics as a career line, which arrive at generalizations in answer to the questions posed above.

B. *Leadership in Types of Social Structures.* Owing principally to the stimulating work of the late Kurt Lewin, there has been much interest and research in the subject of small primary-group leadership. Lewin and his students conducted several ingenious experiments involving the change of leadership in small groups, and obtained results which pointed out the decisive role of leadership in the formation and maintenance of group morale.[17] The experiment conducted with three "atmospheres" (democratic, authoritarian and laissez-faire) attempted to prove that democratic leadership is the most constructive and creative type of leadership,[18] although it did not prove that democratic leadership is best under all situations. This experiment does not justify leaping from a small, relatively simple situation in order to argue its homologies with the larger, more complex political milieu.[19] The democratic atmosphere of an

[17] See Ronald Lippit, "Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psychology: Autocratic and Democratic Atmospheres," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45, pp. 26–49 (July, 1939); and also Alex Bavelas and Kurt Lewin, "Training in Democratic Leadership," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 37, pp. 115–19 (Jan., 1942). For other studies in small group leadership, see Paul Pigors, *Leadership or Domination* (Boston, 1935); Thomas N. Whitehead, *Leadership in a Free Society* (Cambridge, 1936); Fritz Redl, "Group Emotion and Leadership," *Psychiatry*, Vol. 5, pp. 573–96 (Nov., 1942); Ferenc Merei, "Group Leadership and Institutionalization," *Human Relations*, Vol. 2, pp. 23–40 (no. 4, 1949).

[18] Lippit, *loc. cit.*

[19] Lewin never committed this error. See "The Special Case of Germany," in his posthumous *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York, 1948) and note its kinship to Mary P. Follett's emphasis upon primary groups as the base of a dynamic citizenry. (Her collected papers appear as *Dynamic Administration* [New York, 1942].) See also Alexander Dunlop Lindsay's *The Essentials of Democracy* (Philadelphia, 1929).

experimental group is not the microcosm of a democratic society. Political life occurs for the most part in large, institutional types of organizations, in which contacts are secondary and of which rules and forms are more characteristic than they are of face-to-face groups. Moreover, leadership in politics is associated with emergent features of leadership to a greater extent than would be true in an experimentally-imposed one. Political leadership is likewise associated with office-holding, which provides an increment of legal power to the office-occupant, and which in turn contributes to leadership acceptance.

However, the study of leadership in small groups does have several potential uses for the study of politics. Among them are the following: (1) In understanding the internal workings of large political parties, we would profit from the study of informal group leadership. (2) In studying the use of mass communications by political leaders, we could learn much from the function of small-group leaders as transmission belts or resistances in the communication process. (3) In the study of chief executives in their inner circles, "kitchen cabinets," etc., we would again find application for this type of study. (4) Much work remains to be done on small-group leadership in public administration agencies, in interest groups, etc. And there are doubtlessly many more possible applications of the facts governing small-group leadership to the study of political relations.[20]

C. *Leadership as Organizational Function and Institutional Position.* In recent years there has been a burgeoning of the literature on leadership in formal industrial organizations.[21] Owing largely to the work of Elton Mayo and the group whose center is the Harvard Business School, there has appeared a series of studies addressed to the problem of the malaise of morale in such organizations.[22] These excellent studies have laid bare the informal structure that underlies any formal organization. The studies have indicated that the problems of morale, coordination and efficiency in large-scale organizations have been erroneously conceived to be those of technical arrangements. In the task of integrating the web of informal relationship to the goals of the association, lies the crucial problem. And toward the solution of this problem, leadership plays a vital role. Leadership, to use Chester I. Barnard's phrase, is the "strategic factor" in establishing the kind of communication which resolves the tensions arising from the task of coordination. Much of the writing of this school is, therefore, devoted to the problem of the selection and training of able administrative leadership that will effectively organize cooperation.

---

[20] Political scientists, in developing our comparatively rich literature on urban political machines, long ago recognized the influence of primary contact relationships. See, for example, Sonya Forthal, *Cogwheels of Democracy* (New York, 1946); J. T. Salter, *Boss Rule* (New York, 1935); Roy V. Peel, *The Political Clubs of New York City* (New York, 1936).

[21] The literature of this group is abundant and is largely summarized in Elton Mayo, *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Boston, 1945). The most significant work for a theoretical treatment of leadership is Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, 1946).

[22] Political scientists should find much of relevance to their interests when the study of personal ascendancy in economic development, viz., business entrepreneurship, is advanced. See the following three papers, which were presented at the annual meeting of the Economic History Association, 1946, and which may be found in Supplement VI of the *Journal of Economic History*, entitled *The Tasks of Economic History* (1946): Arthur H. Cole, "An Approach to the Study of Entrepreneurship," pp. 1–15; Robert A. East, "The Business Entrepreneur in a Changing Colonial Economy, 1763–1795," pp. 16–27; Chester McArthur Destler, "Entrepreneurial Leadership among the 'Robber Barons': A Trial Balance," pp. 28–49.

As outstanding as has been the research by this school, its relevance to the study of political leadership is subject to some limitations. The first lies in the fact that politics occurs within a consensual framework of more conflicting purposes than the dominant purposes that characterize industrial organizations. Second, it is not the primary function of the political leader to *administer conflicts* or devise structural devices for their mitigation (although this is one of his available methods). Third, the analysis offered by this group ignores the factor of power. The term *communication* is used positively as the lubricant of coordination, so as to suggest that upon effective communication solely hinges proper coordination. That the hierarchical structure in industrial organization may represent power and value divisions between those who have more and those who have less, is virtually ignored. Contrast the type of analysis of executive function in the writings of this group with the analysis of leadership as organizational power in political machines in Harold F. Gosnell's *Machine Politics*. Fourth, the explicit goal of administered social harmony generates a somewhat anti-political bias.[23] Fifth, since a large area of political relations is concerned with competition and conflict between hierarchies, the analysis of a formal organization cannot adequately explain such relations. It is true, of course, that leadership relationships within formal organizations have much to do with their external political behavior; that is to say, other factors than political ones must bear analysis for explanations of this external behavior.

D. *Leadership as a Personality Type.* The attempt to elucidate political behavior by personality types dates back to the work of Ernst Kretschmer[24] and Edward Spranger.[25] The individual most influential in recent times in formulating such a typology in terms of the newer dynamic psychology is Harold D. Lasswell. In his *Psychopathology and Politics*[26] he employed psychoanalytic insights to lay down the basic premise that political motivations had their roots in subconscious sources framed during the early periods of human development. From this developed the basic formulation that the "political personality" displaced private motives onto public objects and rationalized them in terms of the public good.

---

[23] See the penetrating treatment by Chester I. Barnard, *The Dilemmas of Leadership in the Democratic Process* (Princeton, 1939). One is tempted to ask whether these dilemmas are "abnormal" or whether they are not virtues of democracy.

[24] *Physique and Character* (W. J. H. Sprott trans., from the 2d rev. ed.; New York, 1931).

[25] *Lebensformen* (Halle, 1924).

[26] (Chicago, 1930). One of the significant virtues of Lasswell's work is that he has consistently viewed the leadership phenomenon in terms of its power and policy implications and in terms of a broad context of an empirical political theory.

More recently, Lasswell has gone beyond his earlier formulations by using the recently advanced concept of "character structure" as the basis for a typology of political functional types, such as the agitator, theorist, bureaucrat, etc. The concept of political type is defined as embracing individuals who are "power seekers, searching out the power institutions of the society into which they are born and devoting themselves to the capture and use of government."[27] The political type is thus a "developmental type who passes through a distinctive career line in which power opportunities of each situation are selected in preference to other opportunities."[28] The character-type delineation would stress that leadership is both a function of a structural personality type, and in dynamic interaction with larger social situations that select individuals of particular types for leadership.

The question has been asked, however, whether the concept of character types adequately permits us to assess not only developmental factors but situational factors as well. There is a tendency on the part of some students employing this approach to make "character structure" an all-inclusive "sack" in terms of which all behavior of political figures is explained, disregarding the influence of the immediate situations and institutional factors as determinants.

The concept of character structure is a notable advance since it attempts to catch social determinants in behavior. With this tool, much work remains to be done. Those who anticipate the complete synthesis of psychological and social factors in political behavior must await developments in social psychological research. A good full-length treatment of particular political leaders that will attempt to cast psychological factors in their social contextual mold is needed. In the meantime, those employing character structure concepts are doing some of the most vibrant and stimulating work in the analysis of political leadership.[29]

E. *Political Biography.* In America political biography never achieved the vogue characteristic in other countries. However, there has of late been a renaissance in such writing after a long decline. The late nineteenth century gave us the "conservationist" biographies, such as Nicolay and Hay's *Abraham Lincoln.* The twentieth presented us with Albert J. Beveridge's *The Life of John Marshall,* a somewhat unbalanced study that was nevertheless a stride toward analysis beyond mere recording. Henry F. Pringle's *Theodore Roosevelt* must rank high because its author attempted to discover a meaningful pattern in a most complex political figure, although it suffers from Pringle's limited data and sardonic dislike of his subject. Compare Pringle's study, however, with Claude Bowers' study of the challenging figure of Albert Beveridge, wherein the author meanders gracefully with no apparent attempt at interpretation and analysis. In more recent days we have had some examples that elevated the quality of this craft. Harry Barnard's study of John Altgeld was more than historical revelation in its keen, detached grasp of the man and his political context. C. Vann Woodward has drawn an excellent delineation of both the man and his setting in his biography of the Populist demagogue, Tom Watson. The work of Allan Nevins and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has likewise represented advances. Dixon Wecter's *The Hero in America*, a series of essays, caught the key factor of the representational character of leadership and gave adequate attention to the function of public acceptance.

---

[27] *Power and Personality* (New York, 1948), p. 20.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[29] See the forthcoming volume by my colleague, David Riesman, on the theme of politics and character structure in America.

In general, political biography abounds in rich insights but suffers from its lack of criteria and conceptualization. Either no questions are asked or there is confusion as to the types of questions which a full-length treatment of the political leader might answer. It is somewhat paradoxical that, despite the marked stress given in American historiography to the role of the political personality, the analytical literature in political biography is as sparse as it is. One consequently awaits the application of theoretical insights of social science to the study of political biography. (It is encouraging to note that some historians, notably Roy Nichols, T. Cochran and Walter Johnson, are proclaiming the necessity for a more adequately delineated history of politics.)

II. THE MEANING OF LEADERSHIP—TRAITS OR REPRESENTATION?

The preoccupation with the "essence" of leadership has long beset the conception of leadership. It may be, as Professor Carl J. Friedrich has indicated, a reflection of democratic thinking that we have become disenchanted with a conception of leadership posited upon the existence of a peculiar substance possessed only by some. In the literature alluded to in the previous pages, the conception of leadership as relational, that is, dependent upon acceptance within particular contexts, is universally acknowledged. Thus the long search for leadership traits has apparently come to the trough of its promise, where it may well rest for some time.[30] R. M. Stogdill concludes, after his long and exhaustive analysis of the experimental literature, that "leadership is not a matter of passive status, or of the mere possession of some combination of traits. It appears rather to be a working relationship among members of a group, in which the leader acquires status through active participation and demonstration of his capacity for carrying cooperative tasks through to completion."[31] With regard to traits, he adds, "Significant aspects of this capacity for organizing and expediting cooperative effort appear to be intelligence, alertness to the needs and motives of others, and insight into situations, further reinforced by such habits as responsibility, initiative, persistence, and self-confidence." It is noteworthy that the lists of traits that are distilled from the literature usually result in some tautologies, since they refer to conduct by the leader in a particular situation. Traits are not to be ignored nor dismissed, but recent literature has refined our perception of the functional interdependence of leadership traits and situational factors.

---

[30] The relational concept of leadership was elaborated some time ago by sociologists, notably Max Weber, Robert Michels, Georg Simmel and C. H. Cooley. See Irving Knickerbocker, "Leadership: A Conception and Some Implications," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 4, pp. 23–40 (Summer, 1948).

[31] Ralph M. Stogdill, "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature," *Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 25, p. 66 (Jan., 1948).

The characteristic of active participation as a leadership trait calls for comment. Active participation follows from the conventional conceptions of leadership as "dynamic." This overt dynamic quality may be a presumption about leadership not applicable in all instances. Thus it is conceivable that leadership may be exercised without the leader's awareness or conscious striving to be a leader. For situations of this type the concept of a "central person" might be useful.[32] The term might well be used to describe a person who represents a new trend in conduct or ideas without being conscious of leading or directing, a person who even is subject to imitation without *attempting* to influence.

More recent literature has stressed two central factors in the analysis of leadership. First, emphasis has been placed on the hypothesis that *leadership is a function of acceptance by followers.* A leader is not a leader unless he is accepted by followers; leadership is a representational role. Over a generation ago, Charles Horton Cooley expressed this point in the following manner: "All leadership takes place through the communication of ideas to the minds of others, and unless the ideas are so presented as to be congenial to those other minds, they will evidently be rejected."[33]

Secondly, the point has been stressed that *who is chosen as a leader is related to the tensions and values of a particular situation.* This point has been made repeatedly in the literature, but perhaps most cogently in the experimental work of Helen Hall Jennings.[34] Employing the sociometric methods of J. L. Moreno, she arrived at the following conclusion: "Both leadership and isolation appear as phenomena which arise out of the individual differences in interpersonal capacity for participation and as phenomena which are indigenous to the specific social milieu in which they are produced. Individuals who in this community appear as leaders may or may not be found to be leaders in another community of which they later become a part; likewise, individuals who in this community appear as isolates may or may not be found in another community later to remain isolated."[35] The same point was made in the conclusion of the experimental work performed in selecting leaders for OSS during the war by Dr. H. A. Murray and his associates.[36]

---

[32] The term is used by Redl, *loc. cit.*

[33] *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, 1902), p. 294. Chester I. Barnard, in addition to his contributions in other works cited, carefully analyzes this relational aspect of leadership in his chapter on "The Nature of Leadership," in *Organization and Management* (Cambridge, 1948).

[34] See her *Leadership and Isolation* (New York, 1943) and her "Leadership—A Dynamic Re-definition," *Journal of Educational Sociology,* Vol. 17, pp. 431–33 (Mar., 1944). For an interesting application of these methods to discover "political leadership," see the note by Charles P. Loomis, Douglas Ensminger and Jane Woolley, "Neighborhoods and Communities in County Planning," *Rural Sociology,* Vol. 6, pp. 339–41 (Dec., 1941); also Albert J. Murphy, "A Study of the Leadership Process," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 6, pp. 674–87 (Oct., 1941).

In sum, the recent literature on leadership has given us a synthetic view of both traits and functional relationship to group and situation. The more organic view of leadership should permit a convergence of points of view that should make leadership no less complex, but clearer in its basic conception.

III. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE AGENDA

A paper that attempts a survey of the literature must consider the various approaches to the study of leadership. It is apparent that present methods are widely varied. In the consideration of each approach, suggestions were offered as to potential lines of inquiry. In the present stage of development of the social sciences we cannot suggest one single approach as *the* method, and we must necessarily lean upon a fruitful eclecticism. But perhaps we can help solve the problem of approach by delimiting a frame of reference within which the study of political leadership may be pursued.

As political scientists, we are concerned with the conflict, power and policy implications of leadership. Our present literature is largely concerned with understanding leadership within types of social structure and in terms of defining political roles. It thus focusses largely upon leader-led relationships within the confines of group structures. For political scientists this is but one aspect of the study of leadership, to wit, its representative and technique dimensions within groups. We are not interested exclusively in these relationships, nor in the phenomenon of leadership per se. We are instead concerned with a politics by leadership, that is, a conception of politics that finds power factors in society best approachable through the understanding of leader-led and leader-leader relations.[37]

A politics by leadership conception would concern itself with generalizations concerning four types of relations: (1) the relations of leaders to led within particular political structures, (2) the relationship between leaders of political structures, (3) the relationship between leaders of one structure and the followers of another, and (4) the relationship between leaders and the "unorganized" or nonaffiliated.[38] *Within such a matrix the study of leadership may be actively pursued.* For the formulation of such a conception it is necessary that we elaborate concepts of (1) types of relationship between leaders and led, that is, a characterization of kinds of representative relationships we may find, (2) the classification of leaders by functional types, and (3) types of relationships between leaders in the formation of public policy. The problem of developing such categories as these is made difficult by the plurality of approaches which may be used. In other words, if we say that we are interested in types of relationship between leaders and led, shall we characterize the relationship in terms of the rank and file, in terms of the leader's inner circle, or in terms of the hierarchy of sub-leaders among his following? It would appear that the type of relationship would vary in each instance. In a similar vein, the classification of leaders by functional types can be made in terms of their skill function, their institutional position, the character of the group they lead, or the function they perform in the policy process.

---

[35] Jennings, *Leadership and Isolation*, p. 204. See also Pigors, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[36] U. S. Office of Strategic Services, *Assessment of Men; Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Service* (New York, 1948).

[37] It should be emphasized that such a conception of politics entails no value presuppositions as to the inferiority of the public. It is not elitism. On the contrary, such an approach recognizes the vital and sustained role of the public in political direction.

[38] It may be somewhat paradoxical to our notions that political influence is directly correlated with the degree of organization of interests, but if the relatively isolated are identified with the "white collar" floating vote, their isolation makes them most influential politically.

The approach which we would find most useful is the one that centers always on the power and policy context of leadership behavior. Thus leader-led relationships ought to be considered in terms of the distribution of power and influence between leader and led. Leadership types ought to be cast in terms of the role they play in influencing policy. From this standpoint, leadership might be characterized in terms of the scope of the leaders' activities and in terms of the techniques they employ.

One final question must be raised. If leadership research must see the leader in terms of his intra-group relationships as a basis for relating this to his inter-group relationships, to what extent should the power contestants be categorized as groups? For example, if one lumps together the full galaxy of pressure groups, lobbies and functional groups as "groups," the differences in cohesiveness and articulation of structure are so great as to stretch the meaning of "group" beyond the limits of its elasticity. Leader-led relations do exist in these groups, but case studies are necessary to indicate what type of relationships exist within such groups as part and parcel of the study of leadership between these groups.

We may sum up by stating that the areas for profitable leadership research may be denoted as (1) recruitment or developmental studies, i.e., studies concerned with social origins and career-lines of political leaders; (2) studies of the representative dimension of leadership—the character of acceptance by followers; (3) studies of political leadership techniques; (4) specific case studies of leadership functions in typologically expressed political situations.

This paper has touched on some research questions and avenues for research. Its general purpose has been, in short, (1) to indicate the problems that make the study of political leadership of importance from both the empirical and the value standpoint, (2) to point out the nature of some recent research on leadership and its relevance for political science, (3) to urge the importance of theoretical formulations that will build a conception of politics by leadership, within which particular problems for research would assume significance, and (4) to suggest some specific areas for research.

PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH—AN OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICAL PARTIES

FREDERICK C. IRION
University of New Mexico

The purpose of this paper is to describe how public opinion research can aid political parties in adopting sound policies and wise courses of action. In view of the crisis brought to a climax by events in Korea, the analysis is confined to how current public opinion research can be used immediately and to how public opinion methodology can be adapted now for more extensive practical application. In addition, since public opinion research throws into focus the critical problems facing political parties, certain of these problems are noted to show the limitations of public opinion research as it can now be used.

Before the 1948 polling difficulties, research in the form of questionnaires showed that politicians had a high regard for public opinion polls. Although apparently no comparable research has been conducted since then on their attitude toward polls, statements of individual politicians have shown that polls have dropped sharply in prestige. At present, public opinion research techniques are perhaps undervalued, as they were once overvalued.

There is a primary misconception about polls which has been fostered in part by the pollsters themselves. Polls are not accurate to a percentage point or within an artificial "margin of error" under certain circumstances. The difficulties inherent in selecting a topic to be studied, choosing the universe of the sample, determining the make-up of the sample, preparing questions, pre-testing, interviewing, compiling results and presenting findings make it impossible to obtain the exactness of, say, a double-entry bookkeeping system. To this must be added the fact that we have inadequate psychological and sociological data to determine whether or not people, at least people as a whole, really have opinions such as the pollsters attempt to measure.

Furthermore, however accurate they may be, public opinion polls and the other methods of public opinion research were never designed to establish betting odds for elections. Research in this field is much too important to be thought of as a way to aid gamblers, professional or otherwise, who want advance information about coming events.

The correct position has been stated by Avery Leiserson as follows: "If we can agree that public policy decisions are more apt to be made in the line of public interest when more precise information is available as to the extent of agreement and disagreement among opinion segments of the population than when they are made solely on the basis of group pressures and politicians' hunches, then public opinion research needs no higher justification."[1]

---

[1] Avery Leiserson, "Opinion Research and the Political Process: Farm Policy an Example," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 13, p. 33 (Spring, 1949). See also David B. Truman, "Public Opinion Research as a Tool of Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 5, pp. 62–72 (Winter, 1945).

I. PRESENT POLITICAL VALUE AND USE OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH

As now developed, public opinion research has immediate utility for political parties in three areas. Each one of these has both advantages and limitations, which are described in the following discussion.

(1) *Public sentiment.* Present polling methods, especially as developed by the commercial pollsters, have considerable value for politicians. For example, the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) in 1949 obtained information of concern to the Republican Party.[2] The question asked was presented as follows:

> There are two different points of view as to why the Republican Party has not won the last five presidential elections. Which of these two views do you, yourself, think is more nearly right: (1) One group holds that the Republican Party is too conservative—that it needs a program concerned more directly with the welfare of the people, particularly those in the lower and middle income levels. (2) The other group says that the policies of the Republican Party are good—but the party needs better leaders to explain these policies to voters and win support for them.

The answers are summarized here:

	Republicans	*Independents*
Better policies	27%	39%
Better leaders	42	25
Both	12	13
No opinion	19	23

There is no necessity for the Republican Party to assume that the poll quoted above is 100 per cent accurate. Nevertheless, it brings up interesting points that have vital bearing on campaign methods and the future of the Republican Party.

Such polls are not an exclusive way of gathering information. Neither should they be accepted without checking in all other customary ways. However, they do point up ideas which may be unexpected to the persons concerned and do offer a basis for concrete discussion.

Polls must be used in concrete situations. For instance, national polls have shown consistently that housing is considered a serious problem. However, state polls show a varying pattern. For example, a poll showed that more than 30 per cent of the people of California are concerned with housing while in Texas a poll showed that only six per cent of the people of that state believe housing to be a major problem.[3] It would be foolish, on the basis of national results, for a Texas politician to make a great campaign issue out of housing (unless special reasons also existed); it likewise would be foolish for a California politician to ignore housing (unless special reasons also existed).

Polling results are no more self-applying than are stock-market summaries,

---

[2] The question and results are reported in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 13, p. 556 (Fall, 1949).

[3] As reported by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, "The Contribution of the Regional Poll to Political Understanding," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 13, pp. 584–585 (Winter, 1949–50).

Federal Reserve reports, or the statistics of economists. No baseball fan expects a player to perform each game exactly in accordance with his batting average. And it is just as unreasonable to expect polling results to show automatically what path will lead to a desired goal. The uncritical acceptance or rejection of polling results has been a serious handicap to the proper utilization of polling as it now exists; nevertheless, polling results used with proper caution have a great deal to offer the politician.

(2) *Historical analysis.* The influence of public opinion research is clearly felt in the field of history. Lessons from the past, which would be otherwise lost, are often discoverable by looking at materials from a public opinion research viewpoint. For instance, Andrew J. Morse finds that the influence of public opinion on the content of campaign speeches is often greater than the effect of the speeches on the public. He presents Winston Churchill's comments on the British General Election of 1918 as an example.[4]

If it is assumed that history is of value in determining the solution of current political problems, then the evaluation of historical sources in view of public opinion research methodology and knowledge will be of aid to politicians. The amounts of historical materials developed in the light of public opinion research techniques are great. It may be that a political scientist will assemble these interpretations in some codified form that will make them easily available to all.

(3) *Suggestions.* Public opinion research has developed many suggestions that are valuable for politicians and for the parties which they represent. A few of the recurring ones pertain to the development of American international policy in view of home and foreign opinion; the effectiveness of political communications, both at home and abroad; the role of leadership, especially in securing democratic ideals; psychological warfare; and the development of group co-operation, especially by capital and labor and among minorities. Politicians and political parties in search of programs to implement democratic action can find a wealth of material in current publications and books concerning public opinion research.

In the political process, public opinion research techniques have been used in three major ways:

(a) The research bureaus of political parties, national and sometimes state and local, have used the polling technique to determine issues, estimate the popularity of various candidates, and so forth. Party organizations have engaged commercial pollsters to check their canvasses and have even been known to use polls instead of the customary canvasses.[5] One United States Representative conducted at the beginning of his campaign a poll of his district in which questions were asked concerning attitudes toward current issues. He used the poll results as a spring-board in his campaigning. But as a whole there is still no indication that opinion research is used extensively in electioneering and in other party processes.[6]

---

[4] Andrew J. Morse, "The Effect of Popular Opinion on Campaign Slogans—an Illustration," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 13, pp. 507–510 (Fall, 1949).

[5] Dayton David McKean, *Party and Pressure Politics* (Boston, 1949), p. 178.

(b) Administrative agencies sometimes poll public opinion to determine the effectiveness of a program or to decide what program is desired by the public. A few city managers have conducted polls. The Federal Department of Agriculture has conducted elaborate referenda, and the Veterans Administration has used many devices for determining opinion.

(c) Governments have created formal bodies to investigate problems. The legislative reference bureaus, as well as the privately supported bureaus, have sometimes used public opinion research methods. More direct and important experience has been made available by the Washington Public Opinion Laboratory.

II. POTENTIALS OF PUBLICLY SUPPORTED OPINION RESEARCH

In 1947, the legislature of the State of Washington voted funds which founded the Washington Public Opinion Laboratory in Seattle and Pullman. It is staffed and controlled jointly by the social science departments of Washington University and the State College of Washington. The following types of activities are conducted: (a) civic research, to find the facts and amplify the voice of the people on current issues and problems; (b) basic research, to learn how to predict and guide social behavior; (c) technical research, to improve the methods of polling; and (d) personnel training, to build up a body of scientists thoroughly trained in social research. The basic assumption is that "the public opinion poll supplements elections and representatives, news reporters, and other reflectors of the people's attitudes and needs, by providing a modern tool to measure whatever the public wants to know about itself."[7]

Stuart C. Dodd, director of the Laboratory in Seattle, has pointed to two interesting examples of how the Laboratory functions. During a dispute in the State of Washington regarding an increase of old age pensions, the initiative was used to resolve the issues. The state requested the Washington opinion researchers to ascertain the public's desires. A poll revealed overwhelming public favor for the measure and also determined what the public wanted in regard to medical treatment and other benefits. The actual vote confirmed the poll's prediction of support. In addition, it was pointed out that, if the legislature had utilized the information gleaned from the polls, it could have defined the issues more clearly and have inserted clauses which conformed more closely to the public's ideas of the alternatives involved.[8]

Another example involved a housing project in which the police were anticipating an outbreak of violence. Many incidents had occurred and the authorities requested the pollsters to survey the situation and to make recommendations. The results of the poll showed that the situation was not as bad as anticipated but that certain sources of friction existed. This poll had the result of mollifying the police and at the same time of diagnosing the sources of tensions. Following the survey, various groups assumed responsibility for rectifying many of the maladjustments which had caused the friction.[9]

---

[6] Robert Bower, "Public Opinion Polls and the Politician," *Annals*, Vol. 259, p. 109 (September, 1948).

[7] Stuart C. Dodd, "The Washington Public Opinion Laboratory," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12, p. 118 (Spring, 1948).

[8] As discussed in Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 583.

Along slightly different lines, Elmo Roper recommends the use by government, in competition with private agencies, of public opinion polls. He suggests that a governmental polling agency can be developed with an objective staff that would develop a tradition of impartiality. Hugh A. Bone finds that Roper's suggestion has not received the debate it merits, perhaps because Congress fears that such a polling agency might usurp some of the lawmaking function and might be turned into a weapon to favor the program of the party in power.[10]

To make a comparison previously used by the author, parties, politicians and legislatures without adequate polling techniques at their disposal are somewhat like persons attempting to go from New York to Los Angeles by ox cart. Doubtless with care and good fortune, persons carried by ox cart eventually would arrive at their destination. However, politicians and legislators with adequate polling data would be more like passengers making the trip by a superskyliner. This comparison is the more pointed if we take into consideration that we are living in a skyliner age and that, in order to survive, the political process must keep abreast of the time.[11]

III. DEMOCRACY AND A REDUCED LIVING STANDARD

Political parties today seem to be placed in the following situation by events beyond their control: they can advocate "moderate" expenditures for war production and similar activities, or they can advocate increased expenditures on an all-out scale. The first alternative may mean that the United States and its allies will be left defenseless in many areas during the international turmoil through which the world apparently must pass; the second alternative may mean that the living standard of Americans will decline.

Inadequate defense that could cause the United States to lose a war would lead to the destruction of democracy. Defense expenditures that would cause a declining standard of living could likewise cause the loss of democracy, since democracy and an ever-rising living standard have been united in the public mind to a considerable degree. But since the effects of losing a war are so obvious, it is likely that both major political parties will be forced eventually to advocate all-out preparedness. Theoretically, other alternatives exist; practically, they do not under present circumstances.

The immediate problem before each major party is to win elections and to aid to a maximum in the all-out preparations necessary for defending the

---

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 583–584.

[10] Hugh A. Bone, *American Politics and the Party System* (New York, 1949), p. 89.

[11] *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York, 1950), pp. 507–514.

United States. It is easy enough to say that both can be done. But both major parties, as of mid-autumn, 1950, showed considerable fear of a "blood, sweat and tears" program. No party relishes the responsibility of advocating a program that will reduce living standards. It is at this point that public opinion research has a great deal to offer.

Public opinion research has shown that Americans frequently want opposites. They want taxes reduced and the national debt paid off. They also want cheap government and more services of all types. They are, in short, for both sides of many political issues. Consequently, the great advantage of polling in a period in which living standards must be reduced to protect the United States is that political parties and their spokesmen can find means of presenting disagreeable facts in ways that need not necessarily repel voters. If the public wants both increased defense preparations and an increased standard of living, public opinion polling can show how increased defense expenditures can be presented to win widest approval and how a decreased living standard can be presented in such a way that it will be acceptable, although unpopular in certain aspects.

The challenge of public opinion research to political parties lies in the probability that people can be told the truth and elections can still be won, even though the truth may not be popular. The matter of convincing the public of the necessity of an unpopular aspect of a popular program—better defense but less food, goods and services, to be precise—can best be accomplished if the public reaction is adequately gauged through public opinion research techniques. Toward this end public opinion research, especially polling, can be used by political parties to (1) determine the best way in which to state facts and issues, (2) estimate under specific circumstances what various publics want, (3) gauge the popularity of policies, and (4) measure the effect of personalities and events.

There may, however, be two questions raised regarding an extensive use of public opinion research by political parties. Can parties finance polls and conduct them with requisite technical skill? Do political leaders fail to champion the wisest policies for the country simply because they do not know how to "coat the pill"? By way of answer, parties now spend millions of dollars to run campaigns. Probably only at the local level (and this would not apply to larger municipalities) are the funds available insufficient for adequate opinion research, if the parties recognize the necessity for determining public opinion. Also, parties already know how to "coat the pill." What they do not appreciate is the extent to which the public will accept sacrifices, sweat and tears. Without public opinion research for a guide, the danger is that they will think in terms of peacetime stereotypes during the most dangerous crisis which has ever existed for the United States.

It is not argued here that public opinion research is the final answer to the problems faced by political parties. It is urged that public opinion research is an indispensable tool which parties should utilize to the maximum.

IV. DEMOCRATIC THEORY

It would be pleasant to believe that our major political parties would automatically subordinate the desire to win elections and control government to the purpose of advocating necessary programs in the present emergency. But from experience before, during and after World War II, it would be naïve to believe that "political" considerations can be eliminated. It would be indeed surprising to see politicians go around armed with Mildred Parten's *Surveys, Polls, and Samples: Practical Procedures* in order to determine how to advocate necessary but unpopular programs.

Political scientists have given much attention to ways for creating party responsibility. The works of E. E. Schattschneider[12] and others need no mention except to say that they tend in the direction of advocating the British cabinet system. Running parallel to, but somewhat divorced from, the idea of party responsibility, is the belief that public opinion should rule. James Bryce, in *The American Commonwealth*, described four stages in the evolution of opinion. The final stage, one in which public opinion would not only reign but govern, would be possible if the will of the people could be determined at all times. Although public opinion research is unable to determine very close issues and elections to a percentage point (the 1948 election will not be forgotten), it probably is adequate to fulfill Bryce's requirement that a method be devised to determine the will of the people at all times.

Here then is a fundamental question. Why do those who wish to expand democracy call for the short ballot, the single appointive administrator and the dozens of other devices which minimize the amount of popular participation when public opinion research techniques present ways for increased consultation with the public? The answer, as given by most political scientists, is that the public can establish only the broad outlines of policy and is not competent to pass on details. But if the public is not trusted, except in a very general way, the expert will rule. Elections can become a matter of form. An efficient and democratic bureaucracy can become only an efficient bureaucracy.

In order to achieve honest and efficient government, American political scientists have struggled actively for better administration. They have achieved a considerable degree of success. If parties are now perhaps the main avenue through which the broad public interest is represented, it is imperative that political scientists show the same crusading spirit in regard to party reform that they have shown for administrative reform. And political parties must get their ideas somewhere. "The truth is," states Arthur N. Holcombe, "that we do not now possess a satisfactory theory of democracy, and that we greatly need a better understanding of the foundations of the democratic faith."[13]

---

[12] For a convenient summary, see E. E. Schattschneider, *The Struggle for Party Government* (College Park, 1948). See also *Party Government* (New York, 1942).

[13] Arthur N. Holcombe, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 33, p. 824 (August, 1949). Holcombe's statement is in a review of Lindsay Rogers' *The Pollsters*, in which Rogers holds that polls are a threat to representative government and the demo-

If political scientists are unable to reconcile public opinion, political parties and administration, it is unlikely that the parties themselves will be able to work out such a reconciliation with sufficient rapidity to protect and expand our democracy.

* * *

In this article, the ways in which political parties can use presently developed public opinion research techniques have been outlined. Immediately following was a description of how publicly supported opinion research centers can be used in the immediate future. Then it was shown how public opinion research offers a challenge to political parties to meet the internal crisis caused by the international situation. All this is of present practical value in strengthening our democracy. Ultimately, however, political scientists will bear an important responsibility in working out adequate theory and practice to relate public opinion and administration through political parties. Rapid developments in public opinion research no longer permit political scientists to concentrate on administration at the expense of a public opinion which has no apparent place in democratic theory, except as it operates in an ill-defined manner through political parties. The degree to which public opinion can and must be utilized in a democracy should be carefully evaluated.

---

cratic process. In this article, no attempt has been made to answer Rogers' charges since they are made emotionally rather than scientifically; in another sense, this article is a reply to Rogers' theories.

NOTES AND MEMORANDA

POLITICAL SCIENCE, THE NEXT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

PAUL H. APPLEBY
Syracuse University

Political science is often criticized, as it was in the June issue of this REVIEW by Professor Spengler, as "without an adequate frame of reference and a sufficiently systematic approach" and as lacking "a set of consistent theorems suited to introduce order among its heterogeneous facts and findings."

If a plea of "guilty" is to be entered, however, it should not be "guilty as charged." It is true that political science has not the coherence and highly developed methodology toward which critics push us and to which political scientists rather generally aspire. But the failure reflects a certain virtue.

Political scientists are too sophisticated to accept happily Professor Spengler's glib recipe: "it is essential only that political science explicitly center itself about power and power-oriented behavior, just as economics has centered itself about scarcity and scarcity-oriented behavior." It is to be greatly doubted that his formula is as adequate for economics as he seems to believe; certainly it has led him into value-judgments which in his essay he would impose upon politics, and with which many of the abler political scientists would sharply disagree. But however adequate the orientation of economics, and however true it is that power has not been given the attention it deserves from political scientists, their concerns are not to be so easily and simply confined.

Even though confused, political scientists are properly impressed with the social and political nature of their material, the deep and inevitable involvement with value problems, and the number and nature of the variables with which they must deal.

They are increasingly impressed with the relative insignificance of small and specialized studies, manageable with their resources and in terms of any methodology available to them. In 150,000 governmental jurisdictions of this country—ignoring for the moment those of other States and those of international character—literally millions of activities are being carried on, any of which might be the subject of scholarly study. Learnings of many such studies would have little transferable value, because of factors not included and because of variations in other jurisdictions. There is an increasing unwillingness to engage in the business which Ferdinand Silcox used to describe as "picking fly-specks out of pepper." Centering these studies about "power" would not satisfy this concern.

It is sophistication, similarly, which has brought realization that many other studies directed at activities of general significance can produce findings of only such specialized sort as to require vast numbers of other studies to make the advance balanced and important. The dimensions and urgency of modern political problems call for some guides to the conservation and better utilization of scholarly resources.

Political scientists are also concerned about the difficulty of penetrating the political reality. Any systematic study inevitably deals with shadows of reality. Much research, dealing with shadows earlier abstracted by others in some remote contemplation of government, becomes a shadow of a shadow and hardly real at all. At this point it easily degenerates into what Eduard Lindemann has called the "almost incestuous business of writing foot-notes to each other." The limitations of work abstracted from reality bear hard on political scientists peculiarly aware of the fact that social reality never appears the same to the observer as it does to the person actually charged with action responsibility. The responsible parts of the political reality are especially hard to capture, and these parts are repositories of that very great, if unsystematic and non-scientific, learning which is the learning of experience. Organizations are themselves important repositories of such learning, transmitting it to successive incumbents but not having it identifiably at hand for the scholar.

This concern with reality gives political science a bent inevitably earthy and practical, at the same time one dictating pursuit of values. In this discipline it is palpably absurd to say of certain value questions, "those are political matters, and therefore outside the bounds of social science treatment." If political science long contributed to giving politics ill repute and alienating citizens from their democratic citizenship, those days are no more. Justice Vanderbilt was extraordinarily profound when he remarked that this is not the atomic age, but the age of politics; the chain reaction is from the physics laboratories to the halls of government and on to the studies of political scientists.

The very flexibility of political science at this stage is its great hope. If the role of political science as a profession has not been made clear, it may now be believed that it will be formulated in terms of scope, depth, realism, significance, variety in central concepts, and communicability appropriate to the age. The role of the profession, indeed, will appear to be a continuity of roles related to the social and political continuity. Differentiated emphases of individual scholars will be around a central conception larger and more general than has been the usual expectation.

* * *

Perhaps it is not unfair to say that, in the past, insofar as there has been a central conception it has been tied rather simply to the word "research" as meaning a special and systematic extension of knowledge, and no one who is not devoted primarily to that extension has been thought really justifying membership in the profession. The very word has become too holy, too quickly dignifying a vast deal of thoroughly pedestrian and unimaginative business, too readily lost in prematurely developed and inappropriately limiting methodologies. The assertion that good teaching and research are inseparable companions has become a cliché, ignoring the facts that some of the best scholars are notably poor teachers, and that many excellent teachers have not "produced" professional findings of any significance. Surely teaching is a legitimate role for political scientists. Surely much of the real research possible for many teachers, because of either limited resources or personal attributes, is trivial. Surely much good teaching is chiefly dependent upon that form of research which is "keeping up with the field," and upon a somewhat commensurate understanding subtly communicable in the classroom through empathy and teaching skill. The cliché has doomed many teachers to immersion in the inconsequential, and their students to frustration of an initial interest in government and misunderstanding of the governmental realities.

It is true, however, that political science must be a valid, systematic, intellectual discipline, basically devoted to *an* extension of learning and thereby differentiated from the political practice which is the subject of its analytical and critical studies. For that part of the profession so situated and inclined as to make the real extensions of learning which can and will enrich all teaching of the subject there are questions of great moment. The basic structure of political science as a discipline requires scholarly statesmanship of a high order. Such statesmanship, in turn, requires extraordinary understanding of life and learning.

Perhaps the first question for those who would organize the discipline pertains to clarification of the role of the social sciences. Too many social scientists properly concerned with theoretical work and properly fearful of being pulled into too narrowly vocational instruction, are unable adequately to relate their theoretical interest to the social reality. Others, expecting to be able through study of some aspect of an important action problem to produce a ready answer for those charged with decision responsibility, and finding their recommendations unrecognizable in the decision, retreat into a cynical monasticism. Those of the first category need to learn that deeper penetration of the reality will enable them to produce richer theory. Those of the second group should ponder Harold Lasswell's recent oral confession that "the role of the social scientists is not to produce answers for the decision-makers, but to complicate the task of the decision-makers by contributing new insights, and thus widening the range of discretion and increasing freedom."

Behind this question is another, still broader one. It is the question which challenges those who may be inclined—even while affirming that science can not deal with values—to make science itself a final and absolute intellectual value. In this position the assumption seems to be that in general terms there is only one truly intellectual process—the scientific. Yet it may be believed that there are now some, and others yet to be identified and developed, valuable intellectual powers not to be so catalogued. Shakespeare, who has been said never to have "thought" at all, the occasional mathematical genius and the musically gifted person who can reproduce a complicated musical composition once heard may illustrate the possibilities at one level. At another level there is contrasting with analysis the process of synthesis. Essential to the processes of science itself are the non-scientific factors of imagination and intuition, choice of hypotheses, method and point of approach. Essential to the fruitfulness of social science is a recognition of the limitations of the strictly logical, a deference to the great emotional part of man's whole equipment.

There must be realization that an antecedent social philosophy or value-laden assumption inevitably determines the nature of the product of research. "A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing"—actually an infinite number of ways of not seeing.

A social science built extensively on the notion that man's capacity for the rational signifies that he is or can become largely logical will exclude itself from any meaningful relationship to a large part of the social reality. The idea has its place in fiction, as demonstrated by Huxley's *Brave New World* and Shaw's *Back to Methuselah*, but political scientists, let us hope, have no desire or expectation of becoming part of Shaw's "vortex." They have more various aspirations.

Another question, therefore, calls for some resolution, however uneasy, of the problem of values. The belief that social science can escape involvement with values by treating only means and ignoring ends, is well discredited. Values do not appear fullblown without a begetting, they are themselves means, and means are value-determining. Those who sanctify the other belief would unconsciously impose inadequate and inferior judgments. The refusal to treat values results in the creation of a body of doctrine characterized by ruthlessness and impersonality, denying man's capacity for altruism and compassion.

Still another question concerns the relationship between any research and its context. The scholar may understand that the problem—or the aspect of a problem—selected for study can not be seen at all whole in the terms of his study, but this will not be generally understood, and scholars themselves tend to forget it. Terms of reference for an entire discipline should minimize this tendency.

Only after such questions are taken into account can there be satisfactory consideration of the central and specific orientations of a particular discipline. At this stage and for the present discussion perhaps little may be said beyond suggesting that no social science can long be regarded as adequate if it is limited by orientation to a single aspect of behavior. The association of several important central conceptions may be for most scholars the feasible maximum, but it is surely a necessary minimum. Diversity will confess limitations, and by providing perspective will enrich performance disproportionately. Division of a discipline into fields, however desirable, does not provide this kind of perspective.

Perhaps the most persistent and most frustrating effort of orderly minds is the attempt to find one central principle, one simple formula, for the solution of all of society's problems. This is a logical extension of the urge to limit one discipline to one conception. It is a not uncommon expectation of college freshmen that some professor may be able to eludicate such a principle; the remarkable fact is that a few of the professors seem to share their expectation. As a purely intellectual enterprise this may be regarded as an inspiring straining of men against their finitude. It has its place in philosophy, but the most absolute formulations of philosophy are emptiest of guidance when specific problems of life are faced. The more specialized and less philosophical such attempts are, the more inglorious they are as intellectual performances. For economists or sociologists or psychologists or political scientists to engage in such pursuit is not to strain at their finitude but to attempt its denial. One recent book by a prominent economist provides a special example of this tendency to over-simplification, rising not from but with a great preoccupation concerning the "free market" to assert it as the basic guide in all affairs of life. He provides a special example by revealing that this search for a single guiding principle is in espoused renunciation of direct concern for values, in concentration on means as free from value significance, and with results which would aggravate selfishness and deny man control of his own fate.

Political science as a scholarly profession is properly least disposed to fall into an exclusive affection for any of these hobbies. There is room within it for individuals who use any of these recited emphases, as well as others. But political science will be distinguished more and more frankly by a varied number of points of view and emphasis. And it will conduct few heresy trials for those members who seek new ways of illumining its field, and none for those who insist stubbornly on their professional concern with value problems. There will be none even for those who deny that political values are "inferior" or "less rational" than the values determined in the market by irresponsible, blind, accumulated forces of unrestrained self-interest.

On the positive side is an increasing sense of need for more selective research and more highly organized research in quest of more significant learnings. This search for significance is emphatically oriented to deeper penetration and wider coverage of the social and political reality. Older theory tended to stop with very general arrangements which themselves may be determined in fact by more particular arrangements. Older theory naturally antedated our present complexity and fails to explain or relate to it sufficiently. Effective modern political theory has been too long a by-product of economic and legal theory, much too little in fact political. Effective political theory otherwise has been in terms of the town-meeting or the city-state, both thoroughly inadequate now. We have been made vulnerable to physics, to materialism, to anarchy, to interdependence and to authoritarianism.

One new and important emphasis, against this background, adds to confusion when it should enrich our understanding. This is the emphasis on intra-organizational democracy. It becomes an aspect of anarchism and *laissez-faire*, instead of a means to maximizing group performance and member satisfactions. Understanding of organizational performance—the central phenomenon in our complexity—is rudimentary. Freedom through organization, in multiple memberships and multiple disciplines, and in their interstices, should be crucial to constructive social thinking. As musicians find means of self-expression in the discipline of music, men find freedom, if at all, in the disciplines of social and political organization. Balance, variety, and choice as between and among disciplines is important, and the spirit and techniques of the disciplines are important; but they will remain disciplines.

Academic disciplines, in other words, need to penetrate further the disciplines of society and their significance to freedom. Government must be more studied in the context of multiple organizations and as organization peculiarly concerned with balance in the organizational whole. The actual daily conduct of government deserves attention in these terms if we are to relate the necessities of organization with the values of democracy. The study of government can not be so much anti-organizational, or so much agnostic with respect to organization; it will be more concerned with the perfecting of public organization in its context and in furtherance of human values here especially prized. We have come to the political age because of an imbalance in our view of society and in our societal developments. Not because politics is the end-all of life, but to restore balance as we face the future, political science will be for longer than the next quarter-century a profession of prime importance. In no invidious sense it may be said that physics, chemistry, biology, economics and law have contributed importantly to, and therefore together symbolize, the imbalance political science must address.

Only with, and perhaps after, adequate consideration of these general matters can we expect to develop adequate, reasonably satisfactory methodologies of specific and technical sort.

Political science research in the next twenty-five years may not fit traditional patterns neatly. Its orientation at the end of that period may not be easily and simply designated. But its unwillingness to be prematurely and closely confined, its heavier underscoring of the "political" in its own identification, and the increasing frequency of flashing insights of real penetration indicate that it will be greatly accelerating its advance.

* * *

One role appropriate at every stage of human and scholarly development, but peculiarly urgent for the period ahead is to fill the need for formulation of things already known. Most of us know a great deal more than we understand. After analysis comes synthesis; before further analysis comes synthesis. If philosophy is the ultimate endeavor of finite men in pursuit of intellectual synthesis, politics is the ultimate, finite pursuit of synthesis in action. Political scientists will not, as political scientists, produce these syntheses, but some of them will make more preliminary, intellectual-type formulations which will lend themselves through translation to use by those others who are charged or associated with action responsibilities.

Let us insist as much as we feel honor-bound to do that these formulations are only hypotheses; the best possible social action proceeds from just such synthetic formulations. If political science is to be a source of important formulations, there is an antecedent need: to combine with professional modesty more professional courage.

A few of the more mature political scientists, some younger men of peculiar quality, and some who are not political scientists at all will dare to deal with our times as the authors of *The Federalist* dealt with theirs. The continuum of political science scholarship will not be complete unless some of the profession attempt to occupy an area at that end where it curves to the reach of those charged with large action responsibilities, including those of world dimensions.

Perhaps this differentiation in roles may be illumined by considering it in terms of analogy to the administrative hierarchy. Political science itself needs in its membership a kind of hierarchal distribution related to the governmental hierarchy. Many of the profession may engage helpfully in studies directly bearing upon particular and somewhat separable problems of the kind normally treated with some finality at low levels of the public hierarchy. Gradually decreasing proportions of the membership might address themselves to more complicated matters normally treated one, two, three and four levels higher in the hierarchy of action. A few should venture once in a while, at least, to consider more generally more of the governmental and social totality. Some who succeed in that orientation may serve only as critics, but in that role may add greatly to the usefulness of their profession. Some few should attempt the more difficult task of positive formulations of action hypotheses appropriate to the highest levels of political responsibility.

Here the usefulness of the hierarchal analogy ends, however, for at this point it begins to be clear that what we have attempted to describe comes full-circle. There is no intention here to insist that political science makes sense only if it is "practical," offering always or even most of the time findings directly useful to those with action responsibility. It is intended merely to insist that the material of political science is distinctly human and earthy, that these bases must be frequently touched, that some function of practitioner significance is to be recognized for some political scientists some of the time, and that this function is now being no better performed than any other. Shortcoming in this field is related to frailty in others. A whole political science will in some points touch areas of action, sometimes points related to the very highest action responsibility. The more isolated it is, the more specialized it is, the less valid it will be at those high points. There the requirement is for political-science philosophy action oriented, as in other large areas the need is for political-science philosophy purely intellectual in orientation.

Here, then, it may be more useful to consider political science in terms of its communicability, as making for more differentiations than the terms "pure" and "applied" research. All research must be designed to provide communicable learning, but not all of it needs to be designed for communication in the same direction. Some of the improved communication must be to undergraduate and graduate students, and to those who as teachers will be communicating in turn to secondary-school pupils. Some of the communication must be to citizens and to the public generally. Some of it must be to politicians, in party and in office, and some must be to civil servants in and according to their various levels of responsibility. Some must be to other social scientists. And some most particularly must and can be best designed as communication to other political scientists. In no one of these fields is the present performance reasonably satisfying.

Such differentiations of roles may help to prevent the undue narrowing of the task, the undue concentration of activity to fit a simple pattern. Fundamental is the avoidance by the profession in the sum of its parts of that narrowing which is so associated with specialization in area, methodology and material as to deny the "Ph." in Ph.D.

Political science has every reason to lead the social sciences into a philosophy of social science which will seek wholeness. Political science can not fail to be truly political in orientation, and therefore deeply concerned with values of diverse kinds. It must realistically relate politics to the whole society in which politics develops and which politics serves. It must be associated with worldly wisdom, for the reality with which it is concerned is very human and worldly. It can not be confined to the duty of developing that special knowledge which, as John Dewey has remarked, in public matters "is not knowledge at all." At the same time it can not stop at a nodding acquaintance with the other social sciences.

* * *

It should be significant that the social scientists have found so little really common ground. There is a rather general inclination in any single discipline not to listen very attentively to a representative of another discipline until he has been subjected to something resembling a comprehensive examination in the discipline not his own. While this regrettably reflects the parochialism that is a logical product of specialization, it must be admitted that there is too often too much basis for skepticism. The ability of any one social science to contribute to another social science is still more often theoretical and potential than demonstrated. The number of books in other social science fields any single social scientist finds impressive and greatly stimulating is much too small. In many cases he finds the other social scientists laboriously "discovering" learnings very familiar to him in a different context, regarded by him as elementary or historical rather than current in knowledge and significance, and very inadequate in terms of the learning in his own field. It certainly is true that a whole social science will not be the sum derived from the simple addition of these specialized learnings.

Political science can not answer its critics, or satisfy its own members, by saying that the sociologists fondle Max Weber too lingeringly, or that the eleven British anthropologists who actually produced a book about the politics of eleven African cultures have become aware of politics belatedly. To say to the economists that even when they talk fondly of "political economy" they actually exorcise politics from economics, does not prove the virtue of political science. The social sciences can profitably refrain from saying "you're another" to each other for reasons other than those of professional courtesy. They do have a common cause, and the need is to identify it and give it form appropriate to the social whole.

For the present, although, of course not forever, political science does have a preeminent contribution to make to its fellow social studies. The strictly and narrowly scientific impetus and the nature of the materials studied have carried some of the other social sciences further from the complicated social reality than political science, lagging, perhaps, as a systematic study, has gone. The lag, as already suggested, is attributable in part to a certain sophistication related to the peculiar materials of politics. A political science that abandoned politics in any such degree as political economy has abandoned politics would be the more quickly recognized as absurd. The Keynesian impact on economics, happily, is by no means the end of that story, either. Economics is today so urgently faced with the necessity of relating itself adequately to other than traditionally economic values as to forecast revolutionary developments. These developments should not come without benefit of political science. Similarly, the developments in sociology, anthropology and psychology are ripe for political science fertilization.

These other professional fields are ready for political stimulation because they themselves are clearly advancing, freshly examining their materials, terms of reference and methods. Sociology, often maligned, at least saw the significance of organization more clearly and earlier than their cousins, and is now beginning to produce some fresh and important insights. Economics is turning to some important new terms of reference. Historians are making important contributions to social theory. Anthropologists are producing insights of growing significance. Geographers are erecting bridges to political concern with natural resources. The interchange offers great mutual benefits.

One of the important questions for political science has to do with the nature and dimensions of the contribution it could make in the next quarter-century to its sister disciplines. Political science can assert the profound need for a truly political orientation at crucial points in the structure of their disciplines. But whether it can persuade, and help importantly in the orientation, is still uncertain. My own view is rather optimistic. Political scientists know a good deal more than they have revealed, and some of them have understanding far more significant than they have begun to communicate effectively. Some of their understanding is communicable only to other political scientists who read between the lines. Some of it has not been tangibly formulated at all.

* * *

Thus we return to the need for the courage and the competence to formulate such really significant learning as we think is ours. We cannot wait until our deficiencies are all met. The elementary attainments of scholarship must often be taken for granted. What, given those, and given years of study and reflection and living, do mature and creative political scientists believe they have learned? These things they should be led by the state of humanity's need to formulate with imagination and boldness.

SHIPPING QUOTAS AND THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

MARSHALL KNAPPEN
University of Michigan

On October 6, 1949, President Truman signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of that year.[1] This Act authorized appropriations and contracts in the amount of $1,314,010,000, primarily to assist the rearmament of our Western European allies and thus to begin the implementation of the North Atlantic Security Pact which had been ratified in July. Section 409 of the Assistance Act read as follows:

> That at least 50 per centum of the gross tonnage of any equipment, materials or commodities made available under the provisions of this Act, and transported on ocean vessels (computed separately for dry bulk carriers and dry cargo liners) shall be transported on United States flag commercial vessels at market rates for United States flag commercial vessels in such manner as will insure a fair and reasonable participation of United States flag commercial vessels in cargoes by geographic areas.[2]

This section was not in the original bill as prepared by the Department of State and submitted to Congress on July 25, 1949. It was inserted in the bill after the hearing stage, when its inclusion was requested by Mr. Frazer A. Bailey, President of the National Federation of American Shipping.

Readers familiar with the history of the Marshall Plan will recognize Section 409 as an additional illustration of the increasingly restrictive provisions regulating the use of American shipping which were written into the legislation implementing the European Recovery Program. The original purpose of the Marshall Plan, of course, was to secure the maximum degree of European economic recovery with the American dollars which could be made available for this purpose. As the bill implementing this plan made its way through Congress in 1948, however, various special interest groups succeeded in attaching to it protective provisions for the benefit of their particular segments of the American economy. Thus the milling interests obtained the concession that the equivalent of 25 per cent of "the aggregate of the unprocessed wheat and wheat in the form of flour" to be sent abroad from the United States should be milled in this country.[3] Similarly, by an amendment offered by Senator

---

[1] Public Law 329, 81st Cong.

[2] This Section was not mentioned in the amending Act of 1950 (Public Law 621, 81st Cong.) which continued the Military Assistance Program and authorized the appropriation of additional funds. It therefore remains on the statute books unchanged. The subject was not raised at the House and Senate hearings (*To Amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, Second Session* [Washington, June 5–26, 1950], and *Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 1950. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-first Congress, Second Session* [Washington, June 2–15, 1950]). Apparently the American shippers are developing a vested interest in this protective device.

[3] Public Law 472, 80th Cong., Sec. 112(c).

Knowland and Congressman Bradley of the coastal state of California, the final Act stipulated that 50 per cent of the goods to be sent abroad from the United States should be shipped in American vessels, if "available at market rates."[4] This protective arrangement was promptly cited by Mr. Vishinsky and other European Communists as evidence that the real purpose of the Marshall Plan was to enslave Europe and that American professions of interest in European economic recovery were insincere.[5] Since some 12 per cent of the total expenditures in the first six months of the Marshall Plan went for shipping charges,[6] it can be seen that the amount at stake was considerable.

By December, 1948, the rates for European shipping were averaging around \$2.30—and, in the case of 24 ships, \$4.50 or more—per ton below the American rate of \$11.15 to \$16.25 per ton.[7] It was estimated that the total additional cost of using American vessels would run somewhere between \$8,000,000 and \$25,000,000 per year.[8] Mr. Paul G. Hoffman, the Economic Cooperation Administrator, thereupon raised with the so-called Congressional "Watch-Dog" Committee for the Marshall Plan the question as to whether American vessels were "available at market rates" and announced his intention to discontinue shipments on them as of January 1, 1949.[9]

Immediately there was a storm of protest from American shipping men, representing both management and labor unions. Congressman Bland of Virginia, Chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, introduced a bill (H. R. 1340) to require the observance of the quota, to all goods, regardless of differential costs and of source of procurement. Furthermore the bill required that the quota be "computed by countries."[10] This last provision would have had a very serious effect on such a country as Norway, which was largely dependent on the receipts of its carrying trade and which, under the existing law stipulating only that the quota be applied to the general average for the total of ECA trade, had been allowed to handle most of the goods bound for its own ports.

Hearing followed hearing. Mr. Hoffman asserted that his duty was to secure for 42,000,000 taxpayers as much European recovery as possible. Only 12,000,000 of these taxpayers had any connection with the various interest groups which were demanding special concessions. If Congress wished to subsidize the merchant marine or any other American enterprise he had no objection; but this should be done by legislation specifically directed to that end.[11] The Bland Bill, said one of his ECA staff, would be "a very heavy burden on the recovery program, would create resentment and misunderstanding in foreign countries, would be a strong argument for the Communists that ECA was being used for the selfish interests of the United States rather than for European recovery, and would be very burdensome to administer."[12]

---

[4] Sec. 111 (a) (2).

[5] *New York Times*, August 14, 1948, p. 1; Dec. 22, 1948, p. 14.

[6] *New York Times*, Dec. 22, 1948, p. 14.

[7] *Sale, Charter, and Operation of Vessels. Hearings before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, First Session, on H. J. Res. 92 and H. R. 1340* (Washington, Jan. 25–Feb. 8, 1949), p. 205. Hereafter cited as *Hearings on H. R. 1340.*

[8] *Extension of European Recovery Program. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, First Session, on H. R. 2362* (Washington, Feb. 8–18, 1949), Vol. 1, p. 310. Hereafter cited as *Hearings on H. R. 2362.*

[9] *New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1948, p. 1.

[10] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 95, Pt. 3, pp. 4207–09, esp. p. 4208 (81st Cong., 1st Sess., April 9, 1949).

The shippers argued that the use of American vessels was not, in reality, an expense to the American taxpayers because American shipping companies paid American taxes and in many cases charter hire (rent) to the government-owned Maritime Commission for the use of the vessels. Furthermore, European rates would rise if American competition were to be eliminated. They also asserted that other American business interests were allowed to benefit from the Marshall Plan and, finally, that a strong merchant marine was a vital factor in modern war and was therefore essential to the security of the nation.[13]

The House Foreign Affairs Committee, headed at that time by Representative Sol Bloom of New York, dared to go on record as supporting Mr. Hoffman's stand, as did Senator Flanders of Vermont,[14] but the political pressures from the other side were overwhelming. The powerful House Rules Committee cleared the Bland Bill for House consideration,[15] and many Congressmen hastened to proclaim their devotion to the cause of protecting American shipping interests. Frankest of all was Congressman Boykin of Alabama, who said to Mr. Hoffman during one of the hearings:

> I see your point. You are trying to make your team show up, and you are exactly right. But they are certainly on us, and I will tell you I don't believe a man would ever be elected to Congress again if he didn't vote that you should ship 50 per cent of all these goods in American boats. I really don't; I really don't.[16]

In the end Mr. Hoffman and his staff, who seem to have been the only witnesses to testify against the shippers' request, agreed to accept a compromise proposal[17] by which the 50 per cent quota was to be applied regardless of differential costs ("at market rates for United States flag vessels") and was to be "computed separately for dry bulk carriers, dry cargo liner and tanker services." It was not, however, to be "computed by countries"—with the proviso that the Administrator should "insofar as practicable and consistent with the purposes of this title, endeavor to secure a fair and reasonable participation by United States flag vessels, by cargoes, by geographic area." Goods shipped from ports other than those in the United States were not to be subject to the quota. This compromise, submitted on the floor of the Senate by Senator Magnuson of Washington as an amendment to the 1949 ECA Amending Bill, was adopted there without a record vote.[18] It was inserted in the final Act in the conference stage, with the result that there was likewise no record vote on it in the lower house.[19]

---

[11] *Hearings on H. R. 2362*, Vol. 1, p. 311.

[12] C. Tyler Wood, Assistant to the Deputy Administrator, to Boyd Crawford, March 4, 1949, *Hearings on H. R. 2362*, Vol. 2 (including hearings on H. R. 3748), p. 829.

[13] Statement by Mr. Frazer A. Bailey, *Hearings on H. R. 1340*, pp. 2–5.

[14] *New York Times*, March 18, 1949, p. 51; Dec. 22, 1948, p. 14.

[15] *New York Times*, March 23, 1949, p. 55.

[16] *Hearings on H. R. 1340*, p. 212.

[17] Public Law 47, 81st Cong., Sec. 6; *Congressional Record*, Vol. 95, Pt. 3, p. 3857, pp. 4207–09 (81st Cong., 1st Sess., April 5 and 9, 1949).

After this resounding political victory in the spring, the shipping interests had little difficulty a few months later in securing the insertion in the Military Assistance legislation of the amendment cited above. No testimony on it, pro or con, was offered in the House hearings.[20] Its inclusion in the bill, after a perfunctory appearance by Mr. Bailey at the Senate hearings[21] seems to have been taken for granted, although it went a long step beyond the spring legislation. It incorporated the provision of the Bland Bill applying the quota to all cargoes regardless of the country of origin. No one at the hearings testified in opposition to the request. Though Senator Vandenberg apparently hoped, in the closed session of the Committee, to be able to moderate the severity of the regulation,[22] it appears in the final act exactly as requested by Mr. Bailey.

Episodes of this kind are common enough. There would be no point in retelling an old, old story were it not for the fact that the bill to which Section 409 was added was not an ordinary bill. It was the bill implementing the North Atlantic Treaty, the basic element in our new defense policy. Because of that fact Mr. Bailey's brief statement in support of his request before the Joint Hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Armed Services deserves at least a second look.

---

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 3858 (April 5, 1949).

[19] This provision remained unchanged after the passage of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1950 (Public Law 535, 81st Congress), which authorized the continuation of the European Recovery Program for the third year. The only reference in the 1950 Act to this issue is a provision (Sec. 106) that foreign beneficiaries may be exempted by the Administrator from the obligation to deposit local currency equivalents in the Counterpart Funds in respect to "an amount not exceeding the amount, as determined by the Administrator, by which the charges for . . . transportation [on United States flag vessels] exceed the cost of such transportation at world market rates." This provision, of course, constitutes an acknowledgment that the expense is not an essential part of the European Recovery Program.

[20] *Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-First Congress, First Session, on H. R. 5748 and H. R. 5895* (Washington, July 28–Aug. 8, 1949).

[21] *Military Assistance Program. Joint Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. Eighty-First Congress, First Session, on S. 2388* (Washington, Aug. 8–19, 1949), pp. 171–75.

[22] SENATOR VANDENBERG. Under the ECA Act, you state the comparable provisions apply to cargoes moving to and from the United States. I notice you have left that limitation out of your proposed amendment. Did you do that deliberately?

MR. BAILEY. It was our feeling that 50 per cent of any commodities made available under the ECA Act should be moved on American ships, but there was a compromise reached in which only the cargoes to and from the United States were included in the ECA Act.

SENATOR VANDENBERG. You would be reasonably content if you got what you are after with that limitation, wouldn't you?

MR. BAILEY. We feel that we should have all that is made available under the act, Senator, but we leave ourselves in the hands of the committee (*ibid.*, p. 173).

Mr. Bailey first quoted statements by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Mr. John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy in 1948, on the importance of the merchant marine in time of war, and particularly in the recent war. He then testified as follows:

> It is important, therefore, that in granting aid to foreign nations to resist aggression we should not fail to provide for the maintenance of our own national defense resources in all of its important elements.
>
> . . . .
>
> The Congress has already determined that the American merchant marine should participate in ocean transportation resulting from economic and military aid programs. After public hearings and extended debate, Congress directed that not less than one-half of the cargoes moving to and from the United States under the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, the Marshall Plan, be carried on United States flag merchant vessels. This action was based upon a recognition of the necessity for supporting our merchant vessels as an integral part of our national defense and economy at the same time we are giving aid to others. Comments which appeared in the public press at the time that this action was taken seem to indicate that such a policy met with widespread public approval.
>
> . . . .
>
> It seems to the shipping industry that even stronger reasons exist for the application of the policy expressed in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 to the provisions of S. 2388. The United States has assumed the burden of helping free nations to acquire the means of defending themselves from aggression. We shall experience great difficulty in discharging the responsibilities of this burden unless our military and economic strength is unimpaired and unless our merchant fleet is strong and active.
>
> The insertion of a provision in S. 2388 to the effect that at least 50 per cent of the gross tonnage of equipment, materials or commodities made available under the provisions of the bill and transported on ocean vessels shall be transported on United States flag commercial vessels will strengthen the American merchant marine. The insertion of such a provision will also assist in achieving our objective that the United States shall have a merchant fleet of modern combination and cargo vessels manned by American officers and seamen which is capable of transporting all of our domestic, coastwise, and intercoastal commerce, and at least one-half of our exports and imports, reinforced by a fleet of modern passenger vessels.[23]

In thus using the argument of national security Mr. Bailey was relying on a principle traditionally sound for a country without allies, which is therefore compelled to act independently. Adam Smith himself declared that "defense . . . is of much more importance than opulence" and for that reason pronounced the Navigation Acts, which gave to British vessels a near-monopoly of the country's import trade, "the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England."[24]

---

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 172–73. In fairness to the author of this statement, it should be pointed out that this line of argument was advanced before the loss of our monopoly in the matter of atomic bombs (in September, 1949) and the attack on South Korea (June, 1950) rendered the problem of maintaining the security of the North Atlantic area as acute as it has now become.

Since the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, however, the United States has not been a country without allies. Presumably we are adjusting our thinking and legislation accordingly. Obviously that was the very reason for the original introduction of the Mutual Defense Act to which the shippers' amendment was attached. Let us look at the pertinent terms of the treaty and then ask whether the reasoning of the shippers' representative—however sound by the standards of 1776 or 1946—is in harmony with the national policy of 1949 and 1950:

> ARTICLE 2. The Parties . . . will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.
>
> ARTICLE 3. In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
>
> ARTICLE 5. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Clearly the import of the Treaty is to commit this country to a policy of strengthening its new allies so as to enable them to resist a possible attack from outside the Atlantic area, presumably from Soviet Russia. "Mutual aid," "unite their efforts," and "collective self-defense" are key phrases in the Treaty. To be sure, the Treaty also speaks of "self-help," and of "individual . . . self-defense" and carefully refrains from requiring a complete pooling of all the available military resources of the signatories. Nevertheless, the whole point of the Treaty is, obviously, to set up an effective defensive alliance among the countries signing it.

Since the effectiveness of an alliance depends on the total strength of all its members and not on the strength of a single party to it, the available resources and the necessary duties should be so distributed among all the partners in such a way as to achieve the objective of the alliance—the greatest possible total strength. This is a principle we must recognize as basic to our foreign policy in the new era on which we are entering.

The statement of the American shippers' case, however, apparently fails entirely to take account of this principle. The key sentences in it are:

> This [Congressional] action [on ECA cargoes] was based upon a recognition of the necessity for supporting our merchant vessels as an integral part of our national defense and economy at the same time we are giving aid to others. . . . It seems to the shipping industry that even stronger reasons exist for the application of the policy expressed in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 to the provisions of S. 2388. . . . We shall experience

---

[24] *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (2 Vols.; London, 1922), Vol. 1, p. 429.

> great difficulty in discharging the responsibilities of this burden [of helping free nations to acquire the means of defending themselves against aggression] unless our military and economic strength is unimpaired and unless our merchant fleet is strong and active.

The validity of this argument depended on the assumption that by requiring half the goods furnished our allies to go in American vessels, regardless of the comparative efficiency of the various national merchant marines involved, we should be more secure in the long run than if we did not do this. Or, in other words, it was assumed that, once it was decided to spend one and one-third billion dollars for military purposes to implement the Atlantic Treaty, the greatest degree of security would be obtained by spending some of it to employ American ships and crews instead of Norwegian or British ones, for example.

If these assumptions were made about the ordinary carrying trade and if there were no alliance to be considered, no question could be raised as to their soundness. But once we have solemnly ratified a treaty of mutual defense, a new situation is created with which our future actions must be squared. The American shipping interests, however, did not appear to recognize that the signing of the Atlantic Treaty had in any way affected the force of their argument. For their representative said in so many words that in the post-Treaty era there are "even stronger reasons . . . for the application of the policy of the [pre-Treaty] ECA Act." Until this apparent failure to take account of both the terms and the spirit of the Treaty is remedied, the American shipping industry cannot be said to have established its claim to special protection in the post-Treaty era.

The justification for this country's assuming the responsibilities of membership in a North Atlantic alliance is that our security is increased by forming an alliance with like-minded powers. Obviously, the primary objective of our defense policy now must be to obtain the maximum of security possible within the framework of our present international relationships, including the North Atlantic Treaty. To appropriate with one hand to strengthen our European associates and with the other to bar them from an opportunity to make use of and develop their own merchant marines in free competition is a very strange procedure, particularly when it involves an uneconomic expenditure of our resources on our less efficient American shipping industry. It can only be justified on the contentions that (1) such peoples as the British and the Norwegians are unreliable allies or (2) that their shipping would not be available to us in time of war. To assert the first position would seem to destroy the very purpose of the Treaty—to build up the morale of our relatively weaker European associates. To maintain the second is very difficult in view of the mobile nature of mercantile shipping and the record of valiant service rendered the Allied cause by the Norwegian fleet throughout the recent War, although Norway itself was overrun and occupied by the enemy. Half the entire Norwegian merchant marine was sunk while carrying supplies for its country's allies.

In other words, to borrow Mr. Hoffman's thesis, the American taxpayers have now put up over six billion dollars to purchase the greatest possible amount of security under the Military Assistance Program. The way in which this fund is spent should be determined and judged strictly on that basis. The shipping interests have appealed to security considerations. If they are to continue to benefit by Section 409 under the present and future Mutual Defense Acts, they should be asked to make the soundness of their claim in the post-Treaty era more evident than it now appears to be.

On this very issue of security, Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin has made a very serious charge, to which some satisfactory answer should be given if the present arrangement is to continue. Two years ago Mr. Baldwin apparently believed that the merchant marines of our European allies were more trustworthy than our own. Writing on this issue when the ECA controversy was at its height, he said:

> Attention to the purely physical needs of the merchant service does not attack the dry rot that is the fundamental trouble of the merchant marine—the lack of discipline and inefficiency of many ships' crews. . . .
>
> Our operating standards in service and efficiency are well below the standards of British, Dutch and Scandinavian lines, and in some cases undisciplined and subversive influences imperil the merchant marine as an auxiliary of the national defense. . . .
>
> There are still very strong leftist influences in many of the unions, and there are known Communist cells aboard some of the principal American ships and alleged Communists in key positions as radio operators.
>
> This situation has been met by too much of a conspiracy of silence by the public and Congress.[25]

Citing "a constructive, courageous and authoritative article"[26] on the great lack of discipline in our merchant marine, he urged that Congress "be encouraged to face facts frankly."

In July, 1950, after the attack on South Korea, representatives of the overwhelming majority of members of the maritime unions agreed upon a voluntary plan for weeding out Communists and other subversives for the period of the Korean emergency. The Coast Guard was given the authority to reject for employment on American vessels bad security risks, presumably on the basis of information supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence. This plan was put in operation in spite of short-lived opposition from members of the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union, C.I.O., an organization "slated to be tried by the Congress of Industrial Organizations for allegedly adhering to the Communist party 'line' rather than to the policies of the C.I.O." As a result some individuals were barred from employment on American ships. A general "housecleaning" in the radio men's organization, the American Radio Association, has also been reported.[27]

---

[25] *New York Times*, Dec. 30, 1948, p. 8.

[26] Holmes F. Crouch, "A Well Disciplined Merchant Marine?" *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 74, pp. 1467–79 (Dec., 1948). The author, a lieutenant in the United States Coast Guard, served on Merchant Marine inspection duty in San Francisco during part of the war and at the time of writing was with the Office of Merchant Marine Safety at Coast Guard Headquarters.

[27] *New York Times*, July 25, 1950, p. 51; July 31, p. 16; Aug. 2, p. 1; Aug. 4, p. 37; Aug. 5, p. 29; Aug. 8, p. 47; Aug. 9, p. 55.

Assuming that these measures have proved fully effective, the question Mr. Baldwin raised about subversive influences would be satisfactorily answered. The matter of comparative "operating standards in service and efficiency," however, is still a challenge to American sincerity and common sense.

As long as Section 409 remains on our statute books the United States is, at best, put in the position of not having a consistent program for coordinating and strengthening the defense activities of the North Atlantic countries. At the worst, we are asking our European allies to prepare to fight in a common cause while simultaneously we are proclaiming our doubt as to their reliability and good faith.

ADMINISTRATIVE STABILITY AND CHANGE

MILTON J. ESMAN

Government agencies are institutional in design and effect. Their activities and influence transcend numberless shifts in leadership and generations of employees. The size and scope of modern government leads to specialization of personnel and standardization of procedures. The pressure for equity in government rationalizes operations and produces records. A service philosophy develops in terms of high public purposes which give meaning and direction to the efforts of officials and employees. Within each agency an institutional tradition gradually takes shape, with priceless dividends in internal solidarity and public acceptance.

No institution, certainly no government agency, can be self-contained. Its activities inevitably affect individuals and organized interests. As the agency comes into contact with these forces, a complex process of mutual accommodation takes place. Soon a pattern of working relationships and understanding is fashioned between the agency and those who come into contact with its activities—individuals, organizations, their political spokesman and other government agencies. Thus many persons and many groups develop a stake in the operations and the continuity of government agencies.

With increasing security and power, institutions tend to become sluggish, to lose their sensitivity, flexibility and capacity for ready adjustment. Increasingly they become involved in techniques at the expense of goals, in the safeguarding of familiar relationships, and in the protection of personal positions and prerogatives which become vested interests within the organization. How to compensate for these institutional hazards is a major problem in political science, especially in this era of big government when individual rights, important group interests, the public welfare and national security depend so largely on conscientious and inspired administration. In the past, the political impact of agency heads and their non-career lieutenants has been the principal adaptive influence in public agencies. In the future, as the military and civil bureaucracies become more important, the unaided influence of political leadership may not be enough to assure responsiveness in the great government agencies. This article will examine the interplay of political leadership which is sensitive to change and career leadership which epitomizes institutional stability.

Early in their careers public agencies enjoy a breadth of legal discretion. Their charters are rather general and, though the boundaries of their authority may be limited, within these boundaries they have relative freedom to improvise and experiment. As administrative experience produces conflicts of interest, the requirements of public equity lead to increasing prescriptions of detailed rights and procedures, either by statute or by administrative regulation. Groups which are affected by the agency succeed in writing into law or regulation special protections or exemptions, often in great detail, which further limit the discretion of administrative leadership. Agency officials and employees may develop vested interests in the complexity of these regulations, intellectually through their training or politically through their close identification with the groups which the detailed rules protect.

Detailed laws and regulations are not the only rigidities and limitations on leadership in government. Money is controlled by the Bureau of the Budget and by Congress, especially the appropriations subcommittees, whose members are important arbiters of the fate of administrative agencies. Subject matter committees closely scrutinize the agencies and exert a decisive influence on the discretion of administrative heads. This is especially true when interested groups outside the government have established close and sympathetic relationships with leading committee members. Clienteles or regulated interests can greatly influence the activities of public agencies, either by direct political intervention or through sympathetic spokesmen in Congress.

Another limitation on administrative discretion is the permanent staff. For the most part agency heads are free to select and pay personnel only within the legal and administrative limits prescribed by the civil service laws and regulations. Employees generally may be dismissed only for inefficiency or malfeasance and some of these dismissal cases may be appealed beyond the agency. As a practical matter the agency head does no hiring and little firing himself. His practical discretion is limited to the selection and assignment of key personnel, usually from within the organization. Agency heads come and go and the tenure of many of them is brief. The agency, as a public institution, with a life of its own, must carry on indefinitely. To protect the continuity of the organization and the public investment in its personnel, the discretion of the individual agency head has been limited in this sphere just as it has been limited in the fiscal and program areas.

These powerful restrictions on administrative discretion protect government agencies from violent fluctuations in program or internal management. An essential value in government is continuity and these limitations on leadership are powerful guarantees of that continuity. Shifts in agency leadership, whether or not accompanied by shifts in party control, usually are accomplished smoothly without violent disruption in the organization except for a few reassignments at the higher levels. Whatever the fanfare, the actual changes in most programs are usually limited to new emphases, rather than new directions. The interested clients and their congressional allies continue vigilant, the laws remain in effect, the permanent staff continues intact, and the budgetary limitations may change only slightly. Actually it requires a basic political change reflected in the composition of Congress, in the White House, in the strength of the various interest groups in the country and in public opinion to cause radical changes in administrative direction.

Usually the Presidency is a dynamic force in modern government and therefore in administration. The President is unitary, capable of leadership. It is his role to reconcile diverse political influences and to fashion a political program which will hold a popular majority. This program, if successful, will embody the broadest possible consensus on public policy. Effective political leadership requires acute sensitivity to the needs and values that make for public acceptance. The President and his lieutenants, among them agency heads, are impelled continuously to secure public support by widening and strengthening the content of this consensus which takes form in their administrative and political programs. This jockeying for public support results in constant pressure for administrative adjustments by the President and the political heads of agencies. Here we have the mainspring of administrative action.

Congress usually is more conservative. In our system party discipline is weak, political strength is local, constituencies are often small and Congressmen are highly responsive to local economic, social and political interests. Their political survival usually depends less on espousing a broad national consensus than in pleasing articulate groups back home. At times these interests have administrative goals which they pursue aggressively and to that extent they pressure the administrative agencies for new concessions. But more often they seek to protect rights and privileges which have previously been established by law, administrative practice, or governmental inaction. Groups which want something new must be prepared to win a majority, which is a difficult undertaking. Those who fight to protect established interests need only obstruct. Congress will fight particularly hard to protect those who feel that their legitimate interests are being threatened.

The committee system in Congress and the seniority rule are especially strong stabilizing forces. Senior—therefore dominant—committee members tend to return session after session to Congress regardless of election trends or changes in party control. Theirs is a continuing interest in the agency and their point of view changes only slightly over the years. Minorities and majorities shift but the senior members from "safe" districts remain. As colleagues of long standing, they usually work together in harmony, frequently sharing the same views on major questions. Administrative officials know the senior committee members, majority and minority, and what to expect of them. They learn to anticipate and respond to their interests and requests and to call upon them for help, as will be shown later. The committee system and the seniority rule are therefore bulwarks of administrative stability.

There are two levels of administrative leadership in government, career leadership which rises through the ranks and political leadership which is superimposed by the political process. This dual leadership is a distinguishing mark of modern government. Economic, social and religious organizations usually generate their own top leadership, but political accountability requires shifting executive leadership for government agencies.

Unlike political leaders who owe a direct responsibility to an elected chief executive, career leaders are largely self-selected. They are first selected from civil service lists and brought successively to the fore by other career officials. The department head usually plays a formal role in this process. And though higher career officials may be selected by political heads, career employees can be brought into position to be considered for high ranking assignment only by prior action of their senior career officials. To a great extent, therefore, the career service is self-sustaining and career leadership is self-selected, though political heads may play a decisive role in key appointments.

The loyalty of the career leader is closely identified through long service with his organization. His orientation is usually specialized and his experience with technical problems normally predisposes him to appraise novel situations in familiar technical terms. His morality is based on a deep respect for legitimate authority, a scrupulous sense of fairness in dealing with the public and a serious devotion to the public interest. Few career officials consider themselves special pleaders; the great majority would be shocked by the suggestion. What they do espouse is their own reading of the public interest and very frequently their perspective is distorted by long association with one program and with limited methods of administering that program.

This tendency toward a narrow perspective is especially aggravated when personnel and program operations are concentrated in self-contained bureaus, undisturbed by the cosmopolitan influence of departmental controls. In this splendid isolation, career officials often enjoy friendly understandings and working arrangements with organized interests which are intimately concerned with their activities.

By training and conviction career leaders usually represent and defend established programs, familiar techniques, and vested interests within the organization. Often, as a result of concentration on specific subjects, they become preeminent authorities in their fields. They may therefore resent what they consider uninformed amateur interference by short term political chiefs. Like most established groups they are seldom pioneers, except in their earlier years. The weight of their expertise and authority, which resists "crackpot" ideas, effectively tends also to resist even moderate influences which originate outside the agency and threaten to disturb their familiar orientation. Within the organization may be younger men attuned to outside influences and impatient for change but they seldom occupy key positions. Generally the established career group, though adaptable, accepts changes slowly and consequently is a strong force for continuity in government.

This tendency was recently noted by Eleanor Roosevelt. Her forceful statement reflects the impatience of many public figures with the apparent rigidity of old-line civil servants:

> I thought that every government official investigated complaints and gladly tried to correct injustices. I realize now that this was a rather naive idea, for it is apparent from what people have told me that it was often only fear of White House displeasure that set the wheels in motion. This was not true of many departments, but I suppose it is only natural that some of the older departments, where a number of civil service people feel entrenched, should not want to bother with new activities. Both Mr. Woodin and Mr. Morgenthau must have made great changes in the old Treasury Department management. The standards set, particularly after Mr. Morgenthau became Secretary of the Treasury, must have seemed alarming to some of the old types of civil service officials.
>
> I felt very critical of civil service officials at times. When they have been in a department for a long while, they can make any change very difficult. Nevertheless, I think it is

> true that there are an astonishing number of people who want to serve their country and are willing to accept the modest security and low pay of a civil service employee simply because they feel they are performing a patriotic service.[1]

As previously observed, the top leadership in government agencies is almost invariably selected from outside. Such selection achieves two purposes: (1) political accountability to the President and (2) independent lay leadership for the career staff. The second purpose, though seldom considered, may be as significant as the first. Though the career bureaucrats may excel in technical knowledge, in a scrupulous sense of equity and devotion to the public service as they see it, there is always the danger that in their relative security they may lose touch with the public and fall behind contemporary developments outside the agency. A necessary antidote is the fresh influence of strong leadership from the outside.

Agency heads are usually laymen in the administrative sense who differ in background, orientation and interest from career officials. As amateurs they worry less about techniques than program goals, and they regard the agency and its program more as representatives of the general public than as administrative specialists. Usually they are more sensitive to outside influences, opinions and political forces than career administrators. Occasionally a political chief may assume his new position with a thorough knowledge of the agency's work; he may enjoy close association with part of the clientele and have some definite ideas of his own. It is more likely, however, that his information is rather general, that his definite ideas cover only a fraction of the agency's administrative authority and that his knowledge of his new organization, its personnel and its inside operations does not exceed that of any informed citizen. He is more likely than not to bring to his new post good intentions, a reasonably open mind, a sense of public responsibility and a loyalty to his chief.

The appointment of a new agency head signalizes one of the most interesting and complex dramas in administrative life, the reciprocal accommodation of the permanent bureaucracy and the new political chief. In this process of mutual adaptation the new chief is introduced to the program goals and the ideas on internal administration which have guided his career administrators and he learns the problems of administration as they rise by osmosis through the administrative hierarchy. Direct contacts with the President and his staff, Congressmen, clientele groups, newspapers and other outside influences contribute to his education. At the same time the career officials feel him out to gauge his attitudes and to determine how far they must adapt their familiar procedures and objectives to satisfy his preferences. Usually factions within the agency contend for influence and position in a struggle involving program ideas as well as personalities. Out of this pulling and hauling, this struggle for influence and position, this mutual education and accommodation, emerges the pattern of relationships between the political chief and his career executives which is likely to persist throughout his tenure of office.

---

[1] Eleanor Roosevelt, *This I Remember* (New York, 1949), pp. 6–7.

With some variation one of three patterns is likely to develop:

1. The political chief accepts the past orientation and follows the leadership of the dominant career group. In this rather common situation the political chief adopts as his own the views of the career group and becomes their spokesman and defender before the general public and in the councils of the administration. Congressional leaders and clientele groups who have worked closely with the career bureaucracy accept this adjustment enthusiastically since it continues, rather than disturbs, a generally satisfactory relationship. If there is sufficient vitality and flexibility in the career group the agency may flourish for a time under this type of leadership, but ultimately the absence of fresh outside influences extracts a high price in lost vitality, estrangement from new ideas and increasing difficulty in adjusting to outside forces. Such inert political leadership exerts virtually no impact on the organization. It recalls the boast of one recent department head that in his twelve years in office—years of war and depression, of violent social, intellectual and political upheaval—as few changes as possible had been made in his department.

2. Though it occurs less often than the first, the second pattern is worthy of note because its effects can be more dramatic. After initial efforts at accommodation, the political chief and the career executives fail to establish a satisfactory basis for cooperation. There is an absence of rapport between them, a difficulty of communication which eventually crystallizes into open conflict or administrative paralysis. The political chief may try to shuffle some of the key executives by placing in more critical positions those who more nearly share his views or by bringing in new blood from the outside. This expedient may have limited effectiveness unless the career group itself is severely split, because a reluctant organization cannot act effectively. Career executives who feel that they or their program, which they identify with the public interest, are threatened by a hostile chief may turn in desperation to their congressional allies, their clientele groups, and even to sympathetic news columnists for support. This help is quite likely to be granted. The dispute is then transformed to a political issue in which both parties may find themselves publicly engaged in a mutually embarrassing and destructive controversy. After the smoke has cleared, an uneasy truce may reign; the career group and the political chief deal with each other at arms' lengths strictly according to protocol until the political chief, sealed off from effective leadership, is replaced. Usually the career group has greater staying power.

3. The third pattern of leadership is more creative than the first and less disruptive than the second. The political chief and the career group find areas of agreement on program and internal management which provide a basis for working together. They establish their mutual good faith so that neither feels threatened by the other. As problems arise much is accomplished by mutual accommodation. The career group summons up the wealth of its administrative experience; the political chief draws upon his own experience, his political and intellectual contacts outside the organization, and his sense of what is right and expedient to redirect the thinking and attitudes of the career group. Career officials are highly amenable to the pleasure of their political chiefs since their

own influence and positions may be at stake. Unless their basic loyalties are threatened they accept changes imposed from above, even when their enthusiasm is not aroused.

An effective political chief will maintain a steady pressure on his career staff by presenting ideas which originate outside the agency and which comport with his more dynamic vision of the public interest. Where persuasion fails, it may be necessary to impose changes on a skeptical staff which, through growing familiarity with a new idea, may later accept the same idea as its own. There may be times, however, when stronger measures are necessary to insure the faithful application of programs which key members of the career staff have difficulty accepting. Allies are found within the organization, perhaps among the younger officials, who are then brought forth through "reorganizations" into key positions. Some new blood may be judiciously introduced from the outside. Key officials who cannot coöperate are gradually induced to leave or accept reassignments. This process of reeducation and restaffing requires courage, patience, and a sensitivity to basic loyalties so that changes in policy and "reorganizations" will not violently affect the morale of the organization or disturb the steady rhythm of operations. These administrative changes must be accompanied by simultaneous bids for the support of congressional leaders and clientele groups so that efforts to attune the agency to a wider version of the public interest will be applauded instead of resisted by these important groups. As previously observed, administrative changes may be stifled by the hostility of politically powerful interests outside the executive branch.

Even under the most skillful leadership a large and complex organization cannot be remade or redirected overnight. Human material cannot be recast, but only gradually molded. A face-lifting will not change the flesh and blood of an organization and transfusions of new blood too rapidly may paralyze the patient. Moreover, there are real risks to redirecting and reorienting a government agency unless interested groups and their congressional spokesmen accept the changes. The final outcome of program conflicts and even internal management differences is determined by the political calculus. Administration is necessarily a balance between stability as represented by Congress and career officialdom, military and civilian, and dynamic outside forces usually activated by political leadership. Those who prescribe the magic potion of "strong leadership" for every administrative illness ignore one of the fundamental facts of government. Every existing arrangement has its supporters, and established arrangements yield slowly in government, where continuity is a value highly prized.

There can be no assurance from one administration or from one appointment to the next that the political agency head will be a keen interpreter of the public interest or a first-rate leader of men. The new heads are not selected primarily for these qualities. Party service, personal loyalty, geographical background, availability, personal prestige, ability to attract support to the administration are the governors of political selection and will continue to outrank other factors which are less relevant to the political process. In the rapid turnover of political agency heads the stronger administrators will alternate with the weaker and no one can predict the sequence. Students of government must therefore be reconciled to this unpredictable lottery of political choice. It is highly unlikely that any controls can be devised to insure the uniform excellence of political appointees.

The career groups, in the military and civil services, are the brightest hope for sustained improvement at the executive level of government. Their knowledge of program, of techniques, of internal management, of related government agencies, of congressional leaders, and of outside interests, together with their appreciation of administration as a historical process, lend strength and stability to the institutions of government. Too frequently, they have been prevented by narrow orientation from performing at their highest potential as collaborators with their political chiefs in framing and revising administrative policy. These deficiencies which have already been diagnosed and deplored can be neutralized—if not completely corrected—through long range, systematic programs of executive development.

The increasing complexity of modern government has created an urgent need for outstanding career leadership. The development of such leadership has become a serious matter in government and will challenge students and practitioners of public administration for decades to come. The narrow orientation which has stunted so many career officials must be broadened into departmental and, finally, into government-wide loyalties. Until career administrators have enlarged their areas of interest and identification and developed a keener sensitivity to shifting values in the community, they cannot be a creative or integrating force in administration. On the contrary, by burrowing more deeply into their special preserves and girding themselves with the aggressive support of self-seeking interests, they may become an untouchable threat to responsible government. The principal need among career executives, therefore, is breadth.

Executive development encompasses the selection, training and assignment of outstanding men for high responsibility—the continuing direction of the executive institutions of government. A well executed program should have the following effects: (1) attraction to the public service of alert young men and women whose education has taught them to appreciate ideas and to evaluate action in terms of important national and international values; (2) widening of the perspective of professional and scientific specialists already in the service so that their thinking may be attuned to interests broader than their immediate programs and so that those with the necessary aptitudes may learn the techniques of administration; (3) systematic expansion of the experience of promising potential executives by assignment to different lines of work in various programs and in diverse administrative situations so that each successive assignment, tailor-made for the individual, may contribute over the years to his career growth; (4) outside stimulation through activity in professional societies, advanced educational training at government expense, opportunities to observe the practices of industry, local, state and international agencies, and sabbatical leave for independent study and writing; and (5) the growth of high grade officials through periodic self-evaluation in staff conferences with their peers in government, industry and the universities.

There is a growing feeling among able young men and women that the public life is an ennobling challenge and a gratifying career of service. Many of them are prepared to dedicate themselves to administrative careers and some of the best are being accepted annually into the public service. Systematic opportunities and incentives must be provided for them and for their seniors already in the service to deepen their sensitivities and expand their horizons through diversified training and experience. White House sponsorship, Civil Service Commission leadership, effective programs in the agencies, active support and appreciation in Congress together can provide the facilities, the support, the experience, and finally the public acceptance that will solidify this pattern of leadership development as a firm tradition in American government.

The competent executive in today's and tomorrow's democratic government must meet exacting standards. He should combine a deep ethical sense of duty with subtle human understanding and his range of interests should embrace a wide sweep of human experience and knowledge. He must also be a man of action, a director of other men. This well-rounded combination of philosopher and man of affairs calls for carefully selected, highly trained and cultivated leaders.

The cultivated man is a conservator of values and institutions, as well as a reformer and an interpreter of change. He takes a responsible view of the past and the present as well as the future. His judgments balance many conflicting interests and guide them toward a consistent moderation. In public affairs, moderation and a firm attachment to the moral consensus of the larger community must be the ultimate guides, rather than the pressure of special group interests.

American career administrators have been a conservative, more than an adaptive, force in public life. Theirs has been more a static than a creative influence. The burden of adaptation has therefore fallen heavily on political top executives and their non-career staffs who come and go with each political shift. They have been unable to rely sufficiently on their higher career executives for policy advice because that advice has been too often blunted by narrow loyalties, technical preoccupations and an insensitivity to the larger world outside. Some career executives have surmounted these limitations that have borne so heavily on their colleagues, and a few have shown an aptitude for high political leadership. For the most part, however, these conservators of our institutional continuity have lagged behind their larger responsibility.

Though institutional conservatism is an occupational hazard of career executives, there are means not only of overcoming it, but of capturing its constructive values and redirecting them to creative purposes. The purpose of executive development which will bulk large in government in the years to come, is to build whole men with historical perspective and grand loyalties, firm convictions and keen sensitivities, inspired insights and profound human understanding. Career leaders with these qualities can feel as comfortable with the new as with the old and can mediate in the area of large decisions between the claims for institutional continuity and for political change.

RELATIVISM, ABSOLUTISM, AND DEMOCRACY

FELIX OPPENHEIM

University of Delaware

INTRODUCTION

Political convictions may be said to be tied up with philosophical views. But is any one particular school of philosophy necessarily linked to any one particular political doctrine? More specifically, are philosophical and political absolutism interrelated, and, similarly, is democracy linked to philosophical relativism or empiricism? Kelsen and others have recently defended this thesis: "For, just as autocracy is political absolutism and political absolutism is paralleled by philosophical absolutism, democracy is political relativism which has its counterpart in philosophical relativism."[1]

It is the purpose of this paper to test whether such links exist. In doing so, it will be necessary to refrain from siding with either philosophical absolutism or relativism. The conclusion we will reach will compel us, however, to abandon our previous neutrality with respect to these opposite philosophies. Our examination involves the difficulty of how to use precise language for analysing concepts to which various and often vague meanings have been assigned in the past. We shall use these terms in the broadest sense which it is possible to give them without loss of precision.

Philosophical absolutism maintains that there is an "absolute reality" which can be known with certainty on the basis of revelation, intuition, or reason. These sources provide the "true knowledge" of the "essential nature of the universe" as well as of its "moral and spiritual order," while sense experience leads only to probable and therefore unessential knowledge of "appearances." Intrinsic value judgements are generally included among the statements whose truth or falsity can be determined *a priori*. Thus, *ethical absolutism* holds that certain states of affairs are intrinsically good and desirable, and can be known to be so with certainty. The natural law doctrine, which affirms the existence of "just law," recognizable by "right reason," is an instance of philosophical absolutism in general and ethical absolutism in particular.

Philosophical relativism denies the possibility of all objective knowledge about what is and about what ought to be, because sense experience as well as intuition and reason differ from one individual to another.

Empiricism occupies an intermediary position. According to this view, some kind of objective knowledge is indeed possible, but only the probable knowledge which absolutism discards as unessential. Non-analytical[2] assertions are held cognitively significant, if and only if, they are, at least theoretically, intersubjectively verifiable by observation (either directly, or, if they express general laws, by deducing predictions which are empirically verifiable). Hence, the empiricist's language does not include statements such as "Reality is transcendental," or "The world is a moral order," which are of prime interest to the absolutist. Among empiricists, some agree with the absolutists that intrinsic goodness is a quality which can be determined objectively, not indeed with *a priori* certainty but with probability, by "value experience" common to all reasonable men (just as redness can be perceived by sense experience shared by all but the color-blind). Other empiricists side with the relativists with respect to ethical judgements, and thus are *ethical relativists*. They hold that normative knowledge is impossible because there is not intersubjective value experience nor any other way of testing the truth or probability of intrinsic value judgements. Whereas *instrumental* value judgements (e.g., "If democracy is desirable, majority rule is a good [or effective] way to implement it") are empirically verifiable, *intrinsic* value judgements (e.g., "Democracy is desirable") have no cognitive but only emotive meaning, because they do not ascribe a property to, but express the speaker's approval of, something (e.g., democracy).[3] Whereas the position of all-out relativism has not often been defended, there have been many ethical relativists, mostly among empiricists.[4]

---

[1] H. Kelsen, "Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics," THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 42, p. 911 (October, 1948). B. Russell, *Philosophy and Politics* (London, 1947), makes the same assumption.

[2] Absolutists, empiricists, and even relativists agree that statements of logic and mathematics are analytic, i.e., true independently of sense experience. For a recent, concise exposition of empiricism, cf. Herbert Feigl, "Logical Empiricism," in D. D. Runes (ed.), *Twentieth Century Philosophy* (New York, 1943), p. 373.

Political absolutism and *democracy* will be used here in their broadest possible meaning, as designating either *doctrines* concerning the ultimate *purpose* of government, or *forms* of government. Democracy as a political doctrine refers to the faith in the intrinsic worth of each individual. As a form of government, democracy comprises those institutions which have been empirically found to be most effective for the implementation of the democratic ideal, such as majority rule and the basic freedoms. The political doctrine of absolutism holds that government should subordinate the welfare of all to an anti-democratic aim such as the interests of a single class or of the "nation." A government has an absolutistic form if all power is wielded by one or a few without any restraint, for the purpose of implementing some anti-democratic aim.

Finally, the term *interrelation* needs to be clarified, since those who maintain that there is a link between these philosophies and the "corresponding" political doctrines often do not specify whether the supposed link is of a logical, political, psychological, or historical nature. We shall now examine these different possibilities.

---

[3] Cf. C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven, 1944). The failure to distinguish between *empirical statements* connecting means to ends (*instrumental* value judgments) and *intrinsic* value judgments accounts for the following allegation: "If the scientific method itself, however, is proclaimed to be *as a matter of fact* more appropriate than any other for understanding physical and social phenomena, then *this* value judgement *must* be accepted by the positivist as at least one value judgement that is objectively true." John H. Hallowell, "Politics and Ethics," THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 38, p. 648 (August, 1944). (Italics Hallowell's.)

[4] This explains why the term relativism has been, misleadingly, applied to cover empiricism as well (e.g., by Kelsen, *loc. cit.*). It is true that empiricists are relativists in the sense that they consider the degree of confirmation of a theory as a function of the empirical evidence available at a given time. We, however, shall keep a clear distinction between empiricism and (ethical) relativism.

I. LOGICAL CONNECTION

Is there any logical connection between philosophical absolutism or relativism or empiricism on the one hand, and political absolutism or democracy on the other? Both political doctrines involve intrinsic value judgements concerning what the ultimate purpose of government should be. Ethical relativism and empiricism make assertions *about* intrinsic value judgements, namely, that they cannot be validated, or that they can be empirically verified. Clearly, the epistemological theories of ethical relativism or empiricism do not imply the political credo of democracy or autocracy. According to the epistemological theory of ethical absolutism, intrinsic value judgements can be shown *a priori* to be either true or false. If so, then *some* value judgements must be true, and the following type of statement may be made: "It can be proved that either some kind of absolutism is good or that, on the contrary, democracy is desirable." But the thesis of ethical absolutism does not imply that *any particular* value judgement is valid—e.g., that one, and only one, of the following two contradictory statements can be proved: "Autocracy is best"; "Democracy is best." To validate one, and only one of these two value judgements, one would have to assume some other premise besides the validity of philosophical absolutism itself. Hence, no matter which theory about the nature of valuational knowledge one adopts, this does not imply anything about the content of value judgements in general and about the intrinsic value of democracy or autocracy in particular.

It has, however, been maintained that empiricism and democracy are logically connected in an *indirect* way, because they have an important property in common, namely, reliance on scientific method. Both empiricism and democracy are held to make tentative decisions only, after hearing all sides and after weighing all relevant evidence, and to revise such decisions in the light of new facts. Both refuse to single out as absolute truth any one particular view. "The democratic faith is the extension of the ethic of scientific method . . . to all the other human undertakings and institutions."[5] If the use of empirical method is a specific characteristic of democracy, as it is of empiricism, then, evidently, empiricism implies democracy; hence, non-democratic governments do not rely on the empirical method.

In the first place, not all questions but only those concerning the choice of means to a given political end will, in practice, be of concern to both scientists and politicians. Furthermore, granted that "the very foundation of the democratic procedure is dependence upon experimental production of social change,"[6] this procedure does not differ essentially from the way political decisions are reached under any *absolute* form of government. Whoever has to decide which means are best suited to reach a political end must endeavor in his own interest to take the findings of empirical science into account, whether this goal is a democratic one or not. It is doubtful whether the United States Senate is on the whole more likely than the Politburo to base its decisions about the means to implement its basic policies on scientific considerations. The Soviet Government will, *after* having acted, *pretend* to have *deduced* its decisions from the Marxist-Leninist catechism. It is true that an autocratic government is in danger of becoming prisoner of its official, unscientific ideology. Furthermore, a dictatorship is likely to hamper the discovery of scientific truth because it does not allow free discussion, as does democracy. On the other hand, representative government faces the danger of succumbing under the pressure of public opinion, which is sometimes swayed by emotions rather than by scientific arguments. Democracy and autocracy differ, therefore, not so much by the degree to which science is utilized in making decisions, but rather by whom these decisions are made. In a democracy, means are usually determined by majority vote of a popularly elected legislative assembly or by the executive branch which derives its powers ultimately from a majority vote. In an autocracy, such choices are made by one or a few, independently of the will of the majority. Under either system, governmental decisions as to the means to implement ultimate ends become effective regardless of whether or not they are based on information provided by empirical science.

---

[5] H. M. Kallen, "Freedom and Authoritarianism in Religion," *The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith* (New York, 1944), p. 3.

[6] J. Dewey, "Challenge to Liberal Thought," *Fortune*, Vol. 30, p. 188 (August, 1944).

According to another wide-spread view, ethical relativism entails ethical indifference. If so, then the *ethical relativists* are the ones who have, logically, no choice between democracy and absolutism. This does not mean, however, that they are committed to subscribe to one at the exclusion of the other, but rather, that they cannot adhere to *either*, as they must necessarily consider one to be no better than the other. They are, for instance, made to hold the following view concerning the present tension between the United States and Russia: "If with all the facts before the two parties, each feels approval for its own course, both attitudes are equally justified or unjustified."[7] Should the number of ethical relativists increase to the point that such an opinion became generally accepted, they would be held responsible for the resulting "international disaster."[8] In such an eventuality the relativist could, however, plead innocent by pointing out that he never said that something is *intrinsically good* if he approved of it, but that he always maintained that statements such as "x is intrinsically good" are neither *true nor false*. This implies, not that x is as good as non-x, but that the statement "x is as good as non-x" cannot be validated either. If so, then the statement "Democracy is no better than totalitarianism" has just as little cognitive, and just as much emotive, meaning as the value judgement "Democracy is best." Moreover, the view that democracy and autocracy are of equal value could be held with consistency not only by an ethical relativist, but also by an ethical absolutist who claims that this particular value judgement corresponds to absolute truth. The theory of ethical relativism implies that it is impossible to demonstrate that either democracy or autocracy is best, or that they are equally good or bad. But to hold that value judgements cannot be *validated*, does not preclude anyone from *making* value judgements.[9] The ethical relativist remains therefore free to prefer democracy, to favor autocracy, or to have no preference for either.

---

[7] Brand Blanshard, "The New Subjectivism in Ethics," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 9, p. 511 (March, 1949.)

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 510.

II. POLITICAL CONNECTION

It has been shown that nobody contradicts himself by espousing either of the philosophies together with either of the political doctrines. Even so, there may be connections of an empirical character which preclude altogether, or make highly improbable, the occurrence of some of the possible combinations of these philosophical and political theories.

It might thus be argued that, even though the epistemological theories of absolutism, empiricism, and relativism include no value judgements, absolutists, empiricists, and relativists, by being concerned with epistemological theories, presumably consider knowledge itself valuable. Increase of knowledge in the empiricist sense depends on the possibility of confronting each empirical hypothesis with whatever new sense experience becomes available, thus making it possible to formulate new theories having a higher degree of confirmation. This social process of testing and communicating in turn presupposes a political regime which protects the "free trade of ideas." Democracy, even though it cannot be characterized by the use of scientific method, implies freedom of opinion, without which scientific progress would be impossible. There exists, then, not a logical implication, but an empirical law of a political character connecting empiricism and democracy. According to this law, an empiricist must necessarily be a democrat, because a society must be democratic to be able to contribute to the discovery of truth by the only means which the empiricist considers effective. An empirical law of a similar kind would connect philosophical with political absolutism. To the philosophical absolutist, the most important truths are knowable with certainty and *a priori*. Their discovery is therefore hampered rather than promoted if "true knowledge" is left to compete with contrary, and necessarily erroneous, opinions. The philosophical absolutist must consequently favor a government which denies freedom of opinion and compels its citizens to adhere to the views which he considers absolutely true, and that means an absolutistic government.

It is true that there can be no democracy without freedom to express any opinion about what is and what ought to be, and even about the desirability of democracy itself, as long as voicing disapproval of democracy does not endanger existing democratic institutions. But like majority rule, freedom of opinion is not identical with democracy but is only one of its prerequisites. The empiricist, who is concerned with promoting knowledge, will indeed have to insist upon government guarantees of freedom of opinion; he need not, however, for this purpose require majority rule and the other institutions generally considered essential to democracy. He may favor an absolute form of government, provided it allows freedom of opinion on all matters open to scientific inquiry. Such regimes have existed in the past.[10] In general, of course, those who wield absolute power are likely to prevent their citizens from expressing any but the official views on almost any subject, regardless of whether or not this official party line jibes with empirical evidence. It is nevertheless possible for an empiricist to favor an autocratic regime even if it *denies* freedom of opinion, provided he deems the pursuit of scientific truth less desirable than the interest, say, of the "nation," or of the "victorious proletariat." If knowledge is not at the top of the empiricist's value hierarchy, he may with equal consistency adhere to the basic tenets of democracy or autocracy. Only an empiricist who feels that promoting knowledge should be a primary aim of society must favor a regime which insures freedom of opinion, and this means usually, but not necessarily, a democratic regime. (The empiricist may, of course, consider the promotion of empirical knowledge one of the necessary *means* to implement this ideal, rather than an *aim* in itself, and for this reason be a democrat.)

---

[9] "That the positivist does in fact engage in making value judgements is as significant as his claim that he does nothing of the kind" (Hallowell, *loc. cit.*, p. 646). The ethical relativist or positivist claims that it is impossible to *validate* intrinsic value judgements, but not that it is meaningless to *utter* them.

Similarly, a philosophical absolutist must favor a regime which denies freedom of opinion, hence is absolutistic, if he wants government to be responsible for the propagation of absolute truth. Government can indeed promote both an absolutistic end and absolute truth, if the following conditions are fulfilled: (1) some anti-democratic ideal can be proved to be intrinsically good; (2) those in power possess the "true knowledge"; (3) the views to which those in power compel their subjects to adhere in order to implement the anti-democratic end happen to conform to absolute truth. A philosophical absolutist may nevertheless hold that the class of absolutely valid assertions includes the basic tenets of democracy. He must, however, in this case, be willing to forego governmental protection of "true knowledge" in favor of the freedom to express all opinions, even those which are erroneous according to some particular variety of philosophical absolutism. The philosophical absolutist is then confronted with the following dilemma: If the statement "Government ought to be democractic"is absolutely true, then the statement "Government ought to remain neutral with respect to truth and error" must be true. This dilemma might be solved by adding these words to the latter statement: " . . . except as far as the truth of the democratic creed itself is concerned." Thus, philosophical absolutists of Catholic faith did come to terms with Franco's political absolutism, which includes the Catholic religion among its official tenets. They do not, on the other hand, compromise with a Communist dictatorship, whose party line conflicts with the Catholic dogma. The philosophies of Catholicism and democracy, too, are overlapping, as both share the belief in the dignity of the individual; but "Christian Democrats" must be willing to accept the government's neutrality with respect to all religions, as well as to agnosticism.

---

[10] "The development of scientific societies and academies in the 17th century seems to indicate that corridors of free discussion adequate for the development of science may be cut across democracy and despotism." R. McKeon, "Democracy, Scientific Method, and Action," *Ethics*, Vol. 55, p. 253 (July, 1945.)

Many political thinkers, such as the framers of the Declaration of Independence, have been moderate rather than all-out philosophical absolutists. They hold that there are only a few "self-evident" truths, e.g., that government should protect "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and that all other statements are true only insofar as they are confirmed by sense experience. If so, then government, by allowing freedom of opinion in all matters except with respect to these "self-evident" truths, protects absolute and empirical knowledge, as well as the democratic values of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

To summarize, philosophical absolutism excludes freedom of opinion; hence, it is akin to political absolutism—but only if the propagation of absolute truth is deemed a primary responsibility of government. Conversely, the empiricist must insist upon the essentially democratic institution of freedom of opinion only if he wants government to be primarily concerned with furthering scientific truth.

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONNECTION

When the discussion shifts to psychological considerations, empiricism, and especially ethical relativism, are often correlated, not with democracy but, on the contrary, with autocracy, and more specifically with modern totalitarianism. "Implicit in positivism is a nihilism closely akin to, if not identical with, the gospel of cynicism and despair that produced the mentality of fascism."[11] However, cynics are likely to get on the bandwagon, whether fascism, communism, or democracy happens to become the winning side. True, lack of moral convictions is apt to lead to cynicism and hence to political opportunism. It has been shown, however, that moral indifference is not implied by ethical relativism. Nor is there a psychological reason why those who maintain that choice between good and evil is a personal one, should be less determined to make that choice than those who believe—rightly or wrongly—that there is an objective method of distinguishing between good and evil.

The same allegation is often stated in its converse form: to be a democrat, one must be a philosophical absolutist. According to C. S. Lewis, "A dogmatic belief in objective value is necessary to the very idea of a rule which is not tyranny or an obedience which is not slavery."[12] "Without the truths of philosophy and religion," says Professor Adler, "democracy has no rational foundation."[13] This latter statement, taken literally, would be tautological and trivial. Whoever claims that there is a rational (in the sense of *a priori*) foundation for democracy, necessarily believes that there are absolute truths manifested by (absolutistic) philosophy or (not "and") religion, just as any believer in the rationalistic foundation of some absolutistic political aim also must be a philosophical absolutist. Presumably, such assertions are meant in a psychological sense: "A dogmatic belief in objective value" in general, and in the objective value of democracy in particular, is necessary in order to be a *convinced* democrat; without the help of philosophical absolutism, democracy cannot become a *fighting creed*. Again we ask: Why should an ethical relativist who has adopted the credo of democracy necessarily be a less enthusiastic defender of his convictions than a philosophical absolutist who claims that these convictions correspond to absolute truth? In Europe, the most ardent defenders of the democratic principle of individual dignity against the attacks by absolute monarchy, and subsequently by totalitarianism of the Right and Left, have come from the ranks of the liberal and later the socialist movements; their philosophical background has been traditionally one of agnosticism, empiricism, and ethical relativism. Presumably, most of the Jacobins of 1791, the Liberals of 1848, and the *Maquisards* of 1944 were willing to risk their lives for the sake of democratic principles, simply because they *felt* these ideas to be worth fighting for.

---

[11] Hallowell, *loc. cit.*, p. 653.

[12] *The Abolition of Man* (London, 1944), p. 46.

[13] M. Adler, "God and the Professors," *Science, Philosophy, and Religion, A Symposium* (New York, 1941), p. 136.

A psychological difference, although of another kind, does indeed exist between philosophical absolutists and ethical relativists, *regardless of their respective political opinions*. "To justify the subjective value judgements which emerge from the emotional elements of his consciousness, man tries to present them as objective principles by transferring to them the dignity of truth, to make them propositions of the same order as statements about reality."[14] This observation applies not to *man* in general, but to *philosophical absolutists* in general, irrespective of the content of their value judgements.[15] Some are indeed in need of a "rationalization" of what they consider to be intrinsically good, and thus become philosophical absolutists. To others, the relativists, their own—democratic or anti-democratic—feelings are a sufficient motivation for their actions.

IV. HISTORICAL CONNECTION

It is not only *possible* from a logical, political, and psychological point of view to adopt either philosophy together with either political doctrine; the history of political thought shows that all of the possible positions *have in fact been maintained*, contrary to the theory "that almost all outstanding representatives of a relativistic philosophy were politically in favor of democracy, whereas followers of philosophical absolutism, the great metaphysicians, were in favor of political absolutism."[16]

---

[14] H Kelsen, "The Natural Law Doctrine before the Tribunal of Science," *The Western Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 2, p. 501 (December, 1949).

[15] Kelsen's statement is thus hardly compatible with his own thesis (quoted at the beginning of this paper from another article), according to which philosophical absolutism is linked to a particular value judgement, namely political absolutism.

Many, perhaps most, political writings do not fall within either of these philosophical categories, because they are not concerned with the question of whether or how their statements of fact or value can be verified. *The Prince,* for instance, deals (except in the last chapter) only with the means best suited to maintaining tyranny, but not with the question whether tyranny itself is good. Other writings, e.g., *On Liberty* and *Mein Kampf,* do express views as to what the ultimate purpose of government should be, without, however, either attempting to validate such value judgements or explicitly denying that they can be validated.

Among those political philosophers who have held that what is good in general is a matter of *a priori* knowledge, many, from Plato to Hegel, have indeed held absolute government to be intrinsically good. Yet, one of the most prominent founders of the theory of democracy in modern times, John Locke, has been, in his political writings, a typical representative of the absolutistic school of philosophy. His *Second Treatise* is essentially an attempt to demonstrate the "true end of civil government" on the basis of "natural reason" and "revelation." That this is so often forgotten is perhaps due to the fact that the same Locke was, in his epistemological writings, a radical empiricist. From Locke, a straight line leads via the "self-evident truths" of the Declaration of Independence to such contemporary writers as Maritain. Among the philosophers who have explicitly denied the possibility of demonstrating *a priori* or of demonstrating at all what is good in general and what form of government is desirable in particular, some, including Russell and Dewey, have expressed their preference for democracy, while others, including Hobbes,[17] Le Bon and Pareto, have been political absolutists. As mentioned before, even a single variety of philosophical absolutism, Catholic philosophy, has accommodated itself to democracy as well as autocracy. On the other hand, both democracy and autocracy have been espoused by agnostics, who tend to be empiricists and ethical relativists.

CONCLUSION

Our inquiry has shown that none of the philosophical or epistemological theories we discussed is necessarily linked to any one particular political doctrine. There are no logical connections. As to empirical correlations, there are no historical and psychological ones. The only empirical links we found are of a political nature, and these hold only with certain important qualifications. Otherwise, anyone remains logically and empirically free to favor democracy or autocracy, regardless of his philosophical view.

[16] H. Kelsen, "Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics," *loc. cit.* p., 911.

[17] "*Good* and *evil* are names that signify our appetites and aversions" (*Leviathan*, Part I, Ch. 15). This quotation illustrates Hobbes' ethical relativism, even though he was in other respects a rationalist rather than an empiricist thinker.

The thesis of philosophical absolutism itself, however, is valid only if, of two contradictory value judgments such as "Democracy is best" and "Autocracy is best," one is true, hence the other false, and if there is an objective method of deciding which of the two is true. But which of the two *is* true? It has been shown that neither logic nor experience can provide an answer. This leaves philosophical absolutists no choice but to appeal to "intuition" as a special source of knowledge about good and evil. They have not convinced empiricists that intuition is anything but subjective. Nor have the ethical empiricists been able to indicate moral or political principles which are accepted by all reasonable men, except such tautological ones as *suum cuique*, under which even the Nazi or Soviet regime can be subsumed. Color blindness can be operationally defined, not so value blindness.

So far, ethical relativism seems not to have been refuted. Some are unable to reconcile themselves to this, perhaps uncomfortable, truth. They maintain that intrinsic goodness in general, and the intrinsic value of democracy in particular, can be proved, because they *want* such proof to be possible. They should be made to realize that wishful thinking is not an effective means toward implementing the basic tenets of democracy.

NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES AND INSTITUTES

After preliminary planning sessions in Paris in 1948 and 1949, the first International Political Science Association meeting was held at Zurich, Switzerland, during the period September 4–9, 1950, as part of the First World Congress of Sociology and Political Science. In contrast to the almost countless round tables, general sessions and luncheon meetings, beginning in the morning and extending far into the evening, which characterize the American Political Science Association annual sessions, the program arranged at Zurich was relatively simple. Only one meeting was scheduled for any one time and the general plan called for one morning and one afternoon session. Mimeographed copies of the formal papers were sent to the delegates beforehand and the oral presentations were informal. The discussion on each topic was extended, with numerous delegates participating.

A joint opening session of political scientists and sociologists at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology was addressed by various persons, including representatives of the Swiss Republic and the city and canton of Zurich. Subsequent meetings of the political scientists were scheduled in the Beckenhof, a country house built about the middle of the eighteenth century. On the second day of the Congress the political scientists and sociologists were guests of the canton and city of Zurich at a dinner.

After listening to an address by Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago on "The Significance of an International Political Science Association," the conference proceeded to a consideration of the topic, "What are the Minimum Conditions for an Effective and Permanent Union of States?" Formal papers for this discussion were prepared by K. C. Wheare of Oxford University and J. A. Maxwell of Clark University. The paper by Professor Wheare dealt with the allocation of powers, while the paper by Professor Maxwell dealt with financial problems.

On Tuesday the conference discussed the paper of Maurice Duverger of the University of Bordeaux on "The Influence of Electoral Systems upon Political Regimes." It may be noted at this point that a French committee headed by Professor Duverger and including Francois Goguel, J. Cadart, G. de Loys, S. Mastellone, A. Soulier, and G. Vlachos had prepared a monograph bearing the above title which was presented to the Association in the form of a printed volume of 177 pages.

Wednesday was devoted to a joint session with the sociologists on "The Role of the Citizen in a Planned Society." The political aspects were dealt with by J. Barents of the University of Amsterdam. On Thursday and Friday joint sessions with the sociologists gave attention to "The Role of Minorities in International Affairs." Walter Filley of the University of Michigan discussed the problem as it relates to Canada.

Approximately 75 political scientists from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jugoslavia, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States were in attendance. Political scientists of the United States who were present included the following: J. Dunner, Grinnell College; Walter Filley, University of Michigan; R. K. Gooch, University of Virginia; K. A. Hochschwender, University of Florida; Walter H. C. Laves, formerly of UNESCO; E. Lay, Army Historical Service; Eve Lewis, formerly of the University of Alabama; Karl Loewenstein, Amherst College; R. L. Mott, Colgate University; Franz Neumann, Columbia University; M. Niles, Army Historical Service; James K. Pollock, University of Michigan; and Harold Zink, Ohio State University.

Provisional officers were designated as follows: president, Quincy Wright, United States; vice-presidents, Marcel Bridel, Switzerland, and D. W. Brogan, Great Britain; members of the executive committee: J. Barents, Netherlands; F. Celibkas, Turkey; Maurice Duverger, France; Isaac Ganon, Uruguay; J. Goormaghtight, Belgium; E. Håstad, Sweden; J. N. Khosla, India; C. N. Macpherson, Canada; and Adam Schaff, Poland. The executive secretary-treasurer is J. Meynaud of France. The provisional executive committee has given its attention to the drafting of a constitution for a permanent organization, the setting up of a committee on research, the possibility of founding an international institute of research in the social sciences, and the fixing of a date for a second international meeting.

Eight national associations were formally admitted as collective members and were invited to appoint delegates to the Council, which is to be the permanent governing body of the Association. The Constitution provides that each collective member be represented by one, two, or three delegates. It was decided that the United States, Great Britain and France would each have three delegates; Canada, India, Poland and Sweden would each have two; and Ireland would have one. It is considered likely that some 30-odd national associations will become collective members of the International Political Science Association within the next few years.

The provisional organization, established at the Paris meeting in September, 1949, will continue until the national associations have appointed their delegates to the Council and a meeting of the Council has been held. At that time the provisional organization will cease to exist.

It was decided to attempt to hold another congress late in 1952, independently of other international social science associations.

There was discussion of the proposal to establish an international political science review, but it was felt that the financial situation did not warrant such an enterprise at this time and that the interests of the Association can be taken care of in UNESCO's *International Social Science Bulletin*, which devotes a certain number of pages to each of the international social science associations.

Applications for membership in the International Political Science Association may be sent to M. J. Meynaud, 27 Rue Saint-Guillaume, Paris 7e, France.—Harold Zink.

The Eighth International Congress of Administrative Sciences, organized by the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, met at the invitation of the Italian Government in Florence, Italy, from July 25 to August 3, 1950. Twenty-one governments, including the Government of the United States, accredited official delegations to the Congress. The personnel of the official American delegation was: Donald C. Stone, chairman; Everett H. Bellows; Ralph J. Burton; and Rowland Egger. Other American delegates were present from ECA missions in Greece and Italy, the High Commissioner's Office in Germany, and UNESCO.

The work of the Congress was organized around three major topics: (1) administrative practices; (2) international administration; and (3) central administration. Donald C. Stone was chairman of the series of meetings dealing with administrative practices, the discussions of which centered upon the work of organization and methods units in the several countries, and upon the techniques of management improvement generally. Walter R. Sharp was the general *rapporteur* of the sessions on international administration. E. Seeldrayers of the Belgian Ministry of Finance served as general *rapporteur* for the sessions on central administration, which were primarily concerned with an analysis of the common characteristics of central administrative institutions of Continental governments.

A number of modifications of the statutes of the Institute relating to the composition of the Bureau, or governing body, elections to titular membership, etc., were adopted at the General Assembly on August 1. Dr. Oscar Leimgruber, chancellor of the Swiss Confederation, was elected to a second and statutorily final term as president of the Institute. Herbert Emmerich was reelected vice-president. The Institute will sponsor a conference on constitutional courts and on the teaching of administrative law in Monte Carlo in 1951, and, if local arrangements can be satisfactorily concluded, will meet in congress at Istanbul in 1953.—Rowland Egger.

The International Committee for Comparative Law held its first general meeting in London, July 19–20, 1950, under the chairmanship of Dean de la Morandière of the Faculty of Law of Paris. A considerable number of teachers and practitioners attended to discuss the teaching of comparative law and its concern to practitioners. As a result of the discussion the International Committee will inaugurate a study of problems of documentation. The study will be a part of the broader study of documentation being conducted by all international associations formed since the war under UNESCO's auspices. A subcommittee under the chairmanship of Judge Marc Ancel of France will explore the problem in preparation for a meeting of the Executive Bureau of the International Committee to be held in Paris, December 28–30, 1950. William Sprague Barnes, newly appointed at the Harvard Law School to plan the fuller utilization of Harvard's large foreign law collections, will serve on the sub-committee for the United States.

Formal organization of the International Committee was completed at its business session, and committees were admitted to membership from Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Italy, Nicaragua, Peru, the United States and Uruguay. Committees were admitted provisionally from Brazil, Mexico and the United Kingdom, in expectation of early completion of formalities. An application from Spain will be discussed further in the light of UNESCO's opinion. The representative from the United States in the International Committee will be the American Foreign Law Association, whose president is Phanor J. Eder, 74 Trinity Place, New York.—John N. Hazard.

The second conference on political science in German universities, called by the Hessian Ministry of Education, met in Koenigstein (near Frankfort) July 15–16, 1950. Those present included representatives of all of the universities and ministries of education of Western Germany and Berlin. The purpose of the conference was to review the progress that had been made since the conference at Waldleinigen in September, 1949, and to discuss practical steps to be taken for the advancement of political science teaching and research.

The discussion of teaching was led by Professors Theodor Eschenburg of Tuebingen and Ernst Wilhelm Meyer of Frankfort. Professor Michael Freund of Kiel opened the session on research with a report emphasizing the needs and opportunities for political science research in Germany. The conference program also included a paper on political science in France by Charles Burdeau of the University of Dijon, as well as reports by John B. Mason and C. B. Robson on the fields of international relations and comparative government as they have been developed in America. President James K. Pollock of the American Political Science Association was present and conveyed the greetings of the Association to the German political scientists attending the conference. Other Americans present included Karl Loewenstein, Carl J. Friedrich, Franz Neumann, James Read and Jay B. Westcott.

It was noted in the discussions that considerable progress had been made since the summer of 1949 in the extension of the teaching of political science in the universities of Western Germany at the level of general lectures for students of all faculties. The development of advanced and specialized work for training political scientists for careers in government and as research scholars has, however, been handicapped by the limited number of qualified professors, the difficulty of access to the relevant literature, and the lack of facilities for research. Resolutions urging the ministries of education and the universities to support a continuing development of political science at each of these levels and also calling for the organization of a German political science association to promote the desired ends were adopted at the closing session of the conference. Guiding principles for the proposed association were drafted, and a working committee was set up to prepare for an organization meeting during the winter semester of 1950–51.

In connection with the redevelopment of political science in Germany, it should be noted that an Institute for Research in Political Science has been established in Berlin under the joint sponsorship of the Free University and the

High School of Politics. Another significant development during the past summer was the launching of a High School for Political Science in Munich, which has announced a program of lecture and seminar courses for the winter semester.—C. B. Robson.

An international workshop for the social studies was conducted at Heidelberg, Germany, July 17–August 18, under the sponsorship of the United States Department of State. The primary objective of the workship was to clarify thinking as to content, methods of instruction and purpose of the social studies in the educational systems of the German *Länder*. Participants included approximately 60 German educators, selected from all types of schools in the American zone, as well as nine American consultants, and approximately a dozen consultants from other European countries. Serving the group as a consulting specialist in political science was Howard White of Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. The general report of the workshop is under the editorship of Chris De Young of the National Education Association, U. S. A., and William Berger of Bremen, Germany. Copies of this report, a condensation of the reports of the workshop's various committees, are being distributed among educators in Germany.

The Institute of Public Affairs of the University of Virginia held its seventeenth session in Charlottesville, July 9–15, 1950. The session was the first to be held by the Institute since 1942, when its activities were temporarily discontinued because of the exigencies of war. The program was on the general theme, "The United States and the Postwar World," and focused attention on both foreign and domestic problems. Nine panel discussions were devoted to problems in Europe and Asia, the outlook for international organization, controls and uses of atomic energy, foreign and domestic economic problems, agricultural policy, and possible threats to individual freedoms. The Institute was addressed by Philip C. Jessup, ambassador at large for the United States, on the topic, "The Future of Europe," and by President Colgate W. Darden, Jr., of the University of Virginia, who spoke on the topic, "The Dynamics of the Mid-Century World." Others to address the Institute included H. Hume Wrong, Canadian ambassador to the United States, Stringfellow Barr, president of the Foundation for World Government, Bertram M. Gross of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, and Charles F. Brannan, United States Secretary of Agriculture.

St. Lawrence University conducted a Canadian affairs workshop July 3–August 11, 1950. The major emphasis of the workshop was on Canadian history and government, although attention was also devoted to geography, cultural development, and social and economic problems. Participants included, in addition to students, several members of the faculty of St. Lawrence University, while A. R. M. Lower of Queens University and Keith Greenaway of the Canadian Defense Research Board were guest lecturers. The workshop was under the general direction of William R. Willoughby of the St. Lawrence history and government department.

The second annual Institute on Administration of Scientific Research and Development was held at the American University, October 23–27, with the cooperation of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Serving as director of the Institute was Lowell H. Hattery of the department of political science and public administration of the American University.

The Institute of Government and the Extension Division of the University of Utah sponsored a labor institute for the United Steelworkers of America on the campus of the University, August 25–26, 1950. The program, consisting of a series of discussions on topics in the general area of labor relations, included participants from approximately a half dozen departments of the University, while Ellsworth E. Weaver, assistant professor of political science, served as moderator for the institute. The institute was the third of a series of such meetings held at the University with a view toward making the University's facilities available to the Steelworkers in their training programs.

The Southern California Political Scientists held their fall meeting on the campus of Whittier College on October 13. The general theme of the program for the meeting was the current California political scene. Speakers included: Bernard Brennan, campaign manager for Richard Nixon, Republican candidate for the United States Senate; George E. Outland of San Francisco State College; and Walter Slater of the Research and Education Department of the Congress of Industrial Organization.

The fourth annual meeting of the New York State Political Science Association was held at Utica, New York, October 20–21, with an attendance of 75 members. The program included three panel discussions dealing with values in administration, the prospects for European federation, and the teaching of government and citizenship in the schools. Additional features of the program were an address by John M. Gaus of Harvard University on the topic, "Political Scientist Back Home," and an address by Joseph Kaitz, deputy director of planning, New York Civil Defense Commission, to a session at which "Civil Defense and Atomic Warfare" was the topic for discussion. Officers elected by the Association for the coming year are: Roscoe C. Martin of Syracuse University, president; Clinton L. Rossiter of Cornell University, vice-president; Ronald M. Stout of Colgate University, secretary-treasurer; and William E. Diez of the University of Rochester, Kurt Wilk of Wells College and William R. Willoughby of St. Lawrence University, members of the Executive Council. The Association will hold its 1951 conference at Syracuse, New York.

The ninth annual meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists will be held on the campus of the University of Minnesota, May 4–6, 1951. The program committee for the meeting is under the chairmanship of Harvey

Mansfield of Ohio State University, while Asher N. Christensen is chairman of the committee on local arrangements.

The Washington Chapter of the American Political Science Association is continuing with its regular schedule of monthly meetings. Political scientists visiting Washington may secure information relative to the exact dates and places of the meetings from the officers of the Chapter. The officers for 1950–51 include: Franklin L. Burdette of the University of Maryland, president; W. Brooke Graves of the Library of Congress, first vice-president; Catheryn Seckler-Hudson of American University, second vice-president; and Vincent J. Browne of Howard University, secretary-treasurer.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The General Assembly of the United Nations at its third and fourth sessions took action creating an International Centre for Training in Public Administration. The activities of the Centre are directed by the Technical Assistance Administration in the Department of Economic Affairs of the Secretariat, under the supervision of the Economic and Social Council. The Centre is still in the process of development but it is expected that it will be fully organized by 1951.

The first international seminar undertaken under the auspices of the Centre is on the general subject of public personnel administration. Sessions are being held at the new United Nations building in New York. The program was opened on October 30 and will continue through 37 sessions to January 30, 1951.

The group of participants includes some 25 senior public officials, each of whom is actually responsible for the planning and direction of activities in the field of public administration in his own country. In general, there is only one participant from each country. The countries represented include several of those in which techniques of administration are relatively highly developed, such as Belgium, Canada, Norway and the United States of America, and a number of those, like Afghanistan, Bolivia, Pakistan and Thailand, in which such techniques are relatively less developed. Plans for the seminar include visits, from November 24 to December 31, to appropriate governmental offices at the federal, state and local levels, as well as to private industrial, academic and other organizations.

The 1950–51 seminar is only the first step in developing a much broader program. The resolutions of the Economic and Social Council and of the General Assembly outline two broad objectives. The first aim is to afford opportunities for well-qualified civil servants of member governments to receive specific training in problems of public administration, so that they may contribute, upon return to their home countries, to the improvement of the organization and management of the governmental offices and services. The following means are envisioned for the accomplishment of this objective: annual distribution of fellowships and scholarships, promotion of a series of seminars, exchange of civil servants among member governments for periods of study and observation, organized dissemination of technical information, assistance to member governments for the creation or reorganization of national schools, and institutes or centers designed to train in public administration.

The second and ultimate purpose is to develop and spread the art and science of administration for the benefit of all nations. It is hoped that many of those who are selected for training will be able and willing to make valuable written contributions to the common fund of knowledge which constitutes the art and science of public administration.—Harvey Walker.

The International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS) is now well under way with its two new tasks, providing information on administrative practices to the United Nations and to the German Institute of Public Affairs. It has $10,000 contracts this year for both projects and has opened a new Administrative Practices Office at its headquarters in Brussels to administer the projects.

The IIAS's work for the United Nations is a part of the extensive program for the exchange of information in public administration which is being carried out by the International Centre for Training in Public Administration. Under the terms of the IIAS-UN contract, the IIAS is providing to the United Nations, for use by its member states, information on effective administrative practices. This is being done both through the identification of existing documents and through a number of special studies.

The IIAS's work with the German Institute of Public Affairs (GIPA) has been arranged through a contractual agreement between the IIAS and the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany. Under this agreement the IIAS will provide the GIPA with information on administrative practices and experiences in other countries, on significant developments in the improvement of administration at local, state, and national levels, and on the application of democratic principles in administration.

The GIPA operates on a nation-wide basis from headquarters in Frankfort. It has the specific objectives of promoting effective government, responsive to the needs and desires of the people of Germany, and of furnishing a channel for the exchange with other democratic countries of information and persons in the field of governmental affairs. In carrying out these objectives, the GIPA works as a central liaison and coordinating center for major civic and public administration associations in Germany.

The newly created Administrative Practices Office in Brussels has a small staff headed by an executive secretary, Paul Schillings of Belgium, and serves to bring the various resources of the IIAS to bear on the requirements of these two "clients." The Office functions under the general supervision of a small body of the IIAS known as the Supervisory Committee. The membership of this Committee includes: Louis Camu of Belgium, chairman; John R. Simpson of the United Kingdom, vice-chairman; Harry Fite of the United States, vice-chairman for program; Hartvig Nissen of Norway; and Roger Gregoire of France.—Donald C. Stone.

A seminar on modern France was recently organized by the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey. Lecturers for the autumn sessions of the seminar included: from France, Raymond Aron, Jean-Jacques Chevallier and Jean Gottmann of the University of Paris; from Great Britain, J. P. T. Bury and David Thomson of Cambridge University and E. L. Woodward of Oxford University; and from the United States, Edward Meade Earle and Joseph Kraft of the Institute for Advanced Study, Gilbert Chinard and William Ebenstein of Princeton University, Henry W. Ehrmann of the University of Colorado, Paul Farmer of the University of Wisconsin, Edward Fox of Cornell University, H. Stuart Hughes of Harvard University, and Gordon Wright of the University of Oregon. The seminar was planned with a view toward emphasizing the nature, the origins, and the probable consequences to France and to Europe of the present-day French political and economic crisis.

A management improvement survey of the field services of the United States Department of the Interior has been undertaken by Princeton University. The staff, under the direction of Joseph E. McLean, includes Guthrie S. Birkhead, Frederic N. Cleaveland, and Donald Riddle of the department of politics of Princeton University, and James Clark, William Fee, Norman Horowitz, and Joseph McCracken, recent graduates of the Woodrow Wilson School program for training in public affairs. The staff is being assisted by an advisory committee consisting of Dean Thomas C. Donnelly of the University of New Mexico, James Fesler of the University of North Carolina, Charles McKinley of Reed College, and Herman Pritchett of the University of Chicago.

Mississippi State College recently organized a social science research center, whose purpose will be to sponsor research and off-campus activities in political science, public administration, sociology, economics, history and related fields. The center is under the chairmanship of John K. Bettersworth, head of the department of history and government, while Harold F. Kaufman, head of the division of sociology and rural life, is associate chairman. Among the major off-campus activities sponsored by the center will be a community organization program.

Kenneth Colegrove of Northwestern University has been appointed by the president of the American Political Science Association as the Association's delegate to the American Council of Learned Societies. He will serve for a four year term beginning January 1, 1951.

Charles Fairman of Stanford University has been appointed by the president of the American Political Science Association to be one of the Association's representatives on the Social Science Research Council.

Since the opening of the Washington Office of the American Political Science Association in October and the appointment of Edward H. Litchfield as its executive director, the organization of the Office has developed further in the direction contemplated by the Committee on the Washington Office. The staff of the Office has been increased by the appointment of one professional and three clerical assistants. Professor Litchfield has named Ralph J. D. Braibanti, assistant professor of political science at Kenyon College, as his assistant. Professor Braibanti, granted a one-year leave of absence from his teaching duties at Kenyon College to assist in the organization of the Washington Office, served for two years as military government officer in Japan and has been a frequent contributor to professional journals on problems of occupied areas. He has taught in the summer sessions of Syracuse University and Trinity College (Hartford) and has been appointed lecturer in political science at George Washington University. Margaret Schrader, a graduate of the University of Indiana, has been engaged as general secretary of the Office. Ann Templeton, a graduate of Duke University, has been appointed membership secretary, and Julia Claude, a graduate of Vassar College, is the receptionist and office assistant.

Federal Reporting of Statistics on Governments. Federal reporting of basic statistics on state and local governments has been placed on a firmer footing by Public Law 767 of the 81st Congress, which President Truman signed on September 7. This legislation requires that a complete "census of governments" be taken for 1952 and each five years thereafter, covering at least the subjects of "taxes and tax valuations, governmental receipts, expenditures, indebtedness, and employees." The new law replaced a part of the old Census Act of 1902, which authorized, but did not require, that such a census be taken each ten years. Periodic reporting of benchmark government statistics is thus placed on a statutory basis like that which already applied to the quinquennial censuses of manufacturing, trade and service industries, and agriculture.

The first major undertaking under the new law will be the census of governments for 1952, for which preliminary preparation has already begun. In planning the content and coverage of this undertaking, the Census Bureau has sought the help of a representative group, including state and municipal officials, economic research agencies, professors of political science and economics, and others directly interested in governmental statistics.

The first major phase of the 1952 census will involve identification and listing of all local governments in the nation. This task, which is essential to the later gathering of financial and employment figures for all governments, will also provide new benchmark information on numbers of governments. The Census Bureau expects to publish such figures by early 1952, bringing up to date the count last made for 1942, when over 108,000 school districts and 46,000 other local governments were reported in existence.

Subsequent major phases of the 1952 census of governments, as now planned by the Census Bureau, will relate to realty valuations for property taxation, public employees and pay rolls, and governmental finances. Census reports on these various subjects are being scheduled for publication at intervals from 1952 until mid-1954.—Roy V. Peel.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Robert L. Abbey, recently a graduate student at Harvard University, has been appointed to an instructorship in political science at Tulane University.

Thornton H. Anderson, formerly of the University of California, has been appointed assistant professor at the University of Maryland to serve during the absence of Professor Elmer Plischke.

Paul Ashby has been appointed to an assistant professorship in public administration at San Francisco State College.

Stephen K. Bailey has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at Wesleyan University (Connecticut).

Richard F. Behrendt, formerly professor of political science at Colgate University, has been appointed to a professorship at the University of Florida, effective February 1, 1951.

Eric Bellquist will continue on leave from the University of California (Berkeley) through the academic year 1950–51. He is serving as public affairs officer at the American Embassy in Stockholm.

Charles P. Blackmore, formerly of the Fort Hayes Branch of the University of Kansas, has joined the faculty of University College, the evening college of Rutgers University, as instructor in political science.

Mary E. Bradshaw has been named dean of the Washington Semester Program of the American University.

Gordon K. Bryan has been appointed acting professor of government at Mississippi State College.

Franklin L. Burdette has been named head of the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Leo Cagen has been appointed part-time instructor in political science at San Francisco State College.

Lorace Catterson is on leave from Florida State University for graduate study at the University of Missouri.

Charles Clapp is on leave from Florida State University for graduate study at the University of California.

Edward S. Corwin will be visiting professor of political science at Emory University during the spring quarter of 1951.

Aida Raquel Caro Costas is on leave from the University of Puerto Rico, where she is auxiliary professor of history, to serve as director of the Inter-American office of the city government of San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Warren Cunningham, associate professor of government at Miami University

(Ohio), served during the summer of 1950 as supervisor for a group of students studying comparative government in Europe under the auspices of the Bureau of University Travel and the United States Department of State.

John A. Davis of Lincoln University (Pennsylvania) is a visiting lecturer at Ohio State University during the current academic year.

Mary Capen Davis, assistant professor of political science at Vassar College, has been named assistant dean at that institution.

Alfred Diamant, recently a graduate student at Yale University, has been appointed to an instructorship at the University of Florida.

Violet Alkemeyer Earle, formerly assistant professor of political science at San Francisco State College, has joined the political science staff of the University of Alabama as acting assistant professor.

P. T. Fenn has been named chairman of the department of political science of Oberlin College for a three year period.

Theodore Fleming has been appointed instructor in government at Wayne University.

Allen O. Gamble has been serving as lecturer in personnel administration in the fall semester at American University.

Wallace Graves has been appointed to an assistant professorship at DePauw University.

Howard D. Hamilton, recently a graduate student at the University of Illinois, has accepted a position at Albion College.

E. Allen Helms is on leave from Ohio State University for the current academic year to serve as visiting lecturer in political science at Oxford University under the Fulbright program.

Donald G. Herzberg has resigned as instructor in government at Wesleyan University (Connecticut) to accept an appointment in the comptroller's office of the State of Connecticut.

Lynwood M. Holland has been advanced to a full professorship and named chairman of the department of political science at Emory University.

Robert E. Hosack, associate professor of political science at the University of Idaho, is on sabbatical leave for the first semester of the current academic year. While on leave, he is engaged in graduate study at Duke University.

George Hougham has resigned from his position as instructor in political science at the University of Pennsylvania in order to spend a year in research in Canada as a Penfield scholar.

John M. Howell, recently a graduate student at Duke University, is an instructor in political science at the University of Idaho for the first semester of the current academic year.

Paul S. Jacobsen has been on leave from his position as chairman of the department of political science of Colgate University during the fall semester of 1950–51 while serving as supervisor for the twelfth Colgate Washington study group.

Howard Cooper Johnson, Jr., adviser on the planning staff of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, United States Department of State, was a visiting member of the faculty of the University of Idaho for the summer session of 1950

Victor Jones has been promoted to a full professorship at Wesleyan University (Connecticut).

Harvey M. Karlen, formerly lecturer in the department of government of the City College of New York, has been appointed head of the political science section of the social science department at Wright Junior College, Chicago.

Willmoore Kendall is on partial leave from Yale University for the academic year 1950–51 to engage in research.

Klaus Knorr has returned to his position at Yale University after a year's leave spent in teaching at the University Institute of International Studies, Geneva, and in work with the European Economic Commission.

Edgar Lane of Princeton University served as an editorial consultant to the Select Committee on Lobbying Activities of the United States House of Representatives during the summer of 1950.

William F. Larsen, formerly assistant professor at the Citadel, has been appointed assistant professor of political science and director of the public administration clearing service at the University of Florida.

Gertrude C. K. Leighton, visiting lecturer in law at Yale University Law School during the academic year 1949–50, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Bryn Mawr College.

Werner Levi is on a year's leave of absence from the University of Minnesota, where he is associate professor of political science. He will spend the year in India and Europe.

John D. Lewis of Oberlin College is a visiting professor at Wesleyan University (Connecticut) during the current academic year.

Duane Lockard, formerly of Yale University, has been appointed to an instructorship at Wesleyan University (Connecticut).

Charles A. McCoy, recently a graduate student at Colgate University, has been appointed to an instructorship in political science and economics at Worcester College.

I. Thomas McKillop has been serving as lecturer in organization and management in the fall semester at American University.

Donald S. Macrae, formerly administrative assistant in the Public Works Department, San Jose, California, has been appointed personnel director for the City of San Jose.

Harvey C. Mansfield of Ohio State University served as consultant to the Committee on Public Administration Cases during the past summer.

Herbert Marshall, recently a graduate student at the University of North Carolina, has been appointed as an instructor at the University of Florida.

Jaroslav Mayda, formerly of the Charles University in Prague, is a visiting lecturer at Ohio State University during the current academic year.

Lloyd D. Musolf has been advanced to an assistant professorship at Vassar College.

Louis Nemzer has returned to his position at Ohio State University after a leave of absence during which he was engaged in work for the United States Department of State.

Sigmund Neumann of the department of government at Wesleyan University (Connecticut) is a visiting professor at Harvard University for the academic year 1950–51.

Gerhart Niemeyer, professor of political science at Oglethorpe University, has accepted a position in the United States Department of State.

Norman D. Palmer, chairman of the department of political science of the University of Pennsylvania, was a visiting member of the faculty of Columbia University during the summer session of 1950.

John M. Phelps is serving as instructor in political science at Mundelein College during the current academic year.

Elmer Plischke is on leave from the University of Maryland to serve in Germany as historical officer for the United States Department of State.

John Ponturo, recently a graduate student at Yale University, has been appointed instructor in government at Trinity College.

C. Gordon Post, professor and chairman of the department of political science at Vassar College, was a visiting member of the faculty of Cornell University for the summer session of 1950.

Joseph M. Ray has been named dean of the College of Special and Continuation Studies at the University of Maryland, but will continue to give a portion of his time to the department of government and politics.

Elston Roady is on leave from Florida State University for graduate study at the University of Illinois.

Joseph M. Robertson has resigned his position as assistant professor of political science and assistant to the director at the Montgomery Center of the University of Alabama to join the research division of the Kentucky Department of Revenue.

H. Mark Roelofs, recently a student at Oxford University, England, is serving as an instructor in political science at Colgate University during the absence of Professor James Storing.

David N. Rowe has been advanced to the rank of professor at Yale University.

James E. Russell has resigned as assistant professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University to become associate director of the Citizenship Education Project and assistant professor of education at Teachers College, Columbia University.

Elmer E. Schattschneider, who headed a program for German exchange students at Syracuse University during the academic year 1949–50, has returned to Wesleyan University (Connecticut), where he is serving as chairman of the department of government.

Walter R. Sharp has resumed the chairmanship of the department of government of the City College of New York after serving for fifteen months in Paris as chief of the International Cooperation Division of the UNESCO Secretariat.

Charles W. Shull has been promoted to a full professorship in government at Wayne University.

H. Gordon Skilling, on leave from Dartmouth College while a senior fellow at the Russian Institute, Columbia University, was in Czechoslovakia for six weeks during the past summer in connection with the study of the impact of Soviet ideas and practices on Czechoslovak politics which he is conducting at the Institute. He will return to Dartmouth for the second semester of the current academic year.

Harold Sprout of Princeton University was visiting professor of international relations at the University of Denver in the second term of the summer session of 1950.

Joseph R. Starr, formerly of the University of Minnesota, has been appointed professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

William S. Stokes has been advanced to a full professorship in political science at the University of Wisconsin.

James Storing is on leave from the department of political science of Colgate University to accept a Fulbright teaching scholarship at the University of Oslo, Norway.

John E. Swanson, recently a graduate student at the University of Illinois, has accepted a position at the University of Wyoming.

Richard W. Taylor, recently a graduate student at the University of Illinois, has been appointed to an instructorship at the University of Minnesota for the academic year 1950–51.

Garold Thumm has returned to his position as instructor in political science at the University of Pennsylvania after a year in Europe as a Penfield scholar.

John E. Turner, formerly a graduate student at the University of Minnesota, is teaching at that institution during the absence of Professor Werner Levi.

Kenneth E. Van Landingham, recently a graduate student at the University of Illinois, has accepted a position at the University of Kentucky.

Wilbur W. White has relinquished his administrative duties as president of the University of Toledo because of ill health and is serving as visiting professor of political science at Rice Institute.

William O. Winter has resigned his position as research associate in the Bureau of Government, University of Michigan, to accept an assistant professorship in government at Southern Illinois University.

George E. Wolff, recently a graduate student at the University of North Carolina, has been appointed as an instructor at the University of Florida.

Sheldon S. Wolin has been appointed to an assistant professorship at Oberlin College to serve during the absence of Professor John D. Lewis.

William H. Young has been advanced to a full professorship in political science at the University of Wisconsin.

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, NOTICES AND ARTICLES

POLITICAL SCIENCE IN SWEDEN

The systematic study of government, politics, and public affairs in Sweden has a history of more than 300 years. It was not until the middle of the last century, however, that the study and teaching of political science emerged as a separate discipline in Swedish universities. And among Scandinavian countries, it is only in Sweden and Swedish-speaking parts of Finland that political science today enjoys recognition as a separate discipline. In other Scandinavian countries the area of study which Americans call political science is included in the domains of other disciplines.

Although the Swedish concept of what is embraced in political science is essentially the same as the American, Swedish political science appears to have been oriented less to theory of the state and its sovereignty than was so long the case in the United States. Swedish scholars were quicker than the Americans to focus attention on actual political behavior and the practical workings of political institutions. They have shown a persistent interest in the origins and development of political institutions, in their study of them drawing heavily on the disciplines of history and philosophy. But in their study of contemporary political behavior they have, in addition, availed themselves of the methods and experience of such disciplines as sociology, economics, statistics and law.

Swedish political scientists have focused attention primarily on the problems of their own country: constitutional law and constitutional history, parliamentary and cabinet government, local government questions, administration, politics and popular movements. Recently there has been a marked increase in attention to the organization and practices of political parties and formation and expression of public opinion. The study of foreign systems has not been neglected, however; many aspects of Swedish government and politics have been examined in comparison with the institutions and practices of foreign countries. There has been less concern with formal political theory, the development of political thought and the great writings, than has been the case with American political science. The field of international relations has been fairly neglected.

There are four universities in Sweden. The University of Uppsala and the University of Lund are public or state universities in the fullest sense. The University of Stockholm and the University of Gothenburg were originally private institutions but are now semi-public in character since they receive financial assistance from the public treasury and are subject to a greater measure of public control than was originally the case. All four universities are united for certain purposes under a single Chancellor, who is elected by professors in all universities and then appointed for life by the Crown.

The first professorship in political science was created at Uppsala in 1622, three years before Hugo Grotius completed his *De jure belli et pacis* and nearly thirty years before the publication of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*. The chair was in rhetoric and politics, however, and until the middle of the 19th century the holder seems to have been occupied almost exclusively in the teaching of elocution. This chair, named for its donor, John Skytte, still exists, and as vacancies occur one of the descendants of John Skytte formally designates the professor who shall occupy it. For a century the Skyttian professorship has been a chair in politics only.

For some time prior to 1909 the subject matter of political science received more or less attention at the University of Lund, where it was taught as a phase of the study of history. In 1909 it moved out of the hands of the history professors and was united with statistics until 1926. Then political science won a place as a separate discipline.

The University of Stockholm was originally established for the study of the natural sciences only. A humanities division was added in 1921 and political science came into the curriculum as an appendage of statistics and international law. In 1935 a special chair for political science was created, and a second professorship has been added since.

The University of Gothenburg has since its creation been an institution primarily for the study of the humanities. Political science, combined with statistics, has been taught since 1901. Recently at least the holder of this chair has been a political scientist, and the two subjects were entirely separated at the beginning of the 1950 academic year.

The chairs mentioned are reserved for full professors. In addition, some twelve *docents* and a similar number of assistants are connected with the universities.

Professors are required by law to teach only four hours a week, and this fact permits them to devote a considerable amount of time to other interests. In consequence, political science professors have regularly pursued an active career in one or another phase of public affairs. Of the 15 political science professors active in the last 50 years, seven have been members of the Riksdag. Four or five have been prominent in journalism or other writing for the general public. And nearly all of them have played leading roles in Royal Commissions, as will be noted from time to time in this discussion. One has been a Cabinet Minister.

Academic study in Sweden is to a very great extent a matter of independent enterprise on the part of the student. The only political science "courses" that are regularly given are Swedish Constitutional Law (at all four universities) and Public Administration (at Uppsala and Lund). Other courses are given, but the subject matter is determined mainly, if not altogether, by the preference of the particular instructor. The subject may well be one in which the instructor is currently doing research and the course may never be repeated, or it may be repeated only after an interval of several years.

ORGANIZATIONS, LIBRARIES, AND JOURNALS

The government recently created a Social Science Research Council, commissioned to support research and publication activity in the social sciences.

During the first year of its activity it received 350,000 crowns ($70,000)[1] from the public treasury, a substantial sum in a small country like Sweden. The government appoints the chairman and two members. The remaining six members are elected by the social science faculties of the four universities. Undoubtedly the establishment of this research agency represents the most significant measure taken by the government in many years to support social science study.

At present there are no political science research bureaus attached to Swedish universities, comparable to those now so common in the United States. The possibilities of creating a common social science research institute at the University of Stockholm, however, are now being investigated.

There is no nation-wide organization for political scientists. About 20 years ago a Scandinavian Political Science Congress was held in Stockholm, but it has had no successors, possibly because political science lacks in other Scandinavian countries the independent position it has in Swedish universities. General social science conferences are to be held fairly regularly, usually under the sponsorship of the Social Science Research Council. At a national congress arranged by the Council and held in Uppsala last June, a number of lectures and discussions were common to all or some of the social disciplines while others were attended by political scientists exclusively.

At each of the four Swedish universities there is a political science association, membership in which is open to outsiders such as public officials. Regularly these associations have professors and foreign scholars as visiting lecturers.

There are five large general libraries available for the Swedish student: the Carolinian library at Uppsala, the Royal and Riksdag libraries in Stockholm, the Gothenburg city library and the University library at Lund. The State Archives in Stockholm and the Carolinian library are indispensable for the study of Swedish history. Numerous private libraries and documents collections cover special fields, while the universities also have several specialized libraries, one example of which is the large School of Social Work and Public Administration library in Stockholm. Of particular note is the fact that a law passed by the Riksdag in 1810 requires a copy of all material published in Sweden to be delivered to the libraries of Uppsala and Lund, the Royal library in Stockholm and, by a later extension of the provision, the city library in Gothenburg.

An outlet for the results of scholarly research is offered by the *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* (*The Political Science Journal*) published five times annually and edited at Lund. Although the journal is not an organ for political scientists exclusively, it has been of great significance for Scandinavian political science as a whole. Language differences are minor, enabling a scientist from one of the countries to read the language of the others, with the exception of Finnish.

Many popular articles have been written by political scientists for organs of the different political parties. Articles with historical emphasis appear in

---

[1] Internal purchasing power is at least 50 per cent higher than nominal dollar value.

Historisk Tidskrift (Stockholm) and *Scandia* (Lund). *Svensk Juristtidning* (*The Swedish Law Review*) and *Förvaltningsrättslig Tidskrift* (*The Administrative Law Journal*) publish political science studies with a predominantly legal interest.

Two series are available for the publication of special monographs. *Fahlbeckska Stiftelsens skriftserie* at Lund was instituted in 1920 by a donation from Professor Fahlbeck. Its volumes now number 32, not all of which, however, are directly related to political science. Professor Brusewitz initiated the second series in 1933 at Uppsala, *Skrifter utgivna av Statsvetenskapliga Föreningen i Uppsala genom Axel Brusewitz*. It has included only studies in political science and comprises 28 volumes to date.

The Foreign Policy Institute provides two outlets for publications in which it has an interest, *Utrikespolitiska Institutets skriftserie* (pamphlets and monographs) and *Utrikespolitik* (a journal). The series *Ur Arbetarrörelsens historia* is comprised of several studies in the history of the labor movement. Bonnier's "Orientering" and Natur och Kultur's "Populärvetenskapliga handböcker," two private publishers' series, contain writings in political science. The pamphlets of Verdandi, the liberal student association of Uppsala, have been prominent (particularly at an earlier time) in presenting information for popular education. Recently the social democratic publisher, Tiden, initiated a series, "Lilla Biblioteket," with a similar aim, although it is mainly restricted to the interests of the labor movement.

RESEARCH AND SCHOLARLY WRITING

Considering how few of them there are, political scientists in Sweden have been remarkably productive of significant writing. An attempt will be made here to indicate the areas in which more significant inquiries have been made and to list certain outstanding works. What follows is by no means a complete bibliography of Swedish writings in political science. No attempt has been made to determine which of the items listed have been translated into English, though the number is certainly small. English titles have been provided for the convenience of American readers, with the Swedish titles given in parentheses.

1. *Swedish Government, Politics, and Public Affairs.* Before proceeding to a classification of writings by subject of primary interest, the series *Sveriges Riksdag* should be mentioned. In commemoration of its 500 years of existence, the Riksdag published from 1931–1938 some 17 volumes written by political scientists and experts from other fields, notably historians. The first eight volumes describe the development of Swedish political institutions from medieval times to the reform of the Riksdag in 1865. The remaining volumes deal with various aspects of the Riksdag, its functions and procedures. Most of the volumes of the second part will be mentioned below at proper points.

a. *Constitutional history and public law.* The best surveys of Swedish constitutional life are Nils Herlitz' two works, *Outlines of the Historical Development of Swedish Constitutional Government* (2nd ed., 1947, *Grunddragen av det svenska statsskickets historiska utveckling*) and *The Principles of Swedish Constitutional*

Law (1948, *Svenska statsrättens grunder*); and Nils Edén, *The Swedish Riksdag in the Last 500 Years* (1935, *Den svenska riksdagen under 500 år*).

Fredrik Lagerroth's doctoral dissertation, *The Constitution of the "Liberty Era"* (1915, *Frihetstidens författning*), dealt with the constitution of the period 1718 to the monarchical *coup d'état* of Gustav III in 1772. This is said to be the world's oldest constitution of modern design. Later Lagerroth, together with J. E. Nilsson and Ragnar Olsson, wrote a comprehensive treatment of the Riksdag of the Liberty Era, its composition and methods and procedures, in *The Powerful Four Estates in the "Liberty Era"* (1934, *Frihetstidens maktägande ständer*, Vols. 5 and 6 of *Sveriges Riksdag*). Recently he (Lagerroth) summarized his views in a monograph, *The Living and Obsolete Features of the Constitutional Government of the "Liberty Era"* (1947, *Levande och dött i frihetstidens statsskick, en principutredning*). Lennart Linnarsson presented another comprehensive study of this era in *The Political Accountability of the Members of the King's Council* (1943, *Riksrådens licentiering*).

Lagerroth also made a noteworthy study of constitutional history prior to 1718, his *A History and Comparative Analysis of One of the Early Swedish Constitutions* (1947, *Den svenska landslagens författning i historisk och komparativ belysning*) dealing with the Constitution of 1351. But it is the period after 1809 that has been of most interest to the political scientists. This was the year Gustaf Adolf IV was dethroned after the war with Russia. The Riksdag then promulgated the still valid, though in many respects amended, Constitution.

Political scientists have engaged in a lively discussion as to the influences that shaped the Constitution of 1809. Some contend that the fundamental principles stem mainly from Montesquieu and the French revolutionists. Others hold that the document was rather the culmination of a long domestic constitutional development. Axel Brusewitz, in his dissertation and in *The Constitutional Crisis of 1809* (1917, *Studier över 1809 års författningskris. Den idépolitiska motsättningen*), presented the first opinion; Lagerroth supports the second in his *The Constitution of 1809* (1942, *1809 års regeringsform. Dess ursprung och tolkning*).

Since 1809 the reform measures that have been achieved have been the result of peaceful struggle for power among various ideologies. The most significant change after the present Constitution became effective was the substitution of the bicameral system for the four estates Riksdag in 1865–66. The long struggle for this reform dates back to 1810, and its history is still the object of investigation. In 1915 earlier studies covering different periods of time were synthesized by Gunnar Rexius, who was professor at the University of Åbo for Swedish-speaking Finns. Georg Andrén made a thorough study of the influences and motivating factors effective at the time of the enactment of the reform in *The Origin and Development of the Bicameral System* (1934, *Tvåkammarsystemets tillkomst och utveckling*, Vol. 9 in *Sveriges Riksdag*). And Gunnar Hecksher pushed the analysis further in his *Swedish Conservatism before the Reform of the Riksdag* (Vols. 1 and 2, 1939, 1943, *Svensk konservatism före representationsreformen*).

At the opening of the present century the right to vote was Sweden's prime political issue, and it continued to be so until universal suffrage was established by three major acts: universal suffrage for men of legal age in the election of the second chamber (1907) and in the election of the first chamber (1918), and suffrage for women for both chambers (1921). The suffrage problem has been the subject of considerable writing, notably several contributions by Georg Andrén and in Sigfred Wallengren's *Suffrage Problems* (1915, *Valrättsproblem*). Dealing generally with problems of the first chamber (and going beyond matters of suffrage extension) are a number of studies by Axel Brusewitz and Sigfred Wallengren. Two by Wallengren may be mentioned: *The First Chamber Question in the Swedish Riksdag after 1866* (1916, *Förstakammarfrågan inför svenska riksdagen efter 1866*), and *The Bicameral System* (1915, *Tvåkammarsystemet*).

Nils Herlitz, Robert Malmgren, and Axel Brusewitz stand in the forefront in the study of contemporary problems of constitutional practice and administrative law. Herlitz and Malmgren have given special attention to the delegation of authority to administrative agencies, the exercise of administrative power, and the relationship of legislation by the Riksdag to lawmaking by administrative organizations. Herlitz' principal treatment of these matters is in his *On Legislation* (3 parts, 1930, *Om lagstiftning genom samfällda beslut av Konung och Riksdag*); *Lectures in Administrative Law*, Vol. 1, *Introduction to the Study of Administrative Law* (1937, *Föreläsningar i förvaltningsrätt*, I, *Inledning till förvaltningsrättens studium*); *Principles of Administrative Law* (1943, *Förvaltningsrättsliga grunddrag*); and *Administrative Procedure* (1946, *Förvaltningsförfarandet*). Malmgren's views are set forth in *The Riksdag and Legislation* (1934, *Riksdagen och lagstiftningen*, Vol. 14 in *Sveriges Riksdag*); in his commentary on the Constitution (*Sveriges Grundlagar*, latest edition, 1947); and in *The Government of Sweden* (2 parts, 1929, 1937, *Sveriges författning*), which has been revised by Docent Nils Stjernqvist.

Civil rights have not been the subject of scholarly writing in Sweden comparable to the writing on them in the United States. In 1941 a government investigating committee headed by Professor Herbert Tingsten made a detailed survey of the Declaration of Rights in the famous Section 16 of the first part of the Swedish Constitution. Similar matters are discussed from a strictly legal point of view in a recent book by three constitutional law teachers, Erik Fahlbeck, Halvar Sundberg, and Stig Jägerskiöld, *The Right of Citizenship* (1947, *Medborgarrätt*).

Although Sweden is believed to have enacted the first law on freedom of the press, dated at 1766, the subject has not inspired much scholarly writing. The most extensive treatment is probably Hilding Eek's dissertation, *On Freedom of the Press* (1942, *Om tryckfriheten*). There have also been a number of special investigations, and the report of an investigating committee in 1947 provided the basis for a freedom of press amendment to the Constitution which was accepted by the Riksdag in 1948. Political scientists were active in the debate on the press restrictions temporarily introduced in World War II.

Intimately related to freedom of the press in Sweden is the principle of publicity; each citizen has the constitutional right, with certain exceptions strictly defined by law, to examine all documents submitted to government officials or acted upon by public agencies. Professor Herlitz took an active part in shaping the present rules implementing this legislation. Ragnar Simonsson in 1944 analyzed the principle of publicity from a historical and ideological point of view in *The Publicity Principle in Swedish Public Life* (*Offentlighetsgrundsatsen i svenskt statsliv. Några historiska grundlinjer*).

Axel Brusewitz has written extensively on the Riksdag's relation to foreign policy, his main contribution being *The Riksdag and Foreign Policy* (1938, *Riksdagen och utrikespolitiken*, Vol. 15 in *Sveriges Riksdag*). After World War I, a unique institution, partially patterned on similar institutions in earlier times, was introduced in Sweden. The Riksdag every year elects a number of its own members to form the Foreign Affairs Committee (*utrikesnämnden*), which serves much as a regular joint committee of the Riksdag when it is in session. In addition, however, the King or a certain minority of the Committee itself may call a meeting of the Committee at any time between Riksdag sessions, with the King, the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister serving as chairman on such occasions. The result is continuous consultation between the executive and legislative branches of government. In fact, this institution was established at a time when an attempt was made to eliminate secret diplomacy as a threat to war. Brusewitz participated in the framing of the constitutional rules establishing this parliamentary control of foreign policy, and therefore was particularly qualified to examine its application.

b. *Cabinet and parliamentary government.* Problems rising out of the operation of parliamentary and cabinet government in earlier times have been thoroughly analyzed. Many political scientists were actively engaged in the contest which culminated in the reconstruction of the parliamentary system in 1917 and some of their writing of the period of controversy seems to pay greater tribute to political aims than to scientific objectives. Because parliamentarism has functioned successfully and has now been accepted by all major parties it has not been the object of extensive writing in recent years. Karl Staaff, a former liberal prime minister who was strongly influenced by Gladstone, presented his ideas on the relations between King and cabinet in *The Democratic Form of Government* (1917, Vols. 1 and 2, *Det demokratiska statsskicket*). He was supported, to a large extent, in writings by Axel Brusewitz and Herbert Tingsten. In numerous articles and essays appearing currently some prominent political scientists, especially Nils Herlitz, Herbert Tingsten and Elis Håstad, have expressed sympathy for coalition government.

Brusewitz has taken the lead in the study of the role of the cabinet and its functioning during the period 1809 to 1917. Under his direction an archive of letters, diaries, and recollections of politicians was assembled at the University of Uppsala. Leif Kihlberg surveyed the period from 1840 to 1905 in his doctoral dissertation, *The Swedish Cabinet under the Estate Riksdag and under the Bicameral System* (1922, *Den svenska ministären under ståndsriksdeg och tvåkam-*

marsystem). Ivar Anderson described *The "Opposition" and the Responsibility of the Cabinet* (1917, *"Oppositionen" och ministeransvarigheten*) in the period from Karl XIV Johan to the clashes in the Riksdag of 1840–1841. Gunnar Heckscher wrote his doctoral thesis on *King and Cabinet in the Constitution of 1809* (1933, *Konung och statsråd i 1809 års författning*), covering the period to 1859. Other doctoral dissertations which made notable contributions are Arne Wåhlstrand's *The Cabinet Crisis of 1905* (1941, *1905 års ministärkriser*); Gunnar Gerdner's *The Swedish Cabinet Problem, 1917–1920* (1946, *Det svenska regeringsproblemet, 1917–1920*); and Olle Nyman's *Swedish Parliamentarism from 1932–1936* (1947, *Svensk parlamentarism 1932–1936*). With the exception of Kihlberg and Anderson, all these authors wrote their dissertations under Brusewitz' auspices.

Legal responsibility of cabinet members has been studied by Erik Fahlbeck in his doctoral dissertation, *Riksrättsinstitutet i 1809 års författning* (1924). And the political responsibility of cabinet members has been discussed by Herbert Tingsten in a little book called *Studies on Cabinet Government in Sweden* (1928, *Studier rörande ministerstyrelse i Sverige*); and by Axel Brusewitz in the *Sveriges Riksdag* series (1938, *Statsrådets ansvarighet,* Vol. 15, part II). These studies were supplemented in 1930 when the Brusewitz-Uppsala school, in a teamwork project, produced *Studies on the Swedish Riksdag's Control Powers* (*Studier över den svenska riksdagens kontrollmakt*).

Herbert Tingsten's volume on *The Committee System* (1934, *Utskottsväsendet,* Vol. 11 in *Sveriges Riksdag*) describes the unique feature of the Swedish legislature, the joint committee system. Einar J:son Thulin's detailed investigation of the practice of *Compromise and Joint Vote* (1935, *Sammanjämkning och gemensam votering,* Vol. 10 in *Sveriges Riksdag*) describes the two means established by the constitution for resolving conflicts between the two equally powerful chambers.

Problems of budget-making and other fiscal procedures have been relatively neglected in spite of the elasticity of the constitution in these matters and the role played by tradition. The most comprehensive studies appear in the *Sveriges Riksdag* series. Nils Herlitz has written the most used study, *The Finance Power of the Riksdag* (1934, *Riksdagens finansmakt,* Vol. 12 in *Sveriges Riksdag*). Arthur Montgomery discussed *The Riksdag and the Bank of Sweden after 1809* (1934, *Riksdagen och Riksbanken efter 1809,* Vol. 13 in *Sveriges Riksdag*). Karl Hildebrand wrote *The National Debt Office, 1789–1934* (1934, *Riksgäldskontoret, 1789–1934,* Vol. 13 in *Sveriges Riksdag*). And Gunnar Hesslén treated the activity of the Controllers appointed by the Riksdag in *The Riksdag's Controllers* (1935, *Riksdagens revisorer,* Vol. 16 in *Sveriges Riksdag*). In 1946 Nils N. Stjernqvist published his dissertation, *The Riksdag, the Budget and the Administration* (*Ständerna, statsregleringen och förvaltningen*).

Recent government investigations in which Professor Håstad served as expert have resulted in a number of changes in Riksdag procedure.

c. *Public administration.* Swedish public administration offers unusual challenges to the scholar because of long-standing traditions which greatly influence administrative organization and practices today. Furthermore, Swedish administration is exceptional, if not unique, for the large number of agencies that are independent of ministerial control. As a consequence, historians and administrative lawyers have been attracted to the serious study of administration and share the production of a vigorous literature with the political scientists.

The best general study of public administration in Sweden, a standard textbook but one in which the administrative law aspect predominates, is Nils Herlitz, *The Organization of Swedish Administration* (latest edition, 1948, Vol. 2, *Den offentliga förvaltningens organisation*, of *Föreläsningar i förvaltningsrätt*). There is also an excellent general description and explanation of administrative organization and the work of administrative agencies, designed for popular reading, by Allan Ingelsson.

The primary attention of scholars has been directed to administrative development prior to the so-called Departmental Reform of 1840, which established the organization of the cabinet that prevails in its essentials today. But political scientists are turning more and more to contemporary problems. Nils Alexanderson, a Supreme Court Justice, has described the modern version of the unique control instrument established in the middle of the 18th century. Under this arrangement the Riksdag appoints special inspectors who continuously check civil and military administrators (1935, *Justieombudsmannen, militieombudsmannen, tryckfrihetskommittén*, Vol. 16 of *Sveriges Riksdag*). Gunnar Hesslén made a careful exploration of the organization, performance and accomplishments up to 1905 of investigating committees appointed by the government and composed of representatives of parties and, lately, of other interested groups—the customary arrangement for inquiry into public problems in Sweden—in his *Royal Commissions in Sweden before 1905* (1927, *Det svenska kommittéväsendet intill år 1905, dess uppkomst, ställning, och betydelse*).

Other aspects of administration which have not yet been adequately explored but to which we may be sure scholars will give their attention in the near future are relations between the cabinet and the independent agencies; the recruitment, promotion and removal of public officials; administrative decision-making in the agencies; and participation of laymen in policy-making decisions.

d. *Swedish local government and decentralized national administration.* Relatively little has been written in the field of local government and decentralized national administration. The fact that there exists such a large number of administrative units has made systematic investigations extremely costly and time-consuming. The recently established Social Science Research Council will probably contribute funds for the study of these problems. Some important work has already been accomplished, however. Olof Sörndal, *Swedish Provincial Administration* (1937, *Den svenska länsstyrelsen*) described the local governmental organization which was established in principle more than 300 years ago. Sixten Björkblom in 1942 wrote his dissertation on one of the 25 provincial councils which have been in existence in their present form for more than 80 years. Herlitz has written a book dealing with city administration of 100 years ago.

In addition to certain government reports, the most important series of publications with regard to local self-government are the journals of the local government associations. The writers in these journals are rarely trained political scientists but frequently are experienced in local administration.

e. *Political parties and public opinion.* Studies of the party system have dealt mainly with the period after the institution of bicameralism in 1865–66. Prior to this time there was no party system in the modern sense except for the "Hats" and the "Bonnets" of the Liberty Era, 1718–1772. Edvard Thermaenius in 1928 wrote the first dissertation on party problems, describing the first modern Riksdag party, the Agrarian Party of 1867–1879 and its predecessor in the estate of the farmers in the earlier period. Thermaenius later surveyed all the parties from 1867 to the beginning of the 1930's in *The Parties of the Riksdag* (1935, *Riksdagspartierna,* Vol. 17 in *Sveriges Riksdag*). From a sociological point of view, his *Swedish Farmers in Politics* (1931, *Svensk bondepolitik*), a collection of letters of farm politicians, is of great interest. Ragnar Edenman's dissertation in 1946 on the history of the Social Democrat Riksdag group before 1920 gave a comprehensive analysis of the internal organization and procedure of a party group in the Riksdag. In 1947 Wåhlstrand edited a collection of documents which illustrate the foundation of the Conservative Party in 1904.

Increasing attention is being given to the relation between parties and social groups and the problems of public opinion formation. Professor Håstad recently directed an investigation at the University of Stockholm in which prognoses of the Swedish Gallup Institute were systematically analyzed in order to "map" the electorate at the elections of 1946 and 1948. Results of the study were published this year in a book entitled *The Swedish Electorate* (1950, *Gallup och den svenska väljarkåren*). Professor Tingsten, in *Political Behavior* (written in English in 1937) did pioneering work comparing elections and voter behavior in Sweden and in other countries. Some joint studies conducted by Brusewitz were made ten years ago, dealing with such problems as the social composition of the old four estates and of the modern chambers, and the social background of cabinet members of the Scandinavian countries.

The study of organizations and pressure groups has only recently got under way. Jörgen Westerståhl's *The Swedish Labor Movement* (1945, *Svensk fackföreningsrörelse. Organisationsproblem. Verksamhetsformer. Förhållanden till staten*) is now a standard text. Docent Westerståhl, together with Herbert Tingsten and John Lindgren, has written the history of the largest union, that of the workers in the engineering industries. W. Johanson has recently completed a dissertation on the temperance movement. Gunnar Heckscher has written on the great problems of *The State and the Private Organizations* (1946, *Staten och organisationerna*). He described both the structure of the Swedish popular movements and their influence on politics and administration. An excellent summary of his results is contained in the article "Pluralist Democracy—the Swedish Experience" in *Social Research* (Dec., 1948).

2. *Comparative Government and Political Systems.* It was not until the present century, particularly after the close of World War I, that Swedish political scientists began serious study of government and politics in other countries. It is remarkable that they should have produced so rich a literature of comparative institutions and practices in so short a time.

Truly outstanding is Herbert Tingsten's *The Victory and Crisis of Democracy* (1933, *Demokratiens seger och kris*), now translated into French. It describes and analyzes the history of political ideas, constitutional structure and the political systems of the principal western countries. While this undoubtedly is the best, it is only one of many volumes which bring together in a comparative manner the institutions and practices of a number of different countries. In the 1920's Tingsten wrote two books analyzing legislative delegation of power, principally in the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland. In 1934, commissioned by the government, Tingsten examined the parliamentary agenda systems of a number of different countries and in 1942 he published his *Contemporary Federal States* (*Samtidens förbundsstater*).

Tingsten's analysis of parliamentary agenda systems was supplemented in 1947 when Elis Håstad, also commissioned by the government, directed a comprehensive investigation of parliamentary rules and procedures in twelve countries; and his work on comparative federal arrangements was supplemented within a year after its appearance by Arvid Hessler and Britta Skottsberg, *The Powers of Federal Governments* (1943, *Förbundsstatens befogenheter*). Other noteworthy studies which treat comparatively the experience of a number of countries are C. G. Widell, *The State and the Parties* (1939, *Staten och partilivet*), dealing with governmental regulation of parties, and Fredrik Lagerroth, *Scandinavia's Heritage of Freedom* (1945, *Nordens frihetsarv*), dealing with constitutional development and present constitutional systems of the Scandinavian countries.

Worthy of note also are several studies of special devices for popular expression, including initiative of legislation, referendum and recall of officers. Most of these studies were made during the 1920's and some of them were sponsored by the government. Tingsten and Brusewitz were prominent in these inquiries, which included the United States and Australia as well as European countries. The Riksdag has recently taken action directed toward further studies of this sort and there is every reason to believe that one or more political scientists will soon be occupied with an analysis of experience during the past 25 years.

In addition to the studies which examine comparatively the institutions and practices of a number of countries, Swedish political scientists have produced a number of significant works which are concerned with government, politics, and public affairs in a particular country. Great Britain appears to have been the object of most extended study. Two books which deal comprehensively with British government and politics are Gunnar Heckscher's *Parlia* *mentary Government and Democracy in England* (1937, *Parlamentarism och demokrati i England*), and Arvid Hessler's *English Constitutional Government* (1940, *Engelskt statsliv*). Studies of more specialized character include: Nils Andrén, *The First Period of Classical Parliamentarism in England* (1946, *Den klassiska parlamentarismens genombrott i England*); Georg Andrén, *Parliamentarism and Parties in England in 1845–1852* (1929, *Parlamentarism och partier i England 1845–1852*); Edvard Thermaenius. *The Debate on the Address* (1942, *Addressdebatten i underhuset. En studie i parlamentarisk teknik och tradition*); and Knut Peterson, *The Committee System in the House of Commons* (1919, *Utskottsväsendet i underhuset*).

The foregoing list of works dealing with Great Britain includes only those which appear to be most significant. The same limitation governs the following references to Swedish literature dealing with other countries. Some of Tingsten's works which examine political experience in the United States along with that of other countries were mentioned above. In addition to these, he has a number of writings dealing especially with the United States, most noteworthy of which are *American Democracy* (1929, *Amerikansk demokrati*) and *Problems in the United States* (1948, *Problem i USA*). Gunnar Heckscher also has made a number of trips to the United States which have provided him with material for brief articles and pamphlets. On Germany the principal items appear to be Georg Andrén, *Federalism in Germany, 1871–1914* (*Federalismen i den tyska riksorganisationen 1871–1914*); and Erik Arrhén, *The Development of German Parliamentarism under the Kaiser and the Weimar Republic* (1929, *Om tyska parlamentarismens utveckling under kejsardöme och republik*). Italy has had little attention except at the hands of Herbert Tingsten, who has several articles and small monographs, and a more general treatment in his book *From Parliamentarism to Dictatorship in Italy* (1930, *Från parlamentarism till diktatur i Italien*), also in a Dutch edition. On France, in addition to a very thorough treatment by Tingsten in his *The Victory and Crisis of Democracy*, mentioned above, there is Ragnar Simonsson, *The Presidency of Millerand* (*Millerands presidentur*).

Other thoughtful works include: Britta Skottsberg, *Parliamentarism in Austria* (1940, *Der österreichische Parlamentarismus*); Arne Björnberg, *The Development of Parliamentarism in Norway after 1905* (1939, *Parlamentarismens utveckling i Norge efter 1905*); Carl-Henrik Höjer, *Parliamentarism in Belgium from 1918 to 1940* (1946, *Le régime parlamentaire belge de 1918 à 1940*); and Elis Håstad, *Constitutional Government in the Swiss Democracy* (1936, *Regeringssättet i den schweiziska demokratien*). No counterpart to Håstad's or Höjer's dissertations is said to exist even in Switzerland or Belgium.

A number of studies of first-rate import are now in preparation, relating to practically every country involved in the works listed above and some to others in addition.

3. *Political Theory.* It was pointed out at the beginning of this discussion that the literature of political science in Sweden is less oriented to the development of political thought and the great works of political theory than has been

true in the United States. Swedish political scientists have not written theory off as of no consequence; but they have given their primary attention to the analysis of contemporary ideologies and the examination of the theoretic basis of particular political institutions and practices. This is exemplified in the writings of Herbert Tingsten, who is regarded by many of his Scandinavian contemporaries as the greatest living student of government and politics. In addition to his many works listed above, Tingsten has written the following books of a severely analytical character: *The National Dictatorships; The Ideologies of Nazism and Fascism* (1936, *Den nationella diktaturen. Nazismens och fascismens idéer*); *The Ideological Development of the Swedish Social Democratic Party* (Vols. 1 and 2, 1941, *Den svenska socialdemokratiens idéutveckling*), containing a critical analysis of Marxism as a scientific theory; *Criticism of Ideas* (1941, *Idékritik*), in which he especially discusses the ideology of syndicalism; *Conservative Ideas* (1939, *De konservativa idéerna*), a survey from Burke to Maurras; and finally *The Problems of Democracy* (1945, *Demokratiens problem*), which reviews the development of modern democracy.

Other Swedish political scientists who have produced writings which clearly fall under the head of political theory include Rudolf Kjellén, considered by some to be the only Swede in modern times who has developed an original concept of the state, who set forth a system of geopolitics in *The State as a Way of Life* (1916, *Staten som livsform*); Simon Boéthius, *Politics* (1916 Vols. 1 and 2, *Statslivet*); Georg Andrén, *Main Currents in German Political Science in the Nineteenth Century* (1928, *Huvudströmningar i tysk statsvetenskap under 1800-talet*); Gunnar Heckscher, whose previously mentioned *Swedish Conservatism Before the Riksdag Reform* examines the influence of German thought on Sweden; Arvid Hessler, *Geijer As a Politician* (Vols. 1 and 2, 1937, 1946, *Geijer som politiker*), dealing largely with the clashes of conservative and liberal ideas in Sweden during the twenties and thirties of the 19th century; Fredrik Lagerroth, *Plato's Theory of the State and Law* (1928, *Platons stats- och rättsbegrepp*) and *Psychological Reality and Legal Fiction in the Application of Swedish Constitutional Law* (1925, *Psykologisk verklighet och juridisk fiktion vid tillämpningen av Sveriges grundlagar*), an analysis of opinion formation in public life; and Gustaf Olsson, *The Realistic Concept of the State with Special Reference to the School of Legal Philosophy in Vienna* (1925, *Det statsrealistiska problemet med särskild hänsyn tagen till den rättsfilosofiska skolan i Wien*).

4. *Foreign Policy and International Relations.* No good explanation has been discovered for the failure of Swedish scholars to write comprehensively and incisively on the relation of Sweden to the world around it, the problems of war and peace, the search for effective world organization, or any of the many other aspects of international life which make up the study of international affairs in the United States. During the first part of the present century Rudolf Kjellén presented the results of his study of international politics in *The State as a Way of Life*, mentioned above, and in two other works, *The Great Powers* (1913, *Stormakterna, konturer kring samtidens storpolitik*) and *The Great*

Powers and the World Crisis (1920, *Stormakterna och världskrisen*). Tingsten did some pioneer work—from the point of view of method as well as of subject matter—when he treated the formation of public opinion in Sweden in relation to foreign affairs in his *The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden, 1918–1939* (English ed., 1949, Oxford University Press). Several studies of the relations of Sweden with the League of Nations were made while that organization was in operation. And both Tingsten and Herlitz have taken leading parts in certain government inquiries into the obligations of Sweden toward the United Nations. Thus while the volume of Swedish writing on foreign policy and international affairs is undoubtedly small when compared with that of the United States or Great Britain, its average quality seems to be high. The auspices for the young Foreign Policy Institute previously mentioned seem to be bright.

SARAH SCOTT THORELLI.

University of Stockholm.

BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY

Bureaucracy in a Democracy. BY CHARLES S. HYNEMAN. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1950. Pp. xv, 586. $4.50.)

Professor Hyneman's primary concern in this book is "to consider what can be done to make our federal bureaucracy function as the faithful servant of the American people" (p. 5). He believes, I think correctly, that "no reader of this book is likely to question the importance of the problem" (p. ix). He concludes that the federal bureaucracy is not adequately subservient to the political authorities of the government. Though there are many subsidiary problems, the fundamental one is that of conflict between Congress and the President. This goes back to the theory of the separation of powers and of checks and balances in American government, as provided for incompletely and sometimes ambiguously in the Constitution and in actual practice; and it requires first of all a more adequate organization of political authority than we now have. He presents a plan of a central council of political leaders—principal officials, legislators and party members—as one means of minimizing disruptive conflict and of securing political integration (Ch. 25).

The author announces early that he does not attempt to cover the entire scope of his subject and invites the reader "to examine only those aspects of the bureaucracy that the author chooses to write about" (p. 4). This is unexceptionable so far as descriptive material is concerned, but the reader inevitably must question both fact and the principles of selection when it comes to diagnosis of faults, evaluation of results, or proposals for correction. Recognizing this, the author takes much pains to express what he believes are his underlying assumptions (p. 5). Perhaps the most vital of these is the assumption "that the power of government, and therefore the power of the bureaucracy, must be exercised within limits that are acceptable to the American *people as a whole*" (p. 10, my emphasis). The stated assumptions and principles lead to the belief that the federal bureaucracy and the power it possesses must be related to six essential institutions as follows: "*1. There must be an inclusive electorate. 2. There must be ways for the people to be informed. 3. There must be ways for the people to get together. 4. There must be ways for recording the will of the people. 5. There must be a structure of government which enables the elected officials really to run the government. 6. There must be a state of mind that causes people who have governmental authority to exercise it in keeping with their instructions or give up their positions*" (pp. 12–15). After discussing in Chapter 2 the ways in which bureaucracies can abuse their power, and the need of positive leadership with the avoidance of excessive restrictions on it, the author concerns himself with "Direction and Control." He informs us in Chapter 3 of the complications of the subject that lead him to confine himself to essentially *legal* direction and control (statutes and authoritative instructions and orders), and to eliminate from the discussion the "moral base of administration," which would require an examination of the entire environment wherein those who make up the administrative force have spent their lives; such a study would be comparable to an exhaustive analysis of American culture. "No such undertaking will be entered upon in this book. The analysis of direction and control of administration which is presented here is concerned *only* [my emphasis] with forces which play upon administrative officials and employees, regardless of their personal qualities, after they get into the public services." This elimination almost inevitably leads to neglect of the moral factors in leadership and management and to an excessive reliance upon the legal and the formal.

The solution to the problem of direction and control of bureaucracy in a democracy, according to Professor Hyneman, lies in political supremacy as expressed by Congress in statutes and by orders of the President as authorized by the Constitution and the statutes.

The book is organized in six parts. Part I, "Bureaucracy and Democracy: Reality and Ideal," is introductory; and Part VI, consisting of one chapter, is entitled "The Unification of Political Direction and Control." The salient features of these two Parts have already been stated. The descriptive and evidential matter, the core of the book, is in Parts II, III, IV, and V. Here the essential general facts about direction and control are given, and numerous subsidiary problems of direction and control are set forth. The author confines the discussion to six aspects of bureaucratic operations: "(1) setting the tasks of government (the purposes, the objectives, the things to be done) and specifying the conditions to be observed in achieving them; (2) establishing departments and agencies to carry out these tasks; (3) appropriating money, thereby determining the scope and intensity of the department's program for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned to it; (4) pronouncing rules and standards to govern the way in which the work of government shall be carried on; (5) expressing its approval or disapproval of administrative acts and policies, thereby encouraging or discouraging the administrative official in his program and forewarning him of further possible Congressional action; and finally (6) participating in the selection and removal of officials and employees" (pp. 71, 72). These aspects are dealt with categorically in Part II, "Direction and Control by Congress," and less categorically in Parts III, IV, and V.

Parts II to V, inclusive, employ nearly five hundred pages of the book. It is obviously not feasible in this review to summarize so much material. I shall confine my remarks to one or two points in each Part.

The essence of Part II is that Congress ought to direct and control in all respects the operations of the bureaucracy, and that it is competent to do so. Hyneman says that the first and fundamental rule is "that Congress should specify in the statute *every* guide, *every* condition, *every* statement of principle that it knows *in advance* it wants to have applied in the situations that are expected to arise. This rule derives from a concept of legislative supremacy" (p. 81, my emphasis). The author notes that some students of constitutional law and political science do not agree with his position. "They agree that Congress ought to have ample authority to determine what the fundamental features of a program of governmental activity shall be, but they deny that Congress is the repository of best judgment as to what the less-than-fundamental features of the program shall be" (pp. 81, 82). Later he says (p. 102), "Being familiar with and concerned about the public need which calls for action, being preoccupied with the development of a program of governmental activity to meet that need, Congressmen are led to consider what arrangements for administration are most likely to result in the character and quality of administration they desire. *For intelligent consideration of that question, they are excellently equipped*" (my emphasis). The only concession Hyneman makes from this position is to grant that limitations of time, the priority of more important matters, and the need for experience may as practical factors stay the hand of Congress. The technical competence of members of Congress does not enter into the matter. In other words, he avoids in this book the problem of reconciling lay judgment with expert knowledge in the democratic process.

The author's insistence upon the primacy of the congressional authority (subject to constitutional limitations) is, I think, correct in principle. *Any* authority is in principle sovereign over its domain and may recall or modify delegations of authority as it sees fit. It alone can determine within that domain what is trivial, irrelevant to its interest, important, or wise. But in practice, authority is maintained only by discretion and temperance, having in mind not only convenience and dispatch but also that the development of competence and its testing require delegation of authority and the assignment of responsibility.

Moreover, even though the primacy of Congress be insisted upon, Congress is an exceedingly poor instrument for organizing, appointing, approving, or disapproving, in a formal sense, an administrative organization. Any body of more than 500 individuals, divided into two almost independent parts and making a public record of its deliberations, would function unsatisfactorily for these purposes. The individual competence of Congressmen is not under criticism. Were they equipped with Ph.D.'s, law degrees and the morals of angels, the results would be the same. Lack of privacy is one reason, whether or not the subject under consideration is referred to as "public business," for in many matters such a lack serves to suppress the truth and produce stultification. The propensity in politics to give a symbolic meaning to any congressional action quite outside its intrinsic merits is another serious difficulty.

Part III, "Direction and Control by the President," which deals with the relations of the President with the bureaucracy, is essentially concerned with the same categories of problems as is Part II, but has a radically different approach. Whereas in the case of Congress it is held in principle that this body should have complete authority, even if limitations of time prevent actual exercise of authority and impose the necessity of delegation, in the case of the President Professor Hyneman seems to believe that lack of time should operate to relieve the President of authority in many fields. The crux of the matter is revealed in the following sentences: "If we must assume that the President will delegate to another man all of the authority that is vested in him, why do we vest that authority in the President in the first place? If the President is *not personally* (my emphasis) going to review the Civil Service Commission's rules, why do we not authorize the Commission to issue the rules itself without sending them to the White House for approval?" (p. 265). Whether, or to what extent, the rules ought to be submitted to the White House should be essentially a matter of presidential discretion in delegating limited or unlimited authority. The difference between having authority delegated by the President, even assuming that he rarely concerns himself with the exercise of that delegation, and having the delegated authority made absolute by statute is a very great one. By delegating authority an official does not divest himself of the general responsibility for its exercise, a fact that affects not only the appraisal of the qualifications of appointments and the extent of delegation, but also the attitude and responsibility of those to whom authority is delegated. The contrary assumption is quite unrealistic. In most large corporations today the president is completely responsible for all administration. (There are minor qualifications as respects formal reports of comptrollers and, of course, as respects the applicability of criminal law.) Millions of transactions per day are involved. The president may request board authorization of some delegations of authority which no one understands to relieve him of supervisory or directive responsibility, or he may be authorized himself to make delegations. In either case his situation is essentially the same. He has the right and duty to examine, to criticize, and to reverse (except as the interests of outsiders are affected) the specific and especially the general decisions of the holder of delegated authority, as well as the quality of decisions in the aggregate, without himself making a single specific decision in the field of delegated authority. The difference between the corporate official and the President of the United States is in this respect chiefly one of degree—and this is unimportant. Where one man can give personal attention only to fifty or one hundred matters per day, whether the responsibility relates to 1,000,000 or to 100,000,000 transactions is quite irrelevant. In principle the procedures should be the same, the differences being reflected in size and character of staff and in the form of organization. What seems to me not sufficiently recognized is that, although the President is an elected individual, the Presidency is an institution to permit the discharge of presidential responsibilities. Among the primary tasks of the President is the organization, maintenance, and control of that institution so as to allow most effectively the discharge of his supervisory and managerial duties. The ineptitude of Congress to deal with such matters, the inexperience of most of our Presidents with the kind of problems involved in administrative organization, and the highly personal character of political leadership have led to the extremely personal or individualistic conception of management reflected in the Constitution, the statutes, and the customary procedures of government.

Almost every paragraph of Part III raises important questions. It also contains a valuable summary history of the Bureau of the Budget, the General Accounting Office, and the Civil Service Commission, with a discussion of the philosophy of their respective organizations and operations.

Part IV, entitled "The Central Staff Agencies," actually covers only the Bureau of the Budget, the General Accounting Office, and the Civil Service Commission. Other staff agencies such as the National Security Resources Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not included. This Part gives considerable descriptive material with respect to the three staff agencies which have been set up to implement the congressional and presidential responsibility for direction and control of the bureaucracy. It furnishes exemplification of the considerations and arguments of the previous Parts. Much of the discussion is concerned with whether Congress or the President controls or ought to control these staff agencies, and with the constitutional and practical problems involved. I shall comment on only three of the important problems examined in these pages.

First, the governmental budgetary and appropriation practice is badly designed to secure economy. Many departments have insignificant receipts except from Treasury funds, and these must be appropriated. According to Hyneman the expectation of Congress—and sometimes its insistence—is that appropriated funds will be spent. Moreover, in determining what is reasonable for the ensuing years, so much consideration is given to expenditures in previous years that department heads and bureau chiefs are under pressure to spend all they can, even in a year of reduced burden, in order to have adequate funds for a year that may call for more liberal accounts. The system promotes, therefore, what may be called "fiscal immorality" or perhaps "fiscal amorality." This is one of the most important disabilities of the government as contrasted with business operations where usually no appropriations are made for operating expenses (as distinct from capital expenditures). The function of the Bureau of the Budget in apportioning appropriations by quarters is a step in the right direction, as would be a definite policy to restrict expenditures to what is really justified, thereby recapturing the balance. The alternative of government corporations (TVA, RFC, FDIC) is a most questionable way of avoiding appropriation complications, except for capital funds. This problem deserves the most serious attention so far as appropriating and regulatory systems are useful; but no such system will be sufficient unless it is adapted to and promotes the morals of economy among officials and gives incentives and recognition to achievements in economy. I think Hyneman overestimates the control that appropriation procedure gives Congress. In this connection I note that he makes no mention of deficiency appropriation practice, though it is an important aspect of the total process of financial control.

Second, Hyneman overestimates the ability of the Bureau of the Budget and the General Accounting Office to "increase the assurance that they [i.e., other departments and agencies] will do what they are expected to do and will do it in a manner acceptable to the political branches of the government" (p. 355). A system of accounting and control that insures a high degree of gross money honesty in any organization, public or private, is essential, though too easily taken for granted; but such a system and a budget bureau and accounting authority are quite insufficient to insure against informal dishonesty, carelessness, ineptitude, and the effect of unresolved conflicts of experts or of the domination of unbalanced views as to organization, procedures, or equipment. This kind of technical control cannot be secured in general by financial accounting, although, if accounting practice is adapted to administrative purposes, it may greatly assist those in administrative control. A fictitious case will illustrate this important point. The Army designed a certain gun for shell fire that was technically admirable, capable of high accuracy, and adapted to large-scale production economically and effectively. In field use, however, accuracy was so bad that the gun was nearly useless. The reason appeared to be that the design, admirable in every other respect, resulted very quickly in excessive fatigue among gunners which prevented accuracy of aim. The design was susceptible of practical modification to correct this defect; but in the meantime large sums of money were futilely spent. No accountant is in a position to determine whether this failure was censurable or not; yet the money loss was a far more important consideration than whether the manufacturer padded his costs, or was paid for more than he delivered, and whether the technical financial controls were complied with perfectly. Such questions are innumerable in both government and business and call for the most able technical and organizational judgment but not for accounting procedures. They can be dealt with fairly (essential to morale) and adequately only by administrative officials; they are least susceptible to congressional procedures.

Third, I believe that Professor Hyneman underestimates the importance of the bureaucratic organization. I shall discuss this later. Here the point is that though civil service practice protects the organization from debauchery for partisan political purposes, it does so by excessive protection of specific individuals at the expense of the good of the organization, and of the collective interests of many individuals. It is not merely the uncertainty as to constitutional powers of removal by the President or others, but the entire philosophy of government employment that is involved here. Adequate provision for discharge or removal of incompetent or undesirable persons is a most fundamental problem in all organizations.

Part V, "Direction and Control Within the Administrative Organization," differs from the previous Parts in that it predominantly reflects Professor Hyneman's personal experience in government service, whereas the earlier sections, though affected by that experience, chiefly rely upon recorded knowledge and opinion. The thought in the first chapter of Part V (Ch. 20, entitled "The Organization and Its Head") follows the theme of previous Parts, that is, that policy, supervision, correction, and removal in the direction and control of the bureaucracy must come from the political top, Congress and the President, who know what the people want; they and their top appointees must "crack down" on recalcitrant or non-cooperative subordinates. The loyal subordinate is one who seeks to know what the boss's policy is—and it is a policy that can come only from political responsibility and political connection. But very quickly we learn differently from experience—with the result, I think, that sometimes explicitly and much more often implicitly Part V contradicts the main theses of the rest of the book. For example one reads, after some 400 pages that on the whole point toward contrary conclusions, the following: "The need for changes in policy and for extensions of policy become apparent *in the course of applying the policies that are already established.* Many policies come into being as the *cumulative effect of innumerable individual actions.* After a number of interpretations and applications of the initial policies, it becomes apparent that the policies which are actually in effect *are not the same as the ones with which the department started.* Special effort to be forethoughtful may lessen the extent to which this process takes place; *no amount of planning will terminate it altogether*, however. *Situations develop and move in on the public official too swiftly for imagination and reason to anticipate them*" (p. 460, my emphasis).

This leads Professor Hyneman to an excellent discussion of the problem of organization for direction and control (Ch. 22) in which we find this sentence: "The character and quality of government cannot be changed by issuing an order [enacting a statute?] at the top; they are a reflection of a mass of relationships that exist within the organization and will not change until those relationships change" (p. 477). And later he says: "They [i.e., those who do the things that the administrative department was created to do] are by far the richest source of ideas as to how the department could do more expeditiously and more economically whatever it is doing. They are one of the most dependable sources of knowledge and opinion as to what the American people like and dislike about the activities of the department and what the American people would like to see in the way of change in the department's activities" (p. 488). A final quotation: "It seems to me indisputable, therefore, that the department head can hope to make policies that offer any prospect of accomplishing his objectives and can hope to get the policies which he does adopt put into operation only if those policies are arrived at by putting his judgment together with that of the bureau chiefs" (p. 491).

Chapter 23 presents an excellent discussion of the nature of a regulatory commission's work (Federal Communications Commission) and how it differs from that of other agencies or departments. Together with parts of Chapter

24 it furnishes a valuable case summary of what was involved in reorganizing its internal procedures.

The final substantive Chapter 24 is concerned with the problem of inefficiency and red tape. Though excellent, it contains excessive reference to the profit motive in business operations with the implied reliance upon maximization of profit as the rational principle of economic behavior. So far as the rationale of business behavior is concerned, the minimax of the Theory of Games is far more realistic, and also a rule of considerable applicability to non-business operations. But more relevant to the problem of efficiency is the fact that, once an enterprise is established, fear of absolute loss or of recession of profits is a much more dominant determinant of business behavior than the search for profits. Limitation of appropriations furnishes the chief alternative in government, and has or may have similar effects, as Hyneman has shown in the case of the FCC.

As for red tape, it is unfortunate that Sir Henry Clay's article on this subject was not available, for he shows that political control of bureaucracies necessarily imposes excessive centralization of authority, and also that the democratic control of men regulated by laws compels the use of red tape, to maintain impartiality.[1] These are matters definitely germane to Professor Hyneman's main problem—the political control of bureaucracy.

In brief, the book is written in straightforward English, with the courage to state personal estimates and speculative views in concrete terms. The test is not whether one agrees with the main thesis or disagrees with numerous special solutions of detailed problems, but whether the book comprehensively sets forth the nature of an important general problem to a large extent hitherto neglected. I think it does. It would be excellent nuclear material for a year's graduate seminar either in political science or in administration, public or private.

Professor Hyneman has not appended a formal bibliography and in fact gives relatively few specific citations in his footnotes, among them references chiefly to documents of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (or of its Task Forces) or to the Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management. He has adopted the plan of appending to each chapter a "Bibliographic Note" discussing the pertinent literature. It is noteworthy that with few exceptions this literature is dated within the last twenty, and most of it within the last fifteen, years. Even more noteworthy, however, is the number of chapters concerning whose topics there is either no literature at all or literature concerned with only limited aspects of the subject matter.

Keeping strictly within the framework chosen by the author, there seem to me to be three major gaps in his treatment of his subject:

1. As respects the personnel problems of the bureaucracy, there is no discussion of military as against civil employment.
2. There is very little reference to the relation of the courts to the adminis-

---

[1] "Red Tape," *Law Quarterly Review*, Vol. 65, pp. 172–187 (April, 1949).

trative organization of the executive branch, and none whatever to the exercise of the judicial function as involving a special kind of bureaucracy and as performing an *administrative* function, using *administrative* in the broad sense in which the author uses it in reference to regulatory commissions.

3. Although the special conditions of each department and agency are far beyond the scope of Professor Hyneman's work, I think that a consideration of those in the State Department would be necessary adequately to complete what he has undertaken, from the standpoint of employment problems, official appointments, and congressional direction and control. The division of the staff of that Department into a domestic civil service and a foreign service is an important special problem. Ambassadors have been appointed from both high political leadership and from non-political cadres. Congress, "expressing the will of the American people" in Hyneman's phrase, has been negative and uncooperative with respect to this Department from the beginning of the Republic, as Henry Adams observed fifty years ago. The congressional example, moreover, demonstrates the futility of attempting to create overnight a good organization for which a generation of consistently sapient handling by both Congress and the President would be required. And indeed not all the money Congress could appropriate would be effective in creating quickly an instrument adequate to the national policy.

* * *

The task which Professor Hyneman set for himself—a rational understanding of the relationship of bureaucracy to political authority and how to subordinate the bureaucracy to a democratic political system in the United States—will not be completed except by the efforts of many students and by the accumulation of much knowledge not now available. As a minor contribution to this end, I should like to conclude with some brief remarks on several topics to which I think consideration must be given in future work. Each topic deserves an extended essay, and some of them would require a book for adequate exposition; each came strongly to mind repeatedly with the study of Professor Hyneman's book. My remarks, however, are recorded here for general purposes rather than in criticism of his book.

I. THE WILLS AND WANTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Professor Hyneman repeatedly refers to the wills or wants of the "whole American people," and assumes that these wills or wants with respect to the government bureaucracy should and can be expressed by political means. Of the many expressions of this idea I select the following: "If the political organization of the nation is healthy and the electoral system truthfully records what the people say they want, then Congress and President, in the decisions they make and the instructions they give, will reflect with reasonable accuracy what the people want" (p. 24).

For many purposes no doubt the phrase "whole American people" has sufficient meaning for use in intelligible communication. It must be seriously questioned, however, if when used in connection with the difficult problem of governmental organization and control it does not require rather elaborate differentiation. Does it include minors who are excluded from political participation? Many of the consequences of governmental action will affect the future interests of these minors rather than of those entitled to vote. Does it include those entitled legally to vote who are excluded in practical effect from the franchise? If not, how are *their* wants expressed politically? Does it include those who prefer not to vote—usually a large proportion of the electorate—and in what sense politically is political indifference to be interpreted? Many other questions could be raised and they must be raised in the end before the essential problem can be adequately examined.

Professor Hyneman's statement assumes that political methods are or could be adequate to express the wants of the American people as respects the bureaucracy. This assumption must be questioned. Particularly on the national level political questions must be put either in terms of abstract generalizations or determined by considerations of personality. Indeed, the people who vote seem to do so predominantly either along party lines or for particular personalities without much attention to political issues. This is not to assert that questions of political policy do not enter into the choices or that concrete programs or items of programs are without significance in elections. But the question is when and how much? To what extent under the most favorable circumstances is it possible by political formulation to express the everyday wants of the people? I think only to a very limited extent.

To limit this discussion, I will express the opinion that it is to an overwhelming degree the function of the bureaucracy to find out what people want, and how and to what extent they disagree, on the basis of its experience with the actual behavior of people, especially with those limited sections of the people who are directly interested. With the exception of these limited groups, most of the people do not know in the abstract what they want or how to express their needs in general terms. In addition, this function is not made easier because people often sincerely express opinions quite inconsistent with their concrete behavior.

II. LIMITATIONS OF CONGRESS AND/OR THE PRESIDENT TO EXPRESS THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE

Professor Hyneman consistently relies upon the assumption that Congress and/or the President, especially in his legislative capacity, are competent to express by statute and derivatively by order or regulation what the people want. This raises two questions, one of legal competence, the other of functional competence.

Professor Hyneman simplified his presentation by eschewing the problem of the distribution of powers between the national government and the states—"basic political questions" (p. 9). I think this unintentionally leads him to forget the constitutional limitation on the powers of Congress. It is not true that Congress can express the will of the people politically. The powers not specifically conferred upon it are reserved either to the states or to the people. Most of these reservations concern matters of overwhelming importance to the people. Though there has been much extension of the actual intrusion of Congress, particularly under the interstate commerce clause, the organization of the Conference of State Governors is as significant of the need for a non-congressional view of the respective powers and interests, as the interstate pacts are for the important local or regional needs not suitable for national action. The relationship between the federal and state bureaucracies in the "direction and control" of the former is an important aspect of the total problem.

The question of functional competence is exceedingly complex. There can be no question that congressional action usually has some effect beyond the mere printing of the record; but frequently the effect is tangential or even contradictory of that sought. Thus the part of wisdom is frequently to let well enough alone, not because the *status quo* is satisfactory, but because the "by-products" of action intended to be corrective are bad or cannot be estimated. Thus there exists this important limitation on the power to direct and control.

To avoid misunderstanding, nothing said in these remarks assumes that the legislative authority, when constitutional, should not be supreme in the sense that it is legally valid against all contrary authorities. This legal basis is one aspect of the question of authority generally. Though the authority universally rests upon the assent or indifference of those governed, *they* require the fiction that it comes from the top and is objective, not subjective, in character.

III. ORGANIZATION AS AN ASSET

In a number of places (e.g., pp. 95, 274) Professor Hyneman suggests that the practical limitation on the capacity of Congress and of the President to "direct and control the bureaucracy" is lack of time because of more urgent duties. The implication I drew frequently was that the bureaucracy was of secondary importance. If the organization as it exists at any given time be taken for granted, then it is undoubtedly true that many urgent immediate questions must be given priority over any particular organizational problem the solution of which at best would be likely to have relatively small effect after considerable time on the functioning of the organization as a whole.

All men of affairs are confronted with the necessity of dealing with current problems even though they are ephemeral. We have to survive one day if we are to reach the next one. It is therefore easy to underestimate the prime importance of the governmental organization in the long run. This, I think, both Congress and the President have persistently seemed to do until recently; and the general public appears to consider competent organization to be easily attainable. Whether from the standpoint of the execution of national policies or from that of costs, the national organization is the great governmental asset. The question of political control and direction has to be combined with that of development and perfection. Sometimes these objectives are interdependent, but frequently desirable means to attain one end may not be compatible with the means to attain the other objective.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION

Professor Hyneman's restriction of the scope of his study and his approach to it lead to a legalistic, formal conception of the direction and control of bureaucracy, a fact somewhat obscured by the non-legalistic language he uses. In such a reliance upon the formal aspects of governmental organization the subject of authority at least implicitly occupies a central position. This is a subject upon which much has been written in political and juristic, as well as in military, ecclesiastical and general literature on organization. The approach taken also leads Professor Hyneman not merely to neglect but deliberately to reject the consideration of the subject of responsibility. He says (p. 53) that he has avoided the phrase "administrative responsibility" because of the different meanings it has for different people and he refers to Carl J. Friedrich's quite opposite position in the latter's writings (p. 54).

Hyneman rejects the moral base of administrative conduct (pp. 44, 45). I think this may be not only to keep his book within manageable dimensions, but also because he is guided in his understanding of both authority and responsibility by the hoary maxim (p. 219), "Authority must be commensurate with responsibility. Stated in more familiar terms, if a man is to be blamed for the way things are done, he ought to have enough authority to see that they are done in such a way that he will not be blamed. Whichever way you state it, this is a sound rule." But he admits some difficulties: "How do you know when his authority is commensurate with his responsibility?" (p. 220). He later (p. 255) quotes testimony of Louis Brownlow in the 1937 reorganization hearings: " 'We believe that the Chief Executive should be given more authority over the management of the Executive branch in order to make that authority more commensurate with his responsibility.' " He quotes the Hoover Commission (p. 432): " 'Department heads, in many instances, do not have authority commensurate with their responsibilities.' " But later (pp. 442, 443) Professor Hyneman gives three situations in which (1) the President, (2) members of Congress, and (3) the public affect administrative behavior *without* authority. Could this be in discharge of responsibility?

Unlike "authority," "responsibility" has not been a subject of extensive literature.[2] To treat of it adequately would require a monograph. Here I must restrict myself to a few categorical assertions.

The first is that most of the work of formal organizations is accomplished under responsibility without authority, or in excess of authority, or without use of or reliance upon authority. Responsibility and authority are not unrelated, but that they are "commensurate" (assuming this word can have meaning with respect to two concepts, neither of them susceptible of objective measurement) is contrary to experience and observation. This does not deny the importance of a system of formal authority as a part of the "skeleton" of organization, nor that there is a psychological necessity for emphasizing it in order both to incite and to restrain the exercise of responsibility when incited.

---

[2] Considering the common use of "responsibility" and "responsible" in connection with politics, government, and organization this is a matter of astonishment. The subject is not listed in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, although "Organization" and "Authority" are topics presented. The words apparently have no status in legal literature, being not listed in the *Corpus Juris* or in the index of the *Harvard Law Review*. It is a subject not listed in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. The only sustained discussion of the subject I have found is Paul Fauconnet, *La Responsabilité, Étude de Sociologie* (2d ed., Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1928). This book is of value as respects the ethnic history of the concept, and as respects liability to criminal sanctions, but not for problems of responsibility in modern formal organizations.

Excepting in emergencies and for the settling of disputes or controversies where decision is somewhat of a judicial character, experienced and effective administrators prefer generally not to use authority. Perhaps the most important reason for this reluctance is that to get things done by command *relieves* the subordinate of responsibility and restricts intelligent freedom of action. In many instances wise men prefer to discharge responsibilities with no authority whatever in order to impose complete responsibility. Such mode of discharging responsibility is certainly included in what we mean by leadership. The simplest illustration is that of the salesman, who has no authority to compel purchases, yet is held responsible for making sales.

This leads to the paradoxes of the delegation of authority and of responsibility, namely, that the delegator does not relieve himself of either authority or of responsibility, as the case may be; delegation has the effect of increasing both, a fact that in part explains the ability of organized effort to accomplish what could otherwise not be accomplished. The effect of delegation is to diminish (but not necessarily extinguish) the control (in the case of authority) and the responsibility for the *specific* case as distinguished from the *aggregate* of cases. The delegator divests himself of no responsibility for the aggregate result by delegating authority or by sharing restricted responsibility with others. Indeed, it is by either kind of delegation that he utilizes his authority or attempts better to discharge his responsibilities. Thus the administrator may formally make the same delegation to subordinate A as to subordinate B, but he is free to supervise, coach, or interfere with A, and to pay little attention to B. This kind of discrimination is required if in the judgment of the administrator it is warranted. His responsibility involves this kind of judgment. Whether his judgment is good or not relates to his competence to discharge his responsibilities.

A delegation of authority does not relieve the delegator of responsibility for specific decisions. He is potentially under obligation to modify or reverse a decision of a subordinate either on his own motion or on appeal or complaint. There are important qualifications to the application of this rule, some of which will be stated below. But these qualifications do not abrogate the fundamental or normal concept, though they lead to confusion because the qualifications are superficially dominant in certain important classes of cases, e.g., the issuance of patents, the judicial decisions of regulatory commissions, and the decisions of courts. They include the following classes of cases, with reference to the role of the delegator:

a. He may in general refuse to review, modify, or reverse decisions of subordinates to avoid as a practical matter the burden of disposing of appeals and complaints or of investigation of specific cases. Where decisions relate almost entirely to highly technical matters this refusal is usual and acceptable, except where bias or dishonesty is alleged.

b. He may refuse ordinarily to supersede a subordinate in order to impose a high degree of responsibility upon the subordinate. The difference between the sense of responsibility where decision is final and where it is not is of great practical importance.

c. He may refuse to interfere as a matter of enhancing the prestige of the subordinate and of maintaining the morale of subordinate groups.

d. Where established law or regulations are recognized to be the matrix within which decision is to be made, he may refuse (or not be permitted by law or by the Constitution) to interfere adversely with the rights of individuals (or corporations) but may interfere *in favor of* individuals. Thus, some court martial sentences must be approved and may be mitigated by superior authority, but cannot be increased; sentences of trial judges in some cases may be reduced as extreme; verdicts may be rejected as grossly contrary to the evidence or as egregiously unwarranted by evidence. What governs here is a moral attitude of the community that the rules ought not to be changed in the course of the determination of a case (administrative or judicial), i.e., the rule of fair-play which finds its highest formal expression in the constitutional prohibition of *ex post facto* laws.

None of these considerations, however, seem to me to relieve the delegating authority from responsibility which may find its expression in informal admonition (in administrative more than in judicial cases), in censure, in modifying judgments as to appointments or reappointments, and especially in modifying rules or delegations of authority for future application.

To a substantial extent in governmental practice, to a slight degree in business practice, I think, there are two serious interferences with the best development of the delegation of authority. One is the detailed prescription of procedure by law; the other is delegation of authority over the heads of intermediate officials, e.g., giving final authority to bureau chiefs. Under the appearance of fixing responsibility, both processes limit it severely (i.e., furnish incontrovertible alibis for not doing what the specific situation calls for) and diffuse responsibility. Indeed responsibility becomes so widely and indefinitely diffused that no one official or no official body (except Congress where personal responsibility is also diffused) knows how, or need care, how to remedy ills. As a result initiative and imagination are stifled.

The most serious difficulties of the American system in control of the bureaucracy come from supposing that specification of formal authorities by law secures responsibility, whereas it does the reverse except in the most restricted technical sense. The merit of the parliamentary system, from this standpoint, is that it centralizes responsibility, authority being subordinate and instrumental. The centralization of responsibility, which Americans seem to fear, permits and requires the delegation of responsibility and the magnifying of the moral forces by which primarily, I think, bureaucracy can be controlled.

V. THE NEGATIVE AND PAROCHIAL STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN LEGISLATURE

The diffusion and suppression of responsibility characteristic of American political and governmental practice has its legislative counterpart in the system of representation employed and in the bicameral legislature. In the case of the federal government the constitutional restrictions on the Congress and the exclusively parochial nature of congressional representation are calculated to put a premium upon obstruction and dissent, and to minimize representation of the national interest as a whole. Professor Hyneman's National Council, though it might mitigate some of the difficulties, would not, if successful, sufficiently correct the negative bias inherent in the structure of the legislature.

The only public officials having legislative responsibility who are elected by the vote of all the people are the President and Vice President, and they are the only ones with responsibility for and to the country as a whole. Individual Congressmen may, it is true, be informed as well as primarily concerned in matters affecting the entire country. When, however, a broader or longer view is contrary to the immediate and local views, the Congressman is subject to condemnation and defeat in the only basis for his official existence—the congressional district or the state election; and political opponents are not reluctant to make the most of local misunderstanding or prejudice. This possibility not only checks or paralyzes sustained congressional advocacy of fundamentally important constructive measures, but it also puts a premium upon plausible but specious and superficial obstruction of the national administration to obtain local popularity at national expense, as recently occurred in matters affecting the State Department and the Atomic Energy Commission. It also defeats party responsibility, for no Congressman is bound by party pledges or promises as against his own electorate. Within limits the vetoing of national proposals as inconsistent with local interests is desirable; but such vetoing is most undesirable when it is the product of irresponsibility for the welfare of the nation as a whole.

A reasonable balance of the positive and negative considerations in national legislation might be secured if twenty to thirty per cent of the Senate and of the House were elected at large from the country as a whole (for four-year terms at presidential elections). This electoral arrangement would provide a substantial group of men who owed a moral as well as technical political responsibility to the entire nation or to the electoral majority—a group which could speak with more authority and with fewer inhibitions than present Congressmen. The results would, I think, be as follows:

a. Increased party responsibility.
b. The avoidance of irreconcilable conflict between Congress and the President except when the people definitely reject the President's policies or party. (With the increasing scope of the national government services and the size of the bureaucracy this becomes more important.)
c. A more definite development of the President's political responsibility.
d. A more effective and more prompt determination of issues.

CHESTER I. BARNARD.

The Rockefeller Foundation.

The Authoritarian Personality. By T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, R. Nevitt Sanford. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1950. Pp. xxxiii, 990. $7.50.)

The Authoritarian Personality is one of five published volumes in the series *Studies in Prejudice*, published under the sponsorship of the American Jewish Committee and edited by Max Horkheimer and Samuel H. Flowerman. The other works are: *The Dynamics of Prejudice; A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans*, by Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz; *Anti-Semitism and Economical Disorder; A Psychoanalytic Interpretation*, by Nathan W. Ackerman and Marie Jahoda; *Rehearsal for Destruction; A Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany*, by Paul W. Massing; and *Prophets of Deceit; A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator*, by Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman.

It is obvious that we have here a monumental effort to study prejudice, with particular reference to anti-Semitism, and that a few words cannot criticize justly the amassed findings and techniques of one or all of them. The various volumes run the gamut of research skills—from historiography to statistical behaviorism. A psychoanalytic bent characterizes several of the volumes, and there are rather remarkable incongruities of research and theoretical tastes, not always happily resolved, scattered about the series. Each work treads on hallowed research ground, and one frequently gets the *déjà vu* sensation.

The Authoritarian Personality can be said to have tried everything social psychology offers to solve the prejudice problem except to abolish it. A number of notable findings emerge, a few of which may be suggested here. In general, the research team, working together and on individual theories, confirms that Thrasymachus is more than an idea and is, as Plato recognized, a characterological type or, at the least, a statistical type. The authoritarian personality (over most of the work taken as any high scorers on an implicit Fascism-tendency scale) is an abnormal respecter of convention, submissive to authority, an admirer of toughness, cynical beyond the norm, preoccupied with bodily rather than spiritual matters, and a possessor of pedestrian rather than exalted ideals. He is hardly less intelligent than non-authoritarians, is not confined to the upper class levels, and has no highly preferred political affiliation.

Political scientists will find that these and other important conclusions are accompanied by a variety of research techniques, all of which may be applied to many problems of political science in which individuals, rather than groups, are being studied. The techniques themselves are rendered more valuable for the instruction of readers because so much of the torture of the day-to-day work is revealed.

The study begins with the construction of a conventional scale to test anti-Semitic attitudes among members of different California groups (the sample never becomes representative, in the strict sense, of Californians or Americans); it goes on to create an ethnocentric scale, a political-economic conservatism (PEC) scale, and the implicit anti-democratic or Fascist trend scale.

Part II exhibits some remarkable work in classifying the responses of and scoring extensive interviews based on psychoanalytic theory, together with a massive theoretical analysis by Frenkel-Brunswik. Part III shows how an adapted Thematic Apperception Test may be used to differentiate between high and low scorers on the Fascism scale. Part IV presents a prose analysis of the material by Adorno that will be congenial to political theorists, and his short essay on types and syndromes is a useful and uncommon critique of typologies, rendered suspect in slight part, perhaps, by that typical urge to find somehow a category for the "genuine liberal."

Special applications of the derived analytic categories to two intensively-studied individuals, to a group of San Quentin residents, and to some psychiatric clinic patients complete the study.

Despite its bulk, the book is no white elephant; it will serve political science well, both as to its findings and as to its techniques. The authors are to be congratulated for not venturing sweeping practical recommendations beyond the usual concluding wistfulness. Something of a type has been found, but, whatever one's values, he will not find that the typology corresponds to his devils and angels. If the authoritarian personality proves to be an isolable type, its eradication or the excision of the appropriate basic traits would probably eliminate several important functional roles and produce grave dysfunctions in the social order. An alternative would be to think of the authoritarian personality as one that is only predisposed to a certain kind of social ailment called "prejudice" and to go on with personal therapy and political action from there.

ALFRED DE GRAZIA.

Brown University.

Backwoods Utopias. BY ARTHUR EUGENE BESTOR, JR. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1950. Pp. x, 288. $3.50.)

The Utopian Communist; A Biography of Wilhelm Weitling, Nineteenth-Century Reformer. BY CARL WITTKE. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1950. Pp. vii, 327. $4.50.)

These two books have much in common and supplement each other. The general subject of each is pre-Marxian socialism. They show the passage of ideas from the Old World to the New and the influence of such men as Owen, Weitling, Babeuf, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Lamennais, Considerant, Pestalozzi, Oberlin, Fellenburg, and Maclure in determining the objectives of reform in the social and educational systems of our country. Both books bring to light the importance of religion, of feeling, and of faith in the perfectibility of man in bringing about social reform. While their principal characters, Robert Owen and Wilhelm Weitling, respectively, are distinguished more as propagandists than as profound thinkers, the theories of each are grounded in definite moral precepts. Both refused to accept the theory of economic determinism. Their distrust of the masses and of democratic procedures was not concealed, and from their ideas it is not difficult to conclude that those who have "a cure" for the ills of society are likely to approve and adopt means that would have the ultimate effect of reducing the status of the individual to that of an instrument. Both protagonists agree that there can be no "permanent virtue or stability in society" so long as there are great inequalities in the distribution of income. Consequently, they conclude that existing institutions should be radically altered. For this purpose, or even to bring about gradual reform, legislative means are regarded as inadequate. On the other hand, there prevails in each book an unfaltering faith in the efficacy of groups and cooperatives to improve the conditions of the poor, as well as a firm belief that a few successful demonstrations of communal living would contribute largely to the improvement of the social order. The paramount importance of environment in determining the nature of man is accepted.

Both books are scholarly contributions, well organized and written in an easy style. The assembled bibliographical materials, references, and notes should suggest to political scientists a good avenue of exploration in the history of political and social thought. They make it obvious that for a comprehensive theory of our early institutions, the usually accepted authorities are something less than adequate. From both books the "generalists" in political science should receive a great deal of comfort.

Backwoods Utopias is a history of various socialistic communities which existed in the United States before the middle of the nineteenth century. The author's most original contribution lies in the development of the communitarian point of view common to all of them. The members of these communities, he shows, believed that the evils of the world have their origin in the social organization rather than in the imperfections of human nature, as claimed by the individualists. To the communitarians, revolution was no instrument to alleviate social ills. It could produce nothing of permanent value because it would not secure advantages for all classes. Nor was reform by legislation more acceptable to them; this method involved too many delays. Rather they visualized the small experimental community as a lever to exert upon society an exemplary force of sufficient strength to remove existing evils. Social progress, it appeared to them, would be accelerated more by reliance upon deliberate inventiveness and reasoned choice than upon the historically generated forces stressed by the Marxists.

Considerable historical evidence is offered to show that communitarian ideas had their origin in the zones of religious radicalism in Western Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and reached their fullest development in the sectarian communities of the New World during the subsequent one hundred and fifty years. As the ideas developed, the foundation was being laid for the acceptance and promotion of communitarian ideals by non-sectarian and non-religious groups. The establishment by Robert Owen in 1825 of the non-sectarian communitarian colony at New Harmony, in southern Indiana, is regarded as the first indication that communitarianism in America could "stand on its own feet as an independent system of social thought, not a mere corollary of theological doctrine" (p. 137). Professor Bestor suggests that the sectarian groups in serving as a medium of transition whereby religious socialism of the seventeenth century evolved without a break into secular socialism of the nineteenth occupy a unique place in intellectual history because "no genuinely formative intellectual relationship can be traced in Europe between the religious reformers of the earlier period and the outspokenly secular founders of modern socialism" (p. 38). The wide social acceptance given Owen, the dearth and irrelevance of the questions raised in the press, and public discussions on the indefiniteness of his plans for the colony at New Harmony and their economic aspects are convincingly used to show the influence of religious orthodoxy upon social thought and the congeniality of American opinion toward communitarianism.

The close affinity existing between educational and communitarian ideas in the early nineteenth century is unfolded in the book. An educational system, in the opinion of Owen, should train men in that which is useful to their station and inculcate in them a desire to respect it. Proper employment and proper education should be inseparable. A public works program should always be available to complement the schools since it would "guard the unemployed against the miseducative effect of enforced idleness" (p. 141). Any general character, from the ignorant to the most enlightened, could be given to the community through the process of education under the direction of those who had "influence in the affairs of men." These theories of education, plus Owen's distrust of democratic assumptions, perhaps, explain why the school system at New Harmony was designed to serve the "practical end of indoctrinating the population for community life" and not for the advancement of knowledge (p. 192).

The chapter on New Harmony as a study in dissonance presents in interesting detail the fundamental social, economic, and administrative problems encountered by the colonists at New Harmony. The final chapter, on the Owenite legacy, gives a general description of communities which were developed in this country to put into practice the ideas and theories of Robert Owen. The author concludes that their failures did not destroy the communitarian faith. This did not occur until after the Civil War when large-scale enterprise began to render small communities obsolete as economic units.

The Utopian Communist is a biography of Wilhelm Weitling, who played an important role in the radical movements in France, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, and England before the Revolution of 1848 and then migrated to the United States, where he became the editor of a labor paper and an important leader in the organization of cooperatives and in the movement for social insurance.

The poverty and privation experienced by the youthful Weitling made him introspective and were in large part responsible for the role of rebel which he played throughout his later years. He became a journeyman tailor at the age of eighteen and for the next seven years wandered through the little German states, where at times he found profitable employment and on other occasions faced starvation. He arrived in Paris, the "Crucible of Revolution," in 1835, when the social order was beginning to crumble under the impact of the factory system and the rise of the proletarian class. Here he became familiar with the writings of French radicals and made the acquaintance of intellectuals and artisans in the colony of German refugees. It was in such an economic, social, and intellectual environment that young Weitling became imbued with Christian communism (pre-Marxian) or socialism—interchangeable terms at the time—and became one of the most eloquent orators and literary champions of the proletariat.

Weitling's basic ideas and objectives were set forth in *Die Menschheit, wie ist und wie sie sein sollte* ("Mankind as it is and as it should be"). In 1841 the publication was ordered confiscated by Austrian police because it was "highly destructive and dangerous." It preached "hatred and hostility to all higher authority" and was written so interestingly as to mislead the innocent reader. Weitling personally broadcast his philosophy throughout Western Europe, using educational and singing societies and communal eating halls as a screen for his activities. After serving a sentence in Switzerland for conspiracy against the state and blasphemy, Weitling went to London in 1844, where he apparently became more brazen in advocating revolution. Here his dogmatism in behalf of feeling and religion as the most important factors in human conduct and his unwillingness to accept a theory of economic determinism brought him in opposition with English communist leaders and eventually led to a break with Karl Marx in Brussels in 1846. Thereupon Weitling departed for the United States.

Soon after his arrival in this country, the history of his career in Europe began to repeat itself. He saw in American democracy an anarchy of liberty under which the richest, most cunning, and most powerful received the greatest benefits. He found many native and foreign-born Americans dreaming of utopias, especially the immigrant Germans, who eventually made a good subscription list for *Die Republik der Arbeiter*, which he started to publish in 1851. This journal became primarily a vehicle for the dissemination of the ideas which Weitling had published in Europe several years before. Eventually the old battle between the Marxists, who at this time insisted upon working class reform by political action, and Weitling, was renewed. He objected to the piecemeal methods of American reformers and urged complete revolution as the only remedy for existing evils. For political action he substituted bank reform, cooperatives, and colonization schemes. Convinced that a few successful demonstrations of communal living would have a profound effect upon the government of the United States, Weitling established a colony at Communia, Iowa. Embittered and disillusioned by its failure, he returned to New York and spent his remaining years in such diverse pursuits as tailoring, developing a universal language, inventing sewing machine accessories, and studying astronomy.

WILEY E. HODGES.

The Citadel.

The Economic Role of the State. By William A. Orton. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1950. Pp. x, 192. $3.00.)

This reviewer has believed for some time that a new grouping or classification of the economic functions of the state is necessary. It is now wholly unrealistic to contrast *laissez-faire* with collectivism as a means of getting at the realities of state functions. But even in recent years some writers who have known better have set up economic individualism as a strawman that is then knocked down by showing that government actually does something. Economic individualism has been mostly a protest against what the state was doing; it has been a kind of utopian theory of how the good society might be organized. However, the great issue of our time is how to escape from political tyranny; it is the issue of how to preserve some liberty, freedom, or democracy in the things that a government actually does. It is the impact of politics on economic relations, and not the reverse.

Professor Orton is not guilty of using outmoded or hypothetical classifications of state functions; but his failure, if he fails at all, is in not providing an alternative classification of governmental functions. Had he done so, his discussion would have been illuminated with greater force and clarity. Yet, the force of his work lies in its philosophical analysis of state action, and in the examination of particular issues. The broad contrast the author makes in principle is between the voluntary and the coercive, for in spirit and in principle state action carries the possibility of coercive measures in relation to the individual and the group. With the sphere of state action as wide and as chaotic as it is, some might say there are no fundamental principles any more. The author says there are such principles, and he discusses them; but he does not bring them together in such a way that they may make a powerful impact on the thought of the reader.

Broadly, the author argues that the action of the state is a search for justice; that the contours of justice are found in the Western ethical and religious tradition; that its primary divisions are, in relation to the state, distributive justice and commutative justice; that the criteria of state action must arise from an intellectual and philosophical examination of justice that is neither too abstract nor too minute; that there are dangers to morality and justice in an excessive use of coercion; and, finally, that many of our domestic issues can be resolved only upon the prior resolution of international issues, notably the restoration, so far as possible, of the open international market.

In the present situation, we tend to overvalue political activity, especially through abstractions, the vehicle of mass emotion; we cannot solve our current issues in the framework of neo-mercantilist assumptions; legitimate political coercion must arise from a respect for the Christian tradition of limitation on the state, especially through the ideas of moral or natural law. In such a framework of thought, alternative to current predominant trends, we may move toward a realization of the ideal of the free personality. "What the authority of the state finally enjoins is man's duty to himself. This is the only solution of the problem of authority within democracy" (p. 59). Professor Orton will not say that any economic function of the state should or should not be undertaken; but he does say that such a function must be given a moral test in the specific situation. If one is not concerned with the possibility of justice in terms of the "Great Tradition," the chances are that he will not be concerned with Professor Orton. The author tells us that to argue the functions of the state in abstractions, *i.e.*, individualism versus planning, is no solution and no criterion, and certainly it is no defense of the rights of the human person.

The author of this volume is to be praised because he has broken ground for a new approach, in which we may cease to debate the abstract merits of "planning" or "the road to serfdom." But the alternative is a recurrence to fundamental principles to be found far behind any particular economic regulation of the state, existing institutions, such as the national state, or the power of any particular social group. Perhaps Professor Orton can himself state in close order the fundamental principles of political economic functions, and then offer us a new terminology, and a new classification of the functions of the state.

FRANCIS G. WILSON.

University of Illinois.

Presidential Agency OWMR; The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. BY HERMAN MILES SOMERS. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1950. Pp. xiii, 238. $4.50.)

This is a significant and unexpectedly timely contribution to the growing list of administrative histories of war agency experience. The study has been badly needed, for the OWM-OWMR during its brief life occupied a central position at the top level of civilian authority. It was given unprecedented powers and for two years enjoyed full presidential support. It has been treated only incidentally in other accounts, and only fragmentary records of the agency are left in the National Archives. Moreover, this study is not merely descriptive; the author seeks to combine historical narrative with analysis of the problems and needs of policy coordination in the White House. He addresses himself therefore to the same general theme the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937 phrased as "the President needs help." What are the lessons of OWM-OWMR experience bearing on that theme?

The book opens appropriately with the background stages and problems in the evolution of central coordinating machinery for the defense and war agencies dealing with the domestic economy prior to 1943, beginning with Roosevelt's rejection of plans for the delegation of full and centralized authority over that realm in 1939. Two following chapters trace the establishment and guiding policies of OWM under its executive order and of OWMR under its statute, and their relations with other coordinating authorities. The Byrnes pattern for the office—which the author thinks it departed from later only at the cost of its effectiveness—was to avoid operations and their involvements, to insist on an inclusive jurisdiction and plenary authority, to avoid delegations to subordinates (who were therefore necessarily few), to concentrate on major issues only, and generally to keep to the role of adjudicator of disputes. Two major exceptions to this last canon were the OES issuance of the "Hold-the-line Order" of April, 1943, and the OWM sponsorship of the Baruch-Hancock report on reconversion. Both were milestones in the development of over-all policy.

Three succeeding chapters cover the background of policy disputes and review rather too sketchily the contributions of the "Assistant President's" office to their settlement, in three major areas: allocation of resources, manpower and reconversion. Here, although considerable credit is given the office, a strong impression remains that it contributed more to keeping the peace among operating agencies than to solving their substantive problems. Coordination by adjudication in practice meant occasional *ad hoc* intervention, not mobilization.

The final chapter is constructive. It argues the continuing need for program coordination by or on behalf of the President in peacetime as well as in war; concludes that none of the existing machinery fills the bill; and proposes the permanent establishment in the Executive Office of the President of an Office of Program Coordination built along OWM lines. It is hard to quarrel with the proposal itself, but it scarcely takes full account of the evidence presented earlier in the book.

In sum, the record is useful and useful lessons are drawn from it. But there are eloquent and extensive reticences in the record and inadequate analysis of the lessons: the result falls, so to speak, between the two stools of history and theory. The book is too short to do justice to its aims. On the side of history. the three central chapters spend too much space on background events and policies, at the expense of OWM-OWMR contributions. Also, the story is mainly confined to the Byrnes-Vinson period when the office was in the heyday of its power; the Snyder-Steelman period is passed over briefly and lightly. Yet the decline and fall of OWMR was as instructive as its rise.

On the side of theory, if the difference in the political climates of war and demobilization was crucial, as some of the evidence suggests, the argument for a permanent office is weakened. A wartime government has many more decisions to make, and a wartime President is necessarily more preoccupied with military and foreign affairs; he must delegate substantial political power, coordinated or not, over many domestic affairs. A peacetime President may not care or dare to do this. A new and inexperienced President may not know his needs, or understand the machinery at his disposal well enough to use it. If he does not, the office may be by-passed, or at least temporarily become capable of only the technical kind of coordination that the Budget Bureau attempts in its Legislative Reference Division. If a Roosevelt could afford to set up in business in his own office a political figure of such stature as to be a potential successor, while a pre-1948 Truman would not do so, where is the prestige necessary for a permanently effective office of program coordination to come from? Or if the secret of the early success lay as much in the Byrnes-Vinson influence in Congress that Snyder and Steelman did not have—shutting off the prospect that unpersuaded agencies could successfully flank the coordinator by that route—as in the enjoyment of White House support, what assurance is there that a purely executive coordinator can coordinate? The last chapter foresees trouble with the military on that score without suggesting how it can be overcome; the Congress does not rate a mention there.

Take, for example, the peacetime (if not peaceable) subject of conservation and public works: is there reason to suppose that a program coordinator in the White House will have better luck than the Budget Bureau (which has had none) in coordinating the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers? The National Resources Planning Board was set up nominally though not physically in the White House and charged with that very task, which proved to be its undoing. The reader can accept the need and support the proposal urged in this book. Institutions are usually better than improvisations. But they are at best helps rather than assurances. It needs to be emphasized that a President operates in a moving context of power as well as of institutions and their procedures. Personality factors are often decisive. He cannot be made to use instruments that are not congenial to him on both counts. He is seldom in such complete command of all relevant forces that even the best of machinery can guarantee coordinated action according to his wishes on major controversial matters.

There are other difficulties in analysis. The author criticizes "Nelson's apparent failure to distinguish between operating and policy responsibilities" as "crucial" (p. 28), and in the last chapter soundly insists that the proposed Office of Program Coordination should stay clear of operations. But he had just called Nelson's "most damaging errors" (p. 27) the dilution of WPB authority that resulted from the separate establishment (with Nelson's full consent) of "czars" for manpower and rubber. How could he take (or keep) charge of these vast problem areas at that time and still avoid operations? He was certainly right in feeling that the WPB, the only organization he had, was wholly unsuited for manpower controls. This sounds like the one-big-agency fallacy (now being urged again in some quarters) unless Nelson was not to operate anything at all but rather to anticipate the later role of Byrnes. This last is what the author apparently intends, though the point is obscured by the sequence of the argument. Nelson, in short, should have taken the place of SPAB rather than of Knudsen. Yet that would have meant that at a time when nearly all war agency policies were still to be worked out, Nelson must have found, within a matter of days after his appointment in January, 1942, a man—clearly not Knudsen—to whom in turn he could and would entrust all that WPB operations presently became. Considering the President's long hesitation in concluding that he had found such a man in Nelson, and considering also Nelson's own difficulties a little later with Wilson in such a role, this analysis seems ambiguous and unrealistic. Nor is there much reason to think it would have helped if Byrnes had been put where Nelson stood in January, 1942. The author is on firmer ground in urging a better arrangement for the future than in suggesting that the mistakes of 1942, not then clearly analyzed by anyone, were avoidable.

This book is an outgrowth of what started as an official history and became a minor *cause célèbre* in the spring of 1947. In draft form it came at that time accidentally to the attention of a former OES Director and confidant of the President. Shortly afterward, further work on official histories of both agencies was abruptly ordered stopped. The longer record of the agency therefore survives only as a manuscript in the Harvard University library and the present shortened volume has been completed without official sponsorship. The OES history project was not so far advanced and is probably beyond resuscitation. If making and publishing a critical analysis of a part of the President's office during crucial years was once deemed no proper part of the functions of government, the reviewer looking at this book can now only express wonder and regret over official shortsightedness, and congratulate the author for persisting in spite of it.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD.

Ohio State University.

The Regulatory Process in OPA Rationing. BY VICTOR A. THOMPSON. (New York: King's Crown Press. 1950. Pp. xi, 466. $5.75.)

Whenever two or more alumni of OPA's rationing organization gather to reminisce, one sooner or later remarks: "With the administrative arrangements we had it's a wonder anything was ever accomplished." On this general proposition there is little disagreement, but on the question of what should have been, opinion is far from unanimous.

Dr. Thompson, in the volume under review, offers his opinion on these thorny administrative problems. His experience at OPA, his thoughtful consideration of the agency's operations, and a large amount of research in the agency's files all qualify him as an expert and make his opinions important and valuable. Furthermore, he presents them positively so that his book is interesting as well as informative. To add that his is probably not the last word is not to detract from the book; it is certainly too early still for the last word to be written.

Dr. Thompson first describes the rationing administrative arrangements as they existed on paper and as they worked out in practice. He emphasizes (quite properly, I think) the preeminent place of the "branch" in the planning and operating process, and describes in great detail the way in which decisions were reached and implemented. These are in many ways the most valuable portions of the book; the author was a part of this process and reports it well. He is also generally successful in relating these happenings to the more salient aspects of public administration theory.

Part II deals with the conflicts between the rationing branches and other parts of the agency and government. Here the villains are the Bureau of the Budget (particularly on the clearance of forms), the supply agencies (PAW, WPB, WFA, etc.) and the OPA overhead. These relationships were far from satisfactory, as anyone who so much as glanced at the newspapers of the period knows. And anyone who worked in OPA must find himself in substantial agreement with the able description of the endless road blocks erected by the first two, seemingly as a result of a complete lack of understanding of rationing problems.

But one wonders whether Dr. Thompson has not gone too far in his diagnosis with regard to the OPA overhead. (A caveat is in order: the reviewer was a member of the overhead for a time, and is presumably therefore not completely free of bias.) He insists that interference with the rationing branches from above was excessive and damaging, on the ground that only the branch personnel had adequate possession of the facts. This is probably true with respect to facts about industry, but there was no monopoly of common sense in the branches nor of information about consumers. I remember an instance where the meat branch insisted on valuing its stamp at sixteen points, while the processed foods branch had to have its stamp equal to twelve points. At the insistence of the overhead, and over strenuous objections of both branches, these were finally changed to ten points each. Having them the same value, and having that value ten, was a vast improvement. Neither branch could see any reason for the change, and both resented the meddling from above. But to consumers and retailers who dealt daily in both programs the simplification was tremendous.

An argument could be made that in some respects the branches had too much rather than too little autonomy. It made little sense that in sugar rationing, retailers were required to glue their "stamps" to gummed "cards" while gasoline retailers glued their "coupons" to gummed "sheets." (In effect, a stamp and a coupon were the same thing as were a gummed sheet and a gummed card. The terms were different because they were coined in different branches, among which there was no contact, and the overhead lacked authority to impose common terminology.) This was not serious, of course, but it is illustrative of the lack of uniformity which made the agency look absurd so often. The Rationing Department was by and large without discipline, as this book makes clear, but it is by no means obvious that it would have been better if there had been even less discipline.

Part III concerns the "Documents of Communication," mostly the legal documents. Here, as in Part I, the OPA attorneys and their habits of thinking are considered at some length. They do not fare well. Most non-legal personnel would probably agree with the author's treatment of these problems, although it would be most interesting to read an analysis of the conflicts by one of the lawyers. One of the reasons for their great influence, a reason Dr. Thompson does not mention, is that they were an extremely brilliant lot. It is significant that when Prentiss Brown, early in 1943, issued an administrative order substantially reducing their authority, operating procedures and the legal influence scarcely changed. Most non-legal personnel placed high value on approval by attorneys of a proposed action, however much they complained of "legalistic" or "unrealistic" attitudes on their part.

Finally, Part IV draws together and summarizes the author's conclusions and relates them to public administration theory.

The many merits of the book are marred by one expository fault—it is much too long. Its 435 pages contain too much repetition, and by the time the reader has reached page 200 or so he has already encountered practically all the illustrative examples at least once. He will meet most of them several times more as examples of other but similar principles. To cite an instance of this sort of thing, Chapter 3 deals with the gasoline eligibility committee, an extremely interesting administrative and program device. But there is not enough to warrant fifty-five pages of exposition; the story is essentially told in the first third of these. Furthermore, in this one chapter, the request of the motion picture salesmen for preferred mileage comes up no less than four times. And in Part III the point is made, remade and remade again that rationing regulations are not good field instructions (a point which scarcely needs reiteration) and the case of General Ration Order 8 is brought up almost ad nauseum. This type of exposition tends to weaken rather than strengthen the author's case.

One should mention that, because of Dr. Thompson's experience, his book is heavy with examples from fuel, stove, tire and gasoline rationing. Illustrations from processed foods and meat-fats rationing in particular and shoes to a lesser extent are more sparsely employed. To a degree this serves to particularize the generalizations since in many respects the food point rationing programs were quite different.

These drawbacks, of course, are not basic. Anyone interested in public administration theory and problems will find careful study of this book a rewarding experience. It contains a wealth of information about an organization which was quite unique administratively and which met and mastered unique problems.

JOSEPH A. KERSHAW.

RAND CORPORATION,
Santa Monica, California.

Federal Reserve Policy-Making; A Study in Government Economic Policy Formation. BY G. L. BACH. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1950. Pp. xvii, 282, v. $3.00.)

From an organizational and administrative point of view the Federal Reserve System is almost unique among our governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. This is due to a combination of conditions. (1) Though the System performs a governmental function in formulating and executing monetary and credit policies it is supposed to be at least formally "independent" of the executive department and responsible only to Congress. (2) The statutes provide only the most general guides to credit policy; the officials of the System possess very wide discretionary powers as to the nature, timing, and extent of their operations. (3) Internal control is divided between governmental appointees and officials elected by the banks which are subject to control by the System. (4) The statutes are somewhat vague as to the division of internal control between the Board of Governors in Washington and the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks. (5) The state-chartered banks, which comprise a majority of all banks in the country, retain the freedom to determine for themselves whether or not they will become members of the System and thereby subject themselves to the federal laws and regulations applicable only to members. (6) The division of jurisdiction and power between the Federal Reserve and other agencies is in many respects unclear and in some cases jurisdictions and powers clearly overlap. For example, the monetary and debt management powers of the Treasury overlap and can seriously conflict with the monetary and credit policies of the Federal Reserve, and the same is true of the bank supervision and examination policies of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the bank supervisory authorities of the forty-eight states. Such arrangements raise serious problems of political theory, the actual location of control, methods of resolving intra-governmental conflicts, and coordination of the various related policies.

Professor Bach has produced an excellent study of the process of formulating and administering economic policy under these circumstances—a study firmly based on a clear understanding of the purpose and importance of Federal Reserve functions, of the formal and informal steps involved in formulating System policies, of the ideas and philosophies of the various types of Federal Reserve officials, of the negotiations between the Federal Reserve and other agencies, and of the political and economic conditions that help to determine the actual location of control within the System and the actual division of control between the Federal Reserve and other governmental agencies. The latter part of the book suggests organizational changes that might improve the quality of monetary and credit management and bring about a better coordination of financial policies in general.

This book is unlikely to be popular with those who believe that all problems of policy formation and coordination can be solved by drawing a pyramidal type of organizational chart which concentrates final authority and responsibility in the chief executive. It should, however, be welcomed by those who believe that the type of organization to be adopted and the location of control over it should depend upon the nature of the functions to be performed, the types of policies desired, and the past performance of the agency or agencies involved. It is an excellent example of the kind of case study on which plans for government reorganization should be based.

LESTER V. CHANDLER.

Princeton University.

Transforming Public Utility Regulation; A Definite Administrative Program. BY JOHN BAUER. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1950. Pp. xi, 367. $5.00.)

Twenty-five years ago, John Bauer published a thoughtful book on *Effective Regulation of Public Utilities.* With the assistance of Peter Costello he has reexamined the state of public utility regulation and has found it still inadequate. The book is divided into two parts. The first part develops the thesis that the "existing private organization and prevailing public regulation have failed badly to meet reasonably the standards and goals of essential public service." The second part outlines Bauer's program for providing needed adjustments in utility regulation and in the utility industries to make public regulation effective. Public ownership and management of utilities is held out as the only satisfactory alternative to effective regulation of privately owned and operated utilities. The stated purpose of the author is to contribute to the intelligent reshaping of utility regulation and organization.

Bauer insists that the crucial defect in public utility regulation is the "lack of administrability" or "nonadministrability" "due to undefined rights, uncertainty of facts, and unmanageable administration." Accordingly regulation must overcome "indefiniteness, variability, and uncertainty, and its embodiment of conflicting interests." Although state utilities commissions were vested with broad statutory powers to fix reasonable rates, they were not provided with "explicit standards and means through which they could make rate adjustments as a regular and exact matter of administration." As a result, regulation was "perverted" or "strangulated" by the judiciary. Bauer's proposals for transforming utility regulation are designed to avoid judicial strangulation and to overcome vagueness and indefiniteness in rate-making and in controlling the operating costs of the privately managed utilities.

The most stimulating and provocative sections of this very useful book are those which present specific proposals for handling difficult technical problems. They include methods for establishing and maintaining continuously an exact accounting rate base, converting the return to which a company is entitled to an exact cost factor in the fixing of rates, establishing a fixed dividend rate on common stock, controlling a company's construction plans, and accounting for depreciation charges. These suggestions seem to be wise and plausible and stem from a lifetime experience in studying and analyzing utility regulation and organization.

For students of political institutions the principal defect of the study lies in its concept of regulatory administration. The phrase "independent regulatory commission" is not mentioned even once, and there is no consideration of the "independence" of state utility commissions and its impact on the regulatory process. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Bauer's emphasis on providing exact and regular administration is consistent with the implicit desire to depoliticize utility regulation. Bauer believes that his proposals will make the work of regulation "purely administrative" and presumably nonpolitical. In adhering to the traditional American hope of taking controversial matters out of politics, he fails to recognize that regulatory administration is a political process.

The author's objective is to make regulation largely a matter of determining the facts and making decisions to apply or not to apply a rule of law or public policy. However, regulation can never be made so simple. Often the "facts" must be deduced from obscure and conflicting evidence. Data is frequently concealed or distorted. A wide variety of methods are employed to influence the final decision. Regulation, in other words, is and always will be an intensely political process. Its success depends just as much on widespread political support and strong political leadership as it does on sound regulatory techniques.

As Bauer indicates, the achievement of utility regulation in the public interest requires tremendous changes in regulatory policies and in the organization of the utility industries. His program of reform may be regarded by most observers as a frontal assault on existing utility organization. One wonders whether there is any substantial difference between effective regulation as outlined here and government ownership.

MARVER BERNSTEIN.

Princeton University.

John L. Lewis; An Unauthorized Biography. BY SAUL ALINSKY. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1949. Pp. 387. $4.00.)

What manner of man is he who for three decades has been headline news and the butt of criticism and attacks by the press, by viewers with alarm and by the temporary holders of the power of government? He must have great survival value, for he has outlived all criticism and attacks and seems to have triumphed over all opposition.

This biography, written by a warm admirer, but this side of idolatry, is made up of a number of related stories—Lewis as a man, as the spearhead of the labor movement in the United States, as a labor leader and strategist in fearful industrial combat, Lewis and the Government, Lewis and World War II, Lewis and rival labor leaders, Lewis and the Communists. And while, in all these areas, there is hardly an incident where Lewis does not come off gloriously and his adversaries do not look silly or sheepish or callow, the biography is no mere hero worship. However, adverse criticism is restricted to Lewis' position on foreign affairs. This seems to be the reason for the author's observation that Lewis' career was "a great American tragedy in terms of what might have been." What might have been is presumably an American labor party with Lewis at the head. Otherwise the biography is no development of tragedy, but a succession of triumphs resulting in the elevation of coal miners from near the bottom of the wage earners' hierarchy to the very top.

The evidence is here that as a strategist in the struggles of organized labor to make its weight felt, John L. Lewis is without a peer in the American labor movement. He has the daring, the persistence and the iron nerve, the confidence in his cause, and the ability to estimate the weaknesses of the forces against him to outwit, outsit, outtrade, or outlast any opponent—be he another aspiring labor leader, a representative of a great industry or the representative of the United States Government. Lewis' handling of the last coal strike in the light of all of the forces against him came too late to be included in this biography; but his handling of the organizing strike in General Motors in 1937 in the face of the injunction, the weakening sit-down strikers, the fearful dilemma of Governor Murphy and the backbiting of other influential labor leaders remains the most impressive illustration of his skill in maneuvering and bargaining, his daring, his boundless courage, his persistence against apparently insurmountable odds and his ability to turn every swing of fortune to his advantage. Political scientists and historians who are wont to interpret social developments in terms of basic forces might well wonder whether the American labor movement of today or even the establishment and the existence of the CIO today would have been possible without the very special talents of this extraordinary man.

The power and influence of a union leader rest ultimately on the nature of the industry which must come to depend on his attitudes and decisions in order to carry on. From this point of view, Lewis' opportunities as leader of the coal miners were heaven-sent. No manufacturing industry is as indispensable to our economy and no service industry is sufficiently large or unique in its labor requirements to have given him the leverage which is offered by the control of hundreds of thousands of irreplaceable coal miners. He might have functioned equally as successfully as leader of the related steel workers, or possibly the teamsters; but as leader of the railroad workers (assuming he could have knit them together as a single organization) he would have found himself severely inhibited by the requirement of uninterrupted service. His truly artistic power to hold out while the hazards mounted and the alarms added up would have had little scope in an industry where a strike for a week or two is intolerable. The relatively isolated coal miner, risking his life daily in a hard and grimy job, doing work for which outsiders cannot easily be recruited regardless of the need or the pay, and producing the fuel which is basic to our whole industrial life is the solid substance of the power of John L. Lewis. This is noted by the author at the end of the volume in a quotation from Lewis which is a key to his strategy—hold out long enough until the users of coal come to your aid and pressure the coal operators into surrender or satisfactory compromise.

Regarding the second arm of a triumphant labor leader—his unquestioned control of his "own" union—Mr. Alinsky reviews quite candidly the steps by which Mr. Lewis became and has remained the master of the union. This mastery is justified on the ground that the certainty of retaining his office strengthened his power to deal with others and freed his time and energy for larger and more daring activities.

There is much in this biography to account for Lewis as a man of courage and ambition and as a leader and strategist in industrial struggles, but little, if anything, about his thinking on the issues of labor in the economy, of the sources of economic well-being and the means of future improvement. The impression is created (perhaps unintentionally) that Lewis is altogether an opportunist—challenging Gompers because he was too acquiescent in his relations with President Wilson, backing President Hoover until the last, using the new instrumentalities of government created in the early years of the Roosevelt administration for all they were worth and throwing them overboard when they stood in the way. He then dabbled with left wing politics, came out for a third party based on a "popular front" and charged President Roosevelt with "out-Hoovering Hoover." Failing in the gamble against Roosevelt in 1940, he felt no obligation to cooperate with the Government thereafter and returned to the role in which he always shines—opposition to the pressures around him. It was particularly in the decade of the 1940's in a period first of full mobilization for war and then of spectacularly high levels of production and employment that intransigence and bellicosity paid off most. Little Steel formulas, holding-the-line policies, presidential fact-finding boards and other devices were not for tbe United Mine Workers unless fattened by travel time pay, lunch time pay and a fabulous welfare fund which did not count as wages. From almost the beginning of his career the press headlines have been one form or another of the caption: "Government Acts to Stop Lewis." But fencing Lewis in has been no easy matter, whether the "control" was the Executive Council of the AF of L ,the no-strike pledge, the Little Steel formula, the Taft-Hartley Act, the President of the United States or the decisions of the federal courts.

The close and friendly relations of the author with the personality of the biography enable him to go beyond the printed word and even the rationalizations which humans may later make of positions taken. In 1947, when the author was interviewing Mr. Lewis in the course of preparing the biography, Lewis gave him a far different explanation of the causes of his break with President Roosevelt than the author could possibly accept because of his intimate relations with Lewis in 1940. For this reason he could not accept other explanations advanced for the break between Roosevelt and Lewis. His own version of the relations between these two leaders is given in two chapters in which mutual love is finally transformed into mutual loathing.

GUSTAV PECK.

Library of Congress.

Labor Relations in the New York Rapid Transit Systems, 1904–1944. By JAMES J. McGINLEY. (New York: Kings Crown Press, Columbia University. 1949. Pp. xxiii, 635. $6.50.)

In June, 1940, the city of New York assumed ownership and operation of the private rapid transit lines in the city and combined them with its own municipal line which had been in operation since 1932. This action of the city was accompanied by a threat on the part of the transit employees to tie up the lines with a strike. Since that crisis the city has been faced with threat after threat of a general transit strike. Labor relations have become the central problem of rapid transit administration. Father McGinley's timely book shows the reasons for this situation. His study is a broader work than its title indicates. It is actually a study of the operation of the New York transit system with the problem of labor relations as its focus.

The story is one of many paradoxes. There was no independent labor organization among the employees until a few years before unification under municipal operation. But when the city took over the private systems both were completely covered by union shop contracts which required the employees to join the union at the end of their probationary periods. The city, although assuming all existing contracts of the companies when it took over their properties, refused to assume the labor agreements, claiming that their provisions violated the civil service law. When the employees threatened to strike the city assumed the contracts until their expiration date a year later. After the contracts expired the Board of Transportation continued to insist, and it has maintained this position consistently, that it could not enter into any bargaining arrangement with its workers. Yet the Board of Transportation has incomparably broader jurisdiction over its personnel than any other employing agency in the city. It has the power to fix the wages and working conditions of its employees. Nevertheless, it continues to claim that this power must be exercised unilaterally and that it would be violating the law if it fixed working conditions by negotiations and agreement with its employees. The result has been one strike threat after another and several actual slow downs and stoppages in violation of the state law passed in 1947 forbidding public employees to strike.

Father McGinley paints his picture on a broad canvas. He describes the transit industry and shows the place New York's system occupies in it. He tells the story of the construction of that rapid transit system and analyzes the relations of the operating companies to the city and the state. He examines labor relations under private management. He discusses the establishment and operation of the city's independent municipal system and the role of the Board of Transportation as its administrator. A large part of the study is devoted to the history, development and policies of the various employee organizations. At the end of the book there is a brief discussion of the Communist issue in the Transport Workers Union, CIO, by far the largest labor organization in the system. Father McGinley ends his story in 1946, taking this union to task for not having rid itself of Communist influence as other CIO unions had done. Shortly after Father McGinley ended his story this union did just exactly what the author called upon it to do. This book was published in 1949. It is too bad that, although these facts could easily have been brought up to date, this was not done. The omission may mislead many readers.

Father McGinley's able study is a significant contribution important alike to students of labor relations and public administration.

STERLING D. SPERO.

New York University.

The Growth of American Law; The Law Makers. BY JAMES WILLARD HURST. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1950. Pp. xiii, 502. $5.50.)

No doubt Monsieur Jourdain did speak prose with some effectiveness, although unaware that that was what he was doing; and no doubt those engaged in the formulation and elaboration of law, and more particularly members of the legal profession, have functioned somehow, even though often unconscious that their activity is applied social science and, in particular, political science. But, prose or law, a product characterized by elegance, suppleness, and discernment seldom issues from such unsophisticated practitioners. It is the especial merit of Professor Hurst's book that it explicitly reintegrates American legal history into the fabric of the development of American political institutions. All lawyers and all other political scientists who read it will be less prone thereafter to forget that we are members one of another.

The treatment is panoramic, covering, for the century and a half from 1790 to 1940, the activities not only of those classical law makers, the legislatures and the courts, but of their sometimes disregarded collaborators, the constitution makers, the bar, and the executive. The author did not propose any comprehensive exploration of original materials, he tells us in the prefatory note, but intended in the main the examination, analysis, and organization of the substance of materials already available in published form. He seems to have done a remarkably thorough job. The fashionable lumping of citations at the end of the volume, for which perhaps the publisher rather than the author is blamable, diminishes their utility but cannot conceal the fact that the landmark references at least are all there for a remarkably wide range of materials.

The book glances at everything which has shaped American law—at random, the composition of the two chambers of the legislature (and the uncritical acceptance of two chambers), the extent of popular interest and participation in the constituent process, the role of the expert in administration. There is no major problem which has engaged the attention of political scientists concerned with American government which escapes Professor Hurst entirely. He is alert to everything, acute in his comment on many matters, adept in displaying the rich variety of agencies and forces which have played and are playing a part in shaping American law. In a one volume treatment, so great an accomplishment exacts its inevitable price. With so many subjects introduced, the introductions must often be like those at a formal reception—a hand shake, an irrelevant name, and a fleeting greeting. Stylistically the consequence is sometimes a succession of clipped and crowded sentences which jostle the reader uncomfortably. More serious, however, is the fact that, just and penetrating as are many of the author's comments, depth has at times had to be sacrificed to breadth. It is perfectly true that almost without exception the positions taken correspond with prevalent trends of scholarship and that Professor Hurst proves himself conversant with current thinking. The burden of proof to contest almost any of the propositions which he advances would be regarded by qualified experts as resting on his antagonists. Perhaps it is a confession of obsolescence to feel that he is just a bit too topical, too unvaryingly uncritical in his relish for the fruits of contemporary social thought. He himself regards his work as opening and not as closing the line of study on which he engaged, and another manner of treatment might have postponed the book's appearance indefinitely, which would have been a grave loss. But the regret persists.

His competence to have performed the more arduous task is clearly demonstrated in Section V, "The Bar," where he did undertake it. His object—a realized object—was to give an overall picture of the agencies of legal growth. Without intention, and very likely unbeknownst to himself, he has, however, played favorites—not favorites in sentiment or sympathy but in the quality and quantity of his discussion. Section III, "The Courts," and Section V, "The Bar," together take well over half the book and the latter by itself very nearly a third of the entire text. There is probably nowhere else in such a brief compass so excellent a discussion of the role of the legal profession in the law making process. Specialized aspects, such as the evolution of professional organization and the course and consequences of changes in legal education, are explored in a manner which could hardly be bettered. The author's more intimate association with these elements in law making led him with happy results to expand his individual explorations here while his modesty induced deferment to the conclusions of specialists in other areas.

The intending reader should perhaps be apprised that Professor Hurst appears to attribute preponderant importance to class conflict, especially the conflict of economic interests, in the development not alone of the content of the law but also of the agencies which excrete the substantive law, the law makers. In this again he is in line with the views of a very large body of recent scholarship, although it is a bit puzzling to find the economists deserting the postulate of primarily economic motivation just at the time of its high vogue in sister disciplines. To the reviewer and to those who, like him, are intrigued by the culture concept of the sociologists, this is something of a blemish; but, while it must be allowed for, it does not seriously impair the very great merits of the book.

A brief bow is due the publishers for a clearly printed, well-indexed, generally workmanlike job of bookmaking (with reservations always as to the aforementioned isolation of the references). A deep bow is due to the author for his clear vision that, as medicine is to the biological and engineering to the physical sciences, so is law to the social sciences, and for providing so compact, clear and readable a *précis* of their interaction in the United States.

ALBERT S. ABEL.

West Virginia University.

The American Tradition in Religion and Education. BY R. FREEMAN BUTTS. (Boston: The Beacon Press. 1950. Pp. xiv, 230. $3.00.)

Justice Black committed the Supreme Court to the following interpretation of the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment in the *Everson* case: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. *Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.* Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. *No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.* Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and *vice versa.* In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State.'" (Italics added.)

The validity of this interpretation has been, since its pronouncement, the subject of intense public debate at all levels of discussion. Those who disagree with Justice Black advance two principal propositions: that an establishment of religion means only giving a preferred position to one religion over all others, and that the American tradition is not one of separation but rather one of "cooperation" between state and church, provided only that the state treats all religions alike. Professor Butts takes his stand with Justice Black. His little book is designed to prove that Justice Black was right, and that his position is supported both by the teachings of American history and the insistent demands of present-day public policy. Professor Butts believes that an absolute separation of church and state is essential if we are to enjoy religious freedom, "a foundation stone of American liberty."

One of the refreshing aspects of this book—especially when viewed in the light of many other writings in this touchy field of popular disputation—is that the reader is never in doubt as to where Professor Butts stands. He thinks that the minority was right, in the *Everson* case, in its opposition to "public rides to private schools." He agrees wholeheartedly with the Court's decision in the *McCollum* case as to the invalidity of "released-time" religious education in the public schools. He believes that the prohibition of an establishment of religion forbids not only direct public aid or support to religious schools, but also all forms of indirect aid, such as free transportation, free textbooks, and other "auxiliary services." He is also of the opinion that the principle of separation prohibits "non-sectarian" religious instruction in the public schools, whether it takes the form of Bible-reading or some type of released-time promotion of religious instruction. Above all, he maintains that constitutional doctrine requires the state to be completely neutral towards all churches and all religions, and that the state may not legally aid a preferred religion or "cooperate" with all religions.

The clarification and elaboration of this last point represents the principal contribution of this book. Briefly, his point is that, in the perspective of American history, the First Amendment's prohibition of an "establishment of religion" forbids both single *and* multiple establishments. He shows that while in some of the early American colonies establishment took the form of giving some one church a preferred position, this type of church-state relationship either disappeared altogether by the end of the colonial period, or took the form of multiple establishment. Thus, in 1789, when the federal Constitution went into effect, and the First Amendment was drafted, only five states—Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maryland and South Carolina—had some form of establishment, and all were multiple establishments. The struggle for the separation of church and state was not completed until these multiple establishments came to an end. For, as Professor Butts points out, "complete disestablishment of financial and legal support for religion by the state was necessary to achieve a genuinely free exercise of religion resting upon the solid grounds of equal rights of conscience." The First Amendment, then, was an application of a principle already in process of achievement in the states. In the great struggle over this principle in Virginia, both Jefferson and Madison, Professor Butts shows, were opposed to all forms of establishment, single and multiple. This is important, since these two Founding Fathers were the principal architects of the First Amendment. After reviewing the history of the framing and adoption of the First Amendment, the author reaches the same conclusion, that it was designed to prohibit not only a single established church, but plural support of many or all religions as well. Our subsequent national history, with special attention being given to the place of religion in the public schools, is then reviewed to buttress his main thesis.

Professor Butts is perfectly aware of the fact that many practices have persisted to this day which suggest that we do not have even now a complete separation of church and state—e.g., chaplains in Congress and the armed forces, tax exemptions for religious institutions, religious exercises at official ceremonies, et cetera. But he believes that these are exceptions to the principle of the separation of church and state, and do not prove that "cooperation" rather than separation is the principle to which the country is devoted.

A great deal of attention is given to the various court decisions—state and national—which have interpreted our concepts dealing with religious freedom and the establishment of religion. His treatment is even-handed, stating both majority and minority views on the controverted issues. At one point, however, one may question his handling of the constitutional problem. This relates to the crucial question of the incorporation of the federal Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. He states flatly, without supporting analysis, that the latter Amendment imposed the civil rights restrictions of the federal Bill of Rights upon the states, and that "as early as 1896" this view "was widely accepted" (pp. 104–105). This is a dubious proposition. On this point he should consult Professor Charles Fairman's penetrating study in the *Stanford Law Review* for December, 1949. It is true, of course, that in a series of decisions dating from 1925 the Supreme Court has incorporated the whole of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth, but Professor Butts overstates and oversimplifies a hotly-debated point of American constitutional law, and in doing so he weakens his case.

But this flaw in the analysis is peripheral. All in all, Professor Butts has made a substantial contribution to clarifying the meaning of the establishment of religion prohibition in our public law. Until very recently it was generally understood that this country was committed to the principle of the separation of church and state. Now that strident voices are heard to declare that "cooperation" and not separation is really the touchstone of public policy, it is, of course, essential that competent scholars re-examine and re-state this basic article of American faith.

DAVID FELLMAN.

University of Wisconsin.

The Education of Free Men; An Essay Toward a Philosophy of Education for Americans. BY HORACE M. KALLEN. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company. 1949. Pp. xix, 332. $5.00.)

Since Mr. Kallen was a member of the President's Commission on Higher

Education, his views warrant attention. American education, he claims, is still dominated by principles incompatible with democracy, assuming a predestined social order, an already-existing body of truth to be taught by authoritarian indoctrination, and a leisure-class culture divorced from productive life. The result is unintegrated rote learning, a cleavage between the "day life" and the "night life" of modern man, and the perversion and waste of the potential energies of personality. Mr. Kallen paints a horrendous picture of the typical American public school, in which the sexless, neurotic, and dowdy school-marm exerts a dogmatic tyranny reflecting her own subjection to the administrative hierarchy, while her pupils, contrasting the American democratic ideal with the actual class-room dictatorship and impressed by the irrelevance of the prescribed curriculum to their lives and interests, wage a perennial "class-war" with the teacher and learn little except to regard education as a useless hypocrisy. The class-war continues in the college, which Mr. Kallen rather quaintly portrays as an institution in which "collegiate" [*sic*] is a magic word, the student knows no economic concerns save those of managing fraternity or football team, the only significant education is extracurricular, and the student regards his instructors as "hostile outsiders" and "the requirements of the classroom ... as simply the disagreeable condition" which permits "his irresponsible agreeable college life." The instructors, knowing no other world, "concentrate their attention on the records of the past"; for "employing the past to illuminate the present . . . seems to lie beyond pedagogic ambition."

To this nightmare, Mr. Kallen opposes "the education of free men," whose goals are the integration of "the whole man" by the compenetration of culture with vocation, the equipping of the individual with the knowledge that will enable him to sympathize with and participate in the varied associations which make up present-day society, and the release of creative energies for the democratic solution of present-day problems. Many of those condemned as "traditionalists" will have no quarrel with these ideals unless to criticize their omissions. In particular, Mr. Kallen's formula, "no vocation without culture, no culture without vocation," while perhaps a healthy corrective to some aspects of the humanistic tradition, seems an arbitrary restriction on human potentialities and raises a question which he does not seriously examine: whether every modern vocation is an adequate nucleus for culture.

Many will agree that there are some half-truths in Mr. Kallen's indictment of current education but will question his assertion that the method for reaching his goals is "already available" in progressive education. The characteristics of progressive education, we learn, are freedom of inquiry and criticism, a "discipline of freedom" in which the teacher is a leader in group-projects of discovery and achievement, and, above all, the principle that the criterion for choosing educational material must be its evident relevance to the student's current interests. Mr. Kallen denies that interest can possibly follow after the study of material whose significance was not immediately apparent to the student; moreover, he implicitly assumes that the center of interest for the maturing student will be vocational. He gives little advice on the methods to be used in encouraging the development from private interests to social awareness and from vocation to culture; he seems unaware of the difficulties: "If a bootblack is aware of his art with its tools and materials . . . a transition from shoeshine to Caligula and Roman history becomes an unforced event" [!]. Moreover, short of complete *laissez faire*, which Mr. Kallen repudiates, some choice among relevances would seem inevitable even for the most sexually healthy and well-dressed teacher: a problem in permutations and combinations which reaches tremendous proportions as education progresses beyond the kindergarten stage at which milk-drinking obviously suggests a visit to the dairy. To this reviewer it seems that the real educational issues lie in attempts to answer these questions rather than in Mr. Kallen's simple dichotomy between "traditionalist" and "democratic" concepts.

JOHN D. LEWIS.

Oberlin College.

Moral Aspects of Dishonesty in Public Office. BY WILLIAM JOSEPH KING. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press. 1949. Pp. xiii, 225. $2.50.)

Doubtless it is unusual to consider a "Study in Sacred Theology" in a journal of political "science," but the subject of this published doctoral dissertation would seem to have peculiar significance in these days of political meandering. There is only too little consideration by political scientists of the interrelated problems of morals, ethics and politics.

Here the author considers the problem of morality in public office from the Roman Catholic point of view and with suitable references to an entire realm of Catholic thought and authority with which the reviewer is only at best partially familiar. Commencing with the "notion and division of graft," moving on to the nature of society and the common good, moving further to the various forms of justice, and concluding with a discussion of a series of forms of dishonesty (legislative abuses, purchase of immunity, spoils politics, corruption in contracts, etc.), the author attempts to show the nature of public dishonesty and the proper moral "school solution" to such perplexing problems.

It is clear that the author has read widely in political as well as moral literature and that he is conversant with most of the readily available materials which expose the nature of public peculation. And if one accepts his premises and his system of justice, and his analysis of society, the morality proposed is, of course, relatively unassailable. One might also wish that it were applied more than it is.

But there are severe limitations to the study in case some unsuspecting reader should be misled by the sweeping nature of the title. The types of "graft" dealt with are the more obvious ones which most of us will easily agree are against the public interest. Gifts, bribes, and extortions are almost the only mechanisms of grafting that are discussed. Most of the more subtle forms of influence, often involving little immediate turnover in cash but functioning through manipulations of economic strength, propaganda, and violence, are but very lightly touched upon.

Moreover, while the author devotes a chapter to "the Common Good" which the honest public official is expected to serve—as opposed to the "private or party interest" served by the dishonest official—he offers little or no guidance for solving the more perplexing substantive problems confronting most public officials today. The author tells us to follow the common good—but "What is the common good?" is the real question perplexing the world, and on this question the author is of little help. In this volume we are left, in substance, with only a set of moral precepts designed for a late nineteenth century political situation—useful, yes, but only as far as they go. In general, the author presents a much less applicable and stimulating treatment of the moral problems in modern politics than did E. A. Ross in his intriguing little book, *Sin and Society,* published in 1907.

In the opinion of the reviewer, who spent two years in Europe during and after the late War, the author gets onto thin ice right on his first page when he declares on little or no evidence that "The democratic form of government seems to offer more opportunities and greater incentives to corrupt practices among its public officials than other forms do." Conceivably this might be true if one accepted the author's examples of dishonesty as the only forms of dishonesty. Even then, I am doubtful.

In conclusion, it is to the author's great credit that his discussion is well-organized, very clearly written, and relatively free from either political or religious double-talk.

PAUL P. VAN RIPER.

Northwestern University.

The German Catastrophe. BY FRIEDRICH MEINECKE. TRANSLATED BY SIDNEY B. FAY. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1950. Pp. viii, 121. $3.00.)

Few historians have written so wisely of the inner conflicts of German history as Friedrich Meinecke, but his audience in this country has been limited by the fact that very little of his work has been translated. Professor Sidney Fay's desire to correct this situation is, therefore, understandable; and his choice of *Die deutsche Katastrophe* was probably determined in part by the thought that, in days when the German problem is very much on our minds, it might be useful to have before us Meinecke's reflections on the causes of the German tragedy. Meinecke's admirers will perhaps regret Professor Fay's choice, and with reason, for, although it comes from the pen of the dean of German historians, this is in some ways a disappointing book.

The essential purpose of this small volume is to investigate the fundamental causes of the Nazi revolution of 1933. In his opening chapters, Professor Meinecke establishes a direct connection between that event and the breakdown of what he calls the classical liberal synthesis of the mid-nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century, he argues, the intellectual leaders of the German middle classes sought to reconcile the opposing forces of nationalism and socialism, to promote the cause of national unity and state power while at the same time broadening civil liberties and supporting the legitimate desires of the masses. They strove to effect "a synthesis of intellect and force, of the intellect-building and state-building factors" (p. 9). Had the revolution of 1848 been successful, he implies, Germany's national development might have been far different from what in fact it was. But the failure of the middle class liberals to lead Germany to unity and power meant that these desiderata had to be attained by Prussian militarism and by the fertile expedients of diplomatic "realism," which meant, in effect, that they were achieved at the expense of international morality and accepted international standards. Thus, the unification of Germany proved to be "a deep-reaching revolution" which opened "the prospect of further revolutions and an era of wars" (p. 13). Force was deified not only by Germany's leaders but also by wide sections of the middle classes, and the nation was given over in the later century to rampant materialism and a supersensitive nationalism which—in Friedrich Paulsen's words—destroyed "moral and even logical consciousness." Simultaneously, in the educational system and the state administration, technological skill came to be valued at the expense of comprehensive and well-rounded knowledge; *homo faber* tended to replace *homo sapiens*. These tendencies reached their fullest strength during the first World War, when superficial rationalization characterized Germany's military thinking and naked greed the war aims of her ruling classes. The result was the disaster of 1918 which produced the post-war political chaos in which Hitler found it possible to make his way to power.

The passages in which the author develops this theme are powerful and convincing. But Meinecke is reluctant to conclude that Hitlerism was, in fact, a logical outgrowth of Germany's development in the nineteenth century. In a chapter entitled "Chance and General Tendencies," he argues against "the gloomy fatality" which views Hitlerism as Germany's "inescapable destiny" (p. 61). Drawing upon his own memory of the early 1930's and his friendship with men like Groener and Bruening, he describes some of the things that might have been done to stop Hitler. He suggests the possibility that Hitler's accession to power "depended primarily on the decisions of two men—Hugenberg and Hindenburg" (p. 62); and he intimates that, if only the Western Powers had been a little kinder to Bruening, Hitler might never have seen the inside of the *Reichskanzlei* (pp. 66–67). Yet once again he is reluctant to push his point too far and, later in the book (p. 96), introduces still another explanation for Hitler's rise, arguing that "there must . . . have been a special complete break which separates the Hitler movement from all movements of the past. . . . It is one of the great examples of the singular and incalculable power of personality in historical life—in this case of a downright demonic personality."

It would be reassuring if we were allowed to conclude from this that general tendencies, chance and personality combined to produce Hitlerism. It is disturbing, however, to detect in this book an intimation that perhaps the real cause of Germany's catastrophe is a force quite beyond human control. Meinecke is a firm believer in a historical dialectic in which good and evil are at eternal war and in which even the most glorious human achievements have within them the seeds of corruption. So also in the life of nations. "It is in the very nature of . . . state guidance in general," the author writes (p. 52), "that something demonic lies which at a given moment leaps up and seizes control over the ruling authorities." Since the publication of *Die deutsche Katastrophe*, Meinecke has elaborated this theme in a much criticized article in *Der Monat* (October, 1949). There he speaks of "the power of an inner destiny which works by and large in all human life and brings forth good and evil, blessings and misfortunes intertwined." The only comment that need be made of this is that it represents a theory of fatalism which, if carried too far, can be used to exculpate statesmen, politicians and peoples of all responsibility for their actions.

In justice to Meinecke, it must be emphasized that, in the book under review, he repeatedly denies that the German people have the right to evade responsibility for what has happened to them and insists that "the Third Reich was not only the greatest misfortune that the German people have suffered in their existence, but also their greatest shame" (p. 86). In view of this position and in full consciousness of what such a tragic admission must mean to a sensitive and deeply patriotic man, it would be a mistake to dwell too much upon his inconsistency. For, despite it, this is an intensely interesting book. The vigor and freshness of the author's views, his eloquent repudiation of Hitlerism in all its forms, the new light which he throws on the events of 1932, his shrewd critique of army leadership and his appeal to the Germans of this generation to abandon the search for power will commend it to a wide audience. In addition, scholars of all lands could do worse than heed Meinecke's reminder to future German historians that their mission should be "to give evidence of both love and severity for our past and to proceed to the task of maintaining what was truly good in it, recognizing what was valueless and taking warning from it when one has to take action" (p. 108).

Professor Fay's translation is generally readable but at times inaccurate. A whole sentence is missing, for instance, from the Delbrück quotation on page 21. On page 55, by mistranslating *nun* as "not," Professor Fay completely alters the meaning of Meinecke's remarks about Germany's deviation from western European liberal ideas; and, on page 105, he runs afoul of some relative clauses and, in consequence, mistakenly attributes "ethical values" but "spiritual narrowness" to Boyen's military ideas, whereas the German text shows that these words refer rather to "the cruder militarism which came from Frederick William I."

GORDON A. CRAIG.

Princeton University.

Korea Today. BY GEORGE M. MCCUNE IN COLLABORATION WITH ARTHUR L. GREY, JR. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1950. Pp. xxi, 372. $5.00.)

This objective, penetrating, and scholarly study of Korea today gives the reader practically all the information that he needs in order to review the background and history of that unfortunate country up until the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. It is an excellent example of a true area approach to a society. Mr. Grey has completed the late Mr. McCune's manuscript entirely in the spirit of the author. Mr. McCune has developed his story and analysis by using the significant facts in the fields of geography, political science, international relations, history and economics. Although there is no formal use of anthropological or psychological material, Mr. McCune's own deep and intimate knowledge of Korea serves to enrich his analysis with much that those disciplines might have contributed.

The book is more rather than less valuable because it was completed before the invasion of South Korea. The book ends by suggesting that "the present prospect is of prolonged and deepening antagonism" between North and South Korea. The reasons for this foreboding are based not only upon the international situation, with the poor prospects of settlement between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., but also upon an analysis of the effects of the Japanese colonial rule, the defeat of the Japanese, and the differing policies of the Soviet Union and the United States in North and South Korea.

Mr. McCune does not follow the fashionable line of denouncing everything that the United States has done in Southern Korea. It is clear that we were catapulted into this situation without preparation of policy or of people. Following a strictly legal interpretation of international commitments, we refused to recognize any self-appointed Korean political group and insisted upon direct rule until such time as the Koreans could have a general election. This naturally brought down upon us all the psychological and political disadvantages that go with direct rule. It was a perhaps forgivable but certainly very costly assumption that the Koreans longed for freedom and democracy so acutely that they would recognize both when they saw them. The long dictatorial history of Korea and the effects of Japanese colonization should have discouraged that assumption. It is in this sense that Mr. McCune's material raises and helps to answer the very real problem which will face us when and as Korea is liberated. How can we assist Asiatic peoples to achieve political independence and responsible democratic government in a way that is acceptable to them, that achieves the objectives, and that will secure them from the specific techniques used by the Soviet and its native allies in exploiting the situation for their own purposes?

The immediate answer is that we should integrate our political, military, economic, and psychological policies in such a way as to capture the imagination of the peoples of Asia. There is no easy answer to this problem. But the picture in South Korea is not quite so black as many have painted it. If we did not promote and insist upon extensive land reforms, it was partly because we respected Korean political sovereignty. Across the water in Japan where we shared responsibility for the government of Japan, we brought about very extensive agrarian changes. If we found ourselves allied with the more reactionary elements of Korean politics, this was partly because of the very existence of the Communist power in the North. But there is plenty of evidence that one reason the North Koreans and the Soviets struck at the time they did was that things were beginning to develop too well in the South. If some of the intellectuals were looking and moving to the North, the flow of refugees was very definitely to the South. For the United States Information Service, Korea was to be a showcase. It was beginning to look as if the power of attraction of the Korean Republic was going to be greater than that of the Northern Korean government.

Not the least interesting part of Dr. McCune's analysis is that of the political structure organized by the Soviets in North Korea. The People's Committees constituted a first element in a powerful three-cornered system. "They were the actual organs of administration at each level of government: local, provincial, and national." By this means, the Communists created among the Korean people the impression that they were taking part in and were responsible for government. The second element, the political parties, were controlled by the dominant Labor Party (the Communists) which controlled the whole political scene under the careful guidance of Soviet advisers. The third element in the structure of control was the Korean People's Militia. From the very beginning of the occupation, Soviet forces had armed young Koreans with confiscated Japanese military equipment and trained them for military service. The militia has been estimated at anything from 150,000 men to 500,000. As in Communist China, the People's Militia had both political and military importance. It was the very heart of local administration. The militia enforced the agrarian changes as well as the will of the People's Committees. At the same time, it provided local garrisons and in that way liberated for front-line service larger numbers of troops. With a well-organized People's Militia, there are no problems of infiltration or of formal garrisoning. "The apparent ease by which the Soviets seemed to be governing North Korea was misleading." McCune points out that from Russian reports themselves, it was quite clear that there was no freedom of expression or freedom of political activity. Whenever any of the parties belonging to the Korean National Democratic Front got out of line, the purges were immediately carried out. In addition to political terrorism, the food ration system was handled in such a way as to discourage political obstructionism. Perhaps most important of all was the threat of revoking the deeds to land distributed under the Land Reform of March, 1946, if the new owner did not support the Party or do his part in supplying the government with produce. But the Russians kept themselves in the background. While the United States, strictly interpreting its obligations to the United Nations, was out in front running Korea through direct control and suffering all the natural opprobrium that this brings with it, the Russians, preparing to sabotage the United Nations, had all the advantages that come from working behind the scenes. "Thus, while important decisions in policy were made by the Soviets, the Korean party members appeared to initiate and support such decisions, so that the impression was created that they were Korean in origin and implementation."

The Russians, it is clear, had by far the easier job because their system was "more easily adopted by the Koreans than was the western democratic system sponsored by the American command." The Koreans had no problem in understanding dictatorial government and ruthless thought control.

What lessons do we draw from this experience? The first lesson involves a correct understanding of the nature, techniques, and objectives of the Soviet Union in its use of the international Communist movement. This is better understood now, perhaps, than before June 25th. The other lesson, however, is much more difficult to learn and to formulate. Part of the lesson is that the peoples of Asia for the most part are determined to run their own affairs and to secure a much more important place in the councils of the nations than they have had previously. The fact that they have been infected with ideas of Western European and American origin—political freedom, rising standards of living, industrialism, civil liberties—does not mean that they are pro-American. So the other part of the lesson is that we desperately need to discover a democratic program for action that can be expressed in terms of the problems of Asiatic agrarian peoples. How we go about the recovery and reconstruction of Korea will provide a case study for many peoples and problems far removed from that unhappy country.

GEORGE E. TAYLOR.

University of Washington.

The United States and Japan. BY EDWIN O. REISCHAUER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1950. Pp. xviii, 357. $4.00.)

This volume, the eighth to appear in the American Foreign Policy Library, is neatly divided into four parts: the "problem," the "physical setting," the "Japanese character," and the "occupation." It also contains four appendices, among them the new Constitution of Japan, and two maps. It is a meaty book, written with verve, and exhibiting an unusual combination of concise comprehensiveness, originality of literary style, and a simplicity in exposition that conceals learning and reveals understanding. Scholar and layman alike will find it interesting and stimulating. The reader's pleasure is enhanced by the very attractive format of the book.

Professor Reischauer begins with the record of Japan's relations with the West, emphasizing the evidences of American influence upon Japan's civilization and very briefly tracing the decline in mutual confidence that ultimately culminated in war. He then sets forth the American problem, which is to find a way to bring Japan "up to our own democratic standards" (p. 40). Japan, the author maintains, is an ideological battleground. "We are anxious to have another people firmly on the side of democracy" (*ibid.*), and if we fail in this we fail in Asia. These statements of the problem are not identical. The latter lies within the realm of possibilities; the former is a long-time matter, as the author concludes in his final chapter. This is not the only instance of ambiguity in the book which also contains a number of minor inaccuracies in statements of fact, such as: " . . . in 1924 Congress passed a law excluding outright all Japanese on the basis of race" (p. 17); "Japan had won the Kwantung Territory from China in 1895" (p. 22); Japan "accepted an inferior naval ratio of 5–5–3 with the American and British navies" (p. 23), and others.

In Part II it is strikingly evidenced that "Japan is, in a way, a giant (economically) among nations, but . . . an unhappily misshapen one in that her people far outbalance her land and natural resources." The inevitability of manual farming, remarkably high crop yields, economic basis of the political impotence of the peasantry, necessity of birth control, paucity of raw materials, rapidity of industrialization, extent of urbanization, and historical basis of *zaibatzu* power, are treated briefly but with masterly deftness and freshness of view. Perhaps there will be disagreement with the author's statement that "there is no historical connection between modern Japanese factory practices and Japan's feudal past." Indeed he appears to qualify his statement on the same page.

Part III is the most extensive and impressive section of the work. The Japanese are acutely analyzed and their idiosyncrasies explained frankly but considerately; at times subjectively, but always pungently. Included in the complicated, cultural pattern of the Japanese are their homogeneity; inferiority-superiority conflicts; mature nationalism; emotionalism and its expression; religions: "Though Shinto has remained the backbone of Japanese religion, Buddhism has formed most of its flesh and blood for over a thousand years," but it is a different Buddhism, one distilled "over the fires of Chinese Taoism and Japanese nature worship"; conventionalism; guilt-replacing sense of shame; hierarchical social system and deference to authority; and self-discipline. Part III is concluded with a striking explanation of the contrasting effects of Westernization: the growth of centralized government and industry, with attendant susceptibility to militarist manipulation, and the opposing development of enthusiasm for universal education and for social, economic and political liberty.

The author deals gently in Part IV with the administration of the occupation, which he describes rather than evaluates. One reads with some surprise that the Japanese "looked up to [General MacArthur] as the prophet of the future Japan and their own national hero" (p. 225). Dr. Reischauer seems not to question the wisdom of our vast experiment in acculturation, while indicating numerous obstacles to its success. He believes, however, that the time to end the occupation has arrived and that it should be ended completely and without reservations.

HAROLD S. QUIGLEY.

University of Minnesota.

I Was There. BY FLEET ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY. (Whittlesey House: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1950. Pp. 527. $5.00.)

The war memoirs of Fleet Admiral Leahy could not fail to have some importance to political scientists and historians. The man who held the posts of U. S. Ambassador to Vichy France and then of Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman was in much too commanding a position for observation and decision-making to avoid adding something to our knowledge of the politics, strategy, and principal personalities of the Allied Powers during the war years. The wonder is that his book adds so little.

Far the most informative part of the book is the first section, comprising about a fifth of the entire volume, in which the author recounts his experiences as Ambassador to Vichy. Perhaps it is the circumstance that he was the top American on the spot and that he had numerous conferences and conversations with leading Vichy figures unattended by any other American which inspires him to a perspicacity and reportorial competence not observable in other parts of the book. At any rate, many readers will wish to confine themselves to this section alone. And they will indeed find much to admire in the way Admiral Leahy accomplished his most difficult mission. They will discover, not only from his comments after the event but also from his quoted dispatches to President Roosevelt, that he was under no illusions about the character, power, and reliability of persons like Pétain, Darlan, Laval, and Weygand. They may even conclude from what this book contributes to their existing knowledge that our Vichy policy during the war was on the whole a sound one and achieved notably useful results, for which the Admiral who played such a critical part in it deserves a large measure of credit.

For the rest, however, one can only wonder how a man who conferred with Roosevelt almost every morning of the latter's last three years of life, who attended him—and Truman—on all but one of the major Allied conferences of the war (he started for Casablanca but had to stay at Trinidad because of illness), who presided over the meetings of both the Joint Chiefs and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who was the one through whom so many exalted persons, including cabinet members, tried to reach the President and to whom they brought their troubles—in short, how a man who saw so much should be able to tell us so little. It is not that the book is too short for the author's objective, because much of what he does say is either totally unimportant or well known to us from other sources.

At the first Quebec Conference, for example, he notices the British ladies curtsying to the Earl of Athlone, which he considers odd since the Earl is not royalty (as Governor General he *was* the personal representative of the King), and he describes a visit to the Plains of Abraham and various other tours of the area. But about the Conference itself he says rather little more than that the "Combined Chiefs, finally, after many compromises between the British and American points of view, brought the discussions at Quebec to a satisfactory conclusion," that conclusion being the decision to launch the Normandy invasion in May, 1944. The substance of the discussions themselves can only be guessed at.

In fairness it must be said that certain other events, including the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, are reported more adequately. Perhaps the Admiral developed as he went along the habit of taking more copious notes; or possibly he was persuaded that the circumstances of the war's end would be more relevant to the present than earlier events. Also there is an occasional telling revelation, as for example that in October, 1944, Stalin advocated an advance of the western Allies *through Switzerland* to get in the rear of the Siegfried Line.

Admiral Leahy discloses himself as a person of monumental prejudices conforming to a pattern which is almost too pat. Let anyone evoke in his mind the stereotype of the old-line senior naval officer who knows some French and who has been around, and he has pictured the apparent mentality of Admiral Leahy. The latter is pro-Navy, anti-British, extremely conservative, and distrustful of all but the "right" people. He also has a blunt and stubborn integrity, so that he will sometimes acknowledge that the Navy position advocated by Admiral King on the Joint Chiefs was wrong and that the others, despite the fact that they never seemed to understand sea power, were right. Also, he goes out of his way to admit that he had no confidence in the success of the atomic bomb project. He is naive in a manner which causes him several times to express pleasant surprise at the results of a first meeting with someone against whom he had previously been violently prejudiced.

There are some interesting asides on personalities. About Admiral King we learn that "the plain-spoken Admiral did not hide his irritation at some of the tactics of our British ally" (for "our British ally" in Leahy always read "perfidious Albion"), and that Admiral Sir Percy Noble had to complain personally and confidentially to Leahy that he was not getting " 'courteous cooperation' from the American Admiral." We are told something more of Cordell Hull's hypersensitivity to press criticism and of his bitter personal vendettas. And we see displayed again the Hull-Leahy-Roosevelt (in descending order of intensity) hatred of de Gaulle. Conceding that de Gaulle was unquestionably a difficult and arrogant person, one must nevertheless wonder how the American leaders, unlike Churchill, failed completely to recognize that the General represented something to which the United States Government should have been friendly, or at least other than hostile.

The book leaves us with a certain sense of mystery about Leahy—the mystery of why Roosevelt chose him for the post he occupied and made him the top ranking officer of our great wartime military establishment. Does Leahy have talents which do not appear in the book, or is it simply that Roosevelt preferred his Chief of Staff to be a man of character and especially of loyalty rather than of intellectual acumen?

BERNARD BRODIE.

Yale University.

Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. BY EDWARD O. GUERRANT. (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press. 1950. Pp. x, 235. $3.50.)

Professor Guerrant's book is interesting and important, but in some ways disappointing. While he has packed a lot of information about the diplomatic, legislative and administrative aspects of this subject into his 213 pages of text, he omits a good many things one would expect to find and doesn't help the reader enough with explanations or challenge him enough with interpretations.

With one exception, the titles of the seven chapters indicate clearly enough the subjects discussed in them. The titles are, in the order named, "Abandonment of Intervention," "Recognition of New Governments," "Quest for Law," "Expanding Commerce," "Cultural and Scientific Relations," "Preparing for the Storm, 1939 to 1941," and "The Americas at War, 1941–1945." The first five chapters are organized topically, the last two chronologically. As the author recognizes, the plan involves some repetition, but any other plan would have presented difficulties of its own. On the whole he has done this part of his job well. Chapter V, "Cultural and Scientific Relations," struck me as particularly good, though further clarification of the relations between the State Department and the CIAA in this respect is needed (cf. pp. 121 and 125).

The one title that does not fit the contents of the chapter, "The Quest for Law," illustrates a weakness of the book. Actually, the author has also crowded into this chapter a very different topic, the beginning of Pan American hemisphere defense. As a result he has obscured the great importance of this novel development. What is more, he does not discuss the criticism of the whole "Western Hemisphere" idea which this development provoked in the United States, not from pacifists or isolationists, but from interventionists and globalists. The text is likewise silent or inconclusive on other questions that call for explanation or interpretation, such as whether the Good Neighbor policy really was Roosevelt's, as the title of the book implies; if so, why its eclipse began at least two or three years before his death; and how its development was affected after 1941 by United States policy in regard to the Soviet Union and the establishment of the United Nations.

The omissions seem numerous, particularly if the author's major purpose was to write an informational book, not an interpretative one. For example, there is no account of Sumner Welles' resignation; no mention of several men who played an important part in the development of the Good Neighbor policy, such as Henry Wallace, Laurence Duggan, and the Latin Americans, Oswaldo Aranha and Ezequiel Padilla; and no systematic statement of the reasons why the author thinks, as stated in his concluding sentence, that the "cooperation of the Latin American nations is absolutely essential now in view of the ever-widening gulf separating the United States and the Soviet Union."

Since Professor Guerrant obviously knows a great deal more than he has told, and has some interesting ideas, it is to be hoped that he will overcome his reticence and give us a revised and enlarged edition of this book with a much more generous portion of both fact and opinion than he has offered us in this one.

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER.

University of Pennsylvania.

BOOK NOTES, NOTICES AND ARTICLES

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Roosevelt in Retrospect; A Profile in History. By John Gunther. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1950. Pp. xii, 410. $3.75.)

John Gunther has brought together many pieces of the Roosevelt story, both from published and unpublished documents and from the personal reminiscences of those who knew FDR. Rich in anecdote, the book provides a great many clues to the understanding of Franklin Roosevelt. It makes conveniently available widely scattered materials about Roosevelt and adds some new facts to the story. But the volume quite naturally lacks the authority of exhaustive scholarship and the insight of reflective personal experience. Somewhat awkwardly Gunther sets out to relate Roosevelt to four of his contemporaries. That FDR and his cousin Theodore had similarities and differences seems obvious. Comparison and contrast of the thirty-first president with Wilson, Churchill, and Hitler likewise adds little to our understanding. These men no doubt influenced Roosevelt in attitude and action. Some of them affected him more than others. But to use these commonplaces to introduce a study of Roosevelt suggests that Gunther carried his preliminary work from his notes to the printed page. With greater skill he deals next with a number of facets of FDR's personality. Most striking are those materials describing Roosevelt's way of work. But throughout these chapters this reviewer had the feeling that Gunther was not quite comfortable with his pattern of reporting. Irksome, for example, are his repeated promises that this or that major item will receive further discussion later in the book. The last two-thirds of the book offers a brief chronological account of the major events of Roosevelt's life. Here the author seems sure of himself and moves smoothly and persuasively through his story. Those who lived through the years of Roosevelt's presidency will find that Gunther has reconstructed with objective sympathy the period of depression, New Deal, and war. Through anecdote and apt quotation the force of Roosevelt stands out in shaping a revolution in America. The story in these chapters is so compelling that one wonders why Gunther has to tell us that the professional Roosevelt-haters were wrong. The record can speak for itself and through Gunther's account it does.—Egbert S. Wengert, *University of Oregon.*

The Gilmer-Aikin Bills; A Study in the Legislative Process. By Rae Files Still. (Austin, Texas: The Steck Company. 1950. Pp. x, 198. $2.50.)

In political science, as in other social sciences, increasing emphasis is being placed on the value of detailed studies of individual cases. Mrs. Still's little book is a very revealing case study of the legislative process. It is a fascinating tale, with many of the attractions of good fiction: a cast of characters, contending forces, increasing tension building up to a definite climax. The heroes win out in the long run, after several narrow escapes. The story is written in simple and straightforward style; much of the subtlety and finesse involved in the political and legislative art is implied rather than spelled out. There are tantalizing glimpses of behind-the-scenes forces that are not fully described. There are, however, enough accounts of strategy sessions, purposeful maneuvers, and political trading to give a great deal of life to the legislative rulebook. The story is particularly illustrative of the intricate factionalism of a one-party legislature, where yesterday's allies are tomorrow's enemies. The book deals with the life history of three important measures concerning public education in the Texas Legislature, but the case study will be valuable wherever the American legislative process is studied.—York Willbern, *University of Alabama.*

State-City Relationships in Highway Affairs. By Norman Hebden and Wilbur S. Smith. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1950. Pp. xvi, 230. $4.00.)

Highways in Our National Life; A Symposium. Edited by Jean Labatut and Wheaton J. Lane. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1950. Pp. xvi, 506. $7.50.)

Highway planning studies conducted by the Public Roads Administration in the 'thirties disclosed that half of all miles of motor travel in the nation is on city streets, and that four of every five vehicles on all roads are headed for a city or coming from one, and that the traffic peak is reached in the downtown area of cities to the extent of six times that at the outskirts. Before the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944, state highway departments regarded their operations as extending only to city limits. This legislation not only altered the philosophy behind federal aid by earmarking part of the grant for "urban areas," but greatly modified the state highway department's position. This action placed the finger upon a crucial weakness of the whole public highway policy. Norman Hebden, Research Associate in Transportation at Yale University, and Wilbur S. Smith, Associate Director of the Yale Bureau of Highway Traffic, in *State-City Relationships in Highway Affairs* are concerned with the problem of adjustment to the newer philosophy of inclusion of city streets as a state responsibility. Their study is largely devoted to analysis of the extent to which state highway departments in twelve geographically well-distributed states may and do assume responsibility over city streets, the value and limitation of that control and the possibility of improved state-city relationships. As a description of practices the study has much merit. However, the recommendations seem inadequate for such an extended study of an important problem. The authors would have benefited by reading certain chapters in *Highways in Our National Life*, a symposium projected by the Bureau of Urban Research of Princeton University and edited by Jean Labatut and Wheaton J. Lane. Although this omnibus volume on highways contains little of interest to political scientists, a few chapters need to be read carefully by those who wish to be up-to-date in matters of state-local relations. Especially recommended are: Sir Alker Tripp's chapter, "The History of the Modern Highway in England: An Example Showing the Permanence of Right of Way"; Professor

Shorey Peterson on "The Highway from the Point of View of the Economist"; "History of the Modern Highway in the United States," by Spencer Miller, Jr.; and G. Donald Kennedy's "The Planning of the Highway." The chapters by Wheaton J. Lane, Sigvald Johannesson, Charles Ross, and David Levin offer rich rewards to those who will take time to read them.—LASHLEY G. HARVEY, *Boston University.*

The Licensing of Radio Services in the United States, 1927 to 1947; A Study in Administrative Formulation of Policy. BY MURRAY EDELMAN. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1950. Pp. xi, 229. $3.00 cloth, $2.00 paper.)

Edelman's objective is the substantive, rather than the procedural and political aspects of governmental regulation of the radio industry. In fact, this book is almost a manual of substantive regulation. Accordingly, such subjects as administrative procedure, congressional-administrative relations, and FCC-industry conflicts are given little attention. The complexity of the regulatory job is shown by the great variety of governmental activities. As well as public broadcasting—AM, FM, TV, Facsimile, and International—the author has included point-to-point services, such as common carrier stations, protection of safety of life and property, and use of radio by industry and the sciences. Engineering standards—for example, allocation of spectrum space to the various services, distribution of stations over the country, and control of interference—are given considerable attention. Excursions of the FCC into the programming standards of the broadcasters and into the difficulties of competition versus monopoly are sketched. For the most part, the allocation of space to the many problems of regulation is well proportioned. The research job is excellent. Edelman knows the sources and has used them well. Strong reliance on official, governmental material—much of it known only to the specialist in this subject—gives the book a note of authority.—ELMER E. SMEAD, *Dartmouth College.*

Radio, Television and Society. BY CHARLES A. SIEPMANN. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1950. Pp. vii, 410. $4.75.)

Siepmann is primarily concerned with an alleged failure of the broadcasting industry to provide a satisfactory public service. (This is an old accusation, made by many critics over the years, and one which has been repeatedly and emphatically denied by the radio people. The difference between the two sides is one of interpretation of "public interest.") His notion is that radio's capacity to serve democracy can be achieved by making listeners more aware of the political, economic and social world in which they live and not by emphasizing entertainment which gives them an escape from that world. Fair discussion of different points of view is vital. Failure to provide satisfactory public service is due to the "system." The necessity for a broadcasting station to produce revenue by sale of time to advertisers causes, or "invites," a de-emphasis on public service. Although the FCC has the statutory duty to see that the industry operates in the public interest, and although listeners would become better citizens if they were given more such service, both have failed to exercise the coercions at hand. In the search for solutions, Siepmann has admitted difficulties. Although FM and TV provide new and better opportunities, they are treading the old path. Also, the answer is not to be found in the British or Canadian system. (The author has been accused by some radio people of wanting the adoption of the BBC scheme in this country.) On the positive side, an agency to make content analyses of programs would give publicity to existing shortcomings, thus precipitating corrective controls. A new national network, subsidized by the government, would provide more of the needed cultural and informational service. In other words, the accusations roar but the remedies whisper.—ELMER E. SMEAD, *Dartmouth College.*

The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy. BY IRVING BERNSTEIN. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1950. Pp. xiii, 178. $3.00.)

This monograph is a specialized study of national collective bargaining policy from 1933 to 1935. Mr. Bernstein finds four principles in this policy: (1) that employees have the right to organize and to choose representatives to bargain for them; (2) that employers may not interfere with these rights; (3) that by secret ballot a majority of the employees may choose representatives to bargain for all the employees; and (4) that the employer must deal with his employees' representatives. The work analyzes the political, economic, and social factors that led to the formalization and formulation of the early New Deal labor acts; it does not directly explore their administration. The ably demonstrated thesis is that the collective bargaining policy of 1933–35 was a product of the times and not an integral part of the "first New Deal," which Bernstein recognizes as "recovery rather than reform." Indeed, until the Supreme Court overthrew the NRA, President Roosevelt and, for the most part, Secretary Perkins were uninterested in legislation to protect collective bargaining. After the *Schechter* case, Roosevelt actively supported Senator Wagner's bill. This is an excellent study of the development of public policy. The author investigates not only the formal process of legislative enactment, but also the personal influences and the informal forces behind the formal adoption. Of necessity the study is detailed and thus pays the price of any monograph. It is not recommended for beginning students, since a full appreciation depends upon administrative and judicial interpretations subsequent to the period covered by the study. Teachers of the conventional government and business course will find it most useful.—ALLAN R. RICHARDS, *University of Tennessee.*

Government and Business. BY VERNON A. MUND. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1950. Pp. x, 659. $4.75.)

The outstanding characteristic of this volume is the organization of the subject matter around the central theme of competition and the exemptions therefrom. After six chapters with introductory materials, Professor Mund opens up on the significance of competition as a means of promoting the general welfare. Seventeen chapters later he has completed his survey of that policy. The remaining chapters are devoted to brief commentaries on public utilities, public ownership, labor, level of economic activity, natural resources and "optimum adjustment of government to business." The materials included are accurate, well organized, clearly presented, and include all the recent developments. The organization is designed to emphasize the importance of competition as a principle in the public policies applied in the various fields of regulation. The author has a confidence in competition that has all but disappeared in academic circles, as Corwin Edwards points out in his introductory sentences. If Professor Mund has a Utopia, it is the competitive economy. One consequence of that emphasis has been to lessen the attention paid to other regulatory principles so that the overall impact of the volume may leave an impression of the relative unimportance of the additional principles of regulation. It is an excellent book within its frame of organization.—CHARLES B. HAGAN, *University of Illinois.*

The American System of Government. BY JOHN H. FERGUSON AND DEAN E. MCHENRY. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1950. Pp. xii, 1042. $5.00.)

Second edition of one of the more prominent college textbooks dealing with national, state, and local government. Sections on the national government are also published separately as *The American Federal Government* (1950). An abridgement of this full-length text is available under the title *Elements of American Government* (1950).

Readings in American National and State Government. EDITED BY DAVID FELLMAN, LANE W. LANCASTER AND A. C. BRECKENRIDGE. (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc. 1950. Pp. xi, 399; ix, 347. $2.40.)

A combination volume, containing the second edition of Professor Fellman's *Readings in American National Government*, first published in 1947, and a new collection —*Readings in American State Government*—by Professors Lancaster and Breckenridge.

American Government; Basic Documents and Materials. BY ROBERT G. DIXON AND ELMER PLISCHKE. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1950. Pp. xx, 420. $2.90.)

A collection of some 450 items stressing the processes of government, chiefly the national government. Edited by two University of Maryland political scientists, this collection is marked by its emphasis on facsimile reproduction of documents.

American Constitutional Decisions. BY CHARLES FAIRMAN. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1950. Pp. xiv, 489. $2.75.)

Second edition of casebook first published in 1948. Some changes have been made in the Introduction and notes, and two new cases—*United States v. Pink* and *Sweatt v. Painter*—have been added.

An Introduction to Administrative Law with Selected Cases. BY JAMES HART. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1950. Pp. xxviii, 819. $7.00.)

Second and revised edition of casebook and commentary first published in 1940.

Public Personnel Administration. BY WILLIAM E. MOSHER, J. DONALD KINGSLEY AND O. GLENN STAHL. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1950. Pp. xi, 652. $5.00.)

Third edition, substantially revising the 1936 and 1941 editions by the late William E. Mosher and Kingsley. The latter, now Director of the International Refugee Organization, collaborated with Dr. Stahl, Director of Personnel, Federal Security Administration, in the revision. A comprehensive coverage of public personnel practices, supplemented by a twenty-two page annotated bibliography.

The Mid-Term Battle. By Louis H. Bean. (Washington, D. C.: Cantillon Books. 1950. Pp. vi, 98. Paper, $1.00; cloth, $2.50.)

Analysis of election trends by a well-known statistician in the Department of Agriculture, with emphasis on congressional data in thirteen important states. Predictions, written before military incidents in Korea, are cautiously made but indicate continued Democratic control of both Houses of Congress after the elections of 1950. Tables and charts are numerous.

The Municipal Year Book 1950; The Authoritative Résumé of Activities and Statistical Data of American Cities. Edited by Clarence E. Ridley, Orin F. Nolting and Frederick C. Peitzsch. (Chicago: International City Managers' Association. 1950. Pp. x, 598. $10.00.)

The standard volume, now in its seventeenth year. Most old features are retained and brought up to date. There are new sections on health organization, police patrol cars, and garbage disposal.

Transit Modernization and Street Traffic Control; A Program of Municipal Responsibility. By John Bauer and Peter Costello. (Chicago: Public Administration Service. 1950. Pp. xiii, 271. $5.00.)

A comprehensive treatment of the twin problems of mass transportation systems and congested street traffic. The general thesis favors mass transportation as against private automobiles.

Scientific Research; Its Administration and Organization. Edited by George P. Bush and Lowell H. Hattery. (Washington, D. C.: American University Press. 1950. Pp. viii, 190. $3.25.)

Proceedings of a week long institute held at American University dealing with problems of organization and administration in governmental scientific research.

The Initiative and Referendum in California. By Winston W. Crouch. (Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation. 1950. Pp. iv, 56. Paper. $.50.)

Analysis by political scientist at the University of California, Los Angeles. Tables and bibliographies are appended.

Administration of Old Age Security in California. By Margaret Greenfield. (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Administration, University of California. 1950. Pp. iv, 92. $1.25.)

Mimeographed study of procedures under the recently-restored county administration of old age and needy blind programs.

County Finances in Mississippi. By Gordon K. Bryan. (Mississippi State College: Social Science Research Center. 1950. Pp. iv, 65.)

Mimeographed study prepared by a political scientist at Mississippi State College and based on the author's doctoral dissertation at the University of California, Los Angeles. Assessment, tax collection, budgeting, and borrowing are included.

Power and Politics; The Price of Security in the Atomic Age. By Hanson W. Baldwin with preface by David P. Barrows. (Claremont: Claremont College. 1950. Pp. xv, 117. $2.75.)

Three lectures by the Military Editor of the *New York Times* delivered in April, 1950, under the joint auspices of four associated colleges in California. The lectures are entitled "The Political Problem," "The Military Problem," and "The Hard Road—the Middle Way."

History of United States Naval Aviation. By Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1949. Pp. xii, 345. $5.00.)

A well-organized, well-written brief account of the subject. The authors, both naval reserve officers who have been associated with official naval historical enterprises, are consistently sympathetic with the "Navy viewpoint," but the usefulness and scholarly integrity of the work do not appreciably suffer thereby.

The American Century. By Ralph E. Flanders. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1950. Pp. 101. $2.50.)

The Godkin Lectures for 1949, by the junior United States Senator from Vermont who is also a mechanical engineer and industrialist. A middle-of-the-road domestic and foreign program is advocated.

Trade and Agriculture; A Study of Inconsistent Policies. By D. Gale Johnson. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1950. Pp. vii, 198. $2.50.)

The objective of this study, by a University of Chicago economist, is "to indicate how two extremely important areas of national economic policy might be made part of a consistent whole."

Taxes and Economic Incentives. By Lewis H. Kimmel. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 1950. Pp. x, 217. $2.50.)

Brookings study, supported by the Falk Foundation, of the economic effects of various types of taxes. Taxpayers' reactions obtained in part through questionnaire are emphasized.

Ordeal by Slander. By Owen Lattimore. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1950. Pp. viii, 236. $2.75.)

An account of the author's experiences after he was accused by Senator McCarthy of being a Russian spy.

ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS

J. ALTON BURDINE AND EMMETTE S. REDFORD

University of Texas

ARTICLES

National Government

Congressional Wiretapping Policy Overdue. *Stanford Law Review.* July, 1950.

Latham, Earl. The Politics of Basing Point Legislation. *Law and Contemporary Problems.* Spring, 1950.

Sparkman, John. Legislative History and the Interpretation of Laws. *Alabama Law Review.* Spring, 1950.

State Government

Action by the Legislatures—1950. *State Government.* July, 1950.

Akers, Dee Ashley. The Advisory Opinion Function of the Attorney General. *Kentucky Law Journal.* May, 1950.

Banay, Ralph S.; Mumford, Gilbert H. F.; Neumeyer, Martin H.; Van Waters, Miriam. A Symposium on Juvenile Delinquency. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Spring, 1950.

Basic Water Use Doctrines and State Water Control Agencies. *American Waterworks Association Journal.* August, 1950.

California's New Lobby Control Act. *California Law Review.* August, 1950.

Driscoll, Katharine. Massachusetts Declaratory Judgment Law. *Boston University Law Review.* April, 1950.

Fairchild, Thomas E., and Seibold, Charles P. Constitutional Revision in Wisconsin. *Wisconsin Law Review.* March, 1950.

Governors' Conference, 1950. *State Government.* August, 1950.

Highway Safety—Motor Truck Regulation: Summary and Recommendations. *State Government.* July, 1950.

Kammerer, Gladys M. Legislative Oversight of Administration in Kentucky. *Public Administration Review.* Summer, 1950.

Kinevan, Marcos E. Alaska and Hawaii: From Territoriality to Statehood. *California Law Review.* June, 1950.

Miller, Harold V. State Planning and Development—Tennessee Style. *State Government.* July, 1950.

Northrup, Arthur H. The Indiana Gross Income Tax. *Indiana Law Journal.* Winter, 1950.

Paulsen, Monrad G. "Natural Rights"—A Constitutional Doctrine in Indiana. *Indiana Law Journal.* Winter, 1950.

Reinemann, John Otto. Fifty Years of the Juvenile Court Movement in the United States. *Mental Hygiene.* July, 1950.

Reynard, Charles A. Louisiana Homestead Tax Exemption—An Unlitigated Constitutional Provision. *Louisiana Law Review.* May, 1950.

Schreiber, Arthur C. A New Plan for Recall of Judges. *Journal of the American Judicature Society.* June, 1950.

State Reorganization Studies. *State Government.* September, 1950.

The Mental Health Programs of the Forty-Eight States: Summary and Recommendations. *State Government.* July, 1950.

The Parole System in Illinois. *Illinois Law Review.* May–June, 1950.

Vance, Zue. Divorce in Louisiana: Grounds and Defenses. *Tulane Law Review.* June, 1950.

Weihofen, Henry. Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases. *Michigan Law Review.* May, 1950.

Local Government

Bollens, John C. City Annexation Programs and Policies. *Public Management.* April, 1950.

Rosenberg, Herbert N., and Moritz, Donald I. Annexation by Units of Local Government—The Pennsylvania Problem. *University of Pittsburgh Law Review.* Spring, 1950.

Scott, Stanley, and Bollens, John C. Special Districts in California Local Government. *Western Political Quarterly.* June, 1950.

Ward, John F. Requirements for Filing Claims Against Governmental Units in California. *California Law Review.* June, 1950.

Intergovernmental Relations

Corbin, Arthur Linton. The Uniform Commercial Code—Sales; Should It Be Enacted? *Yale Law Journal.* April, 1950.

Hess, Seth G. Interstate Action to Control Pollution. *State Government.* September, 1950.

Interstate Arbitration of Death Taxes. *Boston University Law Review.* June, 1950.

Constitutional Law

Antieau, Chester James. The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability. *Michigan Law Review.* April, 1950.

Baer, Herbert R. The Aftermath of Williams vs. North Carolina. *North Carolina Law Review.* April, 1950.

Brown, Robert C. State Taxation of Interstate Commerce—What Now? *Michigan Law Review.* May, 1950.

Frantz, Laurent B. Peaceful Picketing for Unlawful Objective. *North Carolina Law Review.* April, 1950.

Graham, Howard Jay. The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Wisconsin Law Review.* May and July, 1950.

Horowitz, Harold W., and Steinberg, Lawrence W. The Fourteenth Amendment—Its Newly Recognized Impact on the "Scope" of Habeas Corpus in Extradition. *Southern California Law Review.* July, 1950.

Lowry, Walker. The Supreme Court in 1848 and 1948: A Review of Two Terms. *Southern California Law Review.* July, 1950.

McLaughlin, Delbert. The Migratory Divorce. *Kentucky Law Journal.* May, 1950.

Scott, Austin W., Jr. Federal Restrictions on Evidence in State Criminal Cases. *Minnesota Law Review.* May, 1950.

Sex, Discrimination and the Constitution. *Stanford Law Review.* July, 1950.

Public Administration and Administrative Law

Forsythe, *Lt. Col.* George I. Personnel Management in the Army and in Business *Military Review.* June, 1950.

Gaus, John M. Trends in the Theory of Public Administration. *Public Administration Review.* Summer, 1950.

Guetzkow, Harold. Interagency Committee Usage. *Public Administration Review.* Summer, 1950.

Heller, Francis H. Justice, Jury Trials, and Government Service. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Summer, 1950.

Kriesberg, Martin, and Guetzkow, Harold. The Use of Conferences in the Administrative Process. *Public Administration Review.* Spring, 1950.

MacNamara, Donal E. J. American Police Administration at Mid-Century. *Public Administration Review.* Summer, 1950.

Parsons, William W. Installing Management Improvement in the United States Treasury Department. *Public Administration Review.* Summer, 1950.

Schwartz, Bernard. The Administrative World of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. *Yale Law Journal.* June, 1950.

Warburton, Clark. Co-ordination of Monetary, Bank Supervisory, and Loan Agencies of the Federal Government. *Journal of Finance.* June, 1950.

Political Parties and Elections

Feldman, Justin N. How Tammany Holds Power. *National Municipal Review.* July, 1950.

Saye, Albert B. The County Unit Vote. *Georgia Law Review.* Spring, 1950.

Economic Affairs

National Economy

Cole, William E. The Impact of TVA Upon the Southeast. *Social Forces.* May, 1950.

George, Edwin B. and Landry, Robert J. The Problem of Controlling Resource Flows in Wartime. *American Economic Review,* June, 1950.

Goodman, Robert Israel. Music Copyright Associations and the Antitrust Laws. *Indiana Law Journal.* Winter, 1950.

Kramer, Victor H. Interlocking Directorships and the Clayton Act after 35 Years. *Yale Law Journal.* June, 1950.

McLaren, Richard W. Related Problems of "Requirements" Contracts and Acquisitions in Vertical Integration Under the Anti-Trust Laws. *Illinois Law Review.* May–June, 1950.

Riesenfeld, Stefan A., and Eastlund, Warren. Public Aid to Housing and Land Redevelopment. *Minnesota Law Review.* June, 1950.

Section 11(b) of the Holding Company Act: Fifteen Years in Retrospect. *Yale Law Journal.* May, 1950.

Slichter, Sumner H. How Stable Is the American Economy? *Yale Review.* Summer, 1950.

Smith, McLellan. REA Enters a New Phase. *Public Utilities Fortnightly.* August 17, 1950.

The British Monopolies Act of 1948: A Contrast With American Policy and Practice. *Yale Law Journal.* April, 1950.

Labor

Carlton, Frank T. Management, Labor, and Government. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology.* July, 1950.

Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949. *Minnesota Law Review.* June, 1950.

Fifty Years' Progress of American Labor. Symposium. *Monthly Labor Review.* July, 1950.

Mahan, Charles E. Government by Injunction. *West Virginia Law Review.* June, 1950.

Mellor, Michael L. Fair Employment Practices: Legislation: Trends and Proposals. *California Law Review.* August, 1950.

Perlman, Jack M. The Little Norris-La Guardia Act and the New York Courts. *New York University Law Review.* April, 1950.

Rathbun, Benjamin, Jr. The Taft-Hartley Act and Craft Unit Bargaining. *Yale Law Journal.* May, 1950.

Civil Liberties

Berger, Morroe. The New York State Law Against Discrimination: Operations and Administration. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Summer, 1950.

Dayton, Douglas E. "The Little Red Schoolhouse" and the Communist: New York State Struggles with the Problem of Educating for a Free Society. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Summer, 1950.

Libel Actions by Political Organizations: Freedom from Smear vs. Freedom to Criticize. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review.* May, 1950.

School Boards, Schoolbooks, and the Freedom to Learn. *Yale Law Journal.* April, 1950.

Smith, Philip R. Discrimination v. The Rule of Law—Massachusetts Fair Educational Practices Act. *Boston University Law Review.* April, 1950.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Community Policy. Hearing. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. April 18, 1950.

Congress. House. Committee on Banking and Currency. Defense Production Act of 1950. Hearings. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. 1950.

Congress. House. Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Budgeting and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. Hearing. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. 1950.

Congress. House. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Railway Labor Act Amendments. Hearings. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. 1950.

Congress. House. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. To Provide a Recruitment Procedure for the Competitive Civil Service. Hearing. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. July 1, 1950.

Congress. House. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Post Office Department Financial Control Act of 1950. Hearings. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. June 26, 1950.

Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking and Currency. Defense Production Act of 1950. Hearings. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. 1950.

Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking and Currency. Study of Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Hearings before a subcommittee. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. May 8 and 9, 1950.

Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation. Hearings before a subcommittee. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. 1950.

Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Statehood for Hawaii. Report together with the Minority views. 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Report No. 1928. June 29, 1950.

Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Providing for the Admission of Alaska into the Union. Report together with the Minority views. 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Report No. 1929. June 29, 1950.

Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Alaska Statehood. Hearings. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. 1950.

Congress. Senate. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Transmission of Gambling Information. 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Report No. 1752. 1950.

Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. State Veterans' Laws. Rev. to Jan. 1, 1950. Committee on Veterans' Affairs, House of Representatives, 81st Cong. June 2, 1950.

President. The Mid-Year Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress July, 1950, together with a Report to the President on the Economic Situation at Midyear, 1950, by the Council of Economic Advisers. 1950.

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

A Primer of Public Administration. BY S. E. FINER. (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd. 1950. Pp. 160. 6s.)

This is a book which has long been needed. Surprising though it may seem to American scholars, there are few books by Englishmen on public administration. A picture of British administration can be pieced together from studies of the civil service, the cabinet, local government, and administrative tribunals. It is a pleasure to find the general aspects of British public administration brought between the covers of a single book—and, in the British manner, a small and compact book. It is of modest size because much factual substance and perceptive analysis has been compressed into narrow limits. A short chapter (pp. 26–33) suffices to explain the cabinet system, including a brief comment on cabinet dictatorship. The general plan is illuminating: successive sections deal with "The Administrative Revolution," "The Conditions of Administrative Organization" (in terms of function and space), "Personnel," and "Public Accountability." Details are selected carefully, and subjected to critical comment. Professor Finer calls his book a "Primer," and it justifies the title by clarity and simplicity. A few instances show that it outruns its title: the cabinet secretariat is described and acutely analyzed (pp. 50–52); the limits on Treasury control are intelligently discussed (pp. 62–64); the informal aspects of interdepartmental cooperation are described with assurance (pp.

68–69); regional organization of administration is carefully explained (pp. 78–82); boundary and jurisdiction problems in local government are treated in the light of the most recent information (pp. 93–101). The footnotes and the brief bibliographical note (pp. 159–60) cite most government publications and recent books of importance. Naturally, so brief a book is forced to make omissions. The Central Office of Information, and the analogous public relations activities of local governments, are ignored, to cite one prominent instance. Finally, though the table of contents is a general guide, the book's usefulness is a little impaired by the lack of an index. The brevity and directness of this "Primer" make it a valuable addition to the list of required readings in courses dealing with comparative and English government; and its critical acuteness deserves the close attention of scholars.—PHILIP W. BUCK, *Stanford University.*

The Progressive Party in Canada. BY W. L. MORTON. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1950. Pp. xiii, 331. $4.75.)

The Winnipeg General Strike. BY D. C. MASTERS. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1950. Pp. xv, 159. $3.50.)

These are the first publications in a series of studies organized by the Canadian Social Science Research Council, with the general objective of investigating the Social Credit movement in Alberta. From this program of study by scholars of many fields is emerging an analysis of what might be called the "spirit of revolt" in Western Canada. Most Canadian revolts, such as the Rebellion of 1837, have been unsuccessful in their immediate objectives. There has therefore developed a picture of a Canada contentedly conservative and free of internal conflicts, puzzling to outside observers in a world rocked by revolutions and social conflicts. Canada has in fact had her share of revolts, native-led and the product of indigenous forces, sometimes causing, in spite of their apparent failure, eventual reform of the conditions creating the movement of protest. Two such revolts are here described in books that are of great importance, not only to students of Canadian history and politics, but to students of third parties, western agrarianism and trade unionism in North America. *The Progressive Party in Canada* describes the western agrarian protest after the first world war against the dominance of eastern interests in the economic policy and the political practices of Canada. *The Winnipeg General Strike* describes the celebrated episode in 1920 expressive of the revolt of urban industrial workers. Both revolts contributed mightily to the later rebirth of Canadian radicalism in the depression in the well-known movements of democratic socialism (the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation) and of monetary reform (Social Credit), thus creating a definite tradition of radical protest. The two studies present a view of Canadian history by members of a younger school of Canadian historians, sensitive to the economic and social conflicts within Canadian society and curious as to the relationship between these and the political processes and economic policies of modern Canada. Sectional strains and class conflicts receive the study they deserve and a more realistic interpretation of Canadian historical development results.—H. GORDON SKILLING, *Dartmouth College.*

Constitutions of Nations. Vol. I, Afghanistan to England; Vol. II, France to Poland; Vol. III, Portugal to Yugoslavia. By Amos J. Peaslee. (Concord, N. H.: The Rumford Press. 1950. Pp. xxiv, 807; ix, 823; vii, 839. $22.50 per set.)

Documentary material for the study of comparative government and constitutional law is notably increased by the publication of this ambitious compilation of current constitutions. Mr. Peaslee's editorial task must have been enormous; the collection of documents dealing with 83 states would in itself have been an arduous undertaking, but the material is supplemented by summaries, extensive bibliographies, the draft constitutions of West and East Germany, India, and Israel (not completed at the time of publication), notes on the Baltic states and Indonesia, comparative tables, coats-of-arms, etc. In some instances (Great Britain and the Vatican City, for example) the problem necessitated selection of pertinent constitutional documents in the absence of any single written constitution. The multiplication of new states in recent years has correspondingly multiplied the difficulty of getting access to the important basic documents; difficulties of translation add to the dilemma confronting the student. Though any such collection must in part necessarily quickly get out of date, students will long remain in debt to Mr. Peaslee for his service in preparing this compilation.—Russell H. Fitzgibbon, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Scandinavia; Between East and West. Edited by Henning Friis. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1950. Pp. xi, 388. $4.50.)

What degree of planned and managed economy can a people have and still retain political liberty for the individual? The thesis of *Scandinavia; Between East and West* is that it is not only possible but probably necessary to combine political and economic democracy, if democracy is to survive in the conflict between East and West. With their deep-rooted sense of democratic values, the Scandinavian peoples have energetically tackled some of the most acute social problems of our time and achieved results which have been widely acclaimed. As social reformers the Scandinavians recognize that socialization always involves a certain amount of danger to democratic institutions. Contrary to the intention of the people, the process of democratization may get out of hand; a point of no return may become inevitable if social security is allowed to suppress individual opportunity and government intervention to replace private initiative; inadvertently, then, the people may pave the way for totalitarianism, that is, total government responsibility. Of this danger the Scandinavian peoples seem to be more aware than Great Britain, where Labor seems to have become a victim of its past. The ten authors of the present volume apparently do not fear such a development. The book is pleasantly free from the sort of romanticism that meets one in certain eulogistic reports of the so-called "middle way" states. It is direct, honest, informative—occasionally throwing facts and figures at the reader too furiously for comfort. It is earnestly recommended as a notable contribution to our knowledge of Scandinavia, which is altogether too sparse. A true evaluation of the significance of these experiments in democratic collectivization is still to be made.—ÅKE SANDLER. *Los Angeles State College.*

New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere. BY SAMUEL L. SHARP. (Washington, D. C.: Foundation for Foreign Affairs. 1950. Pp. vi, 114. $1.00.)

Commentary and documentary data on satellite states. Texts of the Polish and Hungarian constitutions are provided, and an extensive table compares the constitutions of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. The author is aware that constitutions may have limited application or that, as he quotes and comments, "'constitution and reality coincide,'—no matter what happens."

Soviet Literary Theory and Practice during the First Five-Year Plan 1928–32. BY HARRIET BORLAND. (New York: King's Crown Press. 1950. Pp. xi, 256. $3.50.)

A study, written at Columbia University, of literary propaganda during the period of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers.

A Guide to Japanese Reference and Research Materials in the Field of Political Science. BY ROBERT E. WARD. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1950. Pp. x, 104. $3.00.)

Selected Japanese titles of books and articles followed by English title translations and English commentaries. Locations in selected American libraries are shown by symbols.

Manual of Government Publications; United States and Foreign. BY EVERETT S. BROWN. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1950. Pp. ix, 121. $2.00.)

Reference work for students and laymen by University of Michigan political scientist. Emphasis is placed on American and British governments and on international affairs.

ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS

MARIO EINAUDI

Cornell University

United Kingdom

British Communist Party, The. *British Information Services,* Reference Division. 1950.

British Constitution Since the War. *British Information Services.* August, 1950.

Coatman, John. The Future of the BBC. *Political Quarterly.* July–September, 1950.

Economic Planning in Britain, Short Reading List on. *British Information Services,* Reference Division. August, 1950.

Freedman, L., and Hemingway, G. Nationalisation and the Consumer. *Fabian Research Series.* Number 139. 1950.

Hill, L. C. Local Government in England: Changes and Challenges. *Social Research.* September, 1950.

Jenkin, Thomas P. The British General Election of 1950. *Western Political Quarterly.* June, 1950.

Opie, Redvers. The British Experience with Nationalization. *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science.* May, 1950.

British Commonwealth

Colonial Territories, (1949–50), The. Report to Parliament by Secretary of State for the Colonies. Cmd. 7958.

L'Église et la Question Ouvrière (in Canada). *Documentation Catholique.* May 21 and June 4, 1950.

Old Age Security, Report of Joint Committee on (Canadian Parliament). June 28, 1950.

Prasad, Rajendra. The New Indian Constitution. *Parliamentary Affairs.* Summer, 1950.

Sawyer, Geoffrey, and others. Federalism in Australia. *Australian Institute of Political Science,* Fifteenth Summer School. 1949.

Western Europe

Alatri, Paolo. Le Origini del Fascismo e la Classe Dirigente Italiana. *Belfagor.* March, May, July, 1950.

Armée Française? *Esprit.* May, 1950.

Benaerts, P., and Rives, M. Remarques Statistiques sur le Nombre des Fonctionnaires. *La Revue Administrative.* May–June, 1950.

Berger, Peter. Elections and Parties in Austria. *Journal of Politics.* August, 1950.

Blamont, Emile. Les Conditions du Contrôle Parlementaire. *Revue du Droit Public.* April–June, 1950.

Blum, Léon. Pages Choisies. *La Revue Socialiste.* June–July, 1950.

Bolles, Blair. Switzerland: Oasis of Free Enterprise. *Foreign Policy Report,* Volume 25, Number 17. 1950.

Cassin, René. Recent Reforms in the Government and Administration of France. *Public Administration.* Autumn, 1950.

Charbonnages de France. Rapport de Gestion, 1949. August, 1950.

Cinquantenaire du Sillon, Le. *Chronique Social de France.* March–April, 1950.

Cook, Geoffrey C. De Gaulle and the R. P. F. *Political Science Quarterly.* September, 1950.

Degu, J. Economies et Réformes des Services Publics. *La Revue Administrative.* March–April, 1950.

Delsinne, Leon. The Trade Union Movement in Belgium. *International Labor Review.* May, 1950.

De Vries, Henry P., and Hoeniger, Berthold H. Post-Liberation Nationalisations in France. *Columbia Law Review.* May, 1950.

Duclos, Jacques. L'Unité d'Action pour la Défense du Pain et de la Paix. *Cahiers du Communisme.* September, 1950.

Guradze, Heinz. The Laenderrat: Landmark of German Reconstruction. *Western Political Quarterly.* June, 1950.

Katzenbach, Edward L., Jr. Political Parties and the French Army since the Liberation. *World Politics.* July, 1950.

Meyer, Ernst Wilhelm. Political Science and Economics in Western Germany. Library of Congress. 1950.

Micaud, Charles A. Stresses and Strains in France Today. *Virginia Quarterly Review.* Summer, 1950.

Neumann, Sigmund. Germany: Promise and Perils. *Foreign Policy Association Headline Series.* July–August, 1950.

———. Trends Towards Statism in Western Europe. *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science.* May, 1950.

Le Plan Monnet. *Collection Droit Social,* No. 36. March, 1950.

Sternberger, Dolf. The Social Sciences in Western Germany. Library of Congress. 1950.

Survey of Southern Italian Economy. Associazione per lo Sviluppo dell'Industria nel Mezzogiorno. 1950.

U. S. Office of High Commissioner for Germany. Germany's Parliament in Action: The September 1949 Debate on the Government's Statement of Policy. U. S. Government Printing Office. 1950.

———. Second Quarterly Report on Germany. U. S. Government Printing Office. July, 1950.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Moscow's European Satellites, symposium. *Annals.* September, 1950.

Baykov, Alexander. Agricultural Development in the U.S.S.R. *Bulletins on Soviet Economic Development.* December, 1949.

Bazin, André. Le Cinéma Sovietique et le Mythe de Staline. *Esprit.* August, 1950.

Collins, Henry H. The Constitutions of the 16 Constituent or Union Republics of the U.S.S.R.: A Comparative Analysis. *American Russian Institute.* 1950.

Dexter, Byron. Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy. *Foreign Affairs.* October, 1950.

Henry, David H. Legislative Restrictions on Freedom of Movement in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. U. S. Foreign Service Institute, Monograph Number 5. 1949.

Meissner, Boris. Die Verfassungsentwicklung der Sowjetunion seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, II. *Jahrbuch für Internationales und Ausländisches Oeffentliches Recht.* 1949.

Sharp, Samuel L. New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere. Foundation for Foreign Affairs. 1950.

Asia

Barnett, A. Doak. Profile of Red China. *Foreign Policy Reports,* Volume 25, Number 19.

Barton, *Sir* William. Kashmir and the Minorities Problem in India and Pakistan. *Quarterly Review.* July, 1950.

L'Economie de l'Iran et le Rapport de M. Paul Van Zeeland sur les Finances Iraniennes. *La Documentation Française.* August 5, 1950.

Evolution de l'Economie Indonesienne. *Études et Conjoncture.* March–April, 1950.

Hu Shih. China in Stalin's Grand Strategy. *Foreign Affairs.* October, 1950.

Lindsay, Michael. Notes on Educational Problems in Communist China, 1941–47. Institute of Pacific Relations. 1950.

New Hope for Burma: Politics and Prospects. *World Today.* September, 1950.

Thomas, S. B. Government and Administration in China Today. *Pacific Affairs.* September, 1950.

Latin America

Blasier, S. Cole. Chile: A Communist Battleground. *Political Science Quarterly.* September, 1950.

Masur, Gerhard. Democracy in Eclipse. *Virginia Quarterly Review.* Summer, 1950.

United Nations, Joint ECLA-FAO Working Party. Agricultural Requisites in Latin America. 1950.

United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Latin America. The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems. 1950.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

L'Organisation Européenne de Cooperation Économique; Étude d'Administration Internationale et de Droit des Gens. BY H. T. ADAM. (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 1949. Pp. 292. Ffrs. 750.)

Legal adviser of the constituent conference of the OEEC, Professor Adam of the Institute of Advanced International Studies at the University of Paris presents much more than a monograph about the genesis and function of the OEEC. Predicating his study on the proposition that we have entered "the era of international organizations as a phase of evolution from the national sovereignty to the . . . international government" (p. 8), he employs the OEEC as a mere instance of the new international administrative pattern, which, through his wealth of knowledge and experience, he succeeds in fitting properly into the broader normative, administrative and politico-economic framework. This enhances greatly the value and the reach of the book which is distinguished by solid research, clear analysis and adequate footnoting—the last being hardly the outstanding characteristic of the majority of the contemporary French publications in the field of *droit et science politique*. Full texts of relevant conventions and protocols are appended; generous quotations from other documents and citations of recent cases of import should prove very useful to the American student. The book deserves an English edition, which Professor Adam—now with the Strasbourg Council—could undoubtedly bring up-to-the-moment with an additional chapter or two.—JAROSLAV MAYDA, *Ohio State University*.

The Customs Union Issue. BY JACOB VINER. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1950. Pp. viii, 221. $2.50.)

The establishment of Benelux and the signing of the Franco-Italian Customs Union Treaty in 1949 bring to the fore the important question of the compatibility of such unions with the most-favored-nation principle. This book contains an admirable analysis of this and related questions. Although the treatment is primarily analytical and the text written from the point of view of the economist it brings together an abundance of important historical material. To those who think that customs unions might solve today's international economic problems the book will be something of a disappointment. For, concludes Dr. Viner, the only type of substantial trade-barrier reduction which is feasible for a country like the United States—the only country in the world today which has a marked competitive advantage vis-à-vis the outside world—is carefully measured reciprocal trade-barrier reduction which leaves it relatively in a balance-of-payments situation not substantially inferior to the preexisting one. Customs unions, on the contrary, almost inevitably operate in the opposite direction. The authority of the author in the field of international economic relations makes this book a "must" for those who would keep abreast of the timely question of customs unions.—HOWARD S. PIQUET, *Library of Congress*.

Journey to the "Missouri." BY TOSHIKAZU KASE. EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY DAVID NELSON ROWE. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1950. Pp. xiv, 282. $4.00.)

This is an account of the Japanese surrender on the battleship "Missouri" and the difficult maneuvers of the peace group within Japan to obtain agreement on surrender. The story is told by a career foreign service officer who served as aide and go-between at the highest levels, and gives an inside picture of the precarious position of civilians in dealing with the military rule, which to the very end was blocking moves toward peace. An excellent picture emerges of the workings of the imperial system during the War, the roles played by the imperial household officials, the cabinet leaders, the *jushin* (senior statesmen or former prime ministers) and the military, and by the emperor himself. If the emperor played the role of a constitutional monarch at the outbreak of war, accepting the decisions of his government, he played a positive role in forcing the issues of peace. The young "hot-head" officers, and their general and admiral pawns, to the very end favored a last ditch struggle, and even after the decision was made to surrender, direct action of several groups threatened rebellion. Toshikazu Kase performs a courageous service in writing this indispensable source-book of wartime Japan.—DALE PONTIUS, *Roosevelt College.*

Reprieve from War; A Manual for Realists. BY LIONEL GELBER. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1950. Pp. xi, 196. $3.00.)

A Canadian writer's analysis of international events as a contest for power.

France and the Saar, 1680–1948. BY LAING GRAY COWAN. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1950. Pp. 247. $3.50.)

Scholarly study of an important international problem, with some attention to administration.

The New Federalist. BY PUBLIUS II—OWEN J. ROBERTS, JOHN F. SCHMIDT AND CLARENCE K. STREIT WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY JOHN FOSTER DULLES. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1950. Pp. xvii, 109. $1.50.)

Reprinted articles, originally published in the magazine *Freedom and Union*, discussing federalism from the point of view of persons favoring international union of states.

Yearbook on Human Rights of 1948. (Lake Success, New York: United Nations. 1950. Pp. xiv, 535. $6.00.)

A third annual volume on the subject. The Yearbook contains all constitutional and legislative texts promulgated in the year. Other sections include texts of treaties and international promulgations regarding human rights.

These Rights and Freedoms. (Lake Success, New York: United Nations. 1950. Pp. iii, 214. $1.50.)

A progress report on the achievements of the United Nations during the past four years in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Includes a bibliography of principal documents and the texts of six of the most important ones.

Note on Research in Department of State Records

The long list of documentary publications on the foreign relations of the United States testifies to official interest in making possible the writing of the full story of our diplomatic history.[1] As early as 1861, the Department of State began the regular annual publication of the more important of its records. Through the years, supplementary, special, and current volumes have rounded out the most complete published documentary record that any nation ever gave to its people. This recognition of official responsibility to the American people largely accounts for a well-informed public and an ever-increasing interest in the foreign affairs of the nation.

---

[1] The following selected published sources are well known: Francis Wharton (ed.), *The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States* (6 vols., Washington, Government Printing Office, 1889); *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of America, from . . . 1783, to 1789* (7 vols., Washington, F. P. Blair, 1833–1834); William

Prior to World War I, relatively few researchers requested permission to delve into the Department's records that for legitimate reasons (principally, the lack of space) had not been printed. It was not until 1921 that requests were numerous enough to justify the issuance of formal regulations regarding non-official use of the Department's unpublished records.[2] Five years later, an Archives Section was created and the main body of records ante-dating August 1906 was transferred to it, and in general opened to the public.

In 1929, the Office of Historical Adviser was created; also the publication of regularly-issued press releases was begun. The following year, the compilation of the annual volumes, *Foreign Relations*, was placed in the hands of professional historians and political scientists. The 1930's brought a much expanded publications program.

World War II reemphasized the responsibilities of the Department to the public and broadened the research interests and needs of those charged with the formulation and execution of the foreign policies of the nation. These developments were reflected organizationally by the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, under

---

R. Manning (ed.), *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States; Canadian Relations, 1784–1860* (4 vols., Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1940–1945); *American State Papers, . . . Class I: Foreign Relations* (6 vols., Washington, Gales and Seaton, 1832–1859 [period covered: 1789–1828]); William R. Manning (ed.), *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations* (3 vols., New York, Oxford University Press, 1925); William R. Manning (ed.), *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831–1860* (12 vols., Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1932–1939); Adelaide R. Hasse, *Index to United States Documents Relating to to Foreign Affairs, 1828–1861* (3 vols., Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1914–1921); United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (One or more vols. for each year for the period 1861–1933, except for the year 1869. Among the more important supplementary vols. in this series are those relating to the Treaty of Washington, 1871; the World War Supplements, 1914–1918; the Lansing Papers, 1914–1920; the Paris Peace Conference vols., 1919; the Japan vols., 1931–1941; Washington, Government Printing Office, 1861–1933); William M. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts . . . , 1776–1909* (2 vols., Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910 [3rd and 4th vols., covering 1910–1923 and 1923–1937 and ed. by C. F. Redmond and E. J. Trenwith, respectively, were published in 1923 and 1938]); Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts . . .* (8 vols. to date, covering 1776–1863, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1938–1948); John Bassett Moore, *A Digest of International Law . . .* (8 vols., Washington, Government Printing Office, 1906); Green H. Hackworth, *Digest of International Law* (8 vols., Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940–1944); *United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949*, Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30 (Washington, 1950); *A Decade of American Foreign Policy; Basic Documents, 1941–1949*, Senate Document 123, 81st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950).

[2] As early as the 1890's, however, "special rules" were issued governing the research use of the so-called "Historical Archives" of the Department—the papers of the Continental Congress, and of George Washington, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James Monroe and Benjamin Franklin. See *Annual Report of the American Historical Association* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1894).

whom the functions of the Office of Historical Adviser (abolished in 1938) and the Division of Research and Publication (created in 1933) were placed.

The Office of Public Affairs, through the Division of Historical Policy Research, is now in the process of developing a research-liaison program for the purpose of encouraging and assisting the research activities of American universities, research centers, private foundations, and individual scholars in certain fields of interest and concern to the Department of State. This program is the responsibility of the Historical Advisory Staff, Division of Historical Policy Research, which is concerned with research principally in the field of international relations, more particularly American diplomatic history and foreign relations.

This broad field of research provides opportunities for mutually profitable cooperation between the Department of State and non-official scholars. Independent researchers are naturally interested. At the same time, the Department gladly responds to this interest, because (1) it has a responsibility to encourage and assist in spreading knowledge of the foreign affairs of the nation, and (2) it can derive great benefit from the cooperation of non-official scholars.

In order to achieve these objectives, the Historical Advisory Staff (1) endeavors to maintain close contacts with universities, research institutes, foundations, and professional associations and to keep the Department informed of research in progress; (2) analyzes the research needs of the Department that can be met outside the government and acquaints appropriate private researchers with those needs; (3) serves as a center of reference for the most effective use of the research resources of the Department of State and of other government agencies; (4) furnishes guidance to researchers in the use of Departmental documents and reference materials; and (5) maintains bibliographical records of unpublished research studies, analyzes on a continuing basis research in progress (both official and non-official), and integrates as far as possible such research with the needs of the Department of State.

The records of the Department are divided into three periods: Open, Restricted (Limited-Access), and Closed. Records dated prior to January 1, 1925, with minor exceptions, are open to the public. On January 1, 1951, and each year thereafter until January 1, 1955, the terminal date of this period will be automatically advanced one year. The Restricted (Limited-Access) Period runs from the Open Period to January 1, 1933. Records bearing dates later than January 1, 1933, are normally regarded as closed to non-official researchers. However, liaison officers of the Department may make available certain types of recent *unclassified* studies; and the Committee on the Use of Departmental Files may grant wider access to "mature scholars undertaking research, the performance of which is regarded by the Department as desirable in the national interest."

Inquiries regarding research topics, programs, and resources in the field of international relations, including American diplomatic history and foreign relations, should be addressed to the Historical Advisory Staff, Division of Historical Policy Research. All applications for research access to the Department's records of the Restricted (Limited-Access) and Closed Periods should be addressed to the Chief, Division of Historical Policy Research, and should contain such information as the following: (1) nature and scope of the study being undertaken; (2) use to be made of the study; (3) as clearly as possible the specific categories of records desired; and (4) data on the academic background and research experience of the applicant, including a list of publications. Also, appropriate letters of recommendation should accompany the application.

The general policy of the Department of State is to make its records available "as liberally as possible without violating principles and procedures consonant with the security of the nation, the protection of public interest, and the efficient operation of the Department and the Foreign Service." These limitations leave ample room for effective and mutually profitable cooperation between the Department of State and the non-official researchers.

E. T. Parks.

Department of State.

ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS

MARTIN B. TRAVIS, JR.
Duke University

ARTICLES

General

Corbett, Percy. E. Objectivity in the Study of International Relations. *World Affairs.* July, 1950.

Lanza, *Col.* Conrad H. World Perimeters: International Military Survey. *United States Army Combat Forces Journal.* October, 1950.

Special Areas

United States

Clucas, Lowell M. Piercing the Iron Curtain. *Yale Review.* Summer, 1950.

Dean, Vera M. The United States Restudies Its Foreign Policy. *International Journal.* Summer, 1950.

Fischer, George. Genesis of U.S.-Soviet Relations in World War II. *Review of Politics.* July, 1950.

Watson, Mark S. United States Foreign Policy and the Armed Forces. *Military Review.* September, 1950.

Wright, Quincy. American Policy toward Russia. *World Politics.* July, 1950.

Latin America

Acierto. The Economics of the Good Neighbor Policy; The Gillette Committee Investigation of the Price of Coffee. *Inter-American Economic Affairs.* Summer, 1950.

Varangot, Carlos I. Transformazioni del Diritto Commerciale nel Mondo ed in Argentina. *Nuova Rivista di Diritto Commerciale Diritto Dell' Economia Diritto Sociale.* Volume III, Numbers 5–7 (1950).

Commonwealth of Nations

Carter, Gwendolen M. The British Commonwealth in the Asian Crisis. *Foreign Policy Reports.* October 1, 1950.

Commonwealth Relations. *Round Table.* September, 1950.

Hinsley, F. H. The Case for Commonwealth Migration. *United Empire.* July–August, 1950.

Hourani, Albert. British Policy in the Fertile Crescent: Past and Future. *United Empire.* July–August, 1950.

Huxley, Elspeth. The Cold War and the Colonies. *Nineteenth Century and After.* July, 1950.

Western Europe

Gilson, Etienne. Neutrality for France? *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* July, 1950.

Mangold, Frederick R. Free Territory of Trieste Works Toward Recovery. *Foreign Commerce Weekly.* September 18, 1950.

Mosely, Philip E. The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn. *Foreign Affairs.* July, 1950.

Robbins, Lionel. Towards the Atlantic Community. *Lloyds Bank Review.* July, 1950.

Serra, Enrico. Italian Foreign Policy. *Nineteenth Century and After.* August, 1950.

Talerico, *Commander* Anthony. Sea of Decision. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings.* September, 1950.

Russia and Eastern Europe

Beloff, Max. Soviet Foreign Policy 1929–41: Some Notes. *Soviet Studies.* October, 1950.

———. Soviet Policy in China. *Pacific Affairs.* June, 1950.

Dallin, David J. Russia's New Empire. *Yale Review.* September, 1950.

Duchacek, Ivo. The February Coup in Czechoslovakia. *World Politics.* July, 1950.

Gross, Feliks. Political Emigration from Iron Curtain Countries. *Annals.* September, 1950.

Howard, Harry N. The Report of the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans to the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. *Department of State Bulletin.* September 4, 1950.

Huszar, George B. de. Use of Satellite Outposts by the USSR. *Annals.* September, 1950.

Kochan, L. The Russian Road to Rapallo. *Soviet Studies.* October, 1950.

Roucek, Joseph S. Geopolitical Trends in Central-Eastern Europe. *Annals.* September, 1950.

Middle and Far East

Austin, Warren R. Discussion of Korean Case in the Security Council: Exposing Soviet Propaganda Tactics. *Department of State Bulletin.* September 4, 1950.

Berger, Peter. The Internationalization of Jerusalem. *Jurist.* July, 1930.

Bondaryevsky, G. The Postwar Struggle of the Malay Peoples for National Liberation. *Soviet Press Translations.* September 15, 1950.

Calvocoressi, Peter. European Comment on Korea. *Nineteenth Century and After.* September, 1950.

Comment and Reports on the Korean War: On Civil War and Aggression. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press.* September 2, 1950.

Dodd, Norris E. A Summary of Activities of the Food and Agricultural Organization in the Middle East. *Middle East Journal.* July, 1950.

Finkelstein, Lawrence S. U. S. at Impasse in Southeast Asia. *Far Eastern Survey.* September 27, 1950.

Godshall, Wilson L. Japan's Dream of Empire. *Social Science.* October, 1948.

Green, O. M. Japan and Korea. *Fortnightly.* August, 1950.

Kusano, Fumio. Communist Activities in Southeast Asia. *Contemporary Japan.* April-June, 1950.

Jessup, Philip C. The United Nations and Korea. *Department of State Bulletin.* July 17, 1950.

Mills, Lennox A. The Cold War in Southeast Asia. *Virginia Quarterly Review.* Summer, 1950.

Mohrenschildt, Dimitri von. Postwar Party Line of the All-Union Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. *Russian Review.* July, 1950.

North, R. C. The Sino-Soviet Agreements of 1950. *Far Eastern Survey.* July 12, 1950.

Sacks, Milton. The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia. *Pacific Affairs.* September, 1950.

Shimoni, Yaacov. Israel in the Pattern of Middle East Politics. *Middle East Journal.* July, 1950.

Tasks of Studying Stalinist Foreign Policy. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press.* September 16, 1950.

Watson, *Sir* Alfred. India and Korea. *Nineteenth Century and After.* September, 1950.

Colonial Areas

Fiske, *Rear Admiral* Leon S. U. S. Administration of Pacific Trust Territory. *Department of State Bulletin.* August 28, 1950.

McAuley, James. Island Administration in the South West Pacific. *Pacific Affairs.* September, 1950.

Riggs, Fred W. Wards of the UN: Trust and Dependent Areas. *Foreign Policy Reports.* June 1, 1950.

Stalinist Theory of Colonial Revolution in Africa. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press.* August 12, 1950.

Economic Factors

General Topics

Bernstein, E. M. Multilateral Trade in an Unbalanced World. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science.* August, 1950.

Black, John D. Bases of Adjusting International Trade in Foodstuffs. *Journal of Farm Economics.* August, 1950.

Golay, Frank H. The International Wheat Agreement of 1949. *Quarterly Journal of Economics.* August, 1950.

Heilperin, Michael A. U. S.-Canadian Partnership for the Revival of Multilateral Trade. *International Journal.* Summer, 1950.

European Recovery

Changes in the Relationship between European Production and Trade. *U.N. Economic Bulletin for Europe.* First Quarter, 1950.

Copland, Douglas B. The Dollar Gap and the Commonwealth. *Foreign Affairs.* July, 1950.

Hilton, Howard J. The European Customs Union Study Group. *Department of State Bulletin.* August 14, 1950.

———. Benelux—A Case Study in Economic Union. *Department of State Bulletin.* July 31, 1950.

Review of the Economic Situation in Europe, January–March 1950. *U.N. Economic Bulletin for Europe.* First Quarter, 1950.

Foreign Investment and Point Four

Beyer, Robert C. Point Four and Latin America. *Miami Law Quarterly.* June, 1950.

Boyd-Orr, *Lord* John. The Food Problem. *Scientific American.* August, 1950.

Croome, Honor. The Dollars Siege. *Lloyds Bank Review.* July, 1950.

Gardiner, Arthur Z. Point Four and the Arab World: An American View. *Middle East Journal.* July, 1950.

Gary, Howard C. The United States and Point Four Problems. *Foreign Policy Reports.* September 15, 1950.

Lattimore, Owen; Pierson, John H. G.; Lawrence, Joseph Stagg; Warburg, James P.; Rosenthal, Morris S.; Pan, Chia Lin; Isaacs, Harold R.; Valentine, Alan; Hakim, George; Mr. Soedjatmoko; Coon, Carleton S.; Thorp, Willard L.; Currie, Lauchlin; Owen, David; Caine, Sydney; Goris, Jan-Albert; Friedericy, Herman J.; Nathan, Robert R. Symposium on Formulating a Point Four Program. *Annals.* July, 1950.

Lewis, W. Arthur. The Industrialization of the British West Indies. *Caribbean Economic Review.* May, 1950.

Point Four: A Re-examination of Ends and Means. *Yale Law Journal.* June, 1950.

Report on the Availability of International Capital for Caribbean Economic Development. *Caribbean Economic Review.* December, 1949.

Rubin, Seymour J. Nationalization and Private Foreign Investment: The Role of Government. *World Politics.* July, 1950.

International Law

The Baltic Straits in International Law. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press.* September 16, 1950.

Beaumont, K. M. Notes on Some Aspects of the Legal Position of International Air Carriers. *International Law Quarterly.* July, 1950.

Brecht, Arnold. The Concentration Camp. *Columbia Law Review.* June, 1950.

Cahn, Hans J. The Responsibility of the Successor State for War Debts. *American Journal of International Law.* July, 1950.

The Case of Korea and International Law. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press.* September 9, 1950.

Cooper, John C. National Status of Aircraft. *Journal of Air Law and Commerce.* Summer, 1950.

Doman, Nicholas R. Compensation for Nationalized Property in Post-War Europe. *International Law Quarterly.* July, 1950.

Downey, William Gerald, Jr., Captured Enemy Property: Booty of War and Seized Enemy Property. *American Journal of International Law.* July, 1950.

Ely, Robert B. The Treaty-Making Power: The Constitutionality of International Courts. *American Bar Association Journal.* September, 1950.

Halliday, Walter J. Inter-American Conventions for Protection of Trade-Marks. *Canadian Bar Review.* June-July, 1950.

Harris, Lester. Treaties Under the Constitution and International Law. *Dickinson Law Review.* June, 1950.

Holman, Frank E. Treaty Law-Making: A Blank Check for Writing a New Constitution. *American Bar Association Journal.* September, 1950.

Hudson, Manley O. Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law. *American Journal of International Law.* July, 1950.

Jiménez de Aréchaga, Eduardo. Existencia y Carácter Jurídico del Derecho Internacional Público. *Revista de Derecho Internacional.* June, 1950.

Lacombe, J. and Saporta, M. La Responsabilité du Transporteur Aérien pour Retard. *Revue Générale de l'Air.* No. 3, 1950.

Nascimento e Silva, Geraldo Eulalio do. El Matrimonio Consular. *Revista de Derecho Internacional.* June, 1950.

Plaisant, R. L'Organisation Internationale du Commerce. *Revue Générale de Droit International Public.* April–June, 1950.

Wright, Quincy. Some Thoughts About Recognition. *American Journal of International Law.* July, 1950.

Yuen-li Liang. The First Session of the International Law Commission: Review of Its Work by the General Assembly. *American Journal of International Law.* July, 1950.

International Organization

United Nations

Bloomfield, Lincoln P. The Department of State and the United Nations. *International Organization.* August, 1950.

En Torno a la Paz de las Naciones del Pacto de la Sociedad de las Naciones a la Carta de las Naciones Unidas. *La Justicia.* June, 1950.

Hamilton, Thomas J. The U. N. and Trygve Lie. *Foreign Affairs.* October, 1950.

Hovey, Allan, Jr. Voting Procedure in the General Assembly. *International Organization.* August, 1950.

Jacobs, Samuel K. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund: An Instrument of International Social Policy. *Social Service Review.* September, 1950.

Vellas, P. La Commission Intérimaire des Nations-Unies. *Revue Générale de Droit International Public.* April–June, 1950.

Regional Organizations

Background of the Schuman Plan. *Round Table.* September, 1950.

The Defense of Europe. *Fortune.* October, 1950.

Diebold, William. Imponderables of the Schuman Plan. *Foreign Affairs.* October, 1950.

Domke, Martin. Inter-American Commercial Arbitration. *Miami Law Quarterly.* June, 1950.

Furniss, Edgar S. The United States, The Inter-American System and the United Nations. *Political Science Quarterly.* September, 1950.

Haiti-Dominican Republic Affair. *Annals of the Organization of the American States.* Volume II, Number 2 (1950).

Jamison, Edward A. Keeping Peace in the Caribbean Area. *Department of State Bulletin.* July 3, 1950.

Kulski, *Dr.* W. W. The Soviet System of Collective Security Compared with the Western System. *American Journal of International Law.* July, 1950.

Lowe, John. British Policy and the Unity of Europe. *Nineteenth Century and After.* September, 1950.

Schick, F. B. The North Atlantic Treaty and the Problem of Peace. *Juridical Review.* April, 1950.

Soviet Reaction to Schuman Plan. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press.* July 1, 1950.

Spaak, Paul-Henri. The Integration of Europe: Dreams and Realities. *Foreign Affairs.* October, 1950.

Trelles, Camilo Barcia. Europa Entre las Dos Orillas. El Pacto Atlantico, El Plan Schuman-Monnet y el Aislacionismo Europes. La Isla, El Continente y dos Estados Unidos. *Informacion Juridica.* September, 1950.

Utley, T. E. The Schuman Plan. *Fortnightly.* July, 1950.

World Government

Corbett, Percy. Congress and Proposals for International Government. *International Organization.* August, 1950.

Dean, William T., Jr., World Government and the Constitution of the United States. *California Law Review.* August, 1950.

International Cooperation

Fox, Byron L. International Cultural Relations. *American Sociological Review.* August, 1950.

Mitrany, David. Reflections on UNESCO Exchange of Persons Programme. *International Social Science Bulletin.* Summer, 1950.

National Programs of International Cultural Relations. *International Conciliation.* June, 1950.

DOCUMENTS

Acheson, Dean. *Strengthening the Forces of Freedom; Selected Speeches and Statements, February 1949–April 1950.* Washington, Government Printing Office. 1950.

Acta de la Sesion Extraordinaria del Consejo de la Organizacion de los Estados Americanos Actuando Provisionalmente Como Organo de Consulta Celebrada el 8 de Abril de 1950. Pan-American Union. May, 1950.

British Information Services, Reference Division. Western Co-operation for Defense. June, 1950.

———. Western Union Cultural Co-operation. March, 1950.

Great Britain. Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to East Africa on Tanganyika; Observations of the United Kingdom Government. Lake Success. 1949 (U.N. Doc. T/333).

India (Republic). White Paper on Indo-Pakistan Trade Relations, 15th August, 1947–31st December, 1949. New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1950.

Institute of International Education. Building Roads to Peace; Exchange of People between the United States and Other Countries. Washington, D. C. 1950 (Department of State, Pub. 3738; Information and Cultural Series, 11).

International Islamic Economic Conference. Economic Survey of the Middle East. Karachi, Kitabistan.

International Monetary Fund. Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Years Ended April 30, 1950. Washington, D. C. 1950.

Organization for European Economic Co-operation. Internal Financial Stability in Member Countries. Paris. 1950.

Pan-American Union, Division of Legal Affairs, Department of International Law and

Organization. Bilateral Treaty Developments in Latin America, 1938–1948 (Law and Treaty Series, 32).

Second Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting, Havana, April, 1950. Final Report of the General Committee (UN Doc. CAR/2-GC-Doc. 6976).

United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs. Economic Development in Selected Countries: Plans, Programmes, and Agencies, Volume II. United Nations. 1950 (UN Pub., sales no.: 1950. II.B.IST/ECA/4 April 1950).

United Nations, Economic and Social Council. Study of Measures to Promote the Dissemination of True Information. United Nations. 1950 (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.1/112, 18 April 1950).

United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Latin America. The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems. 1950.

UNESCO. Report on the Effectiveness of the Reconstruction Programme, 1947–1949 (UNESCO Pub. 732).

———. Report to the United Nations, 1949–50. UNESCO. 1950 (Pub. 714).

———. World Communications, Press, Radio, Film; Division of Free Flow of Information, Department of Mass Communications. UNESCO. 1950 (Pub. 700).

UNESCO, General Conference, Fifth Session. UNESCO Activities Regarding Self-Governing Territories. UNESCO. 1950.

United Nations, Non-Self-Governing Territories. Summaries of Information Transmitted to the Secretary-General during 1949. United Nations. 1950.

United Nations, Secretariat. Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries; Methods of Financing Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries, Survey of Policies Affecting Private Foreign Investment. United Nations. February 15, 1950 (Doc. E/1614).

———. Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries; Methods of Increasing Domestic Savings and of Ensuring Their Most Advantageous Use for the Purpose of Economic Development; Study. United Nations. 1949 (Doc. E/1562, 16 Dec. 1949).

———. Major Economic Changes in 1949. United Nations. 1950 (Doc. E/1601, 8 Feb. 1950).

United Nations, Secretariat, Department of Economic Affairs. International Capital Movements during the Inter-War Period. United Nations. 1949 (Pub. 1949.II.D.2).

United Nations, Secretary General. The Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, 1 July, 1949 to 30 June, 1950. General Assembly Official Records, Supplement 1 (A/1287).

———. Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries; Measures Devised by the Economic and Social Council and the Specialized Agencies to Promote Economic Development and Raise Standards of Living of Under-Developed Countries. United Nations. 1949 (UN Doc. E/1345, 25 May 1949).

United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Committee on Administrative Unions. Administrative Unions Affecting Trust Territories. United Nations. 1949 (Doc. T/338, 6 June 1949).

United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Cameroons. Report of the First United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under British Administration. United Nations. 1950 (Doc. T/461, 13 Feb. 1950).

United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of Togoland. Report of the First Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration. United Nations. 1950 (Doc. T/465, 17 Feb. 1950).

United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Revision of the United Nations Charter. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-First Congress, Second Session, on Resolutions Relative to Revision of the United Nations Charter, Atlantic Union, World Federation, etc. Washington, Government Printing Office. 1950.

United States, Department of State. Our Foreign Policy. Washington, Government Printing Office. September, 1950 (General Foreign Policy Series, 26).

United States, Department of State, International Science Policy Survey Group. Science and Foreign Relations; International Flow of Scientific and Technological Information. Washington, Government Printing Office. 1950 (General Foreign Policy Series, 30).

POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville. TRANSLATED BY ALEXANDER TEIXEIRA DE MATTOS. EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, BY J. P. MAYER. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1949. Pp. xxvi, 332. $5.00.)

Tocqueville thought there was one French Revolution with periodic episodes but with accumulative impact on his nation's economic and social, as well as its political, attitudes and structure. Here he subjects the thesis to a critical examination—through the filter of his personal observation of the events of 1848–49. These "recollections" are, in fact, much more than a record of revolutionary events or a commentary on the principal actors in them. Although intended, as he states, only for his own edification, they are infused with all the sharp insights of his mature mind and practical political experience. Here, we have one of the great classics on the origins, practices, and results of *coup d'état;* that it occurred in a mid-nineteenth-century setting does not make it less instructive or less relevant to our own time. This many-faceted account of the events of 1848–49 in France can be viewed from various standpoints. It is, of course, a valuable addition to the historical understanding of the events themselves, by one of the nation's legislators. Tocqueville's record of parliamentary actions, of the manoeuvres of the party leaders, of the reactions of the rank and file, is almost a daily diary of a legislature in crisis. His estimates of many of his parliamentary colleagues are caustic; the editor of this edition thinks some of them "are not always just." In almost every case, however—and this suggests a second facet of the *Recollections*—Tocqueville explores the motivations behind individual actions. He does not spare his political or personal friends (for instance, Beaumont) any more than his opponents in his appraisals of the effectiveness or the integrity of their conduct. He does give each the benefit of the doubt in the maelstrom of passion and calculation which the events produced for all the actors. Again, the *Recollections* are a brilliant, and somber, commentary on the nature of social action—by the individual and by groups. Few such incisive case studies in political behavior have been written in which acute observation of events is combined with not less acute reflection on their meaning. This is, indeed, a still useful manual on the nature and effects of a society in crisis. Here, too, is that subtlety of thought, that felicity of style, which makes all of Tocqueville's writing a delightful literary experience for the reader. In this edition of the *Recollections*, J. P. Mayer, already known as one of the outstanding students of Tocqueville, has done a truly admirable editorial service to general reader and scholar alike. He has restored many passages omitted in the first English edition (1896) and not available, even in French, till 1942. He has also revised that text substantially and has transferred to us more effectively the flavor as well as the substance of Tocqueville's thought and style. This edition will remain the definitive English text of one of the most useful of Tocqueville's political writings.—PHILLIPS BRADLEY, *Syracuse University.*

Science and Rationalism in the Government of Louis XIV, 1661–1683. BY JAMES E. KING. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1949. Pp. 313, xiv, $3.75.)

Based primarily on materials previously worked, this study is essentially a description and interpretation of the influence of scientific rationalism on French public administration during the period when Louis XIV and Colbert were constructing the first great administrative state of modern times. "The administrators of France from 1661 to 1683 were convinced," declares the author, "that they were engineers of a successful revolution by bringing science into government." Whatever the importance of other factors influencing the policies and reforms of Louis and his able finance minister, "the spirit of science and rationalism was a powerful and ever present determinant." Background for the study is provided in the first two chapters which relate the growing spirit of scientific inquiry to the political philosophy of the seventeenth century. Chapter three reviews the development of administrative ideas and machinery in the years preceding the personal reign of Louis XIV. Chapters four and five describe the government of Louis XIV and Colbert with particular attention to their administrative theories and methods. The balance of the volume contains three chapters which outline "the mechanics of the regime of order." The substance of these chapters includes administrative record-keeping, finance and accounting, statistics and methods of administrative inquiry and reporting, regulation of trade and manufacturing, management of the military and naval establishments, law revision and codification, technological education and the patronage of science, art and invention. A concluding summary and index complete the volume. The efforts of Louis XIV and Colbert afford a particularly apt illustration of how administrative organization and method follow from political policy and in turn give rise to new political problems. Few regimes in the history of government have been so clearly the product of premeditation and planned execution. Its principal actors were conscious of participation in an administrative revolution and because they were articulate, and the written records voluminous, it is possible to reconstruct and interpret the administrative development of the period with a greater assurance of accuracy than is usually possible in administrative history. Mr. King has not attempted to write a general administrative history of the reign of Louis XIV. His concern is primarily with the beginning of the application of scientific inquiry to the problems and processes of the French monarchy. But his study brings into clearer focus the critical "threshold" period when medieval suzerainty was becoming modern administration, and it will therefore be welcomed by students of politics and administration.—LYNTON K. CALDWELL, *Syracuse University.*

East and West; As Face to Face and Side by Side. BY MARY BURT MESSER. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. Pp. 66. $3.00.)

Reply of a Christian Scientist to the Communist Manifesto, written in a style primarily of sectarian interest.

American Influences Abroad; An Exploration. EDITED BY RICHARD H. HEINDEL. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1950. Pp. iv, 51.)

Four papers and six comments, dealing chiefly with research accomplishments and possibilities, presented at the 1949 meeting of the American Historical Association.

Reader in Public Opinion and Communication. EDITED BY BERNARD BERELSON AND MORRIS JANOWITZ. (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 1950. Pp. xi, 505. $4.50.)

Readings on theory and formation of public opinion, impact of public opinion on policy, theory of communication, and communication media, content, audiences and effects. Includes a brief introduction to each section, and a bibliography.

Voluntary Action; Mainstay of a Free Society. EDITED BY FLOYD A. BOND AND JOHN A. VIEG. (Claremont, California: Pomona College. 1950. Pp. 96. Paper, $1.50.)

Ten addresses from the proceedings of a conference inaugurating the Institute of Public Affairs at Pomona College.

The Democratic Revolution. BY LOUIS MELTZER. (New York: The William-Frederick Press. 1950. Pp. 68. $1.50.)

Foresees the end of American capitalism and Russian dictatorship and the emergence throughout the Western world of a new democratic socialism, combining the best features of both.

Ideas They Cannot Jail. BY EUGENE DENNIS WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY WILLIAM Z. FOSTER. (New York: International Publishers. 1950. Pp. 192. $1.25.)

A collection of the speeches, articles, and public statements over the last three years of the general secretary of the Communist Party of the United States.

ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS

FRANCIS G. WILSON

University of Illinois

ARTICLES

Political Theory

History and Criticism

Ames, Van Meter. Fetishism in the Existentialism of Sartre. *Journal of Philosophy.* July 6, 1950.

Bancroft, Robert. América en la Obra de Ramiro de Maetzu. *Revista Hispánica Moderna.* July–October, 1947.

Bart, B. F. Michelet and Proudhon; A Comparison of Methods. *French Studies.* April, 1950.

Cochran, Thomas C. The Legend of the Robber Barons. *Pennsylvania Magazine.* July, 1950.

Coates, Willson H. Benthamism, Laissez Faire, and Collectivism. *Journal of the History of Ideas.* June, 1950.

Cranz, F. Edward. *De Civitate Dei,* XV, 2, and Augustine's Idea of the Christian Society. *Speculum.* April, 1950.

Debré, Michel. Essai sur l'Évolution Moderne des Idées Politiques. *Revue de Droit Public et de la Science Politique.* April-June, 1950.

Del Re, R. Il Pensiero Metafisico di Plutarco: Dio, la Natura, il Male. *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica.* XXIV, 1950.

Easton, David. Harold Lasswell; Policy Scientist for a Democratic Society. *Journal of Politics.* August, 1950.

Echeverria, Durand. Roubeaud and the Theory of American Degeneration. *French American Review.* January-March, 1950.

Faris, J. A. Is Plato's a Caste State, Based on Racial Differences? *Classical Quarterly.* January–April, 1950.

Gaus, John M. Trends in the Theory of Public Administration. *Public Administration Review.* Summer, 1950.

Gershoy, Leo. Carl Becker on Progress and Power. *American Historical Review.* July, 1950.

Gurian, Waldemar. From Lenin to Stalin. *Review of Politics.* July, 1950.

Gustavson, C. G. German Lutheranism: A Psychological Study. *Journal of the History of Ideas.* April, 1950.

Hadas, Moses. Aspects of Nationalist Survival under Hellenistic and Roman Imperialism. *Journal of the History of Ideas.* April, 1950.

Heimann, Eduard. Marxistische Dialectik und Weltpolitik. *Frankfurter Hefte.* July, 1949.

Kallen, H. M. Human Rights and the Religion of John Dewey. *Ethics.* April, 1950.

Lecaillon, Jacques. Marx et Keynes devant la Pensée Économique Contemporaine. *Revue Économique.* May, 1950.

Maravall, José. La Utopía Político-Religiosa de los Franciscanos en Nueva España. *Estudios Américanos.* January, 1949.

Merlan, Philip. Alexander the Great or Antiphon the Sophist. *Classical Philology.* July, 1950.

Mesnard, Pierre. Jean Bodin à Toulouse. *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance.* January, 1950.

Morales, Alfredo T. Contributions of American Thought to Filipino Ideas of Independence. *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review.* September, 1949.

Perticone, Giacomo. The Political Science in Italy. *International Social Science Bulletin.* Summer, 1950.

Price, Kingsley B. Does Hume's Theory of Knowledge Determine His Ethical Theory? *Journal of Philosophy.* July 20, 1950.

Soltau, Roger H. Professor Laski and Political Science. *Political Quarterly.* July-September, 1950.

Stark, W. Kierkegaard on Capitalism. *Sociological Review.* Section 5, 1950.

Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and the Historical Approach. *Review of Politics.* October, 1950.

Tugwell, R. G. The Experimental Roosevelt. *Political Quarterly.* July–September, 1950.

Virtanen, Reino. Nietzsche and the Action Française. *Journal of the History of Ideas.* April, 1950.

Special Study and Analysis

Adams, E. M. The Logic of Planning. *Social Forces.* May, 1950.

Adorno, T. W. Auferstehung der Kultur in Deutschland? *Frankfurter Hefte.* May, 1950.

Brandt, C. L. The Emotive Theory of Ethics. *Philosophical Review.* July, 1950.

Brown, S. M. Does Ought Imply Can? *Ethics*. July, 1950.

Cook, Thomas I. Democracy, Leisure, and Communism. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1950.

Delos, J. T. The Dialectics of War and Peace. *Thomist*. July, 1950.

Geiger, Teodoro. El Dominio de los "Expertos." *Revista de Estudios Politicos*. Number 50, 1950.

Giannattasio, F. Il Materialismo Dialettico Come Umanesimo Ateo. *La Civiltà Cattolica*. May, 1950.

Gotesky, Rubin. Freedom: A Look at Fundamentals. *Antioch Review*. Summer, 1950.

Greenwood, Thomas. International Casuistics. *Thomist*. July, 1950.

Guardini, Romano. Der Mythos und die Wahrheit der Offenbarung. *Frankfurter Hefte*. July, 1950.

Herz, John H. Political Ideas and Political Reality. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1950.

Lander, Luis. La Doctrina Venezolana de Acción Democrática. *Cuadernos Américanos*. July–August, 1950.

Lutz, Ralph H. The History of the Concept of Freedom. *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*. Spring, 1950.

Maritain, Jacques. The People and the State. *Measure*. Summer, 1950.

Martin, Alfred von. Der Gang der Neuzeit in der Krise der Gegenwart. *Politeia*. Numbers 2/3, 1950.

Meyerhoff, H. A. Social Implications of Scientific Progress. *Social Science*. June, 1950.

Miller, William. The Recruitment of the American Business Elite. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. May, 1950.

Minkowski, E. Le Contact Humain. *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. April–June, 1950.

Molitor, André. Réflexions sur la Fonction Publique dans l'État Moderne. *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives*. Number 2, 1950.

Mukerjee, R. Toward a Sociological Theory of Ethics. *Sociology and Social Research*. July–August, 1950.

Pavan, Pietro. La Sussidiarietà Como Principio della Strutture Sociale. *Politeia*. Numbers 2/3, 1950.

Reinhard, M.-R. Histoire et Démographie. *Revue Historique*. April–June, 1950.

Rusch, T. A. Political Thought of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1950.

Schwartz, Bernard. The Imperative Theory of the State. *Notre Dame Lawyer*. Spring, 1950.

Utley, T. E. Delegation or Consent. *Measure*. Summer, 1950.

Villegas, Cosio. Trasfondo Tiránico. *Cuadernos Américanos*. July–August, 1950.

Voegelin, Eric. The Formation of the Marxian Revolutionary Idea. *Review of Politics*. July, 1950.

Winnicott, D. W. Some Thought on the Meaning of the Word Democracy. *Human Relations*. Number 2, 1950.

Legal Theory and Public Law Issues

Bouscaren, A. T. Church and State in America. *Measure*. Summer, 1950.

Cushman, Robert F. Public Support of Religious Education in American Constitutional Law. *Illinois Law Review*. July–August, 1950.

Fellman, David. Separation of Church and State in the United States: A Summary View. *Wisconsin Law Review*. May, 1950.

Frank, Jerome. Modern and Ancient Legal Pragmatism: John Dewey & Co. vs. Aristotle: II. *Notre Dame Lawyer*. Spring, 1950.

Gest, John B. Eugenic Sterilization: Justice Holmes vs. Natural Law. *Temple Law Quarterly*. April, 1950.

Patterson, Edwin W. John Dewey and the Law: Theories of Legal Reasoning and Valuation. *American Bar Association Journal.* August, 1950.

Paulsen, M. G. Natural Rights—A Constitutional Doctrine in Indiana. *Indiana Law Journal.* Winter, 1950.

Rommen, Heinrich. Church and State. *Review of Politics.* July, 1950.

Schmitt, Carl. Die Rechtswissenschaft als Letztes Asyl des Rechtsbewusstseins. *Universitas.* May, 1950.

HERBERT A. SIMON

Carnegie Institute of Technology

ARTICLES

Methodology and Research in the Social Sciences

Philosophy of Social Science

Arrow, Kenneth J. A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare. *Journal of Political Economy.* August, 1950.

Brandt, Richard B. The Emotive Theory of Ethics. *Philosophical Review.* July, 1950.

Ledden, J. E. On the Logical Status of Value. *Philosophical Review.* July, 1950.

Little, I. M. D. The Foundations of Welfare Economics. *Oxford Economic Papers.* June, 1949.

Stevenson, Charles L. The Emotive Conception of Ethics and its Cognitive Implications. *Philosophical Review.* July, 1950.

Timlin, Mabel F. Theories of Welfare Economics. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science.* November, 1949.

Research Methods and Organization

Barrett, Eric, and Post, Geoffrey. Introduction to Some Principles of Applied Cybernetics. *Journal of Psychology.* July, 1950.

Heard, Alexander. Research on Political Behavior, Report on a Conference. *Items.* December, 1949.

McConnell, John W. Problems of Method in the Study of Human Relations. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review.* July, 1950.

Murdock, George Peter. The Conceptual Basis of Area Research. *World Politics.* July, 1950.

Robinson, W. S. Ecological Correlations and Behavior of Individuals. *American Sociological Review.* June, 1950.

Rogers, Lindsay. Notes on the Language of Politics. *Political Science Quarterly.* December, 1949.

Shannon, Lyle W. Experimental Approach to the Development of a Socio-Economic Model. *Social Forces.* May, 1950.

Woodrow, Raymond J. University Research for Defense. *Army Information Digest.* June, 1950.

Young, Donald. Organization for Research in the Social Sciences in the United States. *International Social Science Bulletin.* Numbers 2–3, 1949.

Motivation and Personality

Barrett, Eric. Cybernetics as Applied to a Study of Normal and Abnormal Adjustment Mechanism. *Journal of Psychology.* July, 1950.

Rosen, Ephraim. George X: The Self-Analysis of an Avowed Fascist. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.* October, 1949.

Rosenblith, Judy Francis. A Replication of "Some Roots of Prejudice." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.* October, 1949.

Opinions and Attitudes

Abrams, Mark. Opinion Polls and the British General Election. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* Spring, 1950.

Doob, Leonard W. The Strategies of Psychological Warfare. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* Winter, 1949–50.

Kornhauser, Arthur. Public Opinion and Social Class. *American Journal of Sociology.* January, 1950.

Parry, Hugh J., and Crossley, Helen M. Validity of Responses to Survey Questions. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* Spring, 1950.

Rose, Arnold M. Public Opinion Research Techniques Suggested by Sociological Theory. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* Summer, 1950.

Group Behavior

Bales, Robert F. The Analysis of Small Group Interaction. *American Sociological Review.* April, 1950.

Birch, A. H. The Habit of Voting. *Manchester School.* January, 1950.

Criswell, Joan H. Sociometric Concepts in Personnel Administration. *Sociometry.* November, 1949.

Haavelmo, Trygve. The Notion of Involuntary Economic Decisions. *Econometrica.* January, 1950.

Loomis, Charles, and Powell, Reed M. Sociometric Analysis of Class Status in Rural Costa Rica. *Sociometry.* February, August, 1949.

Mayer, Kurt. Toward Understanding Economic Behavior. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology.* July, 1949.

Morris, Richard T. and Seeman, Melvin. The Problem of Leadership: An Interdisciplinary Approach. *American Journal of Sociology.* September, 1950.

Reid, Ira DeA. and Ehle, Emily L. Leadership Selection in Urban Locality Areas. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* Summer, 1950.

Sanders, Irwin T. The Use of Block Leaders in Effective Community Mobilization. *Sociometry.* November, 1949.

Sharp, Walter R. The Scientific Study of International Conferences. *International Social Science Bulletin.* Spring, 1950.

Worthy, James C. Organizational Structure and Employe Morale. *American Sociological Review.* April, 1950.

Culture and Institutions

Andrzejewski, Stanislaw. Are Ideas Social Forces? *American Sociological Review.* December, 1949.

Bernard, Jessie. Where is the Modern Sociology of Conflict? *American Journal of Sociology.* July, 1950.

Cattell, Raymond B. The Dimensions of Culture Patterns by Factorization of National Characters. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.* October, 1949.

Hall, Edward T. Military Government on Truk. *Human Organization.* Summer, 1950.

Kaplan, A., Skogstad, A. L., and Girshick, M. A. The Prediction of Social and Technological Events. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* Spring, 1950.

Kluckhohn, Florence Rockwood. Dominant and Substitute Profiles of Cultural Orientations: Their Significance for the Analysis of Social Stratification. *Social Forces.* May, 1950.

McGuire, Carson. Social Stratification and Mobility Patterns. *American Sociological Review.* April, 1950.

Weiller, Jean. Les Preferences Nationales de Structure et la Notion de Desequilibre Structurel. *Revue d'Economie Politique.* July–August, 1949.

RECENT FOREIGN BOOKS

WOLFGANG H. KRAUS
The George Washington University

GENERAL

Campagnolo, Umberto. *Comprendre.* (Venice: Carlo Ferraro. 1950. Pp. 175.)

First issue of a yearbook published under the auspices of the recently founded European Society of Culture (Venice), which devotes itself to "the greatest possible effort to save and improve the conditions required for the development of culture in a universal sense as the justification of our civilisation," by fostering the association of men of culture conscious of this necessity. Contains stimulating essays relevant to the problems of synthesis and association by W. Kaegi, J. B. S. Haldane, J. Romein, A. Siegfried, et al.

Casserre, Georges. *Socialiser dans la Liberté; La Vocation de l'Europe.* (Paris: Albin Michel. 1949. Pp. 315.)

A professor of law at the University of Lyon assesses what he describes as the bankruptcy of the European capitalistic system and the new trends towards a controlled economy, and pleads for structural economic reforms in the name of an undogmatic, democratic socialism which will avoid the pitfalls of laissez-faire and totalitarianism alike. He contends that Europe's only salvation lies this way.

Duclos, Pierre. *L'Evolution des Rapports Politiques Depuis 1750.* Pref. by B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch and M. Prélot. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Bibliothèque de la Science Politique. 1950. Pp. xvi, 344.)

A suggestive discussion and interpretation, in terms of changing functions and value-patterns, of the evolution of political institutions during the last two centuries, from popular resistance against absolute authority to the launching of modern empire and supranational organization. Essay of synthesis in the best French manner. Includes valuable bibliographies with each chapter.

Institut fuer Besatzungsfragen. *Das DP Problem.* (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, P. Siebeck. 1950. Pp. 201.)

The Institute for Occupation Problems at the University of Tuebingen has prepared this report on the refugee problem within its historical and European context, in its legal, social and administrative aspects. Useful documentation.

Revista de Estudios Politicos. Vol. XXVI, No. 46. Director: Francisco Javier Conde. (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos. 1949. Pp. 399.)

Latest issue received of this Spanish political science review which combines full-length articles and notes with elaborate bibliographic and reviewing sections indicative of a broad concern for world-wide developments in the field.

Burdeau, Georges. *Traité de Science Politique,* I, II, 1949; III, 1950.

Denoyer, Pierre. *La Presse dans le Monde.* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1950. Pp. 128.)

Deschamps, Hubert. *La Fin des Empires Coloniaux.* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1950. Pp. 127.)

Duche, Jean. *Liberté Européenne; Entretiens avec A. t'Serstevens, et al.* (Paris: Flammarion. 1949. Pp. 202.)

Gerard, Jo. *L'expérience Marxiste, 1944–1948.* (Bruxelles: L'Ecran du Monde. 1949. Pp. 122.)

Ghirelli, Angelo. *El Rénacimiento Musulman.* (Barcelona: Montaner y Simon. 1948. Pp. 357.)

L'Année Politique, 1949. (Paris. 1950.)

Leon, Paul. *La Guerre pour la Paix, 1740–1940.* (Paris. Fayard. 1950. Pp. 700.)

Lhoste, Pierre. *Réhabilitation du Liberalisme; Exposé de l'Evolution Economico-Politique Depuis un Siècle.* (Paris: Editions SEDIF. 1950.)

Mandere, Henri Charles Claude Jacob van der. *Politieke Encyclopedie; Feiten, Personen, Organisaties, Stelsels en Begrippen op het Terrein der Nationale en Internationale Politiek.* Samengesteld door H.C.G.J. van der Mandere, J. A. Mommersteeg en J. C. van Wageningen. (Amsterdam: Keesing. 1949. Pp. 480.)

Mogens, Victor, *Politikk og Fornuft, Betraktninger over Demokratiet.* (Oslo: Eget Forlag. 1950. Pp. 239.)

Pan American Union. Division of Philosophy, Letters and Sciences. *Materiales para el Estudio de la Clase Media en la American Latina.* (Washington. 1950.)

Siegfried, André. *L'Ame des Peuples.* (Paris: Hachette. 1950. Pp. 221.)

Sparano, Carlos. *Constituicoes Democraticas, Ensaio.* (Rio de Janeiro: Irmaos Pongetti. Pp. 269.)

Voinea, Serban. *La Socialisation.* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1950. Pp. 220.)

Weber, Adolf. *Hauptfragen der Wirtschaftspolitik; Abhandlungen, Erinnerungen, Erfahrungen.* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1950. Pp. 374.)

Comparative Institutions and Politics

Abshagen, K. H. *Le Dossier Canaris.* (Paris: Chavane. N.d. Pp. 281.)

Drawing on a close personal acquaintance and a few remaining fragments of evidence—Canaris' diary appears to be permanently lost—a German publicist gives an account of the complex personality, the views and activities of the former German chief of military intelligence who was executed because of his involvement in the conspiracy against Hitler.

Cherioux, Jean, Denis, Bernard and Guillaume, Michel. *Etudes Politiques Anglo-Saxonnes; Irlande du Nord, Connecticut, New York.* (Paris: Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Armand Colin. 1950. Pp. 223.)

Latest in a series of political monographs brought out under the auspices of the Institut d'Études Politiques at the Sorbonne. These substantial research papers deal with the Ulster problem, the government of Connecticut, state and local, and the problem of New York city government.

Ciliga, Anton. *Dix Ans Derrière Le Rideau de Fer Sibérie.* (Paris: Les Iles d'Or, Librairie Plon. 1950. Pp. 310.)

Recollections of experiences in Siberia, sequel to his earlier important volume *Au pays du Mensonge.* The author, a Yugoslav ex-Communist, concentrates on the developments after 1933 of which he witnessed the early phase.

D'EUFEMIA, GIUSEPPE. *Elementi di Diritto Costituzionale.* (Naples: E. Jovene. 1950. Pp. vi, 275.)

A concise textbook on the new Italian constitution, prepared for Italian students of law and political science. Useful for the student of comparative public law and government, with handy bibliographies.

ESCHENBURG, THEODOR. *Das Problem der Neugliederung der deutschen Bundesrepublik. Dargestellt am Beispiel des Suedweststaates.* (Frankfurt/a.M.: Institute zur Foerderung Oeffentlicher Angelegenheiten. 1950. Pp. 80.)

A study of the pressing problems of territorial reorganization in Germany, with special emphasis on the role of the southwest. One of the publications of the recently founded German Institute for Public Affairs.

FORGUES, MAXIMO IGNACIO GOMES. *La Ensenanza Laica Frente a la Constitucion Nacional.* (Buenos Aires. 1949. Pp. 241.)

Doctoral dissertation on secularism in education and the Argentine Constitution.

FORSTHOFF, ERNST. *Lehrbuch des Verwaltungsrechts; I—Allgemeiner Teil.* (Munich & Berlin: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1950. Pp. xx, 434.)

The first part (historical background, general concepts and organization) of a textbook on administrative law whose author (a one-time disciple of Carl Schmitt) seeks to formulate a new approach to administrative law better adapted, in his view, than the traditional one to a society in which social life is shot through with governmental controls.

GOEHRING, MARTIN. *Geschichte der Grossen Revolution. Vol. I—Vom Ancien Regime zum Sieg der Revolution.* (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, P. Siebeck. 1950. Pp. viii, 403.)

First part of a new two volume history of the French Revolution, by a German historian already noted for a series of writings on France. Its readable presentation of the 18th century background should make it of interest to students of political ideas and of the history of administrative institutions.

GUARINO, GIUSEPPE. *Lo Scioglimento delle Assemblee Parlamentari.* (Naples: Casa Editrice Dott. E. Jovene. 1948. Pp. 292.)

A scholarly examination of the basic political and constitutional problems surrounding the dissolution of legislative assemblies. There is a discussion of the earlier literature, special and general, and an analysis of representative examples from comparative government.

KNAPPSTEIN, K. H., SAENGER F., ESCHENBURG THEODOR. *Die Beziehungen zwischen Presse und Behoerden.* (Frankfurt a.M.: Institut zur Foerderung Oeffentlicher Angelegenheiten. 1950. Pp. 85.)

A series of stimulating reports, with discussion, on the important problem of the relationship between press and bureaucracy in postwar Germany.

Leimbach, Werner. *Die Sowietunion; Natur, Volk and Wirtschaft.* (Stuttgart: Franck'sche Verlagshandlung. 1950. Pp. 527.)

Comprehensive nonpolitical treatise on the Soviet Union by a geographer.

Loewenstein, Karl. *Vom Wesen der Amerikanischen Verfassung. Kleine Schriften fuer den Staatsbuerger.* Herausgeg. vom Institut zur Foerderung Oeffentlicher Angelegenheiten in Frankfurt a.M. (Frankfurt a.M.: Metzner. 1950. Pp. 75.)

An American political scientist contributes a primer on the American Constitution to this new German civics series.

Luedde, W. *Les derniers jours du 3e Reich.* (Paris: Ed. Berger-Leurault. 1950. Pp. 237.)

French translation of a volume published in German under the title of *Regierung Doenitz* in which a former German naval officer, one time aide of the German Navy's commander, relates his observations and impressions of the last phase of the German collapse in 1945.

Miksch, Leonard, et al. *Der Schutz der Wettbewerbs in der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft; Bericht ueber eine Arbeitstagung.* (Frankfurt a.M.: Institut zur Foerderung Oeffentlicher Angelegenheiten. 1950. Pp. 148.)

Report of a German conference on the problem of cartels and competition in the German "social market economy."

Nawiasky, H. *Die Grundgedanken des Grundgesetzes fuer die Bundesrepublic Deutschland; System und Kritische Wuerdigung.* (Stuttgart and Cologne: W. Kohlhammer. 1950. Pp. 138.)

Concise discussion of the Bonn Constitution by a German constitutional lawyer already well-known in the Weimar Republic.

Der Oeffentliche Dienst in den Vereinigten Staaten von America; Ein Reisebericht. (Frankfurt a.M.: Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Personalwesen. 1950. Pp. 51 and attachments.)

A cooperative outline on the American public service by a German study group, headed by the chief of the former "bizonal" Personnel Office, Dr. Kurt Oppler, with a good selection of illustrative American civil service forms.

Oppler, Kurt and Rosenthal-Pelldram, Erich. *Die Neugestaltung des Oeffentlichen Dienstes.* (Frankfurt a.M.: Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Personalwesen. 1950. Pp. 75.)

An instructive sketch of the "foundations and problems" of the German public service, issued under the auspices of the new German Society for Personnel.

Peters, Hans. *Lehrbuch der Verwaltung.* (Berlin, Goettingen & Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 1949. Pp. xxii, 560.)

A new text in German administrative law by a well-known teacher of public law who has departed from the conventional in this field by expounding the subject against a rather elaborate background of institutional description and interpretation, thus combining *Verwaltungsrecht* and *Verwaltungslehre.*

RINGELMANN, R. GREWE, W., ZINN, G. A. *Bundesrecht und Bundesgesetzgebung.* Bericht ueber die Weinheimer Tagung des Instituts zur Foerderung Oeffentilcher Angelegenheiten in Frankfurt a.M. am 22. 23. Oktober 1949. Wissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe des Instituts zur Foerderung Oeffentlicher Angelegenheiten, Frankfurt a.M. (Metzner. 1950. Pp. 205.)

Report of a meeting on legislative problems, under the auspices of the Public Affairs Institute.

STELTZER, THEODOR. *Von Deutscher Politik.* F. Minnssen (ed.). (Frankfurt: Jos. Knecht. 1949. Pp. 169.)

Essays on German political questions by a writer who is one of the few surviving active members of the "Kreisau Group" in the German anti-Nazi resistance. Includes essays on: the Kreisau group, "Victors and Vanquished," German federalism, the occupation statute, the German constitution, and a memorandum, dated July, 1944, on the character of the German opposition to National Socialism written for the information of the Allies at that time.

STEPHAN, WERNER. *Joseph Goebbels; Daemon einer Diktatur.* (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsanstalt. 1949. Pp. 312.)

A study of Hitler's master propagandist by a former official of his Ministry of Propaganda who has made use of his diaries.

TUERK, FRITZ AND DOERRHOEFFER, WALTER. *Neuzeitliche Methoden der Personalauslese.* (Frankfurt a.M.: Deutsche Gessellschaft fuer Personalwesen. 1950. Pp. 69.)

A study of aptitude testing methods for the selection of public personnel.

DE VRIES, WILHELM, S. J. *Christentum in der Sowjetunion.* (Waibstadt bei Heidelberg: Kemper Verlag. 1950. Pp. 240.)

A Catholic study on the situation of Christianity in the Soviet Union.

WESTPHAL, SIEGFRIED. *Heer in Fesseln; Aus den Papieren des Stabschefs von Rommel, Kesselring und Rundstedt.* (Bonn: Athenaeum Verlag. 1950. Pp. 332.)

The former chief of staff of three top German commanders gives a detailed account of Hitler's interference in the making of military decisions.

YVES, SIMON (ED.) *La Civilisation Américaine.* (Bruges: Deslée de Brouwer. 1950.)

A general symposium by a number of American Catholic scholars, in which the essays most directly relevant from the political scientist's point of view are those by M. A. Fitzsimmons and W. Gurian, on domestic and foreign policy respectively.

ARNOUX, ALEXANDRE. *Contacts Allemands.* (Paris. 1950.)

BARBOSA, DANIEL MARIA VIERIRA. *Politica do Presente—Politica para o Futuro.* (Porto: Livraria Tavares Martins. 1950. Pp. 59.)

BARRERA FUENTES, FLORENCIO. *Historica y Destino del Municipio en Mexico.* (Mexico: 1950. Pp. 106.)

Benedetti, Dante. *De Gasperi, Politico e Statista.* (Roma: Societa Editrice G.d.M. 1949. Pp. 203.)

Berr, Henri. *Allemagne, Le Contre et le Pour.* Collection "Publication de la Revue de Synthèse." (Paris. 1950.)

Bourdet, Claude. *Le Schisme Yougoslave.* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit. 1950. Pp. 124.)

Bouthilier, Yves. *Le Drame de Vichy.* I. (Paris. 1950.)

Calamandrei, Piero. *Commentario Sistematico alla Costituzione Italiana, Diretto da Piero Calamandrei e Allesandro Levi.* Con la collaborazione di P. Barile, et al. (Firenze: G. Barbera. 1950.)

Compagna, Francesco. *La Lotta Politica Italiana nel Secondo Dopoguerra e il Mezzogiorno.* (Bari: G. Laterza. 1950. Pp. 332.)

Crevenna, Theo R. *La Clase Media en Bolivia, Brasil, Chile y Paraguay; Cuatro Colaboraciones.* (Washington: Union Panamericana, Departmento de Asuntos Culturales. 1950. Pp. 117.)

Crevenna, Theo R. *La Clase Media en Mexico y Cuba; Cuatro Colaboraciones.* (Washington: Union Panamericana, Departamento de Asuntos Culturales. 1950. Pp. 98.)

Crouzet, Francois. *L'Economie du Commonwealth.* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1950. Pp. 135.)

Daluces, Jean. *Le Troisième Reich.* (Paris. 1950.)

Debu-Bridel, Jacques. *L'Agonie de la Troisième Republique.* (Paris. 1950.)

Garay, Sandor, *Volontaires pour la Potence; Technique des Procès Sovietiques.* (Paris: Berger-Levrault. 1950. Pp. 191.)

Gedde, Knud. *De Politiske Partier. Medarbejdere Per Haekkerup, et al.* (Kobenhavn: Danske forlag. 1949. Pp. 286.)

Godefroy, P. *L'Union Française. Sa Situation Actuelle, son Relèvement, Son Avenir.* (Paris: Editions Larose. 1950. Pp. 61.)

Grenier, Fernand. *Au Pays de Staline.* (Paris: Editions Sociales. 1950. Pp. 252.)

Guareschi, Nino. *Diario Clandestino, 1943–1945.* (Milano: Rizzoli. 1950. Pp. 208.)

Guatemala. *Constitucion. Constitucion de la Republica de Guatemala decretada por la Asamblea Constituyente en 11 de Marzo de 1945.* (Guatemala. Pp. 128.)

Guyon, Jean Raymond. *Principes d'une Réforme Administrative.* (Paris: Delmas. 1949. Pp. 78.)

Heffter, Heinrich. *Die Deutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert.* (Hamburg: K. F. Koehler. 1949.)

Kalinov, Cyrille. *Les Maréchaux Sovietiques vous Parlent.* (Coll. "Aspects du Monde." Paris. 1950.)

Kardel, Edward. *De la Démocratie Populaire en Yougoslavia.* (Paris: Livre Yougoslave. 1949. Pp. 186.)

Krabbe, Ludvig. *Historie de Danemark, des Origines Jusqu'a 1945.* (Copenhague: E. Munksgaard. 1950. Pp. 375.)

Lagerroth, Fredrik. *Tyskt och Nordiskt i Danmarks Forfattningsutveckling*

1660–1849; Til 100-Arsminnet av Junigrundlovens Tillkomst. (Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup. 1949. Pp. 188.)

LARCEGUI, FRANCISCO DE S. *El Regimen de Espana visto desde el Extranjero.* (Madrid. 1949. Pp. 77.)

LASSAIGNE, JEAN. *Figures Parlementaires.* (Paris: Editions du Globe. 1950. Pp. 427.)

MARTIN, MARCEL. *Le Conseil d'Etat, Sauvegarde de la Démocratie. Der Franzoesische Staatsrat als Hueter der Demokratie.* (Baden-Baden: Régie Autonome des Publications Officielles. Pp. 31.)

MASSON, ANDRÉ. *Histoire de l'Indochine.* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1950. Pp. 128.)

MEDER, WALTER. *Das Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht der UdSSR und der Baltischen Staaten.* (Frankfurt a.M.: W. Metzner. 1950. Pp. 112.)

MERINO BRITO, ELOY GENARO. *La Interpretacion Constitucional. Prologo de Emilio Menendez.* (La Habana: J. Montero. 1949. Pp. 118.)

MIHALOVICS, ZSIGMOND. *Mindszenty; Ungarn, Europa. Ein Zeugenbericht.* (Karlsruhe: Badenia Verlag. Pp. 262.)

MOLINA Y OSORIO, BERTA. *La Constitucion y los Tratados.* (Mexico. 1950. Pp. 68.)

NABUCO, JOAWUIM. *Discursos Parlementares. Selecao e Prefacio do Deputado Gilberto Freyre. Introducao do deputado Munhoz da Rocha.* (Rio de Janeiro. 1950. Pp. 534.)

PERTICONE, GIACOMO. *La Torre di Babele; Italia 1949.* (G. C. Sansoni. 1949. Pp. 226.)

POUZYNA, I. *Lénine "le Grand"; L'Homme, sa Doctrine, son Action.* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines. 1950. Pp. 92.)

PRELLER, LUDWIG. *Sozialpolitik in der Weimarer Republik.* (Stuttgart: Mittelbach. 1949. Pp. 560.)

RISTELHUEBER, RENÉ. *Histoire des Peuples Balkaniques.* (Paris: A. Fayard. 1950. Pp. 503.)

SAENGER, FRITZ. *Die Volksvertretung; Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestags.* (Stuttgart: J. C. Cotta. 1949. Pp. 438.)

SVERIGES SOCIALDEMOKRATISKA ARBETAREPARTI. *Var Kommunalpolitik.* (1949. Pp. 278.)

TOGLIATTI, PALMIRO. *Linea d'Una Politica; Presentazione di G. Titta Rosa.* (Milano: Milano-Sera. 1949. Pp. 170.)

VALIANI, LEO. *L'Avvento di De Gasperi; Tre Anni di Politica Italiana.* (Torino: F. de Silva. 1949. Pp. 167.)

VAUSSARD, MAURICE. *Histoire de l'Italie Contemporaine, 1870–1946.* (Paris: Hachette. 1950. Pp. 352.)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

COULONDRE, ROBERT. *De Staline à Hitler; Souvenirs De Deux Ambassades 1936–1939.* (Paris: Hachette. 1950. Pp. 334.)

Recollections of the former French Ambassador to Moscow (1936–1938) and Berlin

(November 1938–1939). Background evidence from an experienced and skilled diplomat.

Dirksen, Herbert von. *Moskau, Tokio, London. 20 Jahre Deutscher Aussenpolitik.* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer. Pp. 279.)

These are "recollections and reflections on 20 years of German foreign policy, 1919–1939" by a former German ambassador. While they do not contain any startling revelations, they constitute an important eye-witness account of atmosphere and diplomatic activities in three focal centers of German and world diplomacy. The author, a member of the older Wilhelmstrasse set, has the frame of mind of those technicians who endeavored to carry on as non-Nazis.

Giraud, Emile. *La Nullité de la Politique Internationale des Grandes Democraties (1919–1939). L'Echec de la Société des Nations. La Guerre.* (Paris: Recueil Sirey. 1949. Pp. xvi, 278.)

The author, well-known for his earlier writings on the executive in European and American democracies (1938) and on the political reconstruction of France (1946), here presents a reasoned and lucid exposé of basic shortcomings of the western democracies, in terms of both group attitudes and institutions, which he holds responsible for the sad condition of international society. His viewpoint is suggested by chapter headings such as "responsibility of the democracies for the advent of nationalist dictatorships," "American isolationism," "British and French isolationism," "Erroneous doctrines of pacificism," "Manifestations of incapacity in the democracies," etc.

Helmrich, Wilhelm. *Das Ruhrgebiet, Wirtschaft und Verflechtung.* Veroeffentlichungen des Provinzialinstituts fuer Westfaelische Landes und Volkskunde. (Muenster: Aschendorff. 1949. Pp. 248, maps.)

Study of the Ruhr regional problem confined to the period ending 1938–39.

Holldack, Heinz. *Was Wirklich Geschah. Die Diplomatischen Hintergruende der Deutschen Kriegspolitik.* (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1949. Pp. 548.)

An appraisal of the Nazis' diplomatic preparation for war, based upon the findings of the Nuremberg trial of the major war criminals (disarmament and rearmament, customs union, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the outbreak of war, Hitler and Mussolini, etc.) About half the volume is devoted to relevant documentation.

Kremser, Rudolf. *Staat und Nebenstaat.* (Vienna: Wancura. Pp. 136.)

Broad sketch of the problem of the universal state seen against its historical background since classical antiquity.

Schmidt, Paul. *Statist auf Diplomatischer Buehne, 1923–45; Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswaertigen Amt mit den Staatsmaennern Europas.* (Bonn: Athenaeum Verlag. 1949. Pp. 604.)

Recollections of the former chief interpreter in the German Foreign Office, extracts of which have been published in translation by the *New York Times* earlier this year.

Schmoller, Gustav von. *Die Befuguisse der Besatzungsmaechte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.* Dokumente und Berichte des Europa Archivs, Vol. 8. (Frankfurt a.M.: Europa Archiv. 1950. Pp. viii, 72.)

A documentary volume on the powers retained by the western occupying nations over the Bonn Republic, issued in a monograph series of the *Europa Archiv*, one of the most valuable of the new German periodicals.

BERGER, HANS-SIEGFRIED. *Die Rolle der Waehrungspolitik in den Angelsaechsischen Plaenen zur Reorganisation der Weltwirtschaft.*

DIEZ DE MEDINA, EDUARDO. *Diplomacia y Politica Internacionales.* (La Paz. 1949. Pp. 279.)

ESCALANTE BARANDA, ANGEL. *La Organizacion Internacional del Trabajo.* (Mexico. 1950. Pp. 75.)

FERRER VIEYRA, ENRIQUE. *Privilegios e Inmundidades en los Organismos Internacionales.* (Cordoba: Impr. de la Universidad. 1949. Pp. 92.)

HAUSSMANN, FREDERICK. *Der Neuaufbau der Deutschen Kohlenwirtschaft im Internationalen Rahmen; Ein Beitrag zur Anwendung des Antitrust-Gedankens auf Europa.* (München: C. H. Beck. 1950. Pp. 182.)

INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION. *38th Conference, Stockholm 1949. Compte rendu.* (Genève. 1949. Pp. 847.)

ISTITUTO PER GLI STUDI DI ECONOMIA. *Documenti sul Piano Marshall nel Primo Anno di Attuazione.* (Milano: Instituto Editoriale Italiano. 1949. Pp. 542.)

KRAUS, HERBERT. *Die Auswaertige Stellung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland nach dem Bonner Grundgesetz.* (Goettingen: Musterschmidt. 1950. Pp. 24.)

MAJDRAGANOW, DIMITER BORISSOW. *Die Staatenlosen im Internationalen Privatrecht und Fremdenrecht.* (Heidelberg. 1947. Pp. 116.)

MALLET-CHAUVEAU, ARTHUR. *La Solution du Problème Humain.* (Paris: Editions Biocratiques. 1949. Pp. 80.)

MARANTZ, MARCEL. *Le Plan Marshall, Succès ou Faillité?* (Paris: M. Rivière. 1950. Pp. 273.)

MOURANIEFF, BORIS. *Le Problème de l'Autorité Superétatique.* (Paris. 1950.)

PHILIP, OLIVIER. *Le Problème de l'Union Européenne.* (Paris. 1950.)

RABIER, J. R. *Le Plan Monnet.* (Paris: Librarie Sociale et Economique. 1950. Pp. 56.)

RAIN, PIERRE. *La Diplomatie Française.* (Paris. 1950.)

TOBER, GUSTAV. *Der Hypothetische Parteiwille im Internationalen Vertragsrecht.* (Juris-Verlag. 1949. Pp. 141.)

VETTER, ARTHUR. *Die Bank fur Internationalen Zahlungsausgleich; unter Besonderer Beruecksichtigung ihrer Clearing-Funktion im Rahmen des Europaeischen Wiederaufbauprogramme.* (Heidelberg. 1950. Pp. 124.)

VOLMARS, JANIS. *Europaeische Zusammenarbeit und die Europaeische Zollunion.* (Brunswick, Berlin, Hamburg: G. Westermann. 1949. Pp. 272.)

WINTER, EDUARD. *Russland und die Slawischen Voelker in der Diplomatie des Vatikans, 1878–1903.* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 1950. Pp. 186.)

WISSLER, ALBERT. *Wirtschaftseinheit Europas. Gesichtspunkte und Materialien ueber die Stellung und Aufgaben Deutschlands in einer Gesunden Europaeischen Wirtschaft.* Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung. No. 5. (Berlin, Munich: Duncker und Humblot. 1949. Pp. 120.)

POLITICAL THEORY AND JURISPRUDENCE

CHEVALLIER, JEAN-JACQUES. *Les Grandes Oeuvres Politiques; De Machiavel à Nos Jours.* Pref. by A. Siegfried. (Paris: Armand Colin. 1950. Pp. xiii, 406.)

A re-examination, by a distinguished French scholar, of the development of political thought, traced through the study of a number of great or influential works, ranging from the *Prince* to *Mein Kampf,* with a concluding essay on "Reason against Leviathan."

KIRCHMANN, J. H. VON. *La Jurisprudencia No Es Ciencia.* Trans. and edited by Antonio Truyol y Serra. (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos. 1949. Pp. 83.)

A Spanish translation of Kirchmann's famous speech on the worthlessness of law as a science (1847), with an introductory essay by the translator, a teacher of the philosophy of law at the University of Madrid.

NILSSON, STEN S. *Histoire et Sciences Politiques: Essai sur la Méthode Quantitative.* (Bergen: Chr. Michelsens Institutt, A. S. Grieg. 1950. Pp. 162.)

A Norwegian scholar's study, undertaken with UNESCO support, and written in French, on the use of the quantitative method in political science and its possible value in examining the problem of historical causation. Particular stress is laid on the literature of electoral statistics and sociology, on which the writer includes a helpful international bibliography. Appendices on the quantitative method in international studies and the problem of revolution and dictatorship.

PRÉLOT, MARCEL. *Politique d'Aristote.* (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Science Politique. (Presses Universitaires de France. 1950. Pp. xxviii, 229.)

A new French edition of Aristotle's *Politics* by a distinguished constitutional lawyer and political scientist. The editor is of the opinion that "for our hard-pressed contemporaries, it is too difficult and, above all, too time-consuming to read Aristotle" because the *Politics* requires more than ordinary concentration and understanding of allusions and references to unfamiliar institutions. To remedy this, Prélot has sought to make the *Politics* more genuinely accessible for the modern student by somewhat modernizing and simplifying the text and, more importantly, by rearranging it into four major divisions which he regards as basic: household government, citizen and state, political government, revolutions and the maintenance of governments. A highly suggestive undertaking and sure to arouse controversy at home and abroad.

SAUER, WILHELM. *System der Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie.* (Basel: Verlag fuer Recht und Gesellschaft. A.G. 1949. Pp. xvi, 520.) (American Representative, New York: A. J. Phiebig, 545 Fifth Avenue.)

Second and revised edition of this massive textbook of legal and social philosophy in which the distinguished author combines the presentation of his own system with that of the history of philosophical, sociological, legal and political ideas in which it is embedded.

STEINIGER, ALFONS. *Das Blocksystem; Beitrag zu einer Demokratischen Verfassungslehre.* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. 1949. Pp. 78.)

Despite its limited size, an important attempt to provide a rationalization in constitutional theory of the process and practices of the party bloc system of the "people's democracy" in the German Soviet zone and elsewhere.

TEJADA, FRANCISCO ELIAS DE. *Las Doctrinas Politicas de Eugenio Maria de Hostos.* (Madrid: Ediciones Cultural Hispanica. 1949. Pp. 208.)

A documented study of the 19th century Spanish Puerto Rican "Don Quixote of Liberty," political publicist, constitutional lawyer and educator, one of the influential figures in the Spanish-American world of his time.

ALFIERI, VITTORIO ENZO. *Autorita e Liberta nelle Moderne Teorie dell Politica.* (Milano: C. Marzorato. 1950.)

BAUDRY, LÉON. *Guillaume d'Occam. Sa Vie, Ses Oeuvres, etc. Vol. I.* (Paris. 1950.)

BARTOLI, HENRI. *La Doctrine Economique et Sociale de Karl Marx.* (Paris. 1950.)

BECCARI, ARTURO. *Il Pensiero Politico Classico.* (Milano: Societa Editrice "Vita e Pensiero." 1949. Pp. 223.)

BENEYTO, PEREZ JUAN. *Los Origenes de la Ciencia Politica en Espana.* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos. 1949. Pp. 414.)

DJILAS, MILOVAN. *Lénine et les Rapports Entre Etats Socialistes.* (Paris: Livre Yougoslave. 1949. Pp. 125.)

EBERS, GODEHARD JOSEF. *Grundriss des Katholischen Kirchenrechts; Rechtsgeschichte und System.* (Wien: Manzsche Verlags- und Universitaetsbuchhandlung. 1950. Pp. 479.)

GIUSTI, WOLFANGO. *Il Pensiero di Trotzký.* (Firenze: Le Monnier. 1949. Pp. 162.)

GUTIERREZ LASANTA, FRANCISCO. *Pensadores Politicos del Siglo XIX.* (Madrid: Editora Nactional. 1949. Pp. 384.)

JAMES, EMILIE. *Histoire des Théories Economiques.* (Paris: Flammarion. 1950. Pp. 329.)

JERUSALEM, FRANZ WILHELM. *Die Staatsidee des Föderalismus.* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1949. Pp. 70.)

La Femme et le Communisme; Anthologie des Grands Textes du Marxisme. Précédée d'une Présentation de Jeannette Vermeersch et d'une Étude de Jean Freville. (Paris: Editions Sociales. 1950. Pp. 223.)

LEONOV, M. *Le Marxisme et la Prévision Scientifique.* (Paris. 1950.)

MEYER, JAN DE. *Crisis der Europeesche Staatsphilosophie, De Staatsidee bij de Fransche Philosofen op den Vooravond van de Revolutie.* (Antwerpen: Standaard Boekhandel. 1949. Pp. 367.)

MIREAUX, EMILE. *Philosophie du Liberalisme.* (Paris: Flammarion. 1950. Pp. 347.)

PIETTRE, ANDRÉ. *Humanisme Chrétien et Economie Politique.* (Paris: 1950.)

RUYSSEN, THEODORE. *La Societé Internationale.* Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine. (Páris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1950. Pp. 240.)

SANCHEZ REULET, ANIBAL. *La Filosofiá Latinoamericana Contemporanea.* Washington: Union Panamericana. 1949. Pp. 370.)

VARGA, E. AND MENDELSOHN, L. *Donners Complimentaires à L'Imperialisme de Lénine.* (Paris. 1950.)

INDEX TO VOLUME XLIV

COMPILED BY EMMA RHYNE PATTERSON

Abbott, Roger S. and Sicard, Roger. A Postwar Development in French Regional Government: The *"Super Préfet"*.................. 426
Abel, Albert S. Book reviews........1022
Abshagen, K. H. Books of, noticed..1073
Acomb, Frances. Books of, noticed... 804
Adam, H. T. Books of, noted.......1054
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Book notes.... 782
  Book notices..........1043, 1074, 1075
  Book reviews on: Schwartz, Bernard. *Law and the Executive in Britain*. 196
Adorno, T. W. Books of, reviewed....1005
AFRICA. Book notices............... 511
Aikin, Charles. Book reviews........ 488
Alasco, Johannes. Books of, noticed.. 804
Alighieri, Dante. Books of, noticed... 514
Alinsky, Saul. Books of, reviewed...1019
Allen, Robert S. Books of, noticed... 506
Almond, Gabriel A. Books of, reviewed 757
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION. Zink, Harold. The Growth of the *American Political Science Review*, 1926–1949.............. 257
  Committee Announcements for 1950 233
  Committee Reports.............. 810
  Forty-fifth Annual Meeting: The Program...................... 150
  News and Notes......150, 435, 718, 961
  Presidential Address.............. 1
  Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, Report of the Committee on Political Parties....... ....Supplement
Anderson, William. Book notes...... 218
  Books of, noted.................. 500
Appleby, Paul H. Political Science, the Next Twenty-Five Years....... 924
Arakelian, A. Books of, noted....... 784
ARGENTINA. Book notices...........1074
Arneson, Ben A. and Eells, William H. Voting Behavior in 1948 as Compared with 1924 in a Typical Ohio Community.............. 432
Arnold, Thurman W. Books of, noticed........................ 775
ASIA. Book notices..........786, 796, 797
  Book reviews on: Keeton, George W. *China, the Far East, and the Future*....................... 208
  Mills, Lennox A., *et al. The New World of Southeast Asia*........ 763
Aubert, Louis F. Books of, noticed... 509
AUSTRALIA. Book reviews on: Crisp, L. F. *The Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia*.................... 764
AUSTRIA. Book notices.............. 509

Bach, G. L. Books of, reviewed......1016
Bailey, Stephen K. Book reviews..... 483
  Books of, reviewed.............. 468
Bailey, Sydney D. Books of, noted... 771
Bailey, Thomas A. Books of, noticed. 797
Baldwin, Hanson W. Books of, noticed1045
Ballis, William B. Book notes....... 510
  Book reviews.................... 486
Barker, Ernest. British Ideas of a Social Parliament................ 14
Barnard, Chester I. Book reviews....1004
Bartholomew, Paul C. Comments on Pathology of Democracy in Latin America...................... 147
  Books of, noticed................ 505
Bartlett, Ruhl. Book notes.......... 793
Bates, Gilbert L. Books of, noted.... 504
Bauer, John. Books of, noticed......1044
  Books of, reviewed...............1017
Bean, Louis H. Books of, noticed....1044
Becker, Carl. Books of, noted........ 231
Behling, Burton N. Book notes...... 504
Beloff, Max. Books of, noticed....... 514
Bemis, Samuel Flagg. Books of, noticed........................ 797
Bennett, Walter H. (ed.). News and Notes............150, 435, 718, 961
  Book reviews.................... 476
Bentley, Arthur F. Books of, reviewed 742
Berelson, Bernard. Books of, noticed.1067
Berlau, A. Joseph. Books of, noted.. 507
Berle, Adolf A., Jr. Books of, noticed. 775
Bernstein, Irving. Books of, noted...1042
Bernstein, Marver. Book reviews....1017
Bestor, Arthur Eugene, Jr. Books of, reviewed......................1006
BIBLIOGRAPHY. Burdine, J. Alton and Redford, Emmette S. Articles and Documents....................1045
  Einaudi, Mario. Articles and Documents.......................1052

—— Nationalization of Industry in Western Europe: Recent Literature and Debates............ 177
Fellman, David. Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science...... 689
Kempner, Robert M. W. The Nuremberg Trials as Sources of Recent German Political and Historical Materials........... 447
Kraus, Wolfgang H. Recent Foreign Books...................1072
Parks, E. T. Note on Research in Department of State Records...1056
Simon, Herbert A. Articles and Documents...................1070
Thorelli, Sarah Scott. Political Science in Sweden............. 977
Travis, Martin B., Jr. Articles and Documents...................1059
Wilson, Francis G. Articles and Documents...................1067
Articles listed...777, 786, 797, 805, 1045, ...1052, 1059, 1067, 1070
Book notes.............221, 503, 1052
Book notices............511, 776, 796
Books listed.......515, 808, 1072, 1076, ...1080, 1082
Documents listed......1048, 1052, 1063
Note on Periodical Literature in Political Science.............. 807
Bilainkin, George. Books of, noticed. 786
Binkley, Wilfred E. Books of, reviewed........................ 199
BIOGRAPHY. Book notes............ ....221, 501, 513, 793, 1039
Book notices....506, 509, 775, 804, 1076
Book reviews on: Alinsky, Saul. *John L. Lewis*................1019
Brant, Irving. *James Madison*..... 755
Roosevelt, Eleanor. *This I Remember*......................... 496
Wittke, Carl. *The Utopian Communist*......................1006
Bird, Frederick L. Books of, noted.. 216
Bogue, Don J. Books of, noted...... 218
Bond, Floyd A. Books of, noticed.....1067
Bone, Hugh A. Book notes.......... 772
Books of, noted.................. 499
Borland, Harriet. Books of, noticed..1052
Bouscaren, Anthony Trawick. Books of, noted..................... 795
Boyd, Julian P. Books of, reviewed... 753
Bradley, Phillips. Book notes........1065
Brandt, Karl. Books of, noted....... 225
Brant, Irving. Books of, reviewed.... 755
Breckenridge, A. C. Books of, noticed 506, 1043
Bretton, Henry L. Books of, noticed.. 509
Brinton, Crane. Books of, noticed.... 514
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. Wheare, K. C. Is the British Commonwealth Withering Away?........ 545
Book notices................... 508
Brodie, Bernard. Book reviews.......1035
Bromage, Arthur W. Books of, noted. 500
Brown, Everett S. Books of, noticed..1052
Brown, George W. Books of, noticed .. 785
Brown, Stuart Gerry. Books of, noticed........................ 796
Browne, Vincent J. Books of, noted.. 220
Brownlow, Louis. Books of, reviewed. 198
Brunner, Edmund deS. Books of, noticed........................ 775
Bryan, Gordon K. Books of, noticed..1044
Buck, Philip W. Book notes.........1049
Books of, noticed............... 786
Burdine, J. Alton. Articles and Documents.......................1045
Book notes..................... 501
Burnham, James. Books of, reviewed. 748
Burns, James MacGregor. The Parliamentary Labor Party in Great Britain..................... 855
Book notes..................... 501
Bush, George P. Books of, noticed....1044
Butts, R. Freeman. Books of, reviewed1024

Cadman, John William, Jr. Books of, noticed...................... 506
Caldwell, Lynton K. Book notes.....1066
Cale, Edgar B. Book reviews........ 215
Campagnolo, Umberto. Books of, noticed.......................1072
Campbell, John C. Books of, reviewed 211
CANADA. Book notes...........508, 1050
Book notices................... 785
CAPITALISM. Book notices........775, 804
CARIBBEAN. Book reviews on: Fox, Annette Baker. *Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean*.......... 204
Carman, E. Day. Books of, noted.... 795
Casserre, Georges. Books of, noticed..1072
Chandler, Lester V. Book reviews....1016
Cherioux, Jean. Books of, noticed....1073
Chevallier, Jean-Jacques. Books of, noticed.......................1081
CHINA. Steiner, H. Arthur. Chinese Communist Urban Policy...... 47

Book notes.......................... 784
Book notices.......................... 786
Book reviews on: Keeton, George W. *China, the Far East, and the Future*.......................... 208
Christensen, A. N. Books of, noticed.. 776
Chukuwemeka, Nwankwo. Books of, noticed.......................... 511
Ciliga, Anton. Books of, noticed......1073
Cleverdon, Catherine Lyle. Books of, noticed.......................... 785
Clissold, Stephen. Books of, noticed.. 509
Coase, R. H. Books of, noticed...... 785
Coblenz, Constance G. Book notes... 225
Coit, Margaret L. Books of, noticed.. 775
Cole, K. C. Book reviews........... 201
COMMUNISM. Prendergast. William B. State Legislatures and Communism: The Current Scene........ 556
Book notices................786, 1067
Book reviews on: Bestor, Arthur Eugene, Jr. *Backwoods Utopias*..1006
Burnham, James. *The Coming Defeat of Communism*............ 748
Hunt, R. N. Carew. *The Theory and Practice of Communism*..... 748
Wittke, Carl. *The Utopian Communist*..........................1006
COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT. Abbott, Roger S. and Sicard, Roger. A Postwar Development in French Regional Government: The "*Super Préfet*"............... 426
Burns, James MacGregor. The Parliamentary Labor Party in Great Britain................. 855
Einaudi, Mario. Nationalization of Industry in Western Europe: Recent Literature and Debates.. 177
Fainsod, Merle. Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System.. 266
Nemzer, Louis. The Kremlin's Professional Staff: The "Apparatus" of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 64
Robson, William A. Nationalised Industries in Britain and France. 299
Steiner, H. Arthur. Chinese Communist Urban Policy.......... 47
Thorelli, Sarah Scott. Political Science in Sweden.............. 977
Wheare, K. C. Is the British Commonwealth Withering Away? 545
Book notes..222, 508, 781, 783, 784, 1051
Book notices....508, 509, 785, 786, 1052, ...1072, 1073, 1074, 1075, 1076, 1081
Book reviews on: Crisp, L. F. *The Parliamentary Government of the Commonweath of Australia*..... 764
Galenson, Walter. *Labor in Norway*.......................... 206
Macdonald, Austin F. *Latin American Politics and Government*.......................... 215
Ogg, Frederic A. and Zink, Harold. *Modern Foreign Governments*.......................... 209
Schwartz, Bernard. *Law and the Executive in Britain*............ 196
Shannon, Jasper (ed.). *The Study of Comparative Government*....... 483
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Harris, Robert J. Constitutional Law in 1948–1949.......................... 23
Mason, Alpheus T. Business Organized as Power: The New Imperium in Imperio............. 323
Book notices...........775, 1043, 1073
Book reviews on: Butts, R. F. *The American Tradition in Religion and Education*.................1024
Cook, Thomas I. Generalists Versus Specialists in Social Science: Discussion...................... 387
Cooper, Weldon. Book notes........ 500
Copeland, Thomas W. Books of, noted 513
Corbett, P. E. Book reviews......... 484
Costello, Peter. Books of, noticed....1044
Coulondre, Robert. Books of, noticed.1078
Coulter, E. Merton. Books of, noticed. 775
Cowan, Laing Gray. Books of, noticed.1056
Craig, Gordon A. Book reviews......1029
Crawford, W. Rex. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America. Discussion: A Sociologist's Point of View...................... 143
Crisp, L. F. Books of, reviewed....... 764
Crouch, Winston W. Books of, noticed 505, 1044
Cushman, Robert Eugene. Books of, noticed...................... 775

Dauer, Manning J. Book reviews.... 482
Davey, Harold W. Book notes....... 503
Davie, Maurice R. Books of, noted... 231
Dawson, R. MacGregor. Books of, noted...................... 508
Dealey, J. Q. Book notes........... 226

Dearing, Charles L. Books of, reviewed........ 488
De Grazia, Alfred. Book reviews.....1005
Denis, Bernard. Books of, noticed....1073
Dennett, Raymond. Books of, noted.. 227
Dennis, Eugene. Books of, noticed...1067
Department of State. Books of, noted 793
Desai, A. R. Books of, reviewed..... 207
D'Eufemia, Giuseppe. Books of, noticed........1074
De Vries, Wilhelm. Books of, noticed.1076
Diebold, William. Books of, noticed.. 509
Dillon, Conley H. Book notes....... 228
Dirksen, Herbert von. Books of, noticed........1079
Dixon, Robert G. Books of, noticed...1043
Doerrhoeffer, Walter. Books of, noticed........1076
Dorr, Harold M. Book reviews...... 199
Dubester, Henry J. Books of, noticed. 776
Duclos, Pierre. Books of, noticed....1072
Dulles, John Foster. Books of, reviewed........ 751
Dutt, R. Palme. Books of, noticed.... 785

Eagleton, Clyde. Books of, noticed... 511
Earle, Edward Mead. Books of, reviewed........ 761
ECONOMICS. Einaudi, Mario. Nationalization of Industry in Western Europe: Recent Literature and Debates........ 177
  Mason, Alpheus T. Business Organized as Power: The New Imperium in Imperio............ 323
  Mosk, Sanford A. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: An Economist's Point of View.. 129
  Robson, William A. Nationalised Industries in Britain and France. 299
  Spengler, J. J. Generalists Versus Specialists in Social Science: An Economist's View.............. 358
  Book notes......220, 504, 774, 803, 1042
  Book notices.....506, 507, 510, 775, 785, ...805, 1044, 1045, 1075
  Book reviews on: Bach, G. L. *Federal Reserve Policy-Making*.....1016
  Dearing, Charles L. and Owen, Wilfred. *National Transportation Policy*........ 488
  Gold, Bela. *Wartime Planning in Agriculture*........ 490
  Hancock, W. K. and Gowing, M. M. *British War Economy*.... 464
  Orton, William A. *The Economic Role of the State*................1010
  Secretary of Commerce. *Issues Involved in a Unified and Coordinated Federal Program for Transportation*........ 488
Eells, William H. and Arneson, Ben A. Voting Behavior in 1948 as Compared with 1924 in a Typical Ohio Community............. 432
Edelman, Murray. Books of, noted..1041
Einaudi, Mario. Articles and Documents........1052
  Nationalization of Industry in Western Europe: Recent Literature and Debates............. 177
Einstein, Albert. Books of, noticed... 804
Elliott, William Y. Books of, reviewed........ 476
Elsbree, Hugh L. (ed.). Book Reviews, Notes, Notices and Articles..... ....177, 447, 742, 977
Emerson, Rupert. Book reviews..... 204
Emery, Edwin. Books of, noted...... 504
Emme, Eugene. Books of, noticed... 796
Ernst, Morris L. Books of, noticed... 775
Eschenburg, Theodor. Book of, noticed........1074
Esman, Milton J. Administrative Stability and Change............. 942
EUROPE. Einaudi, Mario. Nationalization of Industry in Western Europe: Recent Literature and Debates........ 177
  Book notices................510, 511
European Affairs Division, Library of Congress. Books of, noticed...510, 511
Ewing, Cortez A. M. Book reviews.. 495

Fahy, Julian. Book notes........... 221
Fainsod, Merle. Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System........... 266
Fairman, Charles. Book reviews..... 497
  Books of, noticed...............1043
FAR EAST. *See* ASIA.
FEDERALISM. Lepawsky, Albert. Water Resources and American Federalism........ 631
  Book reviews on: Wendell, Mitchell. *Relations Between the Federal and State Courts*........ 492
Fellman, David. Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science........ 689
  Book reviews................473, 1024
  Books of, noticed 1043

Ferguson, John H. Book reviews..... 206
Books of, noticed............776, 1043
Fesler, James W. (ed.). Government and Water Resources: A Symposium...................... 575
Book reviews................... 464
Field, Oliver P. Books of, noticed.... 507
Filler, Louis. Books of, noticed...... 776
Finer, Herman. Book reviews........ 470
Books of, noted................. 222
Finer, S. E. Books of, noted.........1049
Fitzgibbon, Russell H. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Political Scientist's Point of View. 118
Book notes.....................1051
Flanders, Ralph E. Books of, noticed.1045
Forgues, Maximo I. G. Books of, noticed.........................1074
Forsthoff, Ernst. Books of, noticed...1074
Fox, Annette Baker. Books of, reviewed...................... 204
Fox, William T. R. Book reviews.... 751
FRANCE. Abbott, Roger S. and Sicard, Roger. A Postwar Development in French Regional Government: The "*Super Préfet*"........... 426
Robson, William A. Nationalised Industries in Britain and France. 299
Book notices...........804, 1056, 1074
Book reviews on: Rossi, Angelo. *A Communist Party in Action*.... 470
Frank, Jerome. Books of, reviewed... 201
Frasure, Carl M. Book reviews...... 214
Frenkel-Brunswik, Else. Books of, reviewed.....................1005
Freund, Paul A. Books of, reviewed.. 494
Friedrich, Carl J. Book notes........ 512
Friis, Henning. Books of, noted......1051

Galenson, Walter. Books of, reviewed. 206
Gange, John. Book reviews.......... 194
Gantenbein, James W. Books of, noticed........................ 512
Garceau, Oliver. Book notes........ 499
Books of, noted.................. 503
Garraty. John Arthur. Books of, noticed... 506
Garrison, Lloyd K. Books of, noticed. 775
Gelber, Lionel. Books of, noticed....1056
GERMANY. Kempner, Robert M. W. The Nuremberg Trials as Sources of Recent German Political and Historical Materials........... 447
Book notes...........224, 225, 507, 803
Book notices.......509, 512, 1074, 1075, ...1076, 1079
Book reviews on: Lerner, Daniel. *Sykewar*.................... 760
Meinecke, Friedrich. *The German Catastrophe*..................1029
Gervasi, Frank. Books of, noted..... 217
Gil, Federico G. Comments on Pathology of Democracy in Latin America...................... 147
Book notes..................... 223
Gill, Frederick W. Books of, noted... 504
Giraud, Emile. Books of, noticed.....1079
Goehring, Martin. Books of, noticed..1074
Gold, Bela. Books of, reviewed...... 490
Goodrich, Leland M. Book notes.... 793
Gosnell, Harold F. Book notes....... 503
Book reviews................... 496
Gough, J. W. Books of, reviewed...... 767
Gourou, Pierre. Books of, noticed..... 786
Gowing, M. M. Books of, reviewed... 464
Graves, W. Brooke. Books of, noted.. 499
GREAT BRITAIN. Barker, Ernest. British Ideas of a Social Parliament..... 14
Burns, James MacGregor. The Parliamentary Labor Party in Great Britain................. 855
Robson, William A. Nationalised Industries in Britain and France. 299
Book notes..............781, 782, 1049
Book notices.................508, 785
Book reviews on: Hancock, W. K. and Gowing, M. M. *British War Economy*.................... 464
Schwartz, Bernard. *Law and the Executive in Britain*........... 196
Greenfield, Margaret. Books of, noticed........................1044
Gregorie, Anne King. Books of, noticed....................... 505
Grewe, W. Books of, noticed.........1076
Grob, Fritz. Books of, reviewed...... 497
Gross, Bertram M. Book reviews..... 742
Gsovski, Vladimir. Book notes...... 783
Guarino, Giuseppe. Books of, noticed.1074
Guerrant, Edward O. Books of, reviewed.......................1037
Guillaume, Michel. Books of, noticed.1073
Gunther, John. Books of, noted.......1039
Gurvitch, George. Books of, noticed.. 513

Hadsel, Winifred N. Book Notes..227, 228
Hagan, Charles B. Book notes.......1043
Hailey, Foster. Books of, noticed.... 797
Hall, Ford P. Books of, noticed...... 507
Hall, Jerome. Books of, noted....... 803

Hallowell, John H. Book reviews..... 203
Hancock, W. K. Books of, reviewed.. 464
Harper, Samuel N. Books of, noted.. 783
Harris, Robert J. Constitutional Law in 1948–1949.................. 23
Harris, Seymour E. Books of, noted.. 231
Harrison, Richard Edes. Books of, noted........................ 227
Hart, James. Book reviews.......... 755
  Books of, noticed................1043
Harvey, Lashley G. Book notes......1040
Hattery, Lowell H. Books of, noticed. 1044
Hawley, Amos H. Books of, noticed.. 805
Hawley, Claude E. Book reviews.... 760
Heady, Ferrel. Book notes.......... 217
Heard, Alexander. Interviewing Southern Politicians................. 886
Hebden, Norman. Books of, noted....1040
Heckscher, Gunnar. Books of, noted.. 784
Heindel, Richard H. Book notes..... 774
  Book reviews.................... 212
  Books of, noticed................1067
Heller, Francis Howard. Books of, noticed........................ 506
Helmrich, Wilhelm. Books of, noticed 1079
Helms, E. Allen. Book notes........ 229
Hildebrand, George H. Books of, noticed........................ 514
HISTORY. Whitaker, Arthur P. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Historian's Point of View........................ 101
  Book notes..................... ..221, 222, 504, 512, 784, 802, 803, 1066
  Book notices.....505, 508, 509, 514, 775, ...776, 785, 797, 804, 805, 1074
  Book reviews on: Boyd, Julian P. (ed.). *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*...................... 753
    Brant, Irving. *James Madison*... 755
    Earle, Edward Mead (ed.). *Nationalism and Internationalism*... 761
    Grob, Fritz. *The Relativity of War and Peace*.................... 497
Hodges, Wiley E. Book reviews......1006
Hoffman, Ross J. S. Books of, noted.. 513
Holcombe, Arthur N. Book reviews.. 192
Holland, L. M. Books of, noted...... 219
Holldack, Heinz. Books of, noticed...1079
Hoover, Glen. Books of, noticed..... 805
Hoskins, Halford L. Book reviews.... 211
Hotz, Alfred J. Book notes.......... 227
Hougham, George M. Book notes.... 508
Howley, Frank. Books of, noticed.... 512
Hudson, Manley O. Books of, noted.. 226
Humphrey, Hubert H. The Senate on Trial........................ 650
HUNGARY. Book notices............ 509
Hunt, R. N. Carew. Books of, reviewed...................... 748
Huntington, Samuel P. A Revised Theory of American Party Politics 669
Hurst, Willard. Book notes.......... 803
  Books of, reviewed.............1022
Hutchins, Robert M. Books of, noticed......................... 514
Hyman, Herbert. Books of, reviewed. 459
Hyneman, Charles S. Books of, reviewed....................... 990

INDIA. Book notices................ 509
  Book reviews on: Desai, A. R. *Social Background of Indian Nationalism* 207
Institut fuer Besatzungsfragen. Books of, noticed...................1072
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ORGANIZATION. Potter, Pitman B. The Logic of International Relations and Organization......... 661
  Book notes..................228, 1054
  Book notices............510, 796, 1056
  Book reviews on: Earle, Edward Mead (ed.). *Nationalism and Internationalism*................ 761
  See also INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNITED NATIONS.
INTERNATIONAL LAW. Kempner, Robert M. W. The Nuremberg Trials as Sources of Recent German Political and Historical Materials....................... 447
  Book notes...............224, 226, 794
  Book notices................... 511
  Book reviews on: Grob, Fritz. *The Relativity of War and Peace*...... 497
  See also LEGAL THEORY AND INSTITUTIONS.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Crawford, W. Rex. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America. Discussion: A Sociologist's Point of View...... 143
  Fitzgibbon, Russell H. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Political Scientist's Point of View....................... 118
  Knappen, Marshall. Shipping Quotas and the Military Assistance Program................ 933

  Mosk, Sanford A. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: An Economist's Point of View.. 129
  Pierson, W. W. (ed.). Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Symposium................ 100
  Potter, Pitman B. The Logic of International Relations and Organization.................... 661
  Whitaker, Arthur P. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Historian's Point of View....... 101
Book notes......223, 510, 791, 795, 1055
Book notices.....510, 511, 512, 785, 786, ...796, 797, 1045, 1056, 1067, 1072, ...1078, 1079
Book reviews on: Campbell, John C., *et al. The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949*............ 211
  Desai, A. R. *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*............ 207
  Dulles, John Foster. *War or Peace* 751
  Fox, Annette Baker. *Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean*........ 204
  Guerrant, Edward O. *Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy*...........1037
  Keeton, George W. *China, the Far East, and the Future*........ 208
  Leahy, William D. *I Was There*..1035
  Lerner, Daniel. *Sykewar*........ 760
  Linton, Ralph (ed.). *Most of the World*...................... 214
  McCune, George M. *Korea Today*.1031
  Meinecke, Friedrich. *The German Catastrophe*...................1029
  Mills, Lennox A., *et al., The New World of Southeast Asia*......... 763
  Reischauer, Edwin O. *The United States and Japan*.............1034
  Rosenman, Samuel I. (ed.). *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*........... 756
  Scott, Franklin D. *The United States and Scandinavia*.......... 765
  See also INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY.
IRAN. Book notes.................. 510
Irion, Frederick C. Public Opinion Research—An Opportunity for Political Parties............... 916
  Books of, noted................ 772
ISRAEL. Book notices............. 786
  See also PALESTINE.
Jackson, W. Eric. Books of, noted.... 781
Janowitz, Morris. Books of, noticed..1067
JAPAN. Book notes.................1055
  Book notices...................1052
  Book reviews on: Reischauer, Edwin O. *The United States and Japan*.....................1034
Jenks, William Alexander. Books of, noticed...................... 509
Jensen, Vernon H. Books of, noted... 773
Jesness, O. B. Books of, noticed...... 507
Johnson, Claudius O. Books of, noticed........................ 506
Johnson, D. Gale. Books of, noticed..1045
Johnson, Walter. Books of, reviewed 486
Jones, Helen L. Books of, noted...... 502
Jones, Howard Mumford. Books of, noticed...................... 514
Jones, Victor. Book notes........... 502
JUDICIARY. Kempner, Robert M. W. The Nuremberg Trials as Sources of Recent German Political and Historical Materials............ 447
  Book notes...............221, 222, 502
  Book notices.................505, 776
  Book reviews on: Frank, Jerome. *Courts on Trial*................ 201
  Freund, Paul A. *On Understanding the Supreme Court*.......... 494
  Wendell, Mitchell. *Relations Between the Federal and State Courts* 492
  See also ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, LEGAL THEORY AND INSTITUTIONS.
Judson, Margaret Atwood. Books of, noted........................ 802

Kallen, Horace M. Books of, reviewed.1026
Kallenbach, Joseph E. Book notes... 773
Kapp, K. William. Books of, noticed.. 805
Kase, Toshikazu. Books of, noted....1055
Keeney, Barnaby C. Books of, noted. 222
Keeton, George W. Books of, reviewed 208
Kempner, Robert M. W. The Nuremberg Trials as Sources of Recent German Political and Historical Materials..................... 447
Kershaw, Joseph A. Book reviews....1014
Key, V. O., Jr. Book reviews........ 198
  Books of, reviewed............... 192
Kimmel, Lewis H. Books of, noticed..1045
King, James E. Books of, noted .1028, 1066

King, Spencer B., Jr. Books of, noted. 220
King, William Joseph. Books of, reviewed........1028
Kingsley, J. Donald. Books of, noticed........1043
Kirchmann, J. H. von. Books of, noticed........1081
Kirkpatrick, Evron M. Books of, noticed........776
Knappen, Marshall. Shipping Quotas and the Military Assistance Program........933
Knappstein, K. H. Books of, noticed..1074
Koestler, Arthur. Books of, reviewed. 213
KOREA. Book reviews on: McCune, George A. *Korea Today*........1031
Kraus, Wolfgang H. Recent Foreign Books........1072
  Book notes........507
Kremser, Rudolf. Books of, noticed..1079

Labatut, Jean. Books of, noted......1040
LABOR. Burns, James MacGregor. The Parliamentary Labor Party in Great Britain........855
  Book notes.230, 231, 503, 773, 1042, 1050
  Book reviews on: Alinsky, Saul. *John L. Lewis*........1019
    Galenson, Walter. *Labor in Norway*........206
    McGinley, James J. *Labor Relations in the New York Rapid Transit Systems, 1904–1944*.....1021
Lancaster, Lane W. Books of, noticed........506, 1043
Lane, Wheaton J. Books of, noted.....1040
Larsen, Christian L. Book notes..... 220
Laski, Harold J. Books of, noted..... 230
Lasswell, Harold D. The Semantics of Political Science: Discussion.... 422
  Books of, noticed........804
Latham, R. T. E. Books of, noticed.. 508
LATIN AMERICA. Crawford, W. Rex. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America. Discussion: A Sociologist's Point of View........143
    Fitzgibbon, Russell H. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Political Scientist's Point of View........118
    Mosk, Sanford A. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: An Economist's Point of View...... 129
    Pierson, W. W. (ed.). Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Symposium........100
    Whitaker, Arthur P. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Historian's Point of View....... 101
  Book notes........223
  Book notices........512
  Book reviews on: Macdonald, Austin F. *Latin American Politics and Government*........215
Lattimore, Owen. Books of, noticed..1045
Laun, Rudolf. Books of, noted...... 224
Lawson, Ruth C. Books of, noticed.. 511
Leahy, William D. Books of, reviewed........1035
Le Boutillier, Cornelia G. Books of, reviewed........482
LEGAL THEORY AND INSTITUTIONS.
  Book notes........224, 803
  Book notices........1081
  Book reviews on: Hurst, James W. *The Growth of American Law*....1022
    Simpson, Sidney Post and Stone, Julius. *Cases and Readings on Law and Society*........473
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS. Humphrey, Hubert H. The Senate on Trial.. 650
    Knappen, Marshall. Shipping Quotas and the Military Assistance Program........933
    Maass, Arthur A. Congress and Water Resources........576
    Prendergast, William B. State Legislatures and Communism: The Current Scene........556
  Book notes........1039
  Book notices........1045
  Book reviews on: Bailey, Stephen Kemp. *Congress Makes A Law*... 468
    Bentley, Arthur F. *The Process of Government*........742
Leimbach, Werner. Books of, noticed.1075
Leiserson, Avery. Book notes........ 230
Lenczowski, George. Books of, noted. 510
Lepawsky, Albert. Water Resources and American Federalism...... 631
  Books of, reviewed........200
Lerner, Daniel. Books of, reviewed... 760
Levack, Paul. Books of, noted....... 513
Levinson, Daniel J. Books of, reviewed........1005
Lewis, Edward G. Book reviews..... 209
Lewis, Evan L. Books of, reviewed... 480
Lewis, John D. Book reviews........1026

Liddell, Helen. Books of, noticed..... 509
Lindsay, Michael. Books of, noticed.. 786
Linton, Ralph. Books of, reviewed... 214
Loewenstein, Karl. Books of, noticed. 1075
Long, Norton E. Book notes........ 772
Lord, Clifford L. Books of, noticed... 1045
Luedde, W. Books of, noticed....... 1075
Lundberg, George A. The Semantics of Political Science: Discussion.... 414
Lynde, Cornelius. Books of, noted.... 771

Maass, Arthur A. Congress and Water Resources.................... 576
McCamy, James L. Books of, noted.. 503
McCandless, Carl A. Books of, noted. 501
McCarthy, Philip J. Books of, reviewed..................... 459
McConaughy, John B. Certain Personality Factors of State Legislators in South Carolina......... 897
McCoy, Charles N. R. The Turning-Point in Political Philosophy.... 678
McCune, George M. Books of, reviewed..................... 1031
Macdonald, Austin F. Books of, noticed........................ 506
  Books of, reviewed............. 215
McDonald, Neil A. Books of, reviewed 476
McGinley, James J. Books of, reviewed..................... 1021
McHenry, Dean E. Books of, noticed. 505, 776, 1043
MacIver, R. M. Books of, reviewed.. 478
McKinley, Charles. The Valley Authority and Its Alternatives..... 607
MacNamara, Donal E. J. Book notes. 218
McRee, Griffith J. Books of, noted... 221
Magil, A. B. Books of, noticed....... 786
Mangoldt, Hermann v. Books of, noted 224
Mansfield, Harvey C. Book reviews.. 1011
Maritain, Jacques. The Concept of Sovereignty.................. 343
Markel, Lester. Books of, reviewed... 212
Marks, Eli S. Books of, reviewed.... 459
Marx, Fritz Morstein, Schattschneider, E. E., *et al. Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*.... .... Supplement
Masland, John W. Books of, noticed.. 786
Mason, Alpheus T. Business Organized as Power: The New Imperium in Imperio..................... 323
  Book reviews.................. 494
  Books of, noted................. 229

Masters, D. C. Books of, noted...... 1050
Mayda, Jaroslav. Book notes....... 1054
Mayer, J. P. Books of, noted........ 1065
Meier, Norman C. Books of, reviewed. 459
Meinecke, Friedrich. Books of, reviewed..................... 1029
Meisel, James H. Books of, noticed... 509
Meltzer, Louis. Books of, noticed.... 1067
Messer, Mary Burt. Books of, noticed. 1067
METHODOLOGY. McConaughy, John B. Certain Personality Factors of State Legislators in South Carolina......................... 897
  Perry, Charner. The Semantics of Political Science........... 394
  Spengler, J. J. Generalists Versus Specialists in Social Science: An Economist's View............. 358
  Book notices.................... 1081
  Book reviews on: Meier, Norman C. and Saunders, Harold W. (eds.). *The Polls and Public Opinion*.... 459
  Mosteller, Frederick, *et al. The Pre-Election Polls of 1948*....... 459
  See also RESEARCH.
Metz, Harold. Books of, reviewed.... 480
Meyer, Ernst Wilhelm. Books of, noted......................... 803
Miksch, Leonard. Books of, noticed.. 1075
Mills, Lennox A. Books of, reviewed. 763
Moley, Raymond. Books of, noted... 501
Monroney, A. S. Mike. Books of, noticed......................... 505
Moos, Malcolm C. Books of, reviewed 199
Morgenthau, Hans J. The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions............ 833
Morton, W. L. Books of, noted...... 1050
Mosely, Philip E. Book notes........ 795
Mosher, William E. Books of, noticed. 1043
Mosk, Sanford A. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: An Economist's Point of View...... 129
Mosteller, Frederick. Books of, reviewed...................... 459
Mott, Rodney L. Book reviews...... 492
Mund, Vernon A. Books of, noted.... 1042
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. Book notes. 218, 500
  Book notices.................. 1044

Nash, Bradley D. Books of, noted.... 771
NATURAL RESOURCES. Fesler, James W.

(ed.). Government and Water Resources: A Symposium....... 575
Lepawsky, Albert. Water Resources and American Federalism 631
Maass, Arthur A. Congress and Water Resources.............. 576
McKinley, Charles. The Valley Authority and Its Alternatives.. 607
White, Gilbert F. National Executive Organization for Water Resources...................... 593
Nawiasky, H. Books of, noticed......1075
Neale, J. E. Books of, noticed....... 508
Nemzer, Louis. The Kremlin's Professional Staff: The "Apparatus" of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union 64
Neuman, William L. Books of, noticed 510
Niemeyer, Gerhart. Book notes...... 794
Nilsson, Sten S. Books of, noticed....1081
Nolting, Orin F. Books of, noticed....1044
NORWAY. Book reviews on: Galenson, Walter. *Labor in Norway*...... 206

Odegard, Peter. Book reviews....... 459
Ogburn, William Fielding. Books of, noted....................... 227
Ogg, Frederic A. Books of, noticed... 776
  Books of, reviewed............. 209
Oppenheim, Felix. Relativism, Absolutism, and Democracy........ 951
Oppler, Kurt. Books of, noticed......1075
Orton, William A. Books of, reviewed.1010
Overacker, Louise. Book reviews.... 764
Owen, Wilfred. Books of, reviewed... 488

Padelford, Norman J. Book notes.... 791
  Books of, noticed............... 510
PAKISTAN. Book notices............ 509
PALESTINE. Book reviews on: Koestler, Arthur. *Promise and Fulfilment*.. 213
  See also ISRAEL.
Park, Richard L. Book reviews...... 207
Parks, E. T. Note on Research in Department of State Records......1056
Parks, Joseph Howard. Books of, noticed....................... 775
Parmalee, Maurice. Books of, noticed. 796
Parten, Mildred B. Books of, noted.. 772
Peaslee, Amos J. Books of, noted.....1051
Peck, Gustav. Book reviews.........1019
Peitzsch, Frederick C. Books of, noticed.......................1044
Pennock, J. Roland. Book reviews... 196
Perkins, Howard C. Book notes..... 504
Perloff, Harvey S. Books of, noted... 774
Perry, Charner. The Semantics of Political Science.............. 394
Peters, Hans. Books of, noticed......1075
Pettee, George S. Book reviews...... 748
Pierson, W. W. (ed.). Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Symposium.................. 100
Pinkham, Spencer. Books of, noticed.. 776
Piquet, Howard S. Book notes.......1055
Plischke, Elmer. Books of, noted..... 774
  Books of, noticed................1043
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. Heard, Alexander. Interviewing Southern Politicians.................... 886
McConaughy, John B. Certain Personality Factors of State Legislators in South Carolina........ 897
Seligman, Lester G. The Study of Political Leadership........... 904
  Book reviews on: Adorno, T. W., *et al. The Authoritarian Personality*..........................1005
POLITICAL PARTIES. Arneson, Ben A. and Eells, William H. Voting Behavior in 1948 as Compared with 1924 in a Typical Ohio Community...................... 432
Burns, James MacGregor. The Parliamentary Labor Party in Great Britain.................. 855
Heard, Alexander. Interviewing Southern Politicians............ 886
Huntington, Samuel P. A Revised Theory of American Party Politics......................... 669
Irion, Frederick C. Public Opinion Research—An Opportunity for Political Parties............ 916
McConaughy, John B. Certain Personality Factors of State Legislators in South Carolina........ 897
Schattschneider, E. E., Marx, Fritz Morstein, *et al. Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*...................Supplement
Seligman, Lester G. The Study of Political Leadership........... 904
Silva, Ruth C. The Lodge-Gossett Resolution: A Critical Analysis... 86
Woodward, Julian L. and Roper, Elmo. Political Activity of American Citizens................. 872

Book notes..........219, 499, 507, 1050
Book notices................506, 1044
Book reviews on: Bentley, Arthur F. *The Process of Government*....... 742
Key, V. O., Jr. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*............... 192
Meier, Norman C. and Saunders, Harold W. (eds.). *The Polls and Public Opinion*............... 459
Mosteller, Frederick, *et al. The Pre-Election Polls of 1948*....... 459
Rossi, Angelo. *A Communist Party in Action*................... 470
Stedman, Murray S., Jr., and Susan W. *Discontent at the Polls*... 495
POLITICAL SCIENCE. Appleby, Paul H. Political Science, the Next Twenty-Five Years............ 924
Fellman, David. Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science......... 689
Fitzgibbon, Russell H. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Political Scientist's Point of View....................... 118
Perry, Charner. The Semantics of Political Science.................. 394
Thorelli, Sarah Scott. Political Science in Sweden.............. 977
Wright, Quincy. Political Science and World Stabilization........ 1
Book notes...................... 803
POLITICAL THEORY. Appleby, Paul H. Political Science, the Next Twenty-Five Years............. 924
Barker, Ernest. British Ideas of a Social Parliament.............. 14
McCoy, Charles N. R. The Turning-Point in Political Philosophy 678
Maritain, Jacques. The Concept of Sovereignty................ 343
Morgenthau, Hans J. The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions............ 833
Oppenheim, Felix. Relativism, Absolutism, and Democracy..... 951
Potter, Pitman B. The Logic of International Relations and Organization.................. 661
Wright, Quincy. Political Science and World Stabilization........ 1
Book notes..........222, 228, 229, 230, ...231, 512, 513, 802, 1065, 1066
Book notices....513, 514, 804, 805, 1045, ...1067, 1076, 1081, 1082
Book reviews on: Bestor, Arthur Eugene, Jr. *Backwoods Utopias*...1006
Boyd, Julian P. (ed.). *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*............ 753
Burnham, James. *The Coming Defeat of Communism*........... 748
Butts, R. F. *The American Tradition in Religion and Education*...1024
Earle, Edward Mead (ed.). *Nationalism and Internationalism*... 761
Elliott, William Y. and McDonald, Neil A. *Western Political Heritage*..................... 476
Gough, J. W. *John Locke's Political Philosophy*................. 767
Hunt, R. N. Carew. *The Theory and Practice of Communism*..... 748
Kallen, Horace M. *The Education of Free Men*..................1026
King, William J. *Moral Aspects of Dishonesty in Public Office*.......1028
Le Boutillier, Cornelia G. *American Democracy and Natural Law* . 482
Lewis, Evan L. *The Individual and Society*....................... 480
MacIver, R. M. *The Ramparts We Guard*.................... 478
Metz, Harold and Thompson, C. A. H. *Authoritarianism and the Individual*.................... 480
Russell, Bertrand. *Authority and the Individual*................. 203
Simpson, Sidney Post and Stone, Julius. *Cases and Readings on Law and Society*.............. 473
Stapleton, Laurence. *The Design of Democracy*................. 478
Wittke, Carl. *The Utopian Communist*........................1006
Pollard, Robert S. W. Books of, noted. 782
Pollock, James K. Books of, noticed.. 509
Pontius, Dale. Book notes..........1055
Possony, Stefan T. Books of, noted.... 791
Potter, Pitman B. The Logic of International Relations and Organization......................... 661
Powell, Alden L. Book notes........ 502
Prélot, Marcel. Books of, noticed.....1081
Prendergast, William B. State Legislatures and Communism: The Current Scene.................... 556
PRESS. Book notes................ 504

  Book notices............510, 512, 1074
    See also PUBLIC OPINION.
Pritchett, C. Herman. Book reviews.. 756
PSYCHOLOGY. McConaughy, John B. Certain Personality Factors of State Legislators in South Carolina........................ 897
  Book reviews on: Adorno, T. W., *et al. The Authoritarian Personality*..1005
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. Esman, Milton J. Administrative Stability and Change.................. 942
    Fesler, James W. (ed.). Government and Water Resources: A Symposium.................. 575
    Lepawsky, Albert. Water Resources and American Federalism. 631
    Maass, Arthur A. Congress and Water Resources............... 576
    McKinley, Charles. The Valley Authority and Its Alternatives... 607
    Redford, E. S. The Value of the Hoover Commission Reports to the Educator................. 283
    White, Gilbert F. National Executive Organization for Water Resources...................... 593
  Book notes..216, 217, 220, 221, 499, 501, ...502, 771, 1040, 1041, 1049
  Book notices...505, 506, 775, 1043, 1044, ...1045, 1075, 1076
  Book reviews on: Bach, G. L. *Federal Reserve Policy-Making*......1016
    Bauer, John. *Transforming Public Utility Regulation*..............1017
    Hyneman, Charles S. *Bureaucracy in a Democracy*............... 990
    Lepawsky, Albert. *Administration* 200
    Somers, Herman Miles. *Presidential Agency OWMR*..........1011
    Thompson, Victor A. *The Regulatory Process in OPA Rationing*...1014
PUBLIC OPINION. Arneson, Ben A. and Eells, William H. Voting Behavior in 1948 as Compared with 1924 in a Typical Ohio Community..... 432
    Irion, Frederick C. Public Opinion Research—An Opportunity for Political Parties............... 916
    Woodward, Julian L. and Roper, Elmo. Political Activity of American Citizens................. 872
  Book notes..............504, 772, 1041
  Book notices.................... ....512, 776, 804, 1044, 1067, 1074
  Book reviews on: Almond, Gabriel A. *The American People and Foreign Policy*................ 757
    Bentley, Arthur F. *The Process of Government*.................. 742
    Markel, Lester, *et al. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*.......... 212
    Meier, Norman C. and Saunders, Harold W. (eds.). *The Polls and Public Opinion*.............. 459
    Mosteller, Frederick, *et al. The Pre-Election Polls of 1948*....... 459
    Stedman, Murray S., Jr., and Susan W. *Discontent at the Polls*... 495
PUBLIC REGULATION. Mason, Alpheus T. *Business Organized as Power: The New Imperium in Imperio*... 323
  Book notes.....................1042
  Book notices................... 507
  Book reviews on: Bauer, John. *Transforming Public Utility Regulation*........................1017
    Thompson, Victor A. *The Regulatory Process in OPA Rationing*...1014
PUERTO RICO. Book notes........... 774

Quigley, Harold S. Book reviews.....1034

RACE RELATIONS. Book notes........ 231
Radin, Max. The Semantics of Political Science: Discussion.......... 411
Rauch, Basil. Books of, noted....... 793
Ray, Joseph M. Book notes......499, 500
Ray, P. Orman. Books of, noticed.... 776
Redford, Emmette S. Articles and Documents....................1045
    The Value of the Hoover Commission Reports to the Educator.... 283
  Book notes..................... 771
Reibstein, Ernst. Books of, noted.... 512
Reischauer, Edwin O. Books of, reviewed.......................1034
Reitzel, William. Book reviews....... 213
RESEARCH. Appleby, Paul H. Political Science, the Next Twenty-Five Years...................... 924
    Fellman, David. Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science.... 689
    Heard, Alexander. Interviewing Southern Politicians............ 886
    Huntington, Samuel P. A Revised Theory of American Party Poli-

tics 669
Irion, Frederick C. Public Opinion Research—An Opportunity for Political Parties 916
McConaughy, John B. Certain Personality Factors of State Legislators in South Carolina 897
Parks, E. T. Note on Research in Department of State Records 1056
Seligman, Lester G. The Study of Political Leadership 904
Woodward, Julian L. and Roper, Elmo. Political Activity of American Citizens 872
Book notes 503
Book notices 1044, 1052
See also BIBLIOGRAPHY, METHODOLOGY.
Rice, Stuart A. Generalists Versus Specialists in Social Science: Discussion 380
Richards, Allan R. Book notes 1042
Ridley, Clarence E. Books of, noticed . 1044
Ringelmann, R. Books of, noticed 1076
Robbins, James J. Book notes 784
Book reviews 765
Roberts, Owen J. Books of, noticed 1056
Robson, C. B. Book notes 803
Robson, William A. Nationalised Industries in Britain and France . . . 299
Roosevelt, Eleanor. Books of, reviewed 496
Roper, Elmo and Woodward, Julian L. Political Activity of American Citizens 872
Rosenman, Samuel I. Books of, reviewed 756
Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen. Books of, noticed 514
Rosenthal-Pelldram, Erich. Books of, noticed 1075
Rosow, Jerome M. Books of, noted . . . 221
Rossi, Angelo. Books of, reviewed 470
Russell, Bertrand. Books of, reviewed . 203
RUSSIA. Fainsod, Merle. Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System . . . 266
Nemzer, Louis. The Kremlin's Professional Staff: The "Apparatus" of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union 64
Book notes 510, 783, 784, 795
Book notices 509, 796, 1052, 1073, 1075, 1076
Book reviews on: Smith, Walter Bedell. *My Three Years in Moscow* 484
Stettinius, Edward R., Jr. and Johnson, Walter (ed.). *Roosevelt and the Russians* 486

Sabine, George H. Books of, noticed . . . 804
Saenger, F. Books of, noticed 1074
Sandler, Åke. Book notes 1051
Sanford, R. Nevitt. Books of, reviewed 1005
Sauer, Wilhelm. Books of, noticed 1081
Saunders, Harold W. Books of, reviewed 459
SCANDINAVIA. Book notes 1051
Book reviews on: Scott, Franklin D. *The United States and Scandinavia* 765
See also SWEDEN.
Schattschneider, E. E., Marx, Fritz Morstein, *et al. Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System* . . . . Supplement
Schmidt, John F. Books of, noticed 1056
Schmidt, Paul. Books of, noticed 1079
Schmoller, Gustav von. Books of, noticed 1079
Schoch, M. Magdalena. Book notes . . . 224
Schwartz, Bernard. Books of, reviewed 196
Schwartz, Harry. Book notes 784
Scott, Franklin D. Books of, reviewed . 765
Scott, Mel. Books of, noted 502
Seckler-Hudson, Cathryn. Books of, noted 221
Secretary of Commerce. Books of, reviewed 488
Secretary-General, United Nations. Books of, noticed 511
Seldes, George. Books of, noticed 512
Seligman, Lester G. The Study of Political Leadership 904
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Books of, noted 793
Shannon, Jasper B. Book notes 771
Books of, reviewed 483
Sharp, Samuel L. Books of, noticed 1052
Sicard, Roger and Abbott, Roger S. A Postwar Development in French Regional Government: The "*Super Préfet*" 426
Siepmann, Charles A. Books of, noted . 1041
Sikes, Pressly S. Books of, noticed 507
Silva, Ruth C. The Lodge-Gossett Resolution: A Critical Analysis . . 86
Simon, Herbert A. Articles and Docu-

ments........................1070
  The Semantics of Political Science: Discussion............... 407
Simpson, Sidney Post. Books of, reviewed....................... 473
Skilling, H. Gordon. Book notes.....1050
Smead, Elmer E. Book notes.........1041
Smith, Bruce. Books of, noted....... 218
Smith, Walter Bedell. Books of, reviewed....................... 484
Smith, Wilbur S. Books of, noted....1040
Social Sciences Staff, University of Chicago. Books of, noted........ 229
SOCIALISM. Book notices............1072
  Book reviews on: Bestor, Arthur Eugene, Jr. *Backwoods Utopias*...1006
  Wittke, Carl. *The Utopian Communist*......................1006
SOCIOLOGY. Crawford, W. Rex. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America. Discussion: A Sociologist's Point of View................. 143
  Book notes...................... 231
  Book notices................805, 1076
  Book reviews on: Bogue, Don J. *The Structure of the Metropolitan Community*................... 218
Sohn, Louis B. Books of, noted...... 794
Somers, Herman Miles. Books of, reviewed......................1011
Sorokin, Pitirim A. Books of, noticed. 509
Spain, August O. Book reviews. . 480
Spear, Percival. Books of, noticed.... 509
Spencer, Joseph E. Books of, noticed. 786
Spengler, J. J. Generalists Versus Specialists in Social Science: An Economist's View.............. 358
Spero, Sterling D. Book reviews.....1021
Spitz, David. Book reviews.......... 478
Stahl, O. Glenn. Books of, noticed.....1043
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. McConaughy, John B. Certain Personality Factors of State Legislators in South Carolina.......... 897
  Prendergast, William B. State Legislatures and Communism: The Current Scene............. 556
  Books notes.218, 219, 220, 501, 502, 1040
  Book notices........505, 506, 507, 1044
  See also MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.
Stedman, Murray S., Jr. Books of, reviewed....................... 495
Stedman, Susan W. Books of, reviewed....................... 495
Stefansson, Vilhjalmur. Books of, noted......................... 227
Steiner, H. Arthur. Chinese Communist Urban Policy........... 47
  Book notes...................... 222
  Book reviews.................... 761
Steiniger, Alfons. Books of, noticed...1081
Steltzer, Theodor. Books of, noticed..1076
Stephan, Werner. Books of, noticed...1076
Stettinius, Edward R., Jr. Books of, reviewed...................... 486
Stewart, Michael. Books of, noticed.. 785
Stickney, William. Books of, noted... 221
Still, Rae Files. Books of, noted......1039
Stone, Julius. Books of, reviewed..... 473
Stoner, John E. Books of, noticed.... 507
Strauss, Leo. Book reviews.......... 767
Strausz-Hupé, Robert. Book reviews.. 757
  Books of, noted.................. 791
Streit, Clarence K. Books of, noticed.1056
Strong, Donald S. Book notes....... 231
Stuart, Graham H. Books of, reviewed...................... 194
Suchodolski, Bogdan. Books of, noticed......................... 509
Swart, K. W. Books of, noticed...... 508
SWEDEN. Thorelli, Sarah Scott. Political Science in Sweden........... 977
  Book notes...................... 784
Swift, Stephen K. Books of, noticed.. 509
Swisher, Carl Brent. Book notes..... 221
SWITZERLAND. Book notes........... 512

Taylor, George E. Book reviews.....1031
Taylor, Philip H. Book reviews...... 763
Teggart, Frederick J. Books of, noticed......................... 514
Tejada, Francisco Elias de. Books of, noticed......................1082
Teng, Ssu-yu. Books of, noted...... 784
Theimer, Walter. Books of, noticed... 786
Thompson, C. A. H. Books of, reviewed....................... 480
Thompson, Ronald. Books of, noted... 783
Thompson, Victor A. Books of, reviewed.......................1014
Thorelli, Sarah Scott. Political Science in Sweden..................... 977
Tiller, Carl W. Book notes.......... 220
Tompkins, Dorothy Campbell. Books of, noticed.................... 776
Tompkins, Pauline. Books of, noticed. 796
Travis, Martin B., Jr. Articles and Documents..................1059

Traynor, Dean E. Books of, noticed.. 510
Trehartha, Glenn T. Books of, noticed.......................... 786
Truman, David B. Books of, reviewed. 459
Tuerk, Fritz. Books of, noticed......1076
Turnbull, Archibald D. Books of, noticed..........................1045
Turner, Robert K. Books of, noted... 227

UNESCO. Books of, noticed.......... 514
UNITED NATIONS. Book notes........ 225
  Book notices................511, 1056
  Books of, noticed................ 511
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. Knappen, Marshall. Shipping Quotas and the Military Assistance Program........................ 933
    Morgenthau, Hans J. The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions............ 833
  Book notes..........223, 227, 774, 793
  Book notices.................511, 512
  Book reviews on: Almond, Gabriel A. *The American People and Foreign Policy*................. 757
    Campbell, John C., *et al. The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949*................... 211
    Markel, Lester, *et al. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*...... 212
    Reischauer, Edwin O. *The United States and Japan*...............1034
    Scott, Franklin D. *The United States and Scandinavia*............... 765
UNITED STATES NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS. Fesler, James W. (ed.). Government and Water Resources: A Symposium....... 575
    Humphrey, Hubert H. The Senate on Trial..................... 650
    Huntington, Samuel P. A Revised Theory of American Party Politics 669
    Lepawsky, Albert. Water Resources and American Federalism. 631
    Maass, Arthur A. Congress and Water Resources.............. 576
    McKinley, Charles. The Valley Authority and Its Alternatives... 607
    Mason, Alpheus T. Business Organized as Power: The New Imperium in Imperio............. 323
    White, Gilbert F. National Executive Organization for Water Resources...................... 593
  Book notes.....................
    .....221, 499, 501, 503, 504, 771, 772
  Book notices...................
    ....505, 507, 776, 804, 1043, 1045, 1075
  Book reviews on: Bailey, Stephen Kemp. *Congress Makes a Law*.... 468
    Binkley, Wilfred E. and Moos, Malcolm C. *A Grammar of American Politics*.................... 199
    Brownlow, Louis. *The President and the Presidency*............. 198
    Dearing, Charles L. and Owen, Wilfred. *National Transportation Policy*....................... 488
    Gold, Bela. *Wartime Economic Planning in Agriculture*......... 490
    Hyneman, Charles S. *Bureaucracy in a Democracy*................ 990
    Roosevelt, Eleanor. *This I Remember*...................... 496
    Rosenman, Samuel I. (ed.). *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*........... 756
    Secretary of Commerce. *Issues Involved in a Unified and Coordinated Federal Program for Transportation*......................... 488
    Somers, Herman Miles. *Presidential Agency OWMR*..........1011
    Stuart, Graham H. *The Department of State*.................. 194
    Thompson, Victor A. *The Regulatory Process in OPA Rationing*...1014

Valeo, Francis R. Book notes........ 784
Vanderbilt, Arthur T. Books of, noted. 502
Van Riper, Paul P. Book reviews... 1028
Vermeil, Edmund. Books of, noticed.. 509
Vieg, John A. Books of, noticed......1067
Vinacke, Harold M. Book reviews.... 208
Viner, Jacob. Books of, noted.......1055
Voigt, Lloyd L. Books of, noticed.... 505
Von Laue, Theodore H. Books of, noticed........................ 804

Waldo, Dwight. Book reviews....... 200
Ward, Robert E. Books of, noticed...1052
Weeks, O. Douglas. Book notes...... 219
Weidner, Edward W. Book notes.... 781
  Books of, noted................. 500
Weigert, Hans W. Books of, noted... 227
Wells, Henry. Book notes........... 774
Wendell, Mitchell. Books of, reviewed. 492

Wengert, Egbert S. Book notes......1039
Wengert, Norman. Book reviews..... 490
Westphal, Siegfried. Books of, noticed. 1076
Wheare, K. C. Is the British Commonwealth Withering Away?......... 545
Whitaker, Arthur P. Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Historian's Point of View....... 101
  Book reviews....................1037
White, Gilbert F. National Executive Organization for Water Resources........................ 593
White, Howard. Book notes......... 231
Wickwar, W. Hardy. Book notes..... 782
Wilcox, Robert F. Books of, noted... 502
Willbern, York. Book notes.........1039
Williamson, René de Visme. Book notes.......................... 231
  Books of, noted.................. 223
Wilson, Francis G. Articles and Documents.........................1067
  Generalists Versus Specialists in Social Science: Discussion....... 382
  Book reviews....................1010
Wiltse, Charles M. Book reviews..... 753
Witney, Fred. Books of, noted....... 503
Wittke, Carl. Books of, reviewed.....1006
Woodward, Julian L. and Roper, Elmo. Political Activity of American Citizens................... 872
Woolbert, Robert Gale. Book notes... 227
Wormuth, Francis D. Book notes. 222, 802
Wright, Quincy. Political Science and World Stabilization............ 1

Yang, E. Hsin Pao. Books of, noticed.. 775
Young, Eleanor. Books of, noticed... 775
Young, Louise M. Books of, noted... 772
YUGOSLAVIA. Book notices.......509, 786
Yves, Simon. Books of, noticed......1076

Zeller, Belle. Book reviews.......... 468
Zimmerman, Frederick L. Book notes. 216
Zimmern, Alfred. Books of, noticed... 775
Zink, Harold. The Growth of the *American Political Science Review*, 1926–1949................ 257
  Book notes...................... 225
  Books of, reviewed............... 209
Zinn, G. A. Books of, noticed........1076
Zucker, A. E. Books of, noticed...... 805
Zvegintzov, Michael. Books of, noticed........................ 509